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Preface
This thesis has been submitted in partial satisfaction of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at the Cardiff University Law School. The objective of this thesis is to 
examine the operation, impact and legal framework of reservations and vetoes, termed 
“exemptive provisions,” in marine conservation agreements. The need to improve ocean 
governance is manifest and this research is intended to help illuminate the path forward. 
This is a work of public international law but the key issues addressed in this thesis 
should be of interest to anyone concerned about marine conservation. English spelling in 
this thesis is American. Citation style is an adaptation of the seventeenth edition of the 
“The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation ” -  the benchmark for legal writing in the 
United States.'Because “The Bluebook” more typically applies to shorter works, some 
adaptations were made for ease and clarity. With regard to footnotes, each chapter is self- 
contained and independent of the others.
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Chapter 1
“Exemptive Provisions:” A Survey of the Issues in International Law
I. Introduction
Fish stocks are rapidly declining.1 Similarly, marine mammal species, whales in 
particular, have a tragic history of over-exploitation that exemplifies the mismanagement
1 See F o o d  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n iz a t io n ,  T h e  S t a t e  o f  W o r ld  F is h e r ie s  a n d  A q u a c u l t u r e  
(2002) [hereinafter SOFIA 2002], The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) o f  the United Nations 
(UN) publishes the SOFIA every two years. SOFIA reports are available online at 
http://www.fao.org/softsofia/index_en.htm.
An estimated 25 percent o f the major marine fish stocks or species 
groups for which information is available are underexploited or 
moderately exploited.. . About 47 percent o f  the main stocks or 
species groups are fully exploited and are therefore producing catches 
that have reached, or are very close to, their maximum sustainable 
limits. Thus, nearly half o f world marine stocks offer no reasonable 
expectations for further expansion. Another 18 percent o f stocks or 
species groups are reported as overexploited. Prospects for expansion 
or increased production from these stocks are negligible, and 
there is an increasing likelihood that stocks will decline further and 
catches will decrease, unless remedial management action is taken to 
reduce overfishing conditions. The remaining 10 percent o f  stocks have 
become significantly depleted, or are recovering from depletion and are 
far less productive than they used to be, or than they could be if  
management can return them to the higher abundance levels 
commensurate with their pre-depletion catch levels.
SOFIA 2002, supra  at Part 1, World Review o f  Fisheries and Aquaculture, Fisheries Resources: Trends in 
Production, Utilization and Trade. FAO website (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
http://www.fao.Org/docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm#P5_l 11. SOFIA 2004 reported similar results and 
trends. See F o o d  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n iz a t io n ,  T h e  S t a t e  o f  W o r ld  F is h e r ie s  a n d  
A q u a c u l t u r e  32 (2004) [hereinafter SOFIA 2004]. The fisheries statistics maintained by the FAO are 
probably the most reliable o f  any available. See also N a t i o n a l  R e s o u r c e s  D e f e n s e  C o u n c i l ,  H o o k , 
L in e a n d  S in k in g : T h e  C r is is  in M a r in e  F ish e r ie s  (1997). “ . . .  [W]e are reaching, and in many cases 
have exceeded, the oceans’ limits. Roughly 70 percent o f the world’s commercially important fish 
populations are now fully fished, overexploited, depleted or slowly recovering.” Id. at xi. For a scholarly 
overview reviewing certain aspects o f  the fishery crisis from legal and policy perspectives see Christopher 
J. Carr & Harry N. Scheiber, Dealing with a Resource Crisis: Regulatory Regimes fo r  Managing the 
W orld’s Marine Fisheries, 21 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 45 (2002).
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2of living marine resources. These dramatic declines are caused by a variety of factors 
including advances in harvesting technology, historically poor stewardship by extractive 
industries and environmental changes.
Even to the extent fishery practices, marine mammal conservation and 
management and trade in endangered species are regulated by competent international 
organizations, the effectiveness of these organizations is often undermined by a 
combination of external and internal challenges. In the case of fisheries in particular, the 
heart of the problem is a great over-capacity in the industrial fishing fleets pursuing these 
resources,3 many of which are subsidized by their governments.4
As the problems faced by conservation and management organizations are both 
manifest and severe, a more complex but no less compelling aspect of fishery practice 
needs to be considered. That is, what are the effects and limitations of treaty mechanisms 
that lawfully allow states to exempt themselves from conservation and management 
measures deemed desirable by a majority of other members of that organization?
2 See Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection o f  Whales in International Law: A Perspective fo r  the Next 
Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (1996); Anthony D ’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their 
Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 21 (1991). The International Convention for the Regulation o f  
Whaling governs the regulation o f  whaling activity today. See International Convention for the Regulation 
o f Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
ICRW], The ICRW established the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to implement the obligations 
o f the treaty. Id. at arts. III-VI. In 1982, largely owing to scientific uncertainly and poor population 
estimates, the IWC voted a moratorium on commercial whaling which was phased in totally by 1986. 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  W h a l in g  C o m m iss io n , T h ir ty -T h ir d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  W h a lin g  
C om m issio n  20-21 (1983). For further discussion o f the ICRW and the work o f  the IWC see chapter 2 
infra.
3 See SOFIA 2004, supra note 1, at 24-28 (discussing the over-capacity o f the world fishing fleet while 
recognizing some attempts to contain it); see also Ransome A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide 
Depletion o f  Predatory Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280 (May 15, 2003). Myers and Worm conclude 
that industrial fishing typically reduces biomass o f commercial fish communities by 80% within 15 years of  
exploitation activities. Id. They estimate that fishery biomass is presently at 10% o f  pre-industrial levels. Id. 
Additional scientific research documents the extent o f the overfishing crisis. See, e.g., Daniel Pauly and 
Reg Watson, Counting the Last Fish, 289 SCI. Am. 42 (July, 2003).
4 For a more complete discussion o f  the effects o f subsidies see infra text accompanying note 6.
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While the over-exploitation of marine resources is not new, the impact of this 
problem and the debate over how to address it will likely be a centerpiece of law and 
policy in the Twenty-First Century. The law of the sea, as a component of public 
international law, provides the most applicable framework governing the conservation 
and utilization of living marine resources. The law of the sea is therefore the appropriate 
context to begin the inquiry.
The evolution of the law of the sea as a domain of modem international law has 
witnessed a growing awareness of the importance of the marine ecosystem. The oceans 
are home to an incredible array of species large and small, fish and fowl, mammal and 
amphibian, graceful and inelegant. These species form intricate connections in a web of 
life that hold the fascination of scientists and poets alike. In fact, much of the potential of 
the oceans awaits scientific discovery. At the same time, the myriad dangers to marine 
species, especially commercially valuable species, threaten the potential of present and 
future generations to enjoy the oceans in their full bounty.
In response to these challenges, the countries of the world have developed a 
growing body of treaty law under the relatively new discipline of international 
environmental law as well as the more traditional pursuit of the law of the sea. These 
treaties range from large multilateral framework agreements to bilateral and regional 
species-specific fishery treaties. These treaties, which can be identified as marine 
conservation agreements, often broadly state objectives to preserve ecosystems, rebuild 
fish stocks and eliminate threats to biodiversity.
A key mechanism found in many marine conservation agreements is the creation 
of decision-making bodies under the treaty regime. These bodies, which typically take the
3
form of a conference of parties or a commission, are inter-govemmental in character and 
have the responsibility of implementing the objectives of the agreement under which they 
are established. Such bodies adopt measures on an ongoing basis that they deem 
necessary or desirable for those conservation and management purposes mandated by the 
treaty. Sadly, despite these valiant efforts, living marine resources continue to disappear 
and ecosystems remain threatened.
The challenges facing international law in its attempt to conserve marine 
resources are daunting. Among the most significant reasons most often attributed to the 
relative lack of success of these regimes is a general lack of political will on the part of 
states to adopt the necessary conservation measures, poor enforcement of such measures 
when they are adopted and “free riders.” That is, the inability of fishery regimes to bind 
non-member states and the inclination of some fishing vessels from non-member 
countries to exploit this by fishing these waters.5 Since free riders do not participate in the 
regimes’ conservation measures they are enjoying their benefits without sharing any of 
their sacrifices.
In addition, the extent to which certain fishing activities are subsidized by 
governments further strains effective fishery management. The problem of subsidies as a 
factor in encouraging overcapacity in fisheries has received growing attention and 
presents difficulties in both trade law and environmental law.6
5 See CHURCHILL &  L o w e , infra note 13, at 301-305. T o understand the problem  o f  free riders in the larger 
context o f  the lim itations o f  fish ery  reg im es see R ebecca Bratspies, Finessing King Neptune: Fisheries 
Management and the Limits o f  International Law, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 213 (2001).
6 The issue o f subsidies is problematic not just in commercial fisheries but also in the wider context of 
international trade law. With regard to the global environment generally, subsidies have long been 
considered a contributing factor to unsustainable policies. The Plan o f Implementation o f the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa from Aug. 26 to Sept. 4, 
2002, called for subsidies to be phased out where they inhibit sustainable development. WSSD, Plan of  
Implementation, III(20)(q), available at
4
Still another problem faced by marine conservation and management bodies, in 
the realm of fishing and whaling in particular, is the problem of illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing activities that further negatively impact cooperative efforts at
n
achieving sustainable fisheries.
A. Scope of Inquiry and Key Terminology
This thesis examines yet another aspect of the problem of marine conservation 
and management: the ability of nation-states to enter reservations to, and even veto, 
conservation measures that may arise within a marine conservation treaty. In this context, 
veto provisions and reservations respectively are those measures which by their 
application allow states to block (veto) or more often object to, and thereby exempt 
themselves from (reserve), conservation measures deemed desirable by other members of 
a marine conservation treaty regime. These provisions, when discussed together and 
without distinction, will herein be referred to generically as “exemptive provisions.”
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIChapter3.htm (visited May 31, 
2003). Notably, fishery subsidies in particular were highlighted as a topic o f  concern at the Doha 
Ministerial negotiations o f  the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Doha, Qatar from Nov. 9- 13, 
2001. See Peter Lichtenbaum, Reflections on the WTO Doha Ministerial: "Special Treatment" vs. "Equal 
Participation:" Striking a Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1035 (2002). 
The Doha Declaration specifically includes fishery subsidies in its treatment o f  subsidies generally. Doha 
Declaration, paras. 28, 31, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/minOl_e/mindecl_e.htm#tradeenvironment (last visited 
May, 30, 2003). In addition, the FAO International Plan o f Action for the Management o f  Fishing Capacity 
identifies subsidies as a cause o f  overcapacity and calls for them to be reduced and progressively 
eliminated. FAO International Plan o f  Action for the Management o f Fishing Capacity, Subsidies and 
Economic Incentives, at paras. 25 & 26, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/x3170e/x3170e04.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2004). For a scholarly discussion o f the impact o f  subsidies on fisheries see 
Christopher D. Stone, Too Many Fishing Boats, Too Few Fish: Can Trade Laws Trim Subsidies and 
Restore the Balance in G lobal Fisheries?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 505 (1997).
7 See KEVIN B r a y , Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing, in CURRENT FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE 
F o o d  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n iz a t io n  o f  t h e  U n ite d  N a t io n s  115-135 (Myron H. Nordquist & John 
Norton Moore eds., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000).
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The generic term “exemptive provisions,” is used to convey the concept of a class of
legal mechanisms which by their operation: 1) allow a state to exclude or modify terms of
a treaty (a general reservation); 2) prevent a conservation measure adopted under a treaty
regime from applying to a treaty member (a specific reservation), or; 3) block a measure
from coming into existence in the first instance (i.e., the proposed measure would be
“vetoed” and therefore not apply to any states within the regime.). The class of legal
mechanisms described here includes general treaty reservations, specific treaty
reservations and veto provisions. These mechanisms are more fully defined, and their
contours analyzed, in Section III. Admittedly, the use of the term “exemptive provisions”
is imperfect in that “exemption” does not technically convey the full scope of legal
activity contemplated herein. Consider the full definition of the verb “to exempt”:
ex*empt. . . ,  to take out: . . .  to free from a rule or obligation which applies 
to others; excuse, release -adj. not subject nor bound by a rule, obligation, etc. 
applying to others.8
In light of this definition the concepts of general and specific treaty reservations 
may properly be thought of as “exempting” a state from obligations accruing to other 
members within the regime. On the other hand, veto provisions, to be precise, do not 
“exempt” a state from an obligation but rather nullify it in full as to all parties. However, 
because of the difficulty in adopting new and effective terminology, for the purpose of 
this inquiry, the term “exemptive provisions” will be applied to general and specific 
treaty reservations as well as veto provisions collectively. As an additional matter of 
nomenclature, the suffix “ive” is rarely added to the root “exempt” in popular usage. In
8 W e b s t e r ’s N e w  W o r ld  D ic t i o n a r y  490 (2d. col. ed., New York: Simon &Schuster, 1982).
6
legal and legislative usage, however, the word “exemptive” is sometimes used as an 
adjective.9
By way of defining the scope of inquiry, no significant discussion of what are 
referred to as unilateral “declarations” or “statements of understanding” is undertaken in 
this thesis. This is not to minimize their potential or perceived importance within certain 
regimes. However, as they are not designed to have direct legal (in other words 
exemptive) effect within a treaty regime, a comprehensive analysis of their role will be 
left for future scholarly study. As will be noted in Section 111(A)(4) of this chapter, it is 
sometimes difficult to conclusively determine whether or not unilateral declarations or 
statements of understanding do indeed have some legal effect. Therefore, while they will 
not be a central focus, they will occasionally be referred to for contrast, background or 
definitional purposes.
To note an additional parameter, there will be no meaningful examination of 
treaty practices that do not relate directly to conservation objectives. For example, in 
those regimes requiring unanimous consent for the adoption of resolutions, there will be 
no substantial discussion of resolutions not applying directly to the management of living 
resources (e.g., procedural matters). In all cases, however, an effort was made to examine 
treaty practices from a maximally informed perspective.
In the case of certain regimes, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and 
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) in particular, where heavy use of 
the objection procedure was observed, the discussion focuses on the aggregate practices 
and trends, offering certain key examples, as opposed to an exhaustive analysis of each
9 See, e.g., General Exemptive Authority, Security Exchange Act o f  1934, Pub. L. No. 104-290, Sec. 36,
110 Stat. 3424 (1934) (emphasis added); Requests for Exemptive, No-Action and Interpretive Letters, 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 140.99 (1999) (emphasis added).
measure, in each year, as they apply to each species. Should the reader wish to access 
more specific, or differently circumscribed, information, for example, with regard to 
exemptive provisions applying to particular species, all references to treaty activity are 
documented for this purpose.
Reservations to multilateral treaties, in the form they exist today, do not have a 
particularly long history. Even so, the reservation has generated not only a corpus of law 
and policy guiding its usage but also a considerable body of high-quality literature 
examining its legal, practical and philosophical benefits and limitations. The veto, as an 
instrument of international law, has received much less attention, especially in the context 
of the law of the sea and international environmental law. This is surprising considering 
so many important fishery regimes adopt decisions by unanimous voting. So, too, has the 
modem practice of the “specific reservation,” (a term found in CITES and CMS) or 
exemption from a single measure adopted by a regime, largely been ignored by scholars. 
In light of this, the curious observer must ask to what extent does the significant law, 
policy and scholarship with regard to general treaty reservations apply to all other 
exemptive provisions as they are practiced in the world today? This question becomes 
even more confusing when one considers that the general reservation, that is, a 
reservation directed to a treaty provision at the time of accession by a state, is by itself 
not a major factor in current marine resources treaties. Conversely, the other forms of 
exemptive provisions, the specific reservation in particular, are observed with increasing 
frequency.
To what extent are exemptive provisions present in marine conservation 
agreements? As this thesis will demonstrate, they are ubiquitous. The vast majority of
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conservation and fishery agreements adopt some form of an objection procedure, 
consensus or unanimous voting, or some combination of them. Conservation and 
management bodies utilizing simple majority voting and offering members no possibility 
to object to measures adopted, are extremely rare.
The utilization of exemptive provisions is by no means limited to the 
environmental context. On the other hand, the exigencies of vanishing marine resources 
and the important objective of conservation treaties warrant a special scrutiny for the 
practice within those regimes serving as a line of defense against commercial collapse 
and even ecological disaster. This scrutiny is necessary to evaluate existing law and 
policy and to better prepare for the future challenges of the stewardship of our precious 
marine resources.
The particular mechanisms available to states to block or exempt themselves from 
obligations within a treaty regime are the subject of the first chapter of this thesis. The 
remaining chapters will examine the application of these mechanisms in a regime-by- 
regime analysis and discuss possible limitations on their use imposed by other obligations 
of international law. This thesis is neither a complete study of the use of exemptive 
provisions in international law, nor a comprehensive review of marine conservation 
regimes in general. It is, however, an analysis of these provisions, their impact and 
limitations, in the context of marine conservation agreements.
The scope of the term “marine conservation agreement” likewise requires some 
explanation. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “marine conservation agreements” 
means those multilateral international agreements that attempt to conserve or manage 
living marine resources. Marine pollution treaties, therefore, are not evaluated. “Living
9
marine resources” obviously refers to a range of aquatic species but most commonly 
commercial fish stocks and mammalian species. The agreements analyzed include those 
focusing upon conservation, utilization or both for a specific species or region. In 
addition, it includes those agreements that directly address the status of living marine 
resources and more general wildlife agreements such as the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).10 Certain other 
agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention)11 
that attempt broader conservation objectives and do not contain an exemptive provision 
are discussed only briefly.
In most cases, however, this thesis will focus upon regional fishery or marine 
mammal agreements that more often than not apply to the high seas and transboundary 
resources (that is, those occurring in more than one maritime zone). Therefore, because a 
large concentration of commercially valuable fish stocks occur within national waters, an 
analysis of international legal regimes must necessarily concentrate on a minority of the 
world’s fisheries. Perhaps this fact by itself underscores a limitation of existing 
conservation and management efforts. Nevertheless, the next section will develop the 
rationale for, and evolution of, the relevant maritime zones, including the high seas, and 
the rights and responsibilities states enjoy in them.
10 See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f  Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 13, 1973, 
27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES]. As o f June 2006 
there were 169 parties to CITES.
11 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/130/7, reprinted 
in, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention], The 
Biodiversity Convention was one o f  the achievements of the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), also referred to as the “Earth Summit I” or “Rio Conference.” 
The Biodiversity Convention mandates member states to preserve biological diversity in its various forms. 
As o f  June 2006 there were 188 parties to the Biodiversity Convention not including its Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety.
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B. Thesis Objective and Questions to be Analyzed
The overall objective of this thesis is to examine the application of exemptive
provisions in marine conservation agreements from the perspective of public international
law. Scholars have raised exemptive provisions and their impact as a limiting factor in
10marine conservation and management regimes. Yet, this claim appears never to be been 
empirically tested. This thesis attempts to do so. In addition, this thesis examines whether 
there are general norms in international law that would restrict the use of specific 
reservations and vetoes.
As the role of reservations and vetoes in marine conservation agreements remains 
largely unexplored by scholars, the author recognizes and accepts that different 
disciplines could be used to scrutinize these important questions. At the same time, the 
treaty reservation is squarely within the domain of public international law and it is from 
that discipline that this analysis proceeds.
This thesis undertakes to analyze several key questions in relation to the law and 
policy of exemptive provisions. How effective are treaty regimes that utilize exemptive 
provisions and are they a factor in their effectiveness? Are such provisions necessary to 
attract states that would otherwise have little incentive to participate in an important 
conservation agreement? Do these provisions necessarily undercut the object and purpose 
of a carefully crafted management program? Do exemptive provisions lead to more 
disputes within a regime? Is there a workable compromise between the greater
12 See infra text accompanying notes 173-174.
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participation allowed by exemptive provisions, on the one hand, and the potential of these 
provisions to limit effective conservation on the other? Can the inclusion of certain 
exemptive provisions satisfy the needs of states that wish to avail themselves of them 
while preserving the quality of a conservation measure? Finally, are there legal 
obligations in the applicable framework agreements or elsewhere that limit the 
application of exemptive provisions in law, policy and practicality?
Of course, not all of these questions can be answered categorically. In some cases 
the behavior of states within the regime may be attributable to circumstances specific to 
that regime. In other cases, states may even invoke exemptive provisions for purely 
domestic reasons that offer little insight into their conservation objectives. At the same 
time, a careful review of the relevant legal instruments, state practice and scholarly 
commentary provides an excellent context to address these vital questions in a 
responsible and informed way.
C. Methodologies
This thesis integrates both theory and empirical study. The most significant 
methodology employed is the collection and reporting of information on exemptive 
provision usage in the various regimes reviewed. The discussion in chapter 2 (specific 
reservations) and chapter 3 (vetoes) will include a textual analysis of the exemptive 
mechanisms in the context of the various treaties regimes where they are found, a review 
of the states invoking them and their reasons for doing so, the status of species they were 
directed against, and, to the extent feasible, a discussion of the degree the exemptive 
mechanism may have contributed to relative success or failure of the regime.
12
Not every marine conservation agreement is analyzed in chapters 2 and 3. The 
regimes discussed in those chapters were selected because of their importance to the 
conservation and management of marine species. The two most salient criteria for 
inclusion are: 1) that the regime has an exemptive mechanism, and; 2) that the regime 
engages in active conservation and management of living marine resources in some way. 
Although not every marine conservation regime with an exemptive mechanism is 
included, the overwhelming majority is found in chapters 2 and 3.
The collection of information on the use of exemptive provisions, which is 
presented in summary tables in the Appendix, primarily involved archival research in law 
libraries and other libraries where environmental and marine conservation and 
management collections are located. The information was typically found in annual (or 
other periodic) reports of fishery and other conservation and management organizations. 
For the practice of states in more recent years, the critical information was often available 
online from electronic reports on regime websites. This was supplemented by 
correspondence with treaty secretariats and reference to scholarly publications discussing 
reservation and veto usage in these regimes.
Questions about whether or not exemptive provisions were exercised in a given 
case, or whether they were intended to apply to one or more species or geographic area, 
were not always straightforward. The decision to include them or not, or how to classify 
them, was often resolved with an educated judgment. Where appropriate, the author notes 
that others might reach different conclusions on certain matters.
Chapters 4 and 5 represent more traditional legal research, evaluating the practice 
of states in the context of an evolving legal framework. In this case the framework is an
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integration of treaty law, the law of sea and international environmental law. The 
recommendations for future practice found in chapter 5 highlight innovations of newer 
regimes and a synthesis of lessons to be gained from the earlier chapters.
The methodology used to research this thesis is familiar to legal scholars and 
social scientists. The author accepts that other methodologies could be brought to bear on 
these questions.
II. The Law of the Sea as a Basis for Effective Marine Environmental
Conservation
A natural point of departure for further inquiry into particular marine conservation 
treaties is an overview of the modem international law of the sea, along with its priorities 
and allocation of ocean space. All by way of foundation, the discussion of the history and 
key concepts of the law of the sea, fisheries law and international fishery organizations 
will be followed by an equally essential review of the basics of treaty law and policy 
pertaining to reservations and veto provisions.
A. Historical Overview
The oceans have been a defining focus of international law for centuries. The 
Dutch philosopher-jurist, Hugo Grotius, widely credited with being a founder of modem 
international law, wrote his historic work Mare Liberum in 1609.13 In Mare Liberum
13 See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. L o w e , THE L a w  OF THE S e a  4  (3d. ed. M anchester: Juris, 1999) [hereinafter 
C h u r c h i l l  &  L o w e ] . There are few  jurist-philosophers w ho have left so  strong a legacy  as H ugo Grotius 
(1 5 83 -1645 ); m uch has been written about his contributions. See HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL 
R e la t i o n s  (H ed ley  B u ll et al. eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); C h a r le s  S. E d w a r d s , H u g o  
G r o t iu s ,  T h e  M ir a c le  o f  H o l la n d :  A S t u d y  in  P o l i t i c a l  a n d  L e g a l  T h o u g h t  (C hicago: N elson -
14
Grotius passionately set forth the reasons why the oceans should be free and open to all.14 
In so doing, he was asserting the rights of his native Holland and the Dutch East India 
Company against the Portuguese who claimed exclusive trade routes to the Far East at the 
time.15 Some years later, the Englishman John Selden directly opposed Grotius’ view of 
the oceans.16 In 1635, in his book Mare Clausum, Selden argued that a coastal nation had 
a right to control the seas adjacent to its coast, especially with regard to the fishery
1 7resources to be found therein.
The opposing views on the status of ocean space represented by Grotius and 
Selden were not simply a theoretical, doctrinal difference between two renaissance 
thinkers. On the contrary, they reflected the very real interests and geo-political
1 Xcapabilities of their respective nations. This tension between the interests of coastal 
states and other maritime users remains a fundamental aspect of the law of the sea today. 
Friction between coastal states and distant water fishing fleets is a key modem
Hall, 1981); H a m il to n  V r e e la n d ,  Jr ., H u g o  G r o t iu s :  t h e  F a t h e r  o f  t h e  M o d e r n  S c ie n c e  o f  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  l a w  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917). Although Grotius is often cited as a 
founder o f modem international law he was by no means the first. See CHURCHILL &  LOWE, supra at 4. His 
predecessors include the Spanish theologians Francisco de Vitoria (probably 1486-1546) and Francisco 
Suarez (1548-1617) as well as the Italian legal scholar Alberico Gentili (1552-1608). Id. See also LOUIS 
H en k in  e t  a l ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L aw : C a s e s  a n d  M a t e r i a l s  x x iv  (3d ed. St. Paul: West, 1993) 
(hereinafter HENKIN). The seminal factor in the development o f modem international law was the formation 
o f  the nation-state. See A k e h u r s t ’s  M o d e r n  I n t r o d u c t io n  t o  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  11 (Peter 
Malanczuk ed., 7th rev. ed. London: Routledge, 1997) [hereinafter Akehurst’s]. For a somewhat contrary 
view arguing that the underpinnings o f the modem treaty system are found much earlier, including biblical 
times, see D a v id  J. B e d e r m a n , I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  in  A n t iq u i t y  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).
14 See C h u r c h i l l  &  L o w e  supra note 13, at 4.
15 Id.
16 Id. For a book examining Selden’s contribution see PAUL CHRISTIANSON, DISCOURSE ON HISTORY, L aw , 
a n d  G o v e r n a n c e  in  t h e  P u b l ic  C a r e e r  o f  J o h n  S e ld e n , 1610-1635 (Toronto: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1996).
17 See C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra  note 13, at 4 ,204.
18 See HENKIN, supra 13, at xxv. Grotius’ view reflected the interests o f a nation with a capability to exploit 
distant trade routes. Id. Selden’s view, on the other hand, reflected the relative maritime inferiority o f  a 
nation whose adjacent waters were threatened by other, more capable, nations. See CHURCHILL & L o w e , 
supra note 13, at 4.
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manifestation of this ancient tension. In fact, the spirit of the Grotius-Selden debate 
resonates loudly in the fishery law and policy of the Twenty-First Century.
For centuries, customary law and not treaties governed the law of the sea. Before 
the middle part of the Twentieth Century there were several attempts at codification but 
they failed to produce anything resembling a comprehensive treaty framework.19 
Probably the single most contentious issue in the long history of the law of the sea is the 
breadth of the territorial sea, or that segment of the ocean immediately adjacent to its
• " ) ncoast where a coastal state enjoys exclusive rights vis-a-vis other states. Early state 
practice on the breadth of the territorial sea was quite inconsistent and often employed
91vague criteria. As every student of international law is aware, the much-discussed 
“cannon-shot rule” was a common method for determining the breadth of a state’s
9 9territorial sea in the Eighteenth Century. Shortly thereafter, a territorial sea of three 
miles was widely accepted as the norm23 although it was never unanimously accepted.24
With regard to fisheries in particular, the breadth of the territorial sea was an 
issue. With rather narrow limits to territorial sea historically, much fishing activity
•  •  9 coccurred on the high seas where fishing was a traditional freedom. International fishery 
organizations, which today play a key role in the management schemes of marine 
resources, did not come onto the scene in any meaningful sense until after the creation of
19 See C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra note 13, at 13-15.
20 See id. at 77 -81 . For a broader d iscussion  o f  the definition, history and sign ifican ce o f  the concept o f  the 
territorial sea see  /c/. at 7 1 -1 0 1 .
21 See id. at 77.
22 See id. at 77-78; see also, THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL L a w  
In a  NUTSHELL 98  (2d  ed. St. Paul: W est N utshell Series 1990), at 170-171 [hereinafter BUERGENTHAL & 
MAIER].
23 See BUERGENTHAL & M a ie r , supra note 2 2 , at 170.
24 See C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra note 13, at 78.
25 Id. at 203 .
16
*y(\the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945. The FAO served as a means of 
promoting and introducing regional fishery bodies to assume management and
9 7conservation responsibilities in fisheries.
Some of the early fishery organizations included the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission (LATTC), the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries (ICNAF),29 the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC),30
9 1the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the International Commission 
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICC AT),32 and the International Commission for 
the South-East Atlantic Fisheries (ICSEAF). The jurisdiction of these organizations was 
generally limited to the high seas. Of course, coastal states’ territorial waters were quite 
narrow at the time. Although some of these organizations live on in rejuvenated form and 
will be discussed in future chapters, the relative failure of many of these bodies served as
26 See BlRNIE & BOYLE, infra note 173, at 654. The FAO is a specialized agency o f  the UN “with a mandate 
to raise levels o f nutrition and standards o f living, to improve agricultural productivity and to better the 
condition o f  rural populations.” FAO: What it is, What it does, at http://www.fao.org/UNFAO/e/wmain- 
e.htm.
27 See B ir n ie  & BOYLE, infra note 173, at 654.
28 The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) was the product o f the 1949 Convention for the 
Establishment o f an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 80 U.N.T.S. 4 (entered into force Mar. 3, 
1950).
29 The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was the product o f the 1949 
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 157 U.N.T.S. 157 (entered into force July 3, 
1950).
30 The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) was the product o f the 1952 International 
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries o f  the North Pacific, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force June 12, 
1953).
31 The North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) was the product o f the 1959 North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries Convention, 486 U.N.T.S. 157 (entered into force 1963) (modification in effect June 4, 
1974).
32 The International Commission for the Conservation o f Atlantic Tunas (ICC AT) was the product o f the 
1966 International Convention for the Conservation o f Atlantic Tunas, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force 
Mar. 21, 1969).
33 The International Commission for the South-East Atlantic Fisheries was the product o f the 1969 
International Convention on the Conservation o f  the Living Resources o f South-East Atlantic, 801 
U.N.T.S. 101 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1971).
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an impetus for massive expansion of national jurisdiction into waters previously 
designated as high seas.
Another factor that created interest in a larger coastal fishing zone was inequities 
in access to fishery resources. By the early 1970s it was clear that the existing law of the 
sea applicable to fisheries was unsatisfactory to developing states concerned about access 
to fishery resources near their own shorelines.34 Specifically, most developing states 
resented that the distant water fishing vessels of developed, more technologically capable 
states were permitted to catch fish on the high seas relatively close to their coasts. From 
the perspective of fisheries law, the monumental development of a large coastal fishery 
zone would ultimately be achieved only after earlier attempts at codification failed to 
meet the growing need for ocean governance.
B. Early Attempts at Codification of the Law of the Sea
Following important technological developments and growing demand for marine 
resources in the post-World War II era it became apparent that the law of the sea needed 
to be addressed in a more integrated way. The most logical way to accomplish this was a 
multilateral conference where plenipotentiaries from the countries of the world could 
assert their respective maritime interests. The First United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was held in 1958.36 Although UNCLOS I produced four
34 See C h u r c h i l l  &  L o w e , supra  note 13, at 287-288.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 15.
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conventions it did not produce consensus on the breadth of the territorial sea. A 
second conference, UNCLOS II, was attempted two years later in 1960. UNCLOS II 
produced neither any new conventions, nor consensus on the breadth of the territorial sea 
despite strong diplomatic efforts to do so.39
The concept of the territorial sea and other maritime zones controlled by coastal 
states is a critical feature in the conservation and management of living marine resources. 
After all, if states are permitted to exercise their prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction 
over certain segments of the ocean adjacent to their coastlines, then they could apply their 
domestic conservation laws and management schemes to the resources located in those 
waters.
An application of domestic laws not only allows states to claim the resources 
found in those waters, it more importantly avoids the problem of the “tragedy of the 
commons.”40 The global commons refers to those areas not falling within any state’s 
national jurisdiction. The term is most often used to express communal rights, if not 
responsibilities, with regard to the resources found there. In the law of the sea, the
37 The four conventions produced by UNCLOS I were the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; the Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 450 
U.N.T.S. 11; the Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958,499 U.N.T.S. 311, and; the 
Convention on Fishing and the Conservation o f  the Living Resources o f the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 559 
U.N.T.S. 285. These agreements are often collectively referred to as the 1958 Geneva Conventions. For a 
discussion o f  the limited inclusion o f  reservations in the high seas treaty see I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law in t h e  
T w e n t ie th  C e n t u r y  354-355 (Leo Gross ed., Publication o f the American Society o f International Law, 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969).
38 See C h u r c h i l l  &  L o w e , supra note 13, at 15.
39 Id. In addition to the issue o f the territorial sea, the important question o f fishery limits was on the agenda 
o f UNCLOS II. IdrA compromise formula that would have provided for a six-mile territorial sea coupled 
with a six-mile fishery zone failed by one vote. Id.
40 See Garrett Hardin, Tragedy o f  the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin and other scholars have 
warned o f the difficulties inherent in resource management in areas not falling under any states’ 
jurisdiction. The high seas and Antarctica are the most obvious examples o f  “global commons.” For an 
excellent discussion o f  the concept o f  the “global commons” in international environmental law see V e d  P. 
N a n d a , I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a w  & P o l i c y  11-26 (Irving-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 
1995) [hereinafter N a n d a ] .
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concept can be traced to Grotius’ notions of the commonage of the oceans. The “tragedy 
of the commons” refers to the difficulties of managing resources for which no state can 
be held, other than abstractly, accountable. The management of resources located in a 
common area like the high seas (i.e., international waters) that are controlled by no one 
yet available for everyone remains an inherent flaw in the legal framework of the oceans. 
This paradigm of the tragedy of the commons is further exacerbated by the migratory 
nature of fish. Where living resources cannot be expected to respect national boundaries, 
a legal order based on state sovereignty and national jurisdiction is bound to be inefficient 
in its stewardship of such resources.
The need for international cooperation, which resonates so loudly in the discourse 
of marine environmental conservation, flows from the inability of individual states to 
apply their laws to a common area of the oceans, or at least beyond those vessels flying 
its flag. In addition, the lack of a central authority over living marine resources in the 
common areas, coupled with a traditional unrestricted freedom to exploit those resources, 
logically gives rise to an ongoing unsustainable utilization of those resources.
The question of the breadth of the territorial sea as well as other growing concerns 
were again addressed at the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III). UNCLOS III was convened pursuant to a United Nations General 
Assembly resolution of 1970 calling for a conference to produce a comprehensive 
convention on the law of the sea.41 The conference was convened in 1973 and was 
attended by more than 150 countries representing all regions of the world.42 The 
negotiations of UNCLOS III proceeded along the lines of achieving maximum consensus
41 G.A. Res. 2749, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., (1970).
42 C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra note 13, at 16-17.
20
wherever possible,43 although achieving consensus was often hampered by regional 
groupings, most notably the “Group of 77,” which was a remarkably cohesive negotiating 
block of developing states 44
C. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
After nine years of difficult negotiations, the product of UNCLOS III was the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).45 UNCLOS entered 
into force on November 16, 1994 and represents a substantial step toward developing a 
workable legal regime at the international level capable of addressing the conservation 
and management of marine wildlife. As a treaty, UNCLOS is so comprehensive in 
addressing issues of ocean space and maritime usage that it was referred to as “a 
constitution for the oceans” by Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, the president of 
UNCLOS III.46
43 Id. at 17.
44Id.
45 United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, opened fo r  signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. UNCLOS is one o f the most notable 
achievements o f  international law in the Twentieth Century. The UNCLOS treaty represents both 
codification and progressive development o f the modem law o f  the sea balancing a host o f maritime 
interests including freedom o f  navigation, fishing, protection o f the marine environment and utilization and 
conservation o f marine resources. Much o f  UNCLOS can best be described as a balancing o f interests 
between coastal states and other maritime users. For a thorough overview o f  the provisions o f UNCLOS 
including insightful commentary see generally CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 13. As o f  June 2006, 149 
states were formally parties to UNCLOS. A number o f other states are signatories but have not ratified.
Still others, such as the United States, apply UNCLOS provisionally. For an up-to-date list o f UNCLOS 
parties see UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law o f the Sea website, at
http://www.un.0rg/Depts/los/reference_f1les/chronological_lists_of_ratif1cations.htm#The United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f  the Sea (last visited June 6, 2006).
46 Remarks by Tommy T. B. Koh, President o f  the Third United Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea, 
reprinted in, UNITED N a t io n s  CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH INDEX AND FINAL ACT OF THE 
T h ir d  U n ite d  N a t io n s  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  t h e  S e a , U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983) (remarks 
delivered on D ec. 6 and 11, 1982 at the final session  o f  the C onference at M ontego  B ay, Jamaica).
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First, UNCLOS recognizes large segments of the ocean as falling within the 
jurisdiction of coastal states. Beyond the achievement of recognizing a territorial sea of 
up to 12nm (Article 3), a particular innovation of UNCLOS is the 200nm Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). In the EEZ coastal states enjoy both economic benefits and 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction concerning the management of living marine 
resources.47 Second, UNCLOS retains the traditional law of the sea designation of high 
seas, or international waters, where rights and responsibilities to living marine resources 
are shared equally by all states.48 In addition, UNCLOS recognizes the responsibility, in 
both the EEZ and high seas, of achieving a balance between “conservation”49 on the one
47 See UNCLOS, supra  note 45, at Part V. For review and commentary o f  Part V, the EEZ, see CHURCHILL 
&  LOWE, supra note 13, at 160-180. See also UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
1982: A C o m m e n ta r y  491-821 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne vol. II eds., Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) [hereinafter Nandan & Rosenne, vol. II].
48 See UNCLOS, supra note 45, at Part VII. For review and commentary o f  Part VII, the High Seas, see 
C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra note 6, at 203-222. See also U n ite d  N a t io n s  C o n v e n t io n  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  
t h e  S e a  1982: A C o m m e n ta r y  27-317 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne vol. Ill eds., The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) [hereinafter Nandan & Rosenne, vol. III].
49 See UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 61. Article 61, entitled “Conservation o f  the living resources [of the 
EEZ]” provides:
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch o f  the 
living resources in its [EEZ].
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific 
evidence available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation 
and management measures that the maintenance o f the living 
resources in the [EEZ] is not endangered by over-exploitation.
As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international 
organizations, whether subregional, regional or global shall 
co-operate to this end.
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore 
populations o f  harvested species at levels which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental 
and economic factors, including the economic needs o f coastal fishing 
communities and the special requirements o f  developing States, and 
taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence o f  stocks and 
any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether 
subregional, regional or global.
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration 
the effects on species associated with or dependant upon harvested species 
with a view to maintaining or restoring populations o f such associated or 
dependent species above levels at which their reproduction may become 
seriously threatened.
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics,
22
hand, and “optimum utilization” (EEZ)50 and “maximum sustainable yield” (high seas)51 
on the other.
and other data relevant to the conservation o f fish stocks shall be 
contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent 
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, 
where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, 
including States whose nationals are allowed to fish in the [EEZ].
Id.
For scholarly commentary on Article 61 see Nandan & Rosenne, vol. II, supra note 47, at 594-611. One 
should note the prominent role intended for international organizations in the conservation of living marine 
resources.
50 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 62. Article 62, entitled “Utilization o f the living resources [of the EEZ]” 
provides in substantial part:
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective o f optimum 
utilization o f  the living resources in the [EEZ] without prejudice 
to article 61.
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the 
living resources o f  the [EEZ]. Where the coastal State does not 
have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall 
through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the 
terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 
4, give other States access to the surplus o f  the allowable catch, 
having particular regard to the provisions o f  articles 69 and 70, 
especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
3. In giving access to other States to its [EEZ] under this article,
The coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, 
including, inter alia, the significance o f the living resources o f the 
area to the economy o f  the coastal State concerned and its other 
national interests, the provisions o f articles 69 and 70, the 
requirements o f  developing States in the subregion or region in 
harvesting part o f the surplus and the need to minimize economic 
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the 
zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification o f  stocks.
4. Nationals o f  other States fishing in the [EEZ] shall comply 
with the conservation measures and with the other terms and 
conditions established in the laws and regulations o f  the coastal 
State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent with this 
Convention . . . [ . ]
Id  (emphasis added).
For scholarly commentary on Article 62 see Nandan & Rosenne, vol. II, supra note 47, at 612-638.
51 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 119. Article 119 entitled, “Conservation o f  the living resources o f the 
high seas” provides in substantial part:
1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other 
conservation measures for the living resources in the high seas,
States shall:
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence 
available to the States concerned, to maintain or restore populations 
o f  harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
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The extension of national jurisdiction in the form of an EEZ, introduced in 
UNCLOS III and ultimately embraced by UNCLOS, led to the revamping of many 
fishery commissions to accommodate the new legal order of the oceans. In 1979, the
c'y
ICNAF, for example, became the Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization (NAFO). 
Moreover, UNCLOS and its negotiations stimulated the creation of new organizations in 
response to the call for greater international cooperation to address key resource issues 
such as the management of living resources in the high seas,53 shared stocks,54 straddling 
stocks,55 highly migratory species56 and anadromous species (those species spawning in
cn
fresh water yet spending the greater part of their life cycle in the marine environment).
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, including the special requirements o f  developing 
States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence 
o f  stocks and any generally recommended international minimum 
standards, whether subregional, regional or globalf]
Id  (emphasis added). For scholarly commentary on Article 119 see Nandan & Rosenne, vol. Ill, supra note 
48, at 304-314.
52 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (hereinafter NAFO) was the product o f  the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See Convention on Future 
Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1979) [hereinafter NAFO Treaty]. For a detailed discussion o f the transition from ICNAF to NAFO see 
E.D. Anderson, The History o f  Fisheries Management and Scientific Advice -  the ICNAF/NAFO History 
from the End ofW W Il to the Present, 23 J. Nw. ATLANTIC FISHERY SCI. 75 (1998).
53 UNCLOS, supra  note 45, at art. 118.
States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and 
management o f  living resources in the areas o f the high sea s .. . .
They shall, as appropriate, co-operate to establish subregional or 
regional fisheries organizations to this end.
Id  (emphasis added).
54 Id. at art. 63(1).
Where the same stock or stocks o f associated species occur 
within the [EEZ] o f  two or more coastal States, these States 
shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional 
or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary 
to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development o f  
such stocks . . . .
Id  (emphasis added).
55 Id. at art. 63(2).
Where the same stock or stocks o f associated species occur both 
within the [EEZ] and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, 
the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent 
area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or
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Among the new regional organizations that were developed to implement the 
requirement of cooperation were the commissions created by the 1980 Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR Treaty),58 the 1994 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central 
Bering Sea (the “Donut Hole” Agreement”),59 the 1993 Convention for the Conservation 
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT Treaty),60 the 1993 Agreement for the Establishment of 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC Treaty),61 the 1982 Convention for the
regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary fo r  the 
conservation o f  these stocks in the adjacent area.
Id  (emphasis added).
56 Id. at art 64(1).
The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region 
for the highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate 
directly or through appropriate international organizations with a 
view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective o f  
optimum utilization o f  such species throughout the region, both 
within and beyond the [EEZ]. In regions for which no appropriate 
international organization exists, the coastal State and other States 
whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate 
to establish such an organization and participate in its work.
Id  (emphasis added).
57 Id. at art. 66(5). “The State o f origin o f anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall 
make arrangements for the implementation o f the provisions o f this article, where appropriate, through 
regional organizations.” Id  (emphasis added).
58 Convention on the Conservation o f  Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47 
(entered into force Apr.7, 1982) [hereinafter CCAMLR Treaty].
59 Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, June 
16, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 67 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 8, 1995) [hereinafter “Donut Hole Agreement”]. The 
Donut Hole Agreement is so named because it refers to the area o f the high seas in the Bering Sea 
surrounded on all sides by the US and Russian EEZs. The central area constituting high seas waters 
resembles a donut hole.
60 Convention for the Conservation o f  Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993, 1994 Austl. T.S. No. 1 6 ,2 6  
L a w  o f  S e a  B u l l .  57  (1 9 9 4 ) (entered into force May 20, 1994) [hereinafter SBT Treaty]. Created the 
Commission for the Conservation o f  the Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).
61 Agreement for the Establishment o f  the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Nov. 25, 1993, 1927 U.N.T.S. 
329 (entered into force Mar. 27, 1996). Created the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).
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Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean (NASCO Treaty),62 and the 1992 
Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean.63
The regional fishery organization has become the central actor in the management 
of living marine resources found in the high seas. The development of these organizations 
has been fostered not only by UNCLOS but also by an important UNCLOS progeny, the 
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(Fish Stocks Treaty).64
The Fish Stocks Treaty is a key agreement that attempts to refine and develop the 
obligations of conservation of marine resources that “straddle” the boundaries between 
national and international waters. In other words, straddling stocks are found in the EEZ 
of at least one state and also the high seas.65
The Fish Stocks Treaty also applies to highly migratory species -- those living 
marine resources that migrate substantial distances during their life cycle. A key feature 
of the Fish Stocks Treaty is its recognition and empowerment of regional and subregional 
fishery organizations in the management of fishery resources. This objective resonates 
through numerous articles in the treaty including Article 8 ([cjooperation for 
conservation and management), Article 9 ([sjubregional and regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements), Article 10 ([functions of subregional and
62 The Convention for the Conservation o f Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, Mar. 2, 1982, 1338 
U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1983) [hereinafter NASCO Treaty]. Created the North Atlantic 
Salmon Organization (NASCO).
63 Convention for the Conservation o f  Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean, Feb. 11, 1992, 22 
L a w  o f  S e a  B u l l .  2X (1993). Created the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission.
64 See Agreement for the Implementation o f  the Provisions o f the United Nations Convention on the Law o f  
the Sea o f 10 Dec. 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management o f  Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, openedfor signature Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. G.A. Doc. AJ CONF. 167/37, 
reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Fish Stocks Treaty].
65 The issue o f straddling stocks as well as shared stocks (those occurring within the EEZ of two or more 
coastal states) is addressed in UNCLOS. See UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 63. The Fish Stocks Treaty, 
however, does not address shared stocks.
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regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements), Article 12 
([transparency in activities of subregional and regional fisheries management 
organizations and arrangements), Article 13 ([strengthening of existing organizations 
and arrangements) and Article 18 ([d]uties of the flag State).
Article 18 is particularly noteworthy because it requires those vessels flying the 
flags of member states to “not engage in any activity which undermines the effectiveness 
o f’ subregional and regional conservation and management measures regardless of 
whether or not the flag state is a party to the applicable subregional or regional scheme. 
Article 8(4) is perhaps the most profound endorsement of fishery organizations in that it 
requires states to join them or follow its mandates. States that fail to do so cannot fish 
those stocks at all.
The Fish Stocks Treaty is not the only instrument to recognize the importance of 
regional fishery management organizations. Article 7 of the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries, for example, reinforces the centrality of these organizations to 
conservation and management. One could even make the argument that the duty to 
respect the work of regional fishery management organizations rises to the level of 
customary law. The discussion in chapter 4 on the “duty to cooperate” will explore this 
further.
Even before the Fish Stocks Treaty entered into force in December 2001 it 
stimulated the creation of two instruments that address the regional management of 
fishery resources. These are the 2000 Convention on Conservation and Management of
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Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean66 and the 2001 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East
f\7Atlantic Ocean (SEAFO Treaty). Additional bodies are under negotiation including 
organizations for the Indian Ocean and the South West Atlantic.
The tension between the obligations of conservation and utilization are at the 
heart of political, legal and economic challenges in world fisheries. One can easily 
understand the governmental, non-governmental and industrial forces deployed in this 
debate. The balancing of conservation and utilization objectives is not limited to the 
realm of commercial fish stocks. That same debate resonates in the realm of marine 
mammal management as well. UNCLOS addresses the issue of marine mammals 
differently than it does commercial fisheries, reflecting the special status of cetaceans 
(whales and dolphins). The appalling mismanagement of these species in past generations 
along with a growing belief that these species are intelligent, social and sentient creatures 
have set them apart legally and politically from other marine species.68
66 Convention on Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (entered into force June 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/westpac.htm.
67 Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean 
(entered into force April 13, 2003), available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/seafo.htm [hereinafter 
SEAFO Treaty]. This treaty creates the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization. The first signatories o f  
the SEAFO Treaty were Angola, EU, Iceland, Namibia, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, the UK (on 
account o f St. Helena) and the US. See EU Press Release o f 25 April, 2001, Memo/01/153, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/fapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/01/153|0|AGED&lg=EN& 
display= (visited Mar. 29, 2004).
68 For a very comprehensive discussion o f the development o f the status o f  cetaceans from consumable 
resource to precious living species deserving o f special protection, if not individual rights see D ’Amato & 
Chopra, supra note 2 (arguing that cetaceans may have acquired a right under customary international law 
to be left alone by human beings); see also Schifftnan, supra note 2 (critiquing D ’Amato & Chopra’s 
conclusion and evaluating the potential impact o f various legal instruments, including UNCLOS, on marine 
mammal conservation).
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UNCLOS addresses the status of marine mammals located in the EEZ most
directly in Article 65.69 Article 65 provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal 
State or the competence of an international 
organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or 
regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more 
strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall 
co-operate with a view to the conservation of marine 
mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in 
particular work through the appropriate international 
organizations for their conservation, management and 
study.70
Article 120 extends the requirements of Article 65 to the high seas.71 As marine 
mammals are specifically enumerated in Article 65, and incorporated by reference in 
Article 120, these provisions may be regarded as the lex specialis superseding the more 
general obligations to both conserve and promote utilization of living marine resources. 
A plain reading of Article 65, and by association Article 120, suggests that UNCLOS
79contemplates a stricter conservation status for marine mammals.
As one moves seaward from the territorial sea through the EEZ to the high seas, 
the rights of the coastal state logically decrease in favor of the rights of other maritime 
users. But the powers of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction enjoyed by the coastal 
state in the EEZ can be both a blessing and a curse from the standpoint of marine 
environmental conservation. In large measure, this allocation of responsibility over 
marine resources in a state’s EEZ can yield positive results only to the extent a coastal 
state takes seriously its obligations to serve as a steward of those resources. The
69 UNCLOS, supra  note 45, at art. 65.
70 Id.
71 Id. at art. 120.
72 For a detailed discussion o f  Article 65, including its history o f negotiation at UNCLOS III see Nanda & 
Rosenne, vol. II, supra  note 47, at 659-664.
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obligations to effectively manage marine resources, however, are supplemented by other 
important UNCLOS requirements.
In addition to the provisions of UNCLOS that directly govern issues of 
conservation and utilization, a host of other provisions impact on living marine resources. 
These include, for example, general obligations to protect and preserve the marine 
environment as well as more specific obligations to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution.74 While matters of exploitation and utilization of marine resources were 
significant issues even in the time of Grotius and Selden, the modem law of the sea treaty 
addresses these issues as part of a larger whole -  that is, an independent regard for the 
marine environment.
This new and meaningful attempt by UNCLOS to address issues of marine 
environmental conservation did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, this reflected the 
worldwide environmental movement that developed essentially during the years in which 
UNCLOS was negotiated. Undoubtedly, the most significant event that allowed the 
growing concern for ecological health to crystallize into a branch of international law was 
the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm
nc
Conference). The key document produced by the Stockholm Conference was the
73 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at Part XII. Part XII is entitled, “Protection and Preservation o f the Marine 
Environment.” The first provision o f Part XII is Article 192, which provides, “State have the obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.” Id. at art. 192. Significantly, this obligation is followed by a 
qualifying provision: “States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their 
environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.” 
Id. at art. 193. Here again we see a coupling o f utilization and conservation objectives.
74 UNCLOS requires states to adopt laws and regulations prevent, reduce and control pollution from land- 
based sources, sea-bed activities, ocean dumping, vessels and the atmosphere. Id. at arts. 207-212.
75 See L a k sh m a n  G u r u s w a m y  a n d  B r e n t  H e n d r ic k s , I n t e r n a t io n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a w  in  a  
N u t s h e l l  3 (St. Paul, Minn: West, 1997) [hereinafter G u r u sw a m y  &  H e n d r ic k s ] .  “The . .  .(Stockholm 
Conference), may well have been the chrysalis from which international environmental law emerged as a 
legal subject in its own right. . . [ .]” Id. For a discussion o f  the Stockholm Conference see id. 3-8; see also 
N a n d a , supra note 40, at 83-101.
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lf\ m lStockholm Declaration. The Stockholm Declaration is a set of 26 non-legally binding 
statement of principles that recognizes, among other things: the need to safeguard the
77natural resources of the earth for future generations, the need to maintain restore or 
improve the earth’s renewable resources,78 and the sovereign right of states to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies without causing
• 70environmental damage outside of their states.
The Stockholm Conference may well have been the first multilateral attempt to 
address the issues of environmental degradation directly, but it was by no means the last. 
After Stockholm, international environmental instruments proliferated. UNCLOS, with 
its meaningful environmental provisions, is one of the most significant. In fact, the 
importance of UNCLOS is demonstrated in the extent to which other regimes recognize 
its primacy on matters of the law of the sea. For example, even though the CITES 
convention was concluded somewhat contemporaneously with the commencement of
QA
negotiations of UNCLOS, the drafters of that treaty understood the importance of the
o 1
task undertaken by the negotiating parties at UNCLOS III. The Convention on the
76 See Report o f  the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A.CONF. 48/14 
and Corr. 1 (1972).
77 Id. at Principles 1 & 2. The obligation to safeguard natural resources for future generations is often 
referred to as “inter-generational equity.”
78 Id. at Principle 3.
79 Id. at Principle 21. Principle 21 is probably the most often cited Principle o f the Stockholm Declaration.
80 See CITES, supra note 10. CITES was signed in Washington, DC on March 3, 1973.
81 CITES, supra note 10, at art. XIV(6). Article XVI provides:
Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the codification 
and development o f the law o f the sea by the United Nations 
Conference on the Law o f the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution 
2750 C (XXV) o f  the General Assembly o f  the United Nations nor 
the present or future claims and legal views o f any State concerning 
the law o f  the sea and the nature and extent o f  coastal and flag State 
jurisdiction.
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Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or Bonn Convention)82 is 
another example of a treaty concluded while UNCLOS was still in negotiation that defers
O'!
to the negotiators of UNCLOS on matters of the law of the sea.
Such deference is hardly surprising given the centrality of the law of the sea to so 
many environmental issues. One may even go so far as to conclude that the respective 
domains of the law of the sea and modem international environmental law share a 
considerable overlap with each informing the other at a fundamental level. Marine 
conservation agreements are the progeny of both of these disciplines.
D. Treaties and their Mechanisms for Addressing Conservation and 
Utilization
Both before and since UNCLOS, however, numerous agreements have attempted 
to refine the relationship between the objectives of conservation, on the one hand, and 
optimum utilization, on the other. The instruments implemented to achieve this range 
from various multilateral framework agreements to specific bilateral treaties between 
states sharing a common interest in a living marine resource. The regional treaty with a 
focus on a specific commercially valuable species is perhaps the most typical marine 
conservation agreement.
In some cases, comprehensive multilateral framework agreements address the 
conservation and optimum utilization of living marine resources. These include
82 Convention on the Conservation o f  Migratory Species o f Wild Animals, June 3, 1979, reprinted in, 19
I.L.M. 15 (Bonn, entered into force Nov. 1, 1983) [hereinafter CMS]. As o f  June 2006, the CMS had 97 
parties.
3 Id. at XII(l). CMS contains the identical provision as CITES in its deference to the negotiation o f  
UNCLOS. For the full text o f  the CITES provision see supra note 81.
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UNCLOS itself and the Fish Stocks Treaty. In other contexts, international and regional 
conservation organizations are developed by Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Of
(MEAs) to oversee and implement regulations. These MEAs include CITES which is
Of 0*7
global in scope. In contrast, the NAFO Treaty is an example of a regional agreement. 
These treaties and several others will be examined in this thesis.
The organizations created by MEAs are often referred to as “Conference of the 
Parties” (COP) or “Meeting of the Parties” (MOP) and have decision-making authority
g o
within the treaty regime. They are designed to foster more responsible stewardship of 
specific biological marine resources or geographic areas. COPs, MOPs, and other 
organizations created under MEAs (i.e., fishery or marine mammal “commissions”) serve 
as the implementation arm of the MEAs that create them. They are tasked with carrying 
out the regime’s objectives and operate pursuant to the will of the state parties. These 
international bodies further the goal of international cooperation that is essential for 
effective management regimes.
84 See Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 64.
85 For an excellent discussion o f the role o f institutions created by “Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements” (MEAs) see Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J. 
I n t l  L. 623 (2000).
85 See CITES, supra note 10. The CITES Conference o f Parties [hereinafter COP] is the decision-making 
body o f the CITES. The COP is provided for in article XI o f CITES. Id. at art XI.
87 See NAFO Treaty, supra note 52. NAFO is the decision-making body created by the NAFO Treaty. As 
o f June 2006, NAFO had 12 parties plus the European Union.
88 See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 85, at 623. Churchill & Ulfstein observe that COPs, MOPs and 
other institutions created by MEAs do not qualify as full-fledged intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
because o f their ad  hoc nature. Id. On the other hand, they are autonomous because they are “freestanding 
and distinct both from the state parties to a particular agreement and from existing IGOs[.]” Id. “They are 
also autonomous in the sense that they have their own lawmaking powers and compliance mechanisms.” Id. 
The concept o f the treaty “regime” can be defined as the “governing arrangements constructed by states to 
coordinate their expectations and organize aspects o f international behavior in various issue-areas. 
[Regimes] thus comprise a normative element, state practice, and organizational roles.” Friedrich 
Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International Organization: A State o f  the Art on an Art o f  the State, 40 
I n t ’l  ORG. 753, 759 (1986), quoted in, Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 85, at 623. For a good discussion 
o f regimes in the context o f  High Seas fisheries generally, see G o v e r n in g  H ig h  S e a s  F ish e r ie s :  T h e  
I n t e r p la y  o f  G l o b a l  a n d  R e g io n a l  R eg im es, (Olav Schram Stokke ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
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Since COPs, MOPs and commissions periodically pass resolutions and adopt 
conservation measures that amend annexes, appendices or schedules of MEAs, these 
regimes therefore are not static. Instead, these regimes may be thought of as organic, 
always changing and, in theory, responding to the conservation and management needs of 
the species in their charge.
As neither fishery treaties nor marine mammal conservation agreements can boast 
of much success, it is necessary to scrutinize these regimes to improve their 
implementation and generate suggestions for future state practice. This thesis attempts to 
examine one particular feature of marine conservation agreements and the work of 
organizations pursuant to them. That is, the tendency of a significant number of these 
treaties to allow member states to block or opt out of individual conservation measures 
adopted by the decision-making body of a regime.
III. Exemptive Provisions in Treaty Law and Policy 
A. General Reservations
The ability of states to opt out of treaty provisions with which they disagree and 
therefore do not wish to be bound by, is by no means limited to marine conservation 
agreements. On the contrary, the practice of reservations in treaty law derives from a long 
and venerable tradition. A reservation has been defined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) as: “a unilateral statement, however phrased or 
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a 
treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of
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the treaty in their application to that State.”89 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law (Restatement) also recognizes the practice of treaty reservations.90
89 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 330 (entered into 
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention was negotiated at the United 
Nations Conference on the Law o f  Treaties in Vienna from 1968-1969. For official documents o f the 
Conference see U n it e d  N a t io n s  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t ie s ,  D o c u m e n ts  o f  t h e  
C o n fe r e n c e ,  1st & 2nd Sess., Mar. 26-May 24, 1968 & Apr. 9-May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/1 l/Add.2, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.5 (1971). Of particular interest in the definition provided by 
Article 2(d) is the inclusion o f language, “however phrased or named” in the definition o f a reservation. See 
Vienna Convention, supra , at art. 2(d). By including this phrase, the drafters o f the Vienna Convention 
understood the potential difficulties o f  determining whether or not unilateral statements or declarations that 
purported to exclude or modify terms o f a treaty, but not specifically labeled as reservations, could fall 
within the legal framework o f reservations. “By defining a reservation as ‘a unilateral statement, however 
phrased or named,’ the [Vienna] Convention indicates that the label selected by a state will not be 
determinative.” B u e r g e n t h a l  & M a ie r , supra note 22, at 98. Clearly the treaty places such statements 
under the umbrella o f  reservations law if  they purport to “exclude or modify” terms o f  the treaty. In other 
words, the intention o f  the statement will control, not the label assigned to it by the issuing state.
Sometimes treaties will expressly prohibit reservations but will permit declarations or statements of 
understanding. The latter merely puts other treaty parties on notice that a state interprets, or will apply, a 
treaty a certain way. Therefore, unlike reservations, such statements and declarations do not have direct 
legal effect. Although in practice it may be difficult to distinguish reservations from declarations and 
statements o f understanding, UNCLOS is a key example o f treaty regime that prohibits reservations yet 
permits unilateral declarations and statements. UNCLOS, supra note 45, at arts. 309-310. For a discussion 
o f unilateral declarations in the context o f UNCLOS see infra text accompanying notes 142-150.
90 R e s t a t e m e n t  (T h ir d ) o f  F o r e ig n  R e la t i o n s  L a w  § 313 (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute, 
1986) [hereinafter Restatement]. The Restatement is an authoritative interpretation o f  international law 
produced by the American Law Institute. US courts often consult the Restatement in their application o f  
international law. The Restatement Section 313 largely reiterates and condenses the rules set forth in the 
Vienna Convention. Restatement Section 313 provides:
Reservations
(1) A state may enter a reservation to a multilateral international agreement 
unlessf:]
(a) reservations are prohibited by the agreement,
(b) the agreement provides that only specified reservations 
not including the reservation in questions may be made, or
(c) the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose 
o f the agreement.
(2) A reservation to a multilateral agreement entered in accordance with 
Subsection (1) is subject to acceptance by the other contracting states as follows:
(a) a reservation expressly authorized by the agreement does not require 
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting states;
(b) where application o f the agreement in its entirety among the parties 
is an essential condition to their consent, a reservation requires 
acceptance by all the parties;
(c) where a reservation is neither authorized nor prohibited, expressly 
or by implication,
(i) acceptance o f a reservation by another contracting state 
constitutes the reserving state a party to the agreement
in relation to the accepting state as soon as the agreement 
is in force for those states;
(ii) objection to a reservation by another contracting state does 
not preclude entry into force o f the agreement between the
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Reservations that apply to treaty provisions may be thought of as “general reservations.” 
The use of the freestanding term “reservation” in discussion of classic treaty law invokes 
the concept of the general reservation. “Specific reservations,” which will be considered 
below, are a more recent phenomenon. They need to be examined independently even 
though they share important features with general reservations.
1. The Value of Reservations
The utility and value of general reservations are undisputed. The flexibility 
permitted by reservations encourages participation in treaty regimes by a wider range of 
states than might otherwise be possible.91 As will be developed in the following pages, 
reservations facilitate the negotiation of treaties and allow international regimes to go 
forward without total agreement on every element within that regime. In the most basic 
application, reservations allow states to opt out of those provisions of a multilateral treaty 
with which they do not agree or cannot abide. The exercise of reservations affirms the
reserving and accepting states unless a contrary intention is 
expressed by the objecting state.
(3) A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance 
with Subsection (2)(c) modifies the relevant provisions o f the agreement 
as to the relations between the reserving and accepting state parties but 
does not modify those provisions for the other parties to the agreement 
inter se.
Id.
91 See John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View o f  State Practice, 
74 Am. J. I n t ’l  L. 3 7 2  (1 9 8 0 ). “Conceptually, the issue o f the desirability o f reservations is straight­
forward. Most arguments in favor o f  the liberal use o f reservations have as their cornerstone the belief that 
the liberal admissibility o f  reservations will encourage wider acceptance o f treaties.” Id. at 372. The goal o f
reservations as a means to increase participation in treaties was recognized by the ICJ’s advisory opinion in
the Genocide Case. See infra text accompanying note 123. For an excellent article emphasizing the 
objective o f reservations to increase treaty participation see Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to 
Multilateral Treaties: The Goal o f  Universality, 71 IOWA L. REV. 295  (19 8 5 ). For additional scholarly 
works thoroughly examining the purpose and function o f reservations in treaty law see Richard W. 
Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 362  (1989); Jean Kyongun Koh, Reservations 
to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine Reflects World Opinion, 23 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71 
(1982).
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principle of state sovereignty at a fundamental level and demonstrates that no state may 
be bound in international law without its consent. Reservations allow states to address 
important domestic needs while fostering participation in international affairs and 
cooperation through international regimes. Even where reservations are not ultimately 
utilized by a state, their mere availability may provide some comfort and security to a 
state contemplating treaty membership.
To be certain, there are drawbacks of reservations in treaty law. On its face, a 
system that allows states to avoid obligations under a multilateral agreement undermines 
the integrity of that agreement. In resource management agreements reservations can 
undermine the goal of regulatory uniformity. Similarly, reservations skew the concepts 
of reciprocity and mutuality of obligation that are central to international law. In the case 
of resource conservation treaties in particular, is it fair that some member states 
experience the full range of sacrifice imposed by the regime while others members do 
not?
Additionally, reservations can, potentially at least, undermine key treaty 
objectives and add to the burdens of successful resource management. Although 
reservations must be compatible with the “object and purpose” of the treaty, there may 
be genuine questions about whether certain reservations meet this standard. In the area of 
human rights, for example, questionable reservations have raised questions as to whether 
the reserving state was in fact a party to the treaty at all or if the reservation could be
92 Eric J. Pan, Recent Developments: Authoritative Interpretation o f  Agreements: Developing More 
Responsive International Administrative Regimes, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 509 (1997).
93 See infra text accompanying notes 104-108.
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“severed” from the treaty.94 In a legal system derived from sovereign states where there is 
no central authority to judge the validity of treaty reservations such questions are indeed 
problematic. Finally, when widely used, reservations carry the risk of splitting 
multilateral agreements into a multitude of related but differing bilateral relationships.95 
Bilateral arrangements in a multilateral context present difficult issues of compliance and 
undermine the cooperative nature of multilateral treaties.
While the use of general reservations in treaty law has a relatively long history, 
the current flexibility and presumptive availability of reservations derives from the 
development of the law of reservations in the latter part of the Twentieth Century. The 
traditional rule in international law with regard to reservations recognized that because 
treaties are agreements between states, and therefore predicated on consent, reservations 
were only permissible when all states participating in the regime consented to the 
reservation at the time proffered by the new member.96
94 See Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 Am. J. INT’L L. 
531 (2002). See also infra text accompanying notes 119-122.
95 See infra text accompanying note 116. This problem o f reducing multilateral treaties to a series of  
bilateral agreements is largely a function o f the response other treaty parties have to the reservation. See 
infra text accompanying notes 110-116. It has been highlighted as a specific concern o f  administrative 
regimes. See Pan, supra note 92, at 509. “[The opt-out system ]. . .  forces the contracting parties effectively 
to become parties o f separate agreements because over time, as parties exercise their right to opt out o f  
various amendments, different parties will end up having different legal obligations to the regime.” Id  
(citing D.W. B o w e t t ,  The L a w  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t io n s  411 (4th ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 
1982)).
96 See Genocide Case, infra note 101.
[N]o reservation can be effective against any State without its 
agreement thereto. It is also a generally recognized principle that a 
multilateral convention is the result o f an agreement freely concluded 
upon its clauses and that consequently none o f the contracting parties is 
entitled to frustrate or impair, by means o f unilateral decisions or 
particular agreements, the purpose and raison d ’etre o f  the convention.
To this principle was linked the notion o f the integrity o f  the 
convention as adopted, a notion which in its traditional concept 
involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was 
accepted by all contracting parties without exception....
Id. at 21. For a m ore thorough d iscussion  o f  the traditional rule requiring consent to a reservation by all 
treaty parties see  S ir  Ia n  S in c la ir ,  T h e  V ie n n a  C o n v e n t io n  ON t h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t ie s  54 -56  (2d ed.
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In all probability, the first time treaty reservations were discussed in a multilateral 
context in a meaningful way was in the League of Nations in the 1920’s.97 Even at this 
early stage the issue of reservations was troublesome and presented a difficulty in the law 
of the sea in particular.98 With the passage of time, especially after World War II, the 
international community experienced a proliferation of nation-states reflecting a broad 
diversity of interests.99 In due course, the practicality of the traditional rule requiring 
unanimous consent began to wane. The new members of the family of nations, many 
former colonies, brought with them a wide range of social, cultural and economic
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) [hereinafter S in c la ir ,  V ie n n a  C o n v e n t io n ] . For an 
incisive analysis o f  the important element o f  state consent generally, including a discussion o f reservations 
and opt-out provisions in administrative treaty regimes, see Pan, supra note 92.
97 See U n ite d  N a t io n s  C o n v e n t io n  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  t h e  S e a  1982: A C o m m e n ta r y  213 (Shabtai 
Rosenne & Louis Sohn, vol. V eds., Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) [hereinafter Rosenne & 
Sohn, vol. V]. Reservations have been identified in multilateral treaties as far back as the late Eighteenth 
Century. See F r a n k  H o r n , R e s e r v a t io n s  a n d  I n t e r p r e t iv e  D e c l a r a t i o n s  t o  M u l t i l a t e r a l  
T r e a t ie s  7 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1988). Although there may be earlier examples, one 
scholar has posited that the very first reservation to a multilateral treaty may have been at the Congress o f  
Vienna in 1815. Id. At the time o f signing o f the Final Act o f the Vienna Congress, the plenipotentiary of 
Sweden-Norway declared that Sweden did not accept certain articles pertaining to the sovereignty o f Lucca 
and the recognition o f  Ferdinand IV as King o f  the Two Sicilies. Id. For a discussion o f  reservations in 
some treaties o f  the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries see S in c la ir ,  V ie n n a  C o n v e n t io n ,  
supra note 96, at 55-56. These early treaties include the International Sanitary Convention (Venice) o f  
1892, the International Sanitary Convention (Dresden) o f 1893, the International Sanitary Convention 
(Paris) o f  1894 and the International Sugar Convention (Brussels) o f 1902. Id. at 55. All o f these 
conventions observed the traditional rule, requiring acceptance o f  the reservation by all parties in order to 
be admitted. Id. at 54-55. In 1925 the League o f Nations Council probably considered for the first time the 
effect o f an objection to a reservation. See S h a b ta i  R o se n n e , D e v e lo p m e n t s  in  t h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t ie s  
1945-1986 356-357 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) [hereinafter ROSENNE, 
D e v e lo p m e n ts ] .  The reservation under consideration was made by Austria to the Convention adopted by 
the Second Opium Conference. See A r n o ld  D u n c a n  M c N a ir , T h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t ie s :  B r it i s h  P r a c t i c e  
a n d  OPINIONS 107-110 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938) [hereinafter M c N a ir ] . The British 
government noted that Austria’s reservation raised a problem posed by allowing signatures to a convention 
after the conclusion o f  the conference that produced it. Id. at 108. The League Council adopted the 
traditional unanimity rule at that time. See ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS, supra at 356-357.
98 See Rosenne & Sohn, supra note 97, at 213.
99 See A n t h o n y  A u s t ,  M o d e r n  T r e a t y  L a w  a n d  P r a c t i c e  100,114 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) [hereinafter AUST]. One need only look at the membership o f  the United Nations [hereinafter 
UN] to see the proliferation o f  nation-states since the mid-Twentieth Century. The UN had 51 original 
members; as o f  June 2006 there were 191. For details on the growth o f the UN since its birth see United 
Nations Website, Growth in United Nations Membership: 1945-2002 at
http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (visited Sept. 28,2002). A current list o f UN members is 
available at, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited June 6, 2006). These states reflect a 
wide range o f economic, political, social and cultural interests. This diversity most clearly highlights the 
policy underlying exemptive provisions. If states were monolithic, the negotiation o f  treaty texts and the 
execution o f their objectives would be a much simpler affair.
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interests, as well as political ideologies. Logically, this newly enlarged world community 
experienced greater challenges in achieving both consensus and broad participation in the 
international legal order of the post-war world.
2. The Genocide Case and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
In 1951, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion100 that 
effectively transformed the practice of reservations in law and policy. The advisory 
opinion Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f 
Genocide101 (Genocide Case) fostered the progressive development of the law with 
regard to reservations and laid the foundation for its codification. The Genocide Case 
recognized the right of states to enter a reservation to a treaty even where the intended
• i mreservation was not consented to by all states in a regime. The rules to be applied to
100 Advisory Opinions by the International Court o f Justice [hereinafter ICJ] are provided for in Article 96 
o f the UN Charter. U.N. C h a r t e r  art. 96. Article 96 provides:
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the 
[ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs o f the [UN] and specialized agencies, which may 
at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also 
request advisory opinions o f  the Court on legal questions arising 
within the scope o f their activities.
Id.
While advisory opinions are not by themselves binding they may be highly authoritative and aid the 
progressive development o f  international law. The advisory opinion rendered by the ICJ in the Genocide 
Case is among the most noteworthy in this regard. See infra text accompanying notes 101-104.
101 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide, Advisory 
Opinion o f 28 May 1951. 1951 I.C.J. 15 [hereinafter Genocide Case]. The full text o f the I d ’s advisory 
opinion in the Genocide Case is available on the ICJ website at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/ippcgsummary510528.htm (visited July 22, 2002). For a summary 
and discussion o f  the Genocide Case see Reservations to Multilateral Convention, Advisory Opinion o f  the 
[ICJ], 1951 Y .B .U .N . 820-824, U.N. Sales No. 1952.1.30.
102 Genocide Case, at 29 (by seven votes to five). The Genocide Case arose from a request by the General 
Assembly to the ICJ to consider the legal effect o f certain reservations attempted by several states upon 
entry into the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide. Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]. The Genocide Convention was one o f several key instruments developed in the wake o f
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reservations in such cases, as set forth by the ICJ in its advisory capacity in the Genocide 
Case were codified almost two decades later in the Vienna Convention of 1969.103
3. The Requirement that Reservations be Consistent with the “Object and 
Purpose” of the Treaty
Under both the Genocide Case and the Vienna Convention the key to the
legitimacy of a proffered reservation is that it be consistent with the “object and purpose”
of the treaty.104 Article 19 of the Vienna Convention provides:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified
World War II and the Nazi Holocaust that served as the cornerstone o f modem human rights law. 
Understandably, serious questions existed at that time as to whether or not it was proper for states to 
derogate at all from provisions o f  a treaty that addressed a matter o f such fundamental human importance. 
The Genocide Case reflected a divided court. Judges Basdevant, Hackworth, Klaestad, Badawi Pasha, 
Winiarski, Zoridic and De Visscher voted with the majority. Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read 
and Hsu Mo filed a joint dissenting opinion. Judge Alvarez filed a separate dissenting opinion. The 
majority reasoned that the presumed availability o f treaty reservations generally and the universal character 
o f the genocide treaty itself called for a more flexible approach. See Genocide Case, at 15-30. The joint 
dissent, on the other hand, found existing treaty practice to require unanimous assent to reservations and the 
need for the integrity o f  treaty provisions to outweigh the desire for universality. See id. at 31-48. Judge 
Alvarez dissenting opinion maintained that the evolving classifications o f international agreements and the 
particular character o f  the genocide treaty should have precluded the availability o f  reservations in the first 
instance. See id. at 49-55.
103 See Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at arts. 19-21. It is worthwhile to note that the Vienna 
Convention is neither retrospective (Article 4 specifies the “non-retroactivity” o f the Vienna Convention) 
nor widely ratified. On the other hand, the Vienna Convention is regarded as declarative o f  existing 
customary international law in large measure (but not completely). See Henkin, supra note 13, at 416-417. 
Finding the legal effects o f  reservations as codified in the Vienna Convention to be customary law, the 
arbitral tribunal in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf case applied Article 21 even before the Vienna 
Convention entered into force. See 18 I.L.M. 398 (1979).
104 See Genocide Caset at 2 4 . “It follows that the compatibility o f the reservation and the object and the 
purpose o f the Convention is the criterion to determine the attitude o f the State which makes the reservation 
and o f the State which objects.” Id  (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion the ICJ relied upon the 
customary law applicable to reservations at the time. See O.A. ELIAS & C.L. KIM, THE PARADOX OF 
CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL L a w  4 4 -4 6  (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998). Article 19(c) o f the Vienna 
Convention similarly expresses the requirement for consistency with the “object and purpose” and therefore 
is an example o f how it codified existing custom. For the full text o f Article 19 see infra text accompanying 
note 105.
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reservations, which do not include the 
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.105
The necessarily elusive concept of “object and purpose” has been the subject of
considerable debate. An advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
decided in 1983 offers some guidance on which matters might fall within the object and
purpose of a treaty and therefore outside the ability of states to file reservations
concerning them.106 The Inter-American Court reasoned, “a reservation which was
designed to enable a State to suspend any of the non-derogable fundamental rights
[guaranteed in the American Convention on Human Rights] must be deemed to be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the [American] Convention. . . .”107
The Genocide Case also provides some guidance on the difficult task of defining
a treaty’s “object and purpose” vis-a-vis reservations. For example, each other treaty
member is empowered to decide whether or not it accepts the reservation and considers a
10Rreserving state a party to the treaty.
105 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 19 (emphasis added). For remarks by the US delegate 
concerning the exact meaning o f  “object and purpose” delivered during the negotiation o f  the Vienna 
Convention see U n it e d  N a t io n s  Co n fe r e n c e  o n  the La w  of Tr e a t ie s , S u m m a r y  r e c o r d s  of the 
PLENARY MEETINGS AND OF THE MEETINGS OF THE COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE, 2d. Sess., April 9-May 22, 
1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.l, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.6 (1970) (remarks by Mr. Stevenson).
106 Advisory Opinion on Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Inter-American Court o f  Human Rights, OC-3- 
83, ser. A, No. 3, 23 I.L.M. 320 (1984). The Inter-American Court o f Human Rights was established by the 
American Convention on Human Rights. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 20, 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
107 Id. at para. 61, quoted in, B u e r g e n t h a l  & M a ie r , supra note 22, at 100.
108 Genocide Case, at 26.
[E]ach State which is a party to the Convention is entitled to 
appraise the validity o f  the reservation, and it exercises this 
right individually and from its own standpoint. As no State 
can be bound by a reservation to which it has not consented, 
it necessarily follows that each State objecting to it will or will 
not, on the basis o f  its individual appraisal within the limits o f  
the criterion o f the object and purpose . .. ,  consider the reserving 
State to be a party to the Convention.
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The ability of other treaty parties to accept or reject the proffered general 
reservation of another treaty member under the modem law of treaties is the key 
difference with the traditional rule; that is, where unanimous consent of all other parties 
was necessary before a reservation could be effective. The Vienna Convention in Articles 
17 through 21 codified this more flexible new rule as set forth in the Genocide Case.109
Under the Vienna Convention mles, other parties to a treaty will have three 
possible options when presented with another state’s reservation that is neither expressly 
authorized, nor prohibited, by the treaty. First, a state may accept the reservation110 
whereby it modifies the treaty between itself and the reserving state.111 Second, a state
Id. (emphasis added). The Vienna Convention essentially adopted this mechanism. See infra text 
accompanying notes 109-114. One observer stresses the difficulty presented by each treaty member 
assessing the object and purpose o f the treaty under its own criteria. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, A n  
I n t r o d u c t io n  t o  C o n te m p o r a r y  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L aw : A  P o l ic y - O r ie n t e d  P e r s p e c t iv e  263 (2d ed. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) [hereinafter CHEN]. “The major difficulty with this test is that, in 
the absence o f  compulsory third-party decision making, the determination o f what is compatible is left to 
the subjective autointerpretation o f the individual states. The danger o f potential misinterpretation is 
obvious.” Id.
109 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at arts. 17-21. For a concise and easy to understand discussion of  
articles 17-21 o f the Vienna Convention see B u e r g e n t h a l  & M a ie r , supra note 22, at 98-103. For a 
excellent review o f the legislative history o f the these articles o f the Vienna Convention see SHABTAI 
R o se n n e , T h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t ie s :  A  G u id e  t o  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  V ie n n a  C o n v e n t io n  
174-187 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1970) [hereinafter ROSENNE, T r e a t ie s ] .
110 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 20(4)(a).
111 Id. at art. 21(l)(a)-(b). In other words, reservations are reciprocal. For a scholarly discussion o f the 
impact o f Article 21 see Franceso Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics o f  
Article 21(1) o f  the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT. L. 1 (2003). Although not pertaining to treaty 
reservations, an excellent example o f  the reciprocity o f reservations is found in the jurisprudence o f the ICJ 
in the Certain Norwegian Loans Case (France v. Norway). See Case o f Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. 
Norway), 1957 I.C.J. 9. In that case, Norway availed itself o f a reservation entered by France in its 
acceptance o f the ICJ’s jurisdiction in an optional clause declaration under Article 36(2) o f the ICJ Statute. 
Id. Other key ICJ cases where the reciprocity o f reservations was an issue in the determination of 
jurisdiction were the Nicaragua Case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. US), 1984 I.C.J. 215, and the Interhandel Case, Interhandel (Switzerland v. US), 1959 I.C.J.
6. To be perfectly clear, the matter o f  reciprocity o f  reservations in optional clause declarations is often not 
as difficult as it is in interpreting a treaty. This is in part because optional clause declarations are 
necessarily unilateral undertakings. In addition, the reciprocity o f a reservation to an optional clause 
declaration is contemplated in the text at Article 36(2) o f the ICJ Statute and frequently invoked in the text 
o f a declaration itself as a condition o f  the acceptance o f jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36(3). For an 
excellent review o f  the optional clause including the reciprocity o f reservations in optional clause 
declarations issues see J o h n  C o l l i e r  & V a u g h a n  L o w e , T h e  S e t t l e m e n t  o f  D isp u te s  in  
I n t e r n a t io n a l  L aw : I n s t i t u t io n s  a n d  P r o c e d u r e s  140-155 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
For a work focusing specifically upon reservations in Article 36(2) declarations see STANIMIR A.
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may object to the reservation but nevertheless consider the reserving state a party to the
112treaty. In this case, neither the reservation nor the treaty provision it was intended to 
exclude or modify applies between them.113 Finally, a state may object to the reservation 
and reject the reserving state as a party to the treaty.114 Here, no treaty exists as between 
those two treaty members.
Significantly, the response by a treaty member to another member’s purported 
reservation has no effect whatsoever on the treaty obligations of any other treaty 
member.115 This is not only an application of the Vienna Convention but also a logical 
extension of the international legal maxim that a state may not be bound by a treaty 
provision, or a reservation for that matter, without its consent. Accordingly, scholars have 
observed that general “reservations can and in fact do transform a multilateral treaty into 
a complex network of interrelated bilateral agreements.”116
Considering the requirement that reservations be consistent with the object and 
purpose of the treaty it is perhaps too obvious to mention that only valid reservations may 
be consented to by other parties. In light of the power of other states to accept or reject 
reservations, however, it is fair to conclude that the treaty parties themselves are the 
functional arbiters of the often difficult question of what constitutes the “object and 
purpose” of a treaty, and by extension, whether or not a reservation is valid. Specifically,
A l e x a n d r o v , Re s e r v a t io n s  in U n il a t e r a l  D e c l a r a t io n s  A cc epting  th e  Co m pu l so r y  
Jur isdic tio n  o f th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  C o u r t  o f  Justice  (Dordrecht: K luwer, 1995).
1,2 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 20(4)(b). “[A]n objection by another contracting State to a 
reservation does not preclude the entry into force o f the treaty as between the objecting and reserving States 
unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting S ta te [.f  Id  (emphasis added).
113 Id. at art. 21(3). “When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force o f the 
treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as 
between the two States to the extent o f the reservation.” Id.
114 Id. at art. 20(4)(b). See the highlighted text o f  note 112 supra.
115 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 21(2). “The reservation does not modify the provisions o f the 
treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se.” Id.
116 BUERGENTHAL & M a ie r , supra note 22, at 103.
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each state seeking a reservation to a treaty, and each other state’s response to that 
reservation, represent primary and secondary layers of determination by the states 
concerned as to the compatibility of a given reservation with the object and purpose of 
the treaty. Whereas states seeking reservations must do so in accordance with their view 
of the object and purpose of the treaty, so, too, other parties must apply their own criteria 
for whether an attempted reservation is consistent with the object and purpose of the 
treaty in their individual responses to other states’ reservations. This state-by-state and 
reservation-by-reservation approach can lead to situations where some parties consider a 
reservation to be valid, that is consistent with the treaty’s object and purpose, while 
others do not. As will be noted in chapter 4, this is the case with the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women117 with respect to 
reservations entered by several Islamic states.
What is the effect within a regime of a reservation that is not valid? The Vienna 
Convention is silent on this point but also sidesteps the question in its reliance on other 
states’ responses to determine the legal effect of a reservation. One possibility, suggested 
by the Genocide Case and implied by Article 21(3) of the Vienna Convention, is that the 
reserving state is not a party at all, at least vis-a-vis other treaty parties that reject the
1 1 o
reserving state’s membership in the regime. Another possibility mentioned above is 
that the invalid reservation is severed from the treaty. This was the approach favored by 
the European Court of Human Rights in the Belilos case.119 In Belilos, which actually
117 Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Discrimination Against Women, opened fo r  signature, 
Mar. 1, 1980, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
118 Article 21(3) o f  the Vienna Convention provides: “ When a State objecting to a reservation has not 
opposed the entry into force o f  the treaty between itself and the reserving State, the provisions to which the 
reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent o f the reservation.” Vienna 
Convention, supra note 89, at art. 22(3) (emphasis added).
119 Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
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concerned an interpretive declaration that the court deemed to be a reservation, 
Switzerland’s intention to be bound by the European Convention on Human Rights
i 90(ECHR) served as a basis to “sever” the improper reservation entirely. Therefore, it
1 9 1had no legal effect whatsoever and Switzerland remained a party of the ECHR. The 
value of Belilos as precedent, however, may be quite limited by the fact the European 
Court of Human Rights was concerned with the “common European public order” 
objective of the ECHR and was therefore seeking the fullest participation in the ECHR on
199the fullest possible terms.
The ICJ’s reasoning on the propriety of the attempted reservations in the 
Genocide Case was clearly informed in large measure by the manifest importance of the 
Genocide Convention and the intention of the General Assembly to attract as many states
19T •as possible into the regime. This case perhaps more than any other exemplifies the 
benefits and drawbacks of reservations in a treaty. The right to opt out of a treaty 
provision by reservation may satisfy internal and domestic interests.124 In addition, the
120 Id. For a discussion the Belilos case and its impact on the reservations law see Richard W. Edwards, Jr., 
Reservations to Treaties: The Belilos Case and the Work o f  the International Law Commission, 31 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 195 (2000); Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to 
General Multilateral Treaties, 64 BRIT. Y.B. In t ’L L. 245, 265-268 (1993).
121 Redgwell, supra note 120, at 266.
122 Id
123 Genocide Case, at 24.
The object and purpose o f the Convention imply that it was the intention 
o f  the General Assembly and o f the States which adopted it that as many 
States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the 
Convention o f  one or more States would not only restrict the scope o f  its 
application, but would detract from the authority o f the moral and 
humanitarian principles which are its basis.
Id
124 One o f the most cited examples o f a state invoking its power o f  reservation, at least in part, to satisfy 
domestic political needs, is the US reservation to the Genocide Convention. In 1986, the US Senate gave its 
advice and consent to US membership in the Genocide Convention subject to the following reservations:
(1) That with reference to Article IX o f  the Convention, before any 
dispute to which the [US] is a party may be submitted to the [ICJ] 
under this article, the specific consent o f the [US] is required 
in each case.
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practice may, generally speaking, ease the way for compromise on matters within a
regime. The International Law Commission (ILC) in its deliberations on the law of
treaties in 1966 aptly described this phenomenon:
[A] power to formulate reservations must in the nature 
of things tend to make it easier for some States to execute 
the act necessary to bind themselves finally to participating 
in the treaty and therefore tend to promote a greater measure 
of universality in the application of the treaty. Moreover, in 
the case of general multilateral treaties, it appears that not 
infrequently a number of States have, to all appearances, 
only found it possible to participate in the treaty subject to 
one or more reservations.125
Despite the Genocide Case’s recognition of the value of reservations in attracting 
treaty parties, it also recognizes that the goal of wide treaty membership cannot
(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes 
legislation or other action by the [US] prohibited by the 
Constitution o f  the [US] as interpreted by the [US].
US reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment o f the Crime o f  Genocide, 132 CONG. R ec. SI 355-01 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). For an 
explanation o f the US attempt to limit its exposure before the ICJ and preserve the primacy o f its 
constitutional law through its reservations to the Genocide Convention see A u s t ,  supra note 99 , at 120- 
121; see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 291 (St. Paul, 
Minn.: West, 1995).
125 Reports o f the International Law Commission, 17th Session (Second Part) and 18th Session [1966], 2 
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 169, 206-206, U.N. Doc. A/ 6309/Rev. 1 (1966), quoted in, Gamble, supra note 91, 
at 372. For a summary o f  the work o f  the International Law Commission (ILC) on the development of 
treaty law pertaining to reservations in the aftermath o f the Genocide Case see Reservations to Multilateral 
Conventions, Report o f  the [ILC], 1951 Y.B. U.N. 824-826, U.N. Sales No. 1952.1.30. For a discussion of  
the ILC’s contribution to the development o f the law o f reservations generally see ROSENNE, 
D e v e lo p m e n ts , supra note 97, at 424-430; T h e W o r k  o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  C om m ission , 3d ed. 
at 27-28, U.N. Sales No. E .80.V.11 (1980); S ir  Ia n  S in c la ir ,  T h e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  C om m ission  54- 
55 (Cambridge, UK: Grotius, 1987) [hereinafter SINCLAIR, ILC]. The ILC has kept the law o f reservations 
under review. In 1994 the ILC appointed Mr. Alain Pellet as special rapporteur on the subject. Mr. Pellet 
produced a series o f reports beginning in 1995 with the goal o f clarifying some o f the complexities o f  
reservations in law and practice. See generally ILC website, Reservations to Treaties, available at 
http://untreaty.org/ilc/summaries/l_8.htm (last modified June 30, 2005). Most recently, in June 2006, 
following the submission o f  Mr. Pellet’s Tenth Report, the ILC considered and provisionally adopted draft 
guidelines on a variety o f topics related to reservations. See Report o f the ILC, 58th Session, (1 May-9 June 
and 3 July-11 August 2006), U.N. Doc. A/61/10, paras. 92-158. Although certain draft guidelines are 
relevant to an analysis o f  specific reservations, it is clear their main focus is general treaty reservations.
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overwhelm the very objectives of the treaty itself.126 The ILC considered this point as
well in proceedings rather contemporaneous with the Genocide Case:
[I]t is also desirable to maintain uniformity in the obligations 
of all the parties to a multilateral convention, and it may often 
be more important to maintain the integrity of the convention 
than to aim, at any price, at the widest possible acceptance of 
it. A reserving State proposes, in effect to insert into the 
convention a provision which will exempt that State from 
certain of the consequences which would otherwise devolve 
upon it from the convention, while leaving the other States 
which are or may become parties to it fully subject to those
i onconsequences in their relations inter se.
Therefore, the fundamental challenge is to balance the objective of greater treaty 
participation on the one hand, against the need to preserve the essence of a treaty; that is, 
its “object and purpose,” on the other. To understand this challenge is essential as it 
drives all relevant law and policy pertaining to reservations.
With such thoughtful and well-balanced law in regard to general reservations, as 
set forth in the Vienna Convention, one might conclude that they are ubiquitous in 
multilateral treaties. This is not the case. In fact, a great many treaties do not permit 
general reservations at all. This phenomenon is certainly true for marine conservation 
agreements. For example, the key agreements of CITES,128 CMS,129 the Fish Stocks 
Treaty130 and the Biodiversity Convention131 all categorically prohibit general
126 Genocide Case. “But even less could the contracting parties have intended to sacrifice the very object o f  
the Convention in favor o f  a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible.” Id.
127 Report o f the ILC, 3rd Session [1951], 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 123, 129, UN Doc. A/1858 (1951), 
quoted in, Gamble, supra  note 91, at 373.
128 CITES, supra note 10, at art. XXIII(l). For the full text o f  article XXIII o f CITES see infra text 
accompanying note 159.
129 CMS, supra note 82, at art. X IV (l). For the full text o f article XIV o f CMS see infra note 164.
130 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 64, at art. 42. “N o  reservations or excep tions m ay be made to this
agreem ent.” Id. A  rev iew  o f  the w orking drafts used by the plenipotentiaries at the six  substantive 
negotiation session s that produced the F ish Stocks Treaty dem onstrates a clear intention to prohibit 
reservations or excep tions. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY 
M ig r a t o r y  F ish  S t o c k s :  S e l e c t e d  D o c u m e n ts  (Jean-Pierre L evy  & Gunnar G. Schram eds., The 
Hague: M artinus N ijh off, 1996).
48
reservations. Perhaps most notably, UNCLOS likewise does not permit general 
reservations.
4. UNCLOS and Reservations
Article 309 of UNCLOS, entitled “Reservations and exceptions,” provides, “No 
reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by
1 ^9other articles of this Convention.” As might be expected by the large number of 
participants, the decision of whether or not to include reservations in UNCLOS was a 
matter of some controversy. Several proposals were considered at UNCLOS III on how 
reservations should be incorporated, if at all, in the new law of the sea treaty.133 The 
Vienna Convention and the earlier experiences of the 1958 conventions informed these 
possibilities.134 These proposals included: the outright prohibition of reservations, the 
express permissibility of certain reservations but not others, and no inclusion of a
i - i c
reservation clause.
The final product of Article 309 is a rather blanket exclusion of reservations 
“unless expressly permitted by other articles”136 of UNCLOS. The indication that 
reservations may be permitted elsewhere in UNCLOS is rather misleading and requires 
some explanation. The only provision of UNCLOS that can be seen as permitting
131 Biodiversity Conyention, supra note 11, at art. 37. “No reservations may be made to this Convention.” 
Id.
132 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 309. For the best available commentary on the history of this UNCLOS 
provision see Rosenne & Sohn, vol. V, supra note 97, at 212-223.
133 Rosenne and Sohn, vol. V, supra note 97, at 214.
134 Id.
n5Id.
136 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 309.
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1 *}7reservations can be found in Part XV, the “Settlement of Disputes.” Article 298 allows 
a state, at the time it becomes a party to UNCLOS “or at any time thereafter” to “declare 
in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in 
[compulsory procedures entailing a binding decision]” with respect to certain categories
t
of disputes. Considering the large and varied scope of UNCLOS, Article 298 is a 
minor aspect of the treaty to be subject to reservations.
The exclusion of reservations was recognition of the cohesive and integrated
1 ^ 0nature of the treaty’s obligation. This was illuminated in a statement by the UNCLOS
III president, Tommy T.B. Koh at the conclusion of the conference. Koh stated:
Although the Convention consists of a series of 
compromises and many packages, I have to emphasize 
that they form an integral whole. This is why the 
Convention does not provide for reservations. It is 
therefore not possible for States to pick what they 
like and to disregard what they do not like. In 
international law as in domestic law, rights and duties 
go hand in hand. It is therefore legally impermissible 
to claim rights under the Convention without being 
willing to assume the corollary duties.140
This view expressed by Koh is widely held and must be considered authoritative on
understanding the disposition of the drafters toward reservations.141
137 Id. at Part XV. Part XV is entitled “Settlement o f Disputes” and is considered groundbreaking and 
innovative for its flexible and potentially compulsory and binding dispute settlement provisions. For a 
general review o f Part XV see J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 170-196 (3d ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); see also COLLIER & L o w e , supra note 11 1, at 84-95.
138 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 298. Article 298 is entitled, “Optional exceptions to applicability of 
section 2 (Compulsory Procedures Entailing a Binding Decision).” Because Article 298 addressed dispute 
settlement and not conservation measures it will not be considered beyond its reference here. However, the 
temporal element as to when Article 298 may be exercised (“or at any time thereafter”) is characteristic o f  
specific reservations. See infra Section III(B).
139 Rosenne & Sohn, vol. V, supra note 97, at 222-223.
140 Id.
141 See id. at 223.
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Even though UNCLOS categorically prohibits reservations, it does provide for
“declarations and statements” (sometimes also referred to as “understandings”) by state
parties.142 Article 310 provides:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, 
ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from 
making declarations or statements, however phrased 
or named, with a view, inter alia, to the harmonization 
of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this 
Convention, provided that such declarations or 
statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect o f  the provisions o f this Convention in 
their application to that State.143
There are two most notable features about the availability of “declarations and 
statements” in UNCLOS. First, the inclusion of the clause, “however phrased or named,” 
indicates that the designation assigned by the state will not be decisive by itself in 
determining the status of the statement.144 It is significant that this clause replicates 
exactly the same language in the Vienna Convention’s definition of a reservation.145 
Therefore, just as a state’s designation that a unilateral statement is something other than 
a reservation does not mean that it is not in fact a reservation, so, too is its designation of 
a unilateral statement not decisive on its status as a “declaration or statement.” Second, 
the clause, “providing that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of the provisions of [UNCLOS] in their application to that 
State[,]” is the critical definitional element distinguishing reservations from other
142 UNCLOS, supra note 45, at art. 310.
143 Id (emphasis added). For commentary on Article 310 see Rosenne & Sohn, vol. V, supra note 97, at 
224-228.
144 See BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 22, at 98-99.
145 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 2(d). For the full text o f Article 2(d) see supra text 
accompanying note 89.
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unilateral statements under UNCLOS. Significantly, a state may not intend to “exclude or 
modify” the terms of the treaty as it applies to that state.
Logically, an interested observer may conclude that Article 309 and 310, taken 
together, indicate that a state may not file a “back door” reservation to UNCLOS simply 
by labeling it as a statement or declaration permitted under the treaty. The legislative 
history of Articles 309 and 310 indicates that the ostensible purpose of allowing 
declarations in the absence of reservations is to facilitate the harmonization of domestic 
laws with the treaty.146 On the other hand, the distinction between reservations as 
contemplated by the Vienna Convention and interpretive declarations is potentially 
blurred in practice.147
How apparent is the distinction between impermissible reservations on the one 
hand and permissible declarations and statements on the other? While at first impression 
they may appear elementally different, a visible international crisis underscored how they 
may become confused. The spy-plane incident between the United States (US) and China 
in April 2001,148 fundamentally reflected a disagreement over the interpretation of
146 See Rosenne & Sohn, vol. V, supra note 97 , at 226-228.
147 See id. at 2 2 6 -2 2 7 . See L.D.M. Nelson, Declarations, Statements and ‘Disguised Reservations ’ with 
Respect to the Convention on the Law o f  the Sea, 50 INT’L &  COMP. L.Q. 767  (2001 ).
148 See Sean D. Murphy (ed.), Contemporary Practice o f  the United States Relating to International Law- 
State Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Immunities—Aerial Incident off the Coast o f  China, 95 Am. J. INT’L L. 
630 (2001). On April 1, 2001, a US surveillance plane conducting a routine mission near the Chinese coast 
collided with a Chinese fighter jet that was sent to intercept it. Id. The pilot o f the Chinese fighter was 
killed while the US plane was badly damaged. Id. After the collision, the US aircraft and its crew of 
twenty-four airmen signaled its distress and managed to land successfully on China’s Hainan Island, albeit 
without China’s permission. Id. These events precipitated a sensitive diplomatic standoff for eleven days.
Id. at 631; Craig S. Smith, China Releases U.S. Plane Crew 11 Days After Midair Collision, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2001, at AL This was, in fact, the first foreign policy crisis o f the new US President, George W. 
Bush. See David E. Sanger & Steven Lee Myers, Delicate Diplomatic Dance Ends Bush’s First Crisis,
N.Y. T im es , Apr. 12, 2001, at A l. The US maintained that its surveillance mission, the behavior of its 
aircraft vis-a-vis the Chinese fighter and the actions o f its aircraft after the collision, were consistent with 
international law. See Murphy, supra at 630-633. The Chinese government, on the other hand, maintained 
that the US plane “rammed” its fighter and that China had a “ . . .  right to maintain peace, security and good 
order in the waters o f  the [EEZ] . . .[.]” Id. at 631, quoting, China Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press 
Release on Solemn Position on the US Military Reconnaissance Plane Ramming into and Destroying a
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UNCLOS and the effect of a Chinese declaration concerning “sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction” in its EEZ.149 China claimed its right to challenge the presence of the US 
surveillance aircraft derived from its rights in the EEZ as indicated in its declaration.150 
The US-China aerial incident of 2001, while demonstrating the potential impact of an 
interpretive declaration, is of limited use, however, in that the US was not a party to 
UNCLOS and therefore shared no reciprocal obligations under the treaty. Examples 
without this limitation include the Philippine declaration concerning archipelagic sea lane 
passage151 and declarations made by Brazil, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Uruguay and
others indicating their interpretation that UNCLOS does not authorize the carrying out of
• 1 military maneuvers in the EEZ without permission from the coastal state. These cases
Chinese Military Plane (April 3, 2001), at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/9607.html>. The divergent US 
and Chinese positions regarding the status o f surveillance flights over China’s EEZ was one o f  the key 
issues in the crisis. See Erik Eckolm, China Faults U.S. in Incident; Suggests Release o f  Crew Hinges on 
Official Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at A l. For a contemporaneous, albeit cursory, discussion of  
some o f the international legal issues that arose from the US-China dispute see Christopher Drew, Old 
Tactics May Pull the Rug From the U.S. Claim to Plane, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at A l.
149 Upon becoming a party to UNCLOS on June 7, 1996, China filed the following pertinent declaration:
In accordance with the decision o f the Standing 
Committee o f  the Eighth National People's Congress o f  
the People's Republic o f China at its nineteenth session, 
the President o f the People's Republic o f China has 
hereby ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law 
o f the Sea o f 10 December 1982 and at the same time 
made the following statement:
1 .In accordance with the provisions o f the United Nations 
Convention on the Law o f the Sea, the People's Republic o f  
China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an 
exclusive economic zone o f 200 nautical miles and the 
continental shelf.
See Declarations and Statements, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law o f the Sea Website at 
http://www.un.Org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China (visited 
September 13, 2002).
150 For a discussion o f China’s position see supra note 148.
151 See C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra note 13, at 128-129.
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illustrate a potential difficulty created by a treaty that does not permit reservations but 
does permit declarations.
Practical confusion between general reservations and declarations, combined with
1an interpretation of the clause, “however phrased or named,” has inspired some
observers to conclude that the Vienna Convention rules that apply to reservations also
apply to declarations. Guruswamy, et al suggest:
The Vienna Convention rule includes all unilateral 
statements, regardless of their labels, under the term 
“reservation” if the substantive content of the statement 
alters the effect of the treaty. The determination of 
whether a statement is a reservation is generally left 
to the other treaty signatories. The law of reservations, 
therefore, must be viewed as one governing unilateral 
qualifying statements because the interpretive effect of 
any one statement may vary with the evaluating party.154
As general reservations are frequently prohibited in treaties, the utilization of 
unilateral declarations may increase as states try to fashion regime practices that are most 
favorable to them. Meanwhile, the manifest question remains: to what extent does the 
law, policy and practice with regard to general reservations apply to other exemptive 
provisions? This question is made more acute when one considers that, with noted 
exceptions, general reservations, even when permissible, have been utilized less 
frequently in practice than one might imagine.155 To the extent they are utilized they 
often concentrate on matters of marginal significance.156
152 Id. at 427.
153 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 2(d). For the full text o f the Vienna Convention’s definition of  
a reservation see supra text accompanying note 89.
154 L a k sh m a n  d . G u r u s w a m y  e t  a l . ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n v ir o n m e n t a l  L a w  a n d  W o r ld  O r d e r  62 (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West, 1994).
155 See Gamble, supra note 91 , at 39 1 -3 9 3 . Gamble’s 1980 study concluded that, “[o]verall, there are no 
reservations at all to 85 percent o f  multilateral treaties . . .” Id. at 392. Other scholars share the conclusion 
that general reservations are not a significant limitation in treaty law. See CHEN, supra note 108, at 263. 
“The potentially catastrophic difficulties involved with reservations in theory rarely occur in practice. The
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International environmental law is an area where treaties, like UNCLOS, for 
example, often prohibit general reservations in a categorical way. At the same time, the 
phenomenon of specific reservations is observed with much greater frequency in marine 
environmental agreements.
B. Specific Reservations
The mechanism of the “general reservation,” that is, a unilateral exclusion or 
modification applying to an actual treaty provision, enjoys both a long history and a 
significant body of scholarly literature examining its many contours. Conversely, the 
more precise practice of invoking the “specific reservation” is more recent in the 
development of treaty law. A specific reservation may be defined as a unilateral 
statement by a state, intending to exclude or modify the terms of a legally binding 
resolution or decision in its application to that state, where a duly authorized body under 
the terms of a treaty promulgates the resolution or decision. Specific reservations are 
provided for directly in the treaty text.
As noted above, in the case of marine conservation treaties, COPs, MOPs and 
designated commissions are frequently authorized to promulgate binding decisions 
concerning species falling within their mandate. Where COPs, MOPs and commissions 
promulgate such decisions with regard to enumerated species and list them in annexes or 
appendices as authorized by a treaty, such treaties often recognize the right of state
element o f surprise is minimized through careful draftsmanship in expressing genuinely shared 
commitments.” Id.
156 Id., citing O s c a r  S c h a c h t e r  e t  a l . ,  T o w a r d  W id e r  A c c e p t a n c e  o f  UN T r e a t ie s  154 (Salem, NH: 
Ayer Co. 1971).
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parties to object to, opt out of, and thereby exempt themselves from a particular 
conservation measure.
In the context of marine conservation treaties, to understand the distinction 
between specific reservations and general reservations is to appreciate the temporal 
difference between the two. Whereas general reservations are limited by the Vienna 
Convention to the time of “signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding” to a
1 ^ 7treaty, specific reservations are typically exercised at the time the decision-making 
body of the regime adopts the particular measure. In so doing, the practice of reservations 
is thereby adapted to the dynamic processes of a treaty regime.
Although a collection of specific reservations will be considered in chapter 2, an 
example of a treaty provision allowing for specific reservations is Article XXIII of 
CITES.158 CITES Article XXIII provides:
1. The provisions of the present Convention shall not 
be subject to general reservations. Specific reservations 
may be entered in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article and Articles XV [Amendments to Appendices I 
and II] and XVI [Appendix III and Amendments thereto].
2. Any State may, on depositing its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, enter a 
specific reservation with regard to:
(a) any species included in Appendix I, II or III; or
(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation to 
a species included in Appendix III.
3. Until a Party withdraws its reservation entered under 
the provisions of this Article, it shall be treated as a State 
not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade 
in the particular species or parts or derivatives specified in 
such reservation.159
157 Vienna Convention, supra note 89, at art. 2(d). For the full text o f  Article 2(d) see supra text 
accompanying note 89.
158 CITES, supra note 10, at art. XXIII.
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As the CITES COP amends the appendices to include new species, state parties enjoy the 
right to enter specific reservations to those amendments.160
Japan, for example, has registered numerous specific reservations to CITES over 
the years allowing it to harvest CITES species under the auspices of this opt out 
provision.161 This includes marine species.162 Details of CITES reservations are 
developed in chapter 2.
159 Id.
160 Article XV (Amendments to Appendices I and II) provides in paragraph 3:
3. During the period o f 90 days provided for by sub-paragraph (c) 
o f paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph (1) o f paragraph 2 o f this Article 
any Party may by notification in writing to the Depositary 
Government make a reservation with respect to the amendment.
Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party shall be treated as 
a State not a Party to the present Convention with respect to trade 
in the species concerned.
Id. at art. XV(3).
Article XVI (Appendix III and Amendments thereto) provides in paragraph 2:
2. Each list submitted under the provisions o f paragraph 1 o f this 
Article shall be communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat as soon 
as possible after receiving it. The list shall take effect as part o f  
Appendix III 90 days after the date o f such communication. At any 
time after the communication o f such list, any Party may by 
notification in writing to the Depositary Government enter a reservation 
with respect to any species or any parts or derivatives, and until such 
reservation is withdrawn, the State shall be treated as a State not a Party 
to the present Convention with respect to trade in the species or part or 
derivative concerned.
Id  at art. XVI(2).
161 See Jared Kassenoff, Treaties in the Mist, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L &  COMP. L. 359,366 (1999), citing, 
Valerie Kamo, Protection o f  Endangered Gorillas and Chimpanzees in International Trade: Can CITES 
Help? 14 H a st in g s  In t ’l & C o m p . L. Re v . 989,990 (1991).
162 For example, Japan harvested certain sea turtles in the early 1990’s under this provision. See Chris 
Wold, The Status o f  Sea Turtles under International Environmental Law and International Environmental 
Agreements, 5 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 11, 26 (2002). In addition, both Japan and Norway have opted 
out o f CITES conservation measures concerning certain cetacean species. See Jaques Bemey, CITES and 
International Trade in Whale Products, in WHALING IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC: ECONOMIC AND POLICY 
PERSPECTIVES 103 (Gudrun Petursdottir ed., University o f  Iceland, 1997), available at 
http://www.highnorth.no/Library/Publications/iceland/ci-an-in.htm (last visited March 28, 2004). Other 
examples will be considered in chapter 2 infra.
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Another example of a specific reservation provision of a major wildlife treaty is 
found in Article XIV of the CMS.163 Article XIV of CMS tracks the requirements of 
CITES Article XXIII to a substantial degree.164
In the marine mammal context, the most often discussed regime providing for a
specific reservation is Article V(3) of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (ICRW).165 This provision, which is slightly different in form from the specific
reservations found in CITES and CMS, allows states to opt out of a catch limit or other
conservation measure adopted by the International Whaling Commission (IWC).166
Article V(l) and (2) of the ICRW empowers the IWC to adopt conservation and
management measures of cetaceans by periodically amending the “Schedule” of the
treaty.167 At the same time, Article V(3) provides:
3. Each of such amendments shall become effective 
with respect to the Contracting Governments ninety 
days following notification of the amendment by the 
[IWC] to each of the Contracting Governments,
163 CMS, supra note 82, at art. XIV.
164 Article XIV o f  CMS provides:
1. The provisions o f this Convention shall not be subject 
to general reservations. Specific reservations may be 
entered in accordance with the provisions o f this Article 
and Article XI [Amendment o f the Appendices].
2. Any State or regional economic organization may, on 
depositing its instrument o f ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, enter a specific reservation with 
regard to the presence on either Appendix I or Appendix II 
or both, o f any migratory species and shall then not be 
regarded as a Party in regard to the subject o f  that 
reservation until 90 days after the Depositary has 
transmitted to the Parties notification that such reservation 
has been withdrawn.
Id.
165 See ICRW, supra note 2, at art V(3).
166 Id.
167 Id. at art. V (l)& (2). For a more complete analysis o f Article V o f the ICRW see infra chapter2. The 
IWC meets annually to review, and potentially amend, the Schedule. As previously noted, a moratorium 
(zero-catch limit) has been in place since 1986. See supra note 2. The moratorium is subject to annual 
review and is regularly challenged by the small number o f  remaining pro-whaling states.
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except that (a) i f  any Government presents to the
[IWC] objection to any amendment prior to the
expiration of this ninety-day period, the amendment shall
not become effective with respect to any of the
Governments for an additional ninety days;
(b) thereupon, any other Contracting Government
may present objection to the amendment at any time
prior to the expiration of the additional ninety-day
period, or before the expiration of thirty days from
the date of receipt of the last objection received during
such additional ninety-day period, whichever date shall
be the later; and (c) thereafter, the amendment shall
become effective with respect to all Contracting
Governments which have not presented objection but
shall not become effective with respect to any Government
which has so objected until such date as the objection is
withdrawn. The [IWC] shall notify each Contracting
Government immediately upon receipt of each objection
and withdrawal and each Contracting Government shall
acknowledge receipt of all notifications of amendments,1 68objections, and withdrawals.
Norway, for example, continues to harvest a certain number of minke whales annually 
under this opt out provision.169
In the realm of fisheries law, procedures akin to specific reservations play a role 
in the development of regional fishery management. In NAFO, for example, state parties 
may opt out of specific conservation and regulatory measures adopted by the regime. 
Article XII of NAFO provides:
1. If any Commission member presents to the Executive
Secretary an objection to a proposal within sixty days of the 
date of transmittal specified in the notification of the 
proposal by the Executive Secretary, the proposal shall not 
become a binding measure until the expiration of forty days 
following the date of transmittal specified in the notification 
of that objection to the Contracting Parties. Thereupon any 
other Commission member may similarly object prior to the
168 See ICRW, supra note 2, at art. V(3) (emphasis added).
169 See Final Press Release o f the Fifty-Fourth Annual Meeting o f the IWC, IWC website, at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/2002PressRelease.htm (visited Sept. 17, 2002).
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expiration of the additional forty day period, or within thirty 
days after the date of transmittal specified in the notification 
to the Contracting Parties of any objection presented within 
that additional forty-day period, whichever shall be the later.
The proposal shall then become a measure binding on all 
Contracting Parties, except those which have presented 
objections, at the end of the extended period or periods for 
objecting. If, however, at the end of such extended period or 
periods, objections have been presented and maintained by a 
majority of Commission members, the proposal shall not 
become a binding measure, unless any or all of the 
Commission members nevertheless agree as among 
themselves to be bound by it on an agreed date.
2. Any Commission member which has objected to a 
proposal may at any time withdraw that objection and the 
proposal immediately shall become a measure binding on 
such a member, subject to the objection procedure provided 
for in this Article.
3. At any time after the expiration of one year from the 
date on which a measure enters into force, any Commission 
member may give to the Executive Secretary notice of its 
intention not to be bound by the measure, and, if that notice 
is not withdrawn, the measure shall cease to be binding on 
that member at the end of one year from the date of receipt 
of the notice by the Executive Secretary. At any time after a 
measure has ceased to be binding on a Commission member 
under this paragraph, the measure shall cease to be binding 
on any other Commission member upon the date a notice of 
its intention not to be bound is received by the Executive 
Secretary.
4. The Executive Secretary shall immediately notify 
each Contracting Party of:
a. the receipt of each objection and withdrawal of 
objection under paragraphs 1 and 2;
b. the date on which any proposal becomes a binding 
measure under the provisions of paragraph 1; and
c. the receipt of each notice under paragraph 3.170
CITES, CMS, the ICRW and NAFO are but four examples of marine 
conservation agreements providing for specific reservations (and will be examined in 
detail in chapter 2). Where specific reservations are provided for, they presumptively 
reflect the will of the parties. Therefore, at the threshold, they are presumed to be lawful.
170 NAFO Treaty, supra note 52, at art. XII.
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In addition, unlike general reservations, the element of surprise vis-a-vis other treaty
171 #
parties is minimized. This is because the provisions susceptible to reservations, and
• 111 those that are not, are stipulated directly in the treaty text. Does the requirement of
Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention (discussed above) that reservations not be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty apply equally to specific
reservations and general reservations? This thesis develops the proposition that it does.
On the other hand, there might be particular cases where the application of Article 19 to a
specific reservation is rendered problematic by other factors. In the case of the ICRW, in
particular, this is examined in chapter 2. In addition, the argument that the “object and
purpose” requirement applies to all reservations as a matter of customary international
law will be explored in chapter 4.
Beyond threshold questions of legality, the use of specific reservations is
controversial in that the right to opt out of conservation measures deemed desirable by
other treaty parties carries with it the potential to undermine the regime and limit the
effectiveness of measures adopted by duly authorized COPs, MOPs and commissions.
Patricia Bimie and Alan Boyle accurately highlight the criticism:
[Reservations, especially in the form o f ‘objection 
procedures’ permitting parties to opt out of amendable 
regulations,. . . undermine the effectiveness of treaties, 
by enabling states to protect their economic and other 
interests. This weakness is especially pertinent to 
environmental protection treaties; states can and do 
opt out of stricter controls negotiated under . .. (CITES) 
and the ICRW, for example.1 3
171 See CHEN, supra note 108, at 263.
m Id.
173 P a t r ic ia  B ir n ie  & A la n  B o y le ,  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  & t h e  E n v ir o n m e n t 15 (2d ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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Other scholars share the concern for the integrity of treaty objectives. “Clearly it is an 
absurdity to have a law relating to scientifically determined TAC [Total Allowable 
Catch] which can be ignored if a party does not agree with the quotas.”174 These 
criticisms will be examined in the context of limiting legal factors in chapter 4.
Despite the fact that specific reservations are permitted with much greater 
frequency in marine resource agreements than general reservations, some treaties allow 
neither general nor specific reservations. A good example is the Donut Hole
1 7SAgreement. On the other hand, the Donut Hole Agreement and several other notable 
marine treaties contain veto provisions that allow member states to defeat a resolution or 
measure from ever being adopted in the first place.
C. Veto Provisions
The final type of exemptive provision to be considered is the veto provision.
1 7 (\Vetoes are found in both domestic legal systems and international law. The concept of 
the veto in international law is by far most often discussed in the context of the UN 
Security Council. In those international agreements where veto provisions are utilized, 
some or all states are given the power to prevent the adoption of a measure or resolution
174 Gail Lutgen, Fisheries War fo r  the Halibut, 25 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 223,226 (1995), quoted in Peter 
Orebech et al., The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: 
Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 119, 125 (1998). 
See also T ed L. M cD orm an, Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words into Actions -  Decision-Making 
Processes o f  Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, 20 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 424,430- 
432 (2005) (observing that objection  procedures can undermine d ecis ion s adopted in fishery m anagem ent 
organizations); A ndre Tahindro, Conservation and Management o f  Transboundary Fish Stocks: Comments 
in Light o f  the Adoption o f  the 1995 Agreement fo r the Conservation and Management o f  Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly M igratory Fish Stocks, 28 OCEAN D ev . & INT’L L. 28 (1997) (arguing that regional 
fishery organizations should  exclu d e an objection procedure).
175 See Donut Hole Agreement, supra note 59.
176 The US Constitution, for example, grants the president o f the US the power to veto legislation produced 
by the Congress. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
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in the first instance. In the case of the marine conservation agreements to be examined 
herein, these provisions take the form of requiring consensus or a unanimous vote by all 
treaty parties before a conservation or management measure can be adopted.
Before any discussion of vetoes in marine conservation treaties can be 
undertaken, however, a brief review of the UN Security Council veto provides a useful 
contextual reference. The UN Charter grants the permanent five members of the Security 
Council the power to veto any non-procedural resolution.177 The veto power, sometimes 
referred to as the rule of “great power unanimity,”178 requires the permanent members to 
cast a “concurring” vote179 on a non-procedural resolution.180 From the founding of the 
UN in 1945 until the end of the Cold War, the veto power of the permanent members, in 
fact its very potential for use, was responsible for paralyzing the Security Council,
177 U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para 3. “D ecision s o f  the Security C ouncil on all other matters shall be made by  
an affirm ative vote o f  n ine m em bers including the concurring votes o f  the permanent m em b ers;. .  .” Id.
The permanent members o f  the UN Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United 
Kingdom and the US. Id. at art. 23, para. 1. In 1971 the seat o f the “Republic o f China” was given to the 
People’s Republic o f China. When the Soviet Union formally dissolved in 1991 its seat on the Security 
Council was claimed by the Russian Federation without objection.
178 See Security Council Background, at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html (visited June 
21,2004).
179 U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para 3. For the full text o f Article 27(3) see text o f note 177 supra. Whereas a 
literal interpretation o f  Article 27(3) would require an actual affirmative vote o f the permanent members, 
the longstanding practice o f  the UN has been to treat an abstention by a permanent member as an 
affirmative vote, thus allowing a resolution to go forward. See UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE 
U N ’s Ro les in In t e r n a t io n a l  Re l a t io n s  9-11 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, eds., 2d. ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). The ICJ recognized the practice o f treating an abstention like an 
affirmative vote in its advisory opinion, the Namibia Case. Legal Consequences for States o f the Continued 
Presence o f South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21). The requirement o f  
a negative vote to exercise the veto mitigates the power o f the veto by requiring permanent members to 
spend political capital and expose their isolation on the question. It therefore closes the gap somewhat 
between those five states that have the veto and the majority that do not. For scholarly commentary on 
Article 27 generally see T he C h a r t e r  of th e  U n it e d  N a t io n s: A Co m m e n t a r y  430-469 (Bruna Simma 
ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
180 The question o f  w hether an issue is procedural or non-procedural is itse lf problem atic. The drafters o f  
the Charter provided som e gu idance by enum erating matters o f  procedure in A rticles 28-32. U.N. CHARTER 
arts. 28-32. In cases w here there is d isagreem ent am ong the m em bers as to w hether a question is procedural 
or non-procedural, that question  it se lf  is treated as a non-procedural matter to be decided  by the Council 
and the veto  applies. See AKEHURST’S, supra note 13, at 374. This is referred to as the “double veto .” Id.
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rendering it unable to act in important matters of peace and security. Since the end of 
the Cold War the Security Council operates with somewhat greater ease in matters of
peace and security reflecting the political verities and influence of a single remaining
182superpower.
The provision for the veto in the UN Charter clearly demonstrates the reality of 
world politics and the desire of the founding member states to preserve their national
1 KTinterests. Despite its value in enticing the victors of World War II to participate in the 
fledgling UN, the power of the permanent members to exercise a veto over Security 
Council action remains a potent limitation on the ability of the most prominent 
international organization to fulfill its mandate.
To be clear, the case of the Security Council veto does not provide a perfect 
parallel to marine conservation agreements. First, only a minority of Security Council 
members enjoys the veto. Second, and related to this, the Security Council takes 
decisions, generally speaking, by majority vote. Third, the Security Council is a small 
body that takes decisions binding UN members as a whole. This contrasts with most of 
the regimes to be discussed herein; these bodies are comprised of all parties of the 
organization concerned. Nevertheless, the incentive that the Security Council veto served 
to secure the participation of the victors of World War II is very similar to the incentive
181 See Roberts & Kingsbury, supra  note 179, at 11. For data on the use o f  the veto by permanent members 
from 1946 to 1992 see id. at 10-11.
182 For example, Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing the Persian Gulf War o f 1990-1991, to evict 
Iraq from Kuwait, would certainly not have been possible in the days o f  Soviet competition with the West. 
U.N. S.C. Res. 678, 2963rd mtg. (1990) (voting against were Cuba and Yemen only with China abstaining).
183 Roberts & Kingsbury, supra note 179, at 9-10. It is quite understandable that the victors o f World War 
II, as the founding members o f  the UN, wanted to insure their own position in the new world body by 
reserving the veto power for themselves. Interestingly, both Winston Churchill and Harry S. Truman noted 
the seeming reluctance o f  the Soviet Union to accept the voting procedure. Churchill attributed this to 
Stalin’s general indifference to the organization and its goals. See CHURCHILL: TAKEN FROM THE DIARIES 
OF LORD M o r a n  242 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966). Truman observed that Stalin’s ultimate 
acceptance o f the voting procedure effectively saved the San Francisco Conference that produced the UN 
Charter. See D a v id  M c C u l lo u g h ,  T r u m a n  398 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).
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that the veto serves in marine conservation agreements. Moreover, just as the veto as a 
limiting factor in the work of the Security Council has been of interest to historians and 
legal scholars, its effects should be studied in other international organizations as well.
A similar limitation may be manifest in marine conservation agreements that 
adopt a veto mechanism. A number of marine conservation treaties utilize a procedure 
requiring consensus or unanimity for the adoption of conservation measures. Among 
these are the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT Treaty),184 
CCAMLR Treaty,185 the SEAFO Treaty186 and the now expired Convention on 
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals (NPFS Treaty).187
The objective of the SBT Treaty “is to ensure, through appropriate management
1 Rftthe conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna.” The SBT Treaty 
establishes the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna [CCSBT] to
1 fiQdecide upon catch-limits for the SBT stocks. Article 7 of the SBT Treaty provides: 
“[e]ach Party shall have one vote in the [CCSBT]. Decisions of the [CCSBT] shall be 
taken by unanimous vote of the Parties present at the CCSBT meeting.”190 A veto 
provision in an organization like the CCSBT prevents two coastal states, Australia and 
New Zealand, from out-voting Japan. It is relevant that in the history of the CCSBT 
Australia and New Zealand have been more oriented toward the conservation of the
184 Convention for the Conservation o f Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993, 1994 Austl. T.S. No. 16 
[hereinafter SBT Treaty]. From 1994 until 2001 the SBT Treaty had three parties: Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand. The Republic o f Korea joined in 2001.
185 See CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 58.
186 See SEAFO Treaty, supra note 67.
187 Convention on Conservation o f  North Pacific Fur Seals, 1956 Interim Treaty, Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 
2283, 1976 Protocols, May 7, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3371 [hereinafter NPFS Treaty]. Protocols to the NPFS 
Treaty were negotiated in 1976, 1980 and 1984. This convention is no longer in force.
188 SBT Treaty, supra note 184, at art. 3.
189 See id. at arts. 6-14.
190 See id. at art. 7.
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southern bluefin tuna while Japan has been more interested in the utilization of the
resource.
The CCAMLR Treaty is another agreement where the parties have included a 
veto provision as part of the decision-making apparatus. CCAMLR seeks to conserve 
Antarctic marine living resources.191 The regime is part of the Antarctic Treaty System 
and seeks to achieve its objectives through an ecosystem-based approach to conservation. 
This includes not only the prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested
i no
populations, but also the maintenance of the ecological relationships between 
harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources. The 
restoration of depleted populations is a key focus of the regime.193 The CCAMLR veto 
provision found in Article XII is somewhat more sophisticated than that of the SBT 
Treaty. Article XII of CCAMLR provides:
1. Decisions o f the Commission on matters o f substance 
shall be taken by consensus. The question of whether a 
matter is one of substance shall be treated as a matter of 
substance.
2. Decisions on matters other than those referred to in 
paragraph 1 above shall be taken by a simple majority of 
the Members of the Commission present and voting.
3. In Commission consideration of any item requiring a 
decision, it shall be made clear whether a regional 
economic integration organization will participate in the 
taking of the decision and, if so, whether any of its member 
States will also participate. The number of Contracting 
Parties so participating shall not exceed the number of 
member States of the regional economic integration 
organization which are Members of The Commission.
See CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 58, at art. 11(1).
192 Id. at art. 2(3)(a).
193 Id. at art. 2(3)(b).
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4. In the taking of decisions pursuant to this Article, a 
regional economic integration organization shall have only
194one vote.
The requirement of consensus is consistent with other aspects of the Antarctic 
Treaty System. For example, Article IX of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty calls for measures 
to be approved by all parties entitled to participate in the meetings where they are 
considered.195 Interestingly, CCAMLR also features a specific reservation provision in 
Article IX(6)(c) and (d).196 While this provision by itself has never been a major factor in 
the operation of the treaty, one state, France, has been successful in preventing CCAMLR 
conservation measures from applying to waters it controls in the Southern Ocean.197
194 Id. at art. XII (emphasis added).
195 The Antarctic Treaty, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force June 23, 1962), available at 
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/About_Antarctica/Treaty/treaty.html (visited Mar. 29, 2004). Article IX 
addresses the adoption o f  measures in furtherance o f the objectives o f  the treaty including “preservation 
and conservation o f  living marine resources.” Id. at art. IX(f).
196 CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 58, at art. IX(6Xc) and (d). Article IX(6)(c) and (d) provide:
6. Conservation measures adopted by the Commission in accordance 
with this Convention shall be implemented by Members o f  the 
Commission in the following manner:
(c) if  a Member o f the Commission, within ninety days following the 
notification specified in sub-paragraph (a), notifies the Commission 
that it is unable to accept the conservation measure, in whole or in part, 
the measure shall not, to the extent stated, be binding upon that 
Member o f  the Commission;
(d) in the event that any Member o f the Commission invokes the 
procedure set forth in sub-paragraph (c) above, the Commission shall 
meet at the request o f  any Member o f the Commission to review the 
conservation measure. At the time o f such meeting and within thirty 
days following the meeting, any Member o f  the Commission shall have 
the right to declare that it is no longer able to accept the conservation 
measure, in which case the Member shall no longer be bound by such 
measure. Id.
197 While the potential to exclude CCAMLR conservation measures from the adjacent waters o f certain 
Antarctic islands is not limited to French territories, France is clearly the intended beneficiary o f  this 
exemptive provision and has invoked it more often than any other state. For a more complete discussion o f  
France’s exemptions under the CCAMLR Treaty see infra chapter 3, text accompanying notes 311-314.
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The SEAFO Treaty, which entered into force April 13, 2003, is another example 
of a regime requiring adoption of conservation measures by consensus of its parties. 
Article 17 of the SEAFO Treaty, entitled “Decision Making” provides:
1. Decisions of the Commission on matters of substance 
shall be taken by consensus of the Contracting Parties 
present. The question of whether a matter is one of 
substance shall be treated as a matter of substance.
2. Decisions on matters other than those referred to in 
paragraph 1 shall be taken by a simple majority of the 
Contracting Parties present and voting.
3. In the taking of decisions pursuant to this Convention, a 
regional economic integration organisation shall have only
198one vote.
The objective of the SEAFO Treaty is to ensure long-term conservation and sustainable 
use of all living marine resources in the South East Atlantic.199 The agreement helps to 
implement the objectives of the Fish Stocks Treaty. The regime members include both 
developed and developing states as well as coastal states and distant water fishing states. 
The veto provision in SEAFO prevents coastal states and developing states from being 
out-voted by distant water fishing states that more aggressively pursue commercial 
stocks.
Still another regime requiring consensus in the adoption of conservation measures 
is the Donut Hole Agreement. Article 5 of the Donut Hole Agreement provides:
1. Each Party has one vote in making decisions at the 
Annual Conference.
2. Except as provided elsewhere in this Convention, 
decisions of the Annual Conference on matters of substance
198 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 67, at art. 17.
199 Id. at Preamble.
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shall be taken by consensus. A matter shall be deemed to be 
of substance if any Party considers it to be of substance.
3. Decisions on matters other than those referred to in 
paragraph 2 above shall be taken by a simple majority of 
the votes of all Parties casting affirmative or negative 
votes.200
The key objective of the Donut Hole Agreement is the conservation and management of 
pollock resources in the central Bering Sea.201 Before the Donut Hole Agreement the 
distant-water fishing fleets of China, Korea, Japan and Poland aggressively pursued these 
stocks including illegal incursions into the US and Russian EEZs.202 This was a principal 
factor in the collapse of the stocks.203 As in SEAFO, the requirement of consensus in this 
treaty prevents the coastal states from being out-numbered in decision-making by the 
distant water fishing states.
The NPFS Treaty, which has not been in force since the 1980s, also utilized 
unanimous decision-making. The objective of the NPFS Treaty was quite similar to other 
marine conservation regimes, that is, to provide for maximum sustainable yield of the 
resource and promote international cooperation.204 The provision requiring a unanimous
200 Donut Hole Agreement, supra  note 59, at art. V.
201 Id. at Preamble.
202 C h u r c h i l l  & L o w e , supra  note 13, at 306-307.
203 Id.
204 NPFS Treaty, supra note 187, at Preamble. The Preamble provides the objective o f  the treaty is to:
take effective measures toward achieving maximum 
sustainable productivity o f  the fur seal resources o f the 
North Pacific Ocean so that the fur seal populations can 
be brought to and maintained at the levels which will 
provide the greatest harvest year after year, with due regard 
to their relation to the productivity o f  other living marine 
resources o f  the area,. . . [and] to provide for international 
cooperation in achieving these objectives.
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vote to adopt management measures was virtually identical to that of the CCSBT 
Treaty.205
As previously noted, there is a dearth of literature discussing the role of specific 
reservations as compared with general reservations. There is even less scholarly attention 
devoted to veto provisions outside the context of the UN Security Council. International 
environmental conservation and management require a high degree of cooperation and 
coordination among treaty parties. Securing that level of cooperation would realistically 
be more difficult if state parties could be forced to accept a conservation measure against 
their will. On the other hand, this possibility of states not having to accept conservation 
measures undermines those measures.
Treaties utilizing veto provisions often have a small number of parties although 
this is by no means always the case. The NPFS Treaty had four parties: Canada, Japan, 
the Soviet Union and the US. In the case of the SBT Treaty, there were initially only 
three parties: Japan, Australia and New Zealand, but this grew to four (Republic of 
Korea) with a fifth functional member (Taiwan) by 2002. With a small number of 
parties, a voting procedure requiring consensus or unanimity might not seem like a 
substantial limitation. As discussed in chapter 3, within the SBT regime the opposite is 
true.
205 See NPFS Treaty, supra  note 187, at art. V(4). “Each Party shall have one vote. Decisions and 
recommendations shall be made by unanimous vote.” Id.
206 Id. at Preamble.
207 See CCSBT website, About the Commission at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (visited Oct. 15, 
2005). On August 2, 2004, Philippines became a formal cooperating non-member.
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The flexibility offered by reservations generally is well established. Similarly, the 
reassurance offered by a veto is easily understood. Is the incentive of empowering treaty 
parties to avoid specific obligations within a marine conservation organization necessary 
to entice some states into membership in those organizations? Do they create more 
problems than they solve? Do exemptive provisions, however well intentioned, undercut 
the object and purpose of an environmental treaty?
As UNCLOS balances the objectives of conservation and optimum utilization, so, 
too, must individual states balance those same objectives within the ongoing operations 
of environmental regimes. Accepting conservation measures deemed unnecessary or 
excessive may be impossible for states dependent upon commercial harvesting revenues. 
Participation in treaties containing exemptive provisions may provide sufficient legal and 
political cover to allow them to participate in regimes where they otherwise would not. 
The extent to which exemptive provisions have been utilized and their impact upon 
individual regimes is the subject of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 2
A Review of Objections and Specific Reservations in Key Treaties
The last chapter highlighted the historical and legal context for exemptive 
provisions in international law. This chapter will examine the use of specific reservations 
in key marine conservation agreements. The regimes examined in this chapter include 
those devoted to fisheries, marine mammals and endangered species generally. 
Examining the text of specific reservations and their use is instructive in evaluating the 
overall significance of exemptive provisions to conservation and management regimes.
The information on the use of specific reservations reported in this chapter is 
derived from a review of available data provided by treaty secretariats and annual reports 
of relevant conservation and management bodies. The reader should note that the use of 
specific reservations is hardly ever reported as a freestanding statistic in organizational 
documents and reports. On the contrary, such information often needs to be extracted 
from more general descriptions of the work of the treaty regime. Not all information is 
available for all regimes and therefore the presentation differs among the regimes 
considered in this chapter.
Furthermore, primary sources often need to be supplemented with secondary 
sources, to the extent they are available, to help one understand trends and patterns of 
usage. What follows is derived from a survey of primary sources where possible and 
secondary sources where necessary or useful. Information is often presented in an 
aggregate form with reference to specific details on objections and reservations presented
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in summary tables. Direct reference to primary source documents discussing the 
reservation is provided to the extent such documents are available.
I. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)1
As noted in chapter 1, Article XII of the NAFO Treaty is an example of a treaty 
provision that permits member states to opt out of conservation measures adopted by a 
competent regulatory authority.2 NAFO, as the implementing arm of the NAFO Treaty, is 
tasked with promoting conservation and optimum utilization of the fishery resources of 
the Northwest Atlantic and encouraging international cooperation and consultation with 
respect to the fishery resources found in the area.3 In the organizational structure of 
NAFO the General Council is responsible for internal and external relations and the 
Fisheries Commission (FC) is directly responsible for adopting conservation and 
management measures in the Regulatory area.4 The Scientific Council advises the FC and 
coastal states and the Secretariat serves as the headquarters and administrative arm.5 
NAFO regulates almost all fishery resources in the Northwest Atlantic except those
1 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization [hereinafter NAFO] is the product o f  the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. See Convention on Future 
Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369 (entered into force Jan. 1, 
1979) [hereinafter NAFO Treaty], As o f  June 2006, NAFO’s parties were: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, 
Denmark (in respect o f Faroe Islands and Greenland), European Union (EU), France (in respect of Saint 
Pierre et Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, Republic o f  Korea, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the 
United States (US). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Spain are no longer contracting parties 
after they acceded to the EU. Romania withdrew on December 31, 2002. The German Democratic Republic 
is no longer a party following German reunification and accession to the EU.
2 Id. at art. 12. For the full text o f  Article XII o f the NAFO Treaty see chapter 1 supra , text accompanying 
note 170.
3 NAFO Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble.
4 See NAFO website, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization at 
http://www.nafo.ca/About/FRAMES/AbFrMand.html (visited Sept. 4, 2003).
5 See id.
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managed by other regional bodies such as salmon, tunas and marlins, and whales.6 The 
commercial stocks managed by NAFO include cod, redfish, American plaice, witch, 
capelin, yellowtail, squid and Greenland halibut (turbot).
The NAFO FC regularly adopts conservation measures to achieve its objectives. 
The key mechanism by which NAFO regulates fishery resources is the fixing of a Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) for its fish stocks in designated areas of the Northwest Atlantic 
which is then subdivided among NAFO members.7 In addition, NAFO adopts measures 
for the reduction of bycatch, effective notification, record keeping and surveillance 
among others. It is to these quotas and conservation measures that objections registered 
under Article XII are addressed.
To what extent have the state parties of NAFO availed themselves of the specific 
reservations in the work of NAFO? From when the NAFO Treaty entered into force in 
1979 until August 2005 specific reservations were invoked a total of 160 times by 12
O
members objecting to 83 separate conservation measures. A summary table of the use of 
the objection procedure for these years appears in Table-1. In this time NAFO 
conservation measures included annual revisions of the Quota Table prescribing catch 
limits for each of its species.9 The use of the objection procedure by state parties was
6 See id., at Fishery resources o f  the Northwest Atlantic not managed by NAFO.
1 See Robin R. Churchill, The European Community and its Role in Some Issues o f  International Fisheries 
Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES Law 533, 551 (E. Fley ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999).
8 This data was compiled from a survey o f  NAFO proposals and resolutions as reported in Summary of 
Status o f  Proposals and Resolutions o f  NAFO (as o f  July 2002), NAFO/FC Doc. 02/10 [hereinafter NAFO 
Summary Report 2002] and NAFO FC Doc. 05/4, Serial No. N5156, Summary o f Status Proposals and 
Resolutions o f NAFO -  2000-2005 (Aug.) distributed by the NAFO Secretariat (on file with author) 
[hereinafter NAFO Summary Report 2005] as well as direct communications with the NAFO Secretariat 
updating and amending the information contained in the NAFO Summary Reports. All communications 
with the NAFO Secretariat are on file with author.
9 See NAFO Summary Report 2002 and NAFO Summary Report 2005, supra note 8.
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overwhelmingly loaded in a single member: the European Community. The EC/EU 
recorded a total of 51 objections from 1979 through 2005.
The Russian Federation10 had the second most objections. A review of NAFO 
proposals indicates that the Russian Federation registered a total of 40 objections 
although this perhaps needs to be qualified by the fact that 29 of those were recorded in a 
single year, 1991 --a  year where an unusually high number of proposals was adopted.
The Russian Federation objected to all but two proposals that year. Many of Russia’s 
objections in 1991 concerned the marking of vessels and documentation requirements 
rather than annual management measures more directly affecting fish stocks. This can 
perhaps be explained by political and administrative reorganization in Russia following 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union.11
The remaining states registering objections were: Spain (17); Iceland (14); Latvia 
(13); Portugal (9); Denmark (6); Ukraine (4); Lithuania (3); Poland (1); Estonia (1); Cuba 
(1). See Table-1 for specifics on objection usage by these states.
Iceland’s objections concerning the management of shrimp in division 3M of the
NAFO regulatory area has been motivated by its opposition to the management practice
1 *)of allocating “effort days” versus TAC. Iceland maintains that it is not possible to
10 The designation “Russian Federation’' also includes the “USSR” and “Russia” as all names appear in the 
NAFO reports over the years. The Russian Federation formally succeeded the USSR as a NAFO member 
on Jan. 1, 1992.
11 See G e ir  H o n n e la n d ,  R u s s ia n  F is h e r ie s  M a n a g e m e n t:  T h e  P r e c a u t io n a r y  A p p r o a c h  in T h e o r y  
AND PRACTICE 88-96, 170-171 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) (discussing the shifting influences o f  
regional and administrative bodies as well as other actors during Russia’s transition to post-Soviet political 
and economic institutions).
12 E-mail o f Hoskuldur Steinarsson, Head o f  Icelandic Directorate o f Fisheries, Head o f  Dept, of 
Information, to author (Oct. 12, 2005) (on file with author).
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control the amount of shrimp taken simply by allocating effort.13 As a result, Iceland has 
unilaterally set a TAC for its vessels pursuing shrimp in NAFO waters.14
The question of whether the use of the NAFO objection procedure has been 
excessive is probably in the eye of the beholder. States utilizing Article XII would likely 
point to individual interests satisfied by the specific reservation or particular 
dissatisfaction with one conservation measure or another. On the other hand, in 1988 
NAFO members collectively raised concern about the heavy use of objection procedures. 
In Resolution 4/88 adopted by the General Council on September 16, 1988, NAFO 
members warned that excessive use of Article XII could damage the living marine 
resources of the Northwest Atlantic.15 Resolution 4/88 entitled, “Resolution of the 
General Council of [NAFO] calling on all Contracting Parties to avoid excessive or 
inappropriate use of the objection procedure” provides:
The General Council,
Recalling the obligations inscribed in the Law of the Sea 
Convention of 1982, as regards international cooperation 
to provide for the conservation, and optimum utilization 
of the living resources of the sea;
Bearing in mind that the [NAFO Treaty] was bom out of a 
desire to promote the conservation and optimum utilization 
of the living resources of the Northwest Atlantic Area;
Recalling that the Convention provides that the object of 
the [NAFO] shall be to contribute through consultation and 
cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management 
and conservation of the living resources of the NAFO 
Convention Area;
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 NAFO Summary Report 2002, supra  note 8, at 55. NAFO Resolution 4/88 is entitled, “ Resolution o f the 
General Council o f  the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization calling on all Contracting Parties to 
avoid excessive or inappropriate use o f  the objection procedure.” (adopted by the General Council on 16 
September 1988). Id.
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Noting that the Convention provides that the Fisheries 
Commission shall be responsible for the management and 
conservation of the fishery resources in the Regulatory 
Area, and that the Commission exercises this responsibility 
inter alia , by adopting proposals for the establishment of 
total allowable catch limits and the allocation to the 
Contracting Parties of quotas in the Regulatory Area;
Noting the annual adoption by the Fisheries Commission 
of fisheries regulations specifically requiring that the 
Contracting Parties conduct their fisheries in the Regulatory 
Area in such a manner that catches shall not exceed the total 
allowable catch for each stock and the quotas for each stock 
set out in annual Fisheries Commission regulations;
Considering that the objection procedure set out in Article 
XII of the NAFO Convention if applied on a continuing 
basis by any NAFO member against the regulatory fisheries 
measures adopted by the Commission, may lead to damage 
of the living marine resources of the Northwest Atlantic;
Calls on all Contracting Parties to avoid excessive or 
inappropriate use of the objection procedure against the 
regulatory measures adopted by the Fisheries Commission.16
What would constitute “excessive or inappropriate” use of the objection 
procedure? Resolution 4/88 provides no guidance on this question. At the same time, one 
could logically conclude that continued objections to conservation measures vis-a-vis 
species that suffer deepening declines should be avoided. Similarly, specific reservations 
directed at stocks where there is passionate disagreement over the necessary regulatory 
measures would also seem to be inappropriate to the extent international cooperation is a 
key goal.
Between 1986 and 1992 the EC’s consistent use of the objection procedure (see 
Table-1) and the setting of its own independent quotas was an obvious departure from 
cooperation in North Atlantic fisheries management. Observers have noted that the use of
16 Id.
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the objection procedure by the EC beginning in the year 1985 was “coincidental with the 
need to find fishing opportunities for Spain and Portugal who would be joining the
tn
EU[.]” The EC’s autonomous quotas often significantly exceeded the ones set by 
NAFO.18 Perhaps more troubling, the extent to which the cumulative catches by NAFO 
members exceeded the annual NAFO TAC was often of the same order of magnitude by 
which the EC itself exceeded its quota.19 In other words, EC actions were largely 
responsible for undermining the conservation and management scheme of NAFO. 
Consequently, it is not difficult to conclude that Northwest Atlantic stocks suffered as a 
result.
The pattern of EC objections through 1992 ended when the EC recognized the 
severe depletion of stocks it had pursued. In addition, at the end of 1992 Canada and the 
EC finalized a bilateral fisheries agreement that committed the EC to respect all NAFO
7 1decisions. The events of 1995 would prove this not to be the case. The 1995 allocation 
of Greenland halibut (turbot) in Subareas 2 and 3 (Proposal 2-95, see Table-1) warrants 
particular consideration because it was a factor in a dramatic confrontation between 
Canada and Spain over access to these stocks.
17 See L.S. Parsons & J.S. Beckett, The NAFO Model o f  International Collaborative Research, 
Management and Cooperation, 23 J. Nw. ATLANTIC FISHERY SCI. 1, 11 (1998).
18 See Churchill, supra  note 7, at 551. To cite an extreme example, in 1986 and 1987 NAFO fixed the EC 
quota for cod at 12,345 Mt. with a TAC o f 33,000. Id. The EC set an autonomous quota o f 26,400 Mt. for 
those same years. Id.
19 Id. The actual recorded catches by EC vessels were, however, typically lower than the autonomous 
quotas the EC set for itself. Id.
20 See R.G. Halliday & A.T. Pinhom, North Atlantic Fishery Management Systems: A Comparison o f  
Management Methods and Resources Trends, 20 J. Nw. ATLANTIC FISHERY SCI. 3, 87 (1996).
21 Id.
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On March 9, 1995 Canadian maritime authorities boarded the Spanish fishing vessel
• 77Estai in the Grand Banks slightly seaward of Canada’s EEZ. The Estai had been trawling for 
turbot in the “Nose and Tail” of the Grand Banks of the North Atlantic for five months before the
23seizure. Canada’s action was a result of its growing concern for the collapse of the once rich 
fishery of the Grand Banks and must be understood in the context of both its domestic 
conservation measures and NAFO regulation. In July 1992 Canada ordered a moratorium on cod 
fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, leaving the Greenland Halibut as the last major stock in 
the area.24 Canada pressed NAFO for stronger measures to conserve turbot and implemented
9Sdomestic legislation for that purpose as well.
9In 1994 and 1995 Canada amended The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act to allow for 
enforcement outside of its EEZ against flags of convenience and Spanish and Portuguese
9 7  9 8vessels. Most EC fishing vessels were Spanish and Portuguese trawlers. This expansion of 
enforcement jurisdiction not only underscored the seriousness of the problem but also the 
“straddling” nature of these living resources; domestic enforcement alone was presumptively 
inadequate.
22 See David R. Teece, G lobal Overfishing and the Spanish-Canadian Turbot War: Can International Law 
Protect the High Seas Environment? 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT’L L & POL’Y 89, 94-95 (1997).
23 See id. at 89.
24 See id. at 92.
25 See id. at 93.
26 The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33 (1985), amended by ch. 14, 1994 S.C. & SOR 95- 
136 (Can.).
27 See Teece, supra note 22, at 93-94. The often contentions relations between the EC and Canada arising 
from Northwest Atlantic fishery management, the issue o f straddling stocks in particular, has been 
addressed in a number o f  scholarly works. See Peter G.G. Davies & Catherine Redgwell, The International 
Legal Regulation o f  Straddling Fish Stocks, 67 BRIT. Y .B . INT’L L. 199 (1997); G.L. Lugten, Fisheries War 
fo r  the Halibut, 25 Envtl. Pol’y & L. 223 (1995); Douglas Day, Tending the Achilles ’ Heel o f  NAFO: 
Canada Acts to Protect the Nose and Tail o f  the Grand Banks, 19 MARINE POL’Y 257 (1995); Stig S. 
Gezelius, Limits to Externalisation: The EU NAFO Policy, 23 MARINE POL’Y 147 (1999); Carlyle L. 
Mitchell, Fishery Management in the Grand Banks, 1980-1992 and the Straddling Stocks Issue, 21 MARINE 
POL’Y 97 (1997); Christopher C. Joyner, On the Borderline? Canadian Activism in the Grand Banks, in 
G o v e r n in g  H igh  S e a s  F ish e r ie s: T he In t e r p l a y  of G l o b a l  n d  Re g io n a l  Reg im es  207 (Olav Schram 
Stokke ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
28 See Teece, supra note22, at 93.
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The EC resisted Canada’s unilateral and multilateral attempts to address the status 
of turbot stocks in the Grand Banks area.29 In addition, Spain and Portugal were limited 
in their ability to fish in European waters.30 In 1995 when NAFO set its first quota for 
Greenland halibut, it reduced the EC’s share of the catch from the preceding unregulated 
years from approximately 70 percent to 12.59 percent.31 The EC objected pursuant to 
Article XII and set its own unilateral quota at 69 percent of the TAC.32 This set the stage 
for the seizure of the Estai where Canadian authorities confiscated the turbot catch and
- j *3
charged the ship’s captain with overfishing.
Europe reacted to the arrest of the Estai with outrage. The EC Fisheries 
commissioner Emma Bonino compared Canada’s exercise of enforcement jurisdiction to 
an act of piracy and turning the Grand Banks into “the Wild West.”34 These comments 
drew an unusually sharp response from the Canadian Fisheries and Oceans Minister 
Brian Tobin and Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells accusing the EU of bad faith and 
not understanding the NAFO process.35 Interestingly, in this heated exchange both 
European and Canadian officials referred to the other’s use of the marine conservation 
objection procedures. The Canadian officials pointed to the EC’s record of objections in 
NAFO36 while the EC alleged “Canada had granted itself opt-outs from conservation
29 See id. at 93. For a discussion o f the role and perspectives o f Europe in key fishery issues including the 
Spain-Canada dispute see Churchill, supra note 7.
,0 See Churchill, supra  note 7, at 552.
See id.
32 See id.
j3 See Teece, supra  note 22, at 95.
34 See Anne Swardson, C an ada’s Fish Affair: Diplomacy or Piracy?, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1995, at A25.
35 See Press Release, Canada Fisheries and Oceans, Tobin and Wells Respond to Misinformation on the 
Canada-EU Turbot Dispute (Mar. 27, 1995), available at http://www.dfo- 
mpo.gc.ca/media/newsrel/1995/hq-ac34_e.htm (visited Sept. 7, 2003).
36 See id. The Canadian Press Release o f March 29, reported the following:
Statement by Ms. Bonino:
The last time the EU launched an objection was 1989.
Response:
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measures. . .”37 A review of the NAFO objection history indicates Canada, in fact, has 
never filed an objection.
On April 16,1995 after several rounds of negotiations the EC and Canada reached 
an agreement that addressed the allocation of Greenland halibut as well as NAFO 
regulation of the fishery.38 NAFO endorsed the Canada-EC agreement in a June 9, 1995 
resolution.39
The EU regularly objected to NAFO decisions from 1986 to 
1991 (for the 1992 season). In fact, the EU objected to NAFO decisions 
for seven o f  eight NAFO managed stocks and 2J3KL cod in 1990, and 
objected to NAFO decisions on 3LN redfish, 3NO with flounder, and 
2J3KL cod in 1991/92.
Statement by Ms. Bonino:
Canada has also launched many objections in NAFO.
Response:
This is not true. Canada has never launched an objection in
NAFO.
Id. A review o f  NAFO documents indicates the characterizations by Ms. Bonino o f the EU, as reported in 
this Canadian press release, are quite inaccurate. The EU did in fact “regularly objectf ] to NAFO decisions 
from 1986 to 1991.” Her allegation that Canada had also launched objections in NAFO is likewise untrue. 
There is no record o f Canada ever having done so and the Canadian response properly denies this 
allegation. See Table-1 for details on objection usage.
j7 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Calls on Canada to Negotiate in Good Faith (Mar.
29, 1995) (on file with author).
j8 See William T. Abel, Fishing fo r  an International Norm to Govern Straddling Stocks: The Canada-Spain 
Dispute o f  1995, 27 U. M iam i In t e r -A m . L. Rev. 553, 570-572 (1996). 
j9 NAFO Resolution 1-95 provides:
(1/95) Resolution o f  the Fisheries Commission o f  NAFO adopted on 9 
June 1995
THE FISHERIES COMMISSION
Having considered the joint proposal by Canada and the European 
Community to NAFO for 1995 that:
(a) The 27,000t TAC for 2+3 Greenland halibut be divided as follows:
- 2+3 K. (Canadian 200 mile zone) 7,000 tonnes
- 3LMNO 20,000 tonnes
(b) The 7,000t allocation for 2+3K (within Canadian 200 mile zone) for 
Greenland halibut be allocated to
Canada;
Recalling Scientific Council reports which have cautioned about 
concentrating fishing effort on one part o f  the stock;
Noting that the catches o f Greenland halibut in the NAFO Regulatory 
Area will take place entirely in 3LMNO;
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Despite the new agreement substantial legal issues were presented by Canada’s 
unilateral enforcement action. In light of this, Spain initiated a case in the ICJ seeking 
redress for what it argued was Canada’s violation of its freedom of fishing on the high 
seas.40 The ICJ was unable to reach a final judgment on the merits, somewhat ironically, 
because of the effect of a reservation. On Canada’s declaration accepting the jurisdiction 
of the ICJ, filed pursuant to the Optional Clause (Article 36(2)) of the Statute of the ICJ,41 
it had placed a reservation excluding those “. . . disputes arising out of or concerning
Noting that Canada will limit its catch in 2+3K to 7,000t and in 
3LMNO to 3 ,0 0 0 t;
HAS AGREED to implement its decisions for 1995 with respect to 2+3 
Greenland halibut by specifying that:
(a) Sub-area 2+3 shall, as regards the management o f Greenland 
halibut, be geographically divided as
follows:
-2+3K
-3LM N O
(b) The T AC for 3LMNO shall be 20,000t.
NAFO Summary Report 2002, supra note 8, at 61.
40 See Application Instituting Proceedings, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), International Court o f  
Justice (hereinafter ICJ) website (visited Sept. 7, 2003), at http://www.icj- 
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iec/iecffame.htm.
41 St a t u t e  o f th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  Co u r t  of Ju st ic e , art. 36(2). Article 36(2) o f  the Statute o f the ICJ 
provides:
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as 
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state 
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction o f the Court in all legal disputes 
concerning:
a. the interpretation o f  a treaty;
b. any question o f  international law;
c. the existence o f  any fact which, if established, would constitute a 
breach o f  an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent o f the reparation to be made for the breach o f an 
international obligation.
Id.
For a discussion o f optional clause declarations and the potential o f reservations to limit the ICJ’s 
contentious jurisdiction see chapter 1, supra note 111.
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conservation and management measures taken by Canada with respect to vessels fishing 
in the [NAFO’s] Regulatory Area . . . and the enforcement of such measures."42
The inability of the ICJ to reach a final judgment in the Spain-Canada fishery case 
is yet another example of a reservation, albeit to a unilateral document and not a treaty, 
limiting a potentially important application of international law. To be certain, Canada’s 
reservation on its Optional Clause declaration as well as the EC’s 1995 reservation to 
NAFO’s allocations of Greenland halibut were perfectly legal, but this is not to suggest 
that these reservations did not have deleterious effects upon marine conservation and the 
ability to adjudicate a resulting dispute.
To return to NAFO objections specifically, it has been suggested that the ability 
of states to opt out of conservation measures deemed desirable by the other members of 
the organization has rendered NAFO a failure.43 Distressed by further declines in 
Northwest Atlantic commercial stocks, several Canadian officials, for example, agree 
with this characterization.44 On the other hand, such a sweeping condemnation is perhaps 
premature given the ongoing nature of NAFO’s work and further developments in the
42 ICJ Press Release 98/41, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iec/iecframe.htm (visited 
Sept. 7, 2003). For a more detailed discussion o f the contours o f the proceedings o f the Spain-Canada 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case before the ICJ see Howard S. Schiffrnan, UNCLOS and Marine Wildlife 
Disputes: Big Splash or Barely a Ripple?, 4 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 257, 259-262 (2001) (arguing 
that the often cumbersome jurisdictional requirements o f the ICJ may render it less useful than other fora to 
address marine wildlife disputes).
43 See Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference on Straddling and 
Highly Migratory' Fish Stocks Changes the Law o f  Fishing on the High Seas, 26 C al. W. INT’L L. J. 313,
319 (1996). “ When a state made an objection, it was no longer legally bound by that provision. Although 
this made it easier to get initial cooperation, the ease with which states could object out o f management 
measures led to NAFO’s failure.” Id.
44 News Release, Government o f  Newfoundland and Labrador, Fisheries and Aquaculture, Minister 
Confirms that NAFO is a Completely Ineffective Organization for Newfoundland and Labrador (Sept. 20,
2002), available at http://www.gov.nf.ca/releases/2002/fishaq/0920n02.htm (visited Sept. 10, 2003) 
(arguing that lack o f compliance and enforcement has rendered NAFO unable to manage the fishery 
resources on the nose and tail o f  the Grand Banks). This same sentiment has often been expressed in 
Canadian Parliamentary debate. Frustration with NAFO is driven by the very real economic impact stock 
depletion has had on the areas o f  Newfoundland and Labrador.
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law of the sea. In particular, the Fish Stocks Treaty empowers regional fishery 
organizations, but it remains to be seen whether this elevates NAFO regulation to more 
effective levels. Despite this possibility there can be little doubt that use of the objection 
procedure has had a noticeably negative effect on the ability of NAFO to fulfill its 
mandate.
Concern about the impact of the NAFO objection procedure needs to be 
understood in the larger context of problems facing commercial fish stocks alluded to at 
the beginning of chapter 1. These include the general over-capacity of fishing fleets and 
the subsidies of those fleets by governments, weak enforcement measures and free riders. 
While these other serious concerns allow one to conclude that reservations are not the 
only impediment to effective conservation and management, they do suggest that 
extensive use of the objection procedure further undermines the effectiveness of 
measures adopted by the regime.
The key commercial stocks managed by NAFO remain in poor shape. Greenland 
cod is considered to be outside safe biological limits.43 The cod fishery is still so severely 
depressed Canadian fishermen burned the Canadian flag in May 2003 to protest the loss
<1 f \of their industry. These facts coupled with the acrimonious Estai crisis are compelling 
signs that the NAFO objection procedure has had a detrimental effect on the success of 
the regime.
The ongoing pressure on valuable stocks energized a proposal to modify Article 
XII to limit the use of objections. The proposed change was first introduced by Canada in
45 See Greenland cod (ICES Subarea XIV and NAFO Subarea 1), available at 
http://wwvv.ices.dk/committe/acfm/comwork/report/2003shy/may/cod-ewgr.pdf (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
46 Don MacDonald, Out with the C od and in with the Crude, Oil that is, THE HERALD (Halifax), May 2, 
2003, available at http://www.herald.ns.ca/stories/2003/05/02/f0pinion.html (visited Oct. 1, 2003).
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1992 in the form of a protocol and debated through 2001. It would have required states 
availing themselves of the objection procedure to give a statement of the reasons for the 
objection and to declare what conservation and management measures it would take on 
behalf of the affected species.47 The proposal would also have initiated a NAFO dispute 
settlement procedure clarifying the mechanisms available to states that find themselves in 
a dispute over NAFO regulation (Spain and Canada, for example).48
As of 2005 the proposed amendment had not been adopted in part because the 
parties had yet to determine whether this should be implemented by way of a treaty 
amendment or the adoption of a protocol. The matter of NAFO reform, including 
improvements to the decision-making process, was on the agenda of the 27th annual 
meeting of the NAFO General Council in 2005.49 The proposed amendment and the 
negotiations about reform signal a significant level of concern about the impact of 
objections within the regime. A review of NAFO’s history suggests this concern is 
warranted.
NAFO’s challenges, the Spain-Canada dispute in particular, highlighted the need 
to address flaws in the management of straddling and migratory stocks and served as a 
catalyst for the development of the Fish Stocks Treaty. Key substantive provisions of the 
Fish Stocks Treaty that discuss the duty to cooperate will be addressed in chapter 4.
47 See NAFO ANNUAL REPORT 19-25 (2001), available at
http://www.nafo.ca/publications/frames/PuFrRep.html (visited Jan. 1, 2004). For a discussion o f the 
original proposal see Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview o f  Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: 
The Nonsustainable Nature o f  High Seas Fisheries, 25 OCEAN DEV. &  INT’L L. 255,302-303 (1994).
48 See NAFO 2001 Annual Report, supra note 47, at 24-25. The text o f  a proposed amendment on the 
agenda o f the 2001 annual meeting was largely the product o f efforts by the NAFO Working Group on 
Dispute Settlement Procedures.
49 See NAFO Report o f  the General Council, 27th Annual Meeting, Sept. 19-23, 2005, NAFO/Doc. 05/4, 
Serial No. N5205, Annex 17. At the 27th Annual Meeting, while stressing the importance o f the 
discussions on reform, the EU representative (John Spencer) noted the “debates on dispute settlement 
procedures . . .  dragged on over years even though all but one party agreed on a text.” Id. at Annex 4.
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Ultimately, it is the concept of international cooperation that is affected by use of a 
treaty’s objection procedure. NAFO is a key fishery regime where the objection 
procedure of Article XII has been heavily utilized. In contrast, ICCAT is a fishery regime 
where the parties have not availed themselves of the objection procedure nearly as often.
II. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT)50
ICCAT is the product of the 1966 International Convention for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT Treaty).51 It is the only regional fishery organization 
responsible for the conservation and management of tuna and tuna-like species in the 
Atlantic Ocean and the adjacent seas. There are approximately 30 species of chief 
concern to the organization.53 As of June 2006, there were 42 parties to the ICCAT 
Treaty including both developed and developing states.54 ICCAT holds regular meetings 
every two years and special meetings as necessary.55
The organizational structure of ICCAT is quite complex with several key 
components, including a Council responsible for tasks between sessions; a Secretariat 
coordinating and facilitating the work of the regime; a Compliance Committee; a 
Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS); and four Panels, each concerned 
with different species of tuna.56 The SCRS is the branch responsible for providing the
50 International Convention for the Conservation o f  Atlantic Tunas, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (entered into force 
Mar. 21, 1969) [hereinafter ICCAT Treaty],
51 Id.
52 Id. at Preamble & art. I.
53 See ICCAT website, Introduction, at http://www.iccat.int (last visited June 10, 2005).
54 Id. at Contracting Parties (last visited June 10, 2006).
55 ICCAT Treaty, supra  note 50, at art. 111(4).
56 For a review o f the organizational structure and decision-making apparatus o f ICCAT see Internet Guide 
to International Fisheries Law, at http://www.oceanlaw.net/orgs/iccat.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2003).
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scientific advice upon which ICCAT predicates its decisions.57 The principal way ICCAT
• • c oundertakes to achieve its objectives is the adoption of recommendations. Decisions by 
ICCAT are taken by majority vote,59 and recommendations are binding upon its members 
unless they object.60
The objection procedure established by Article VIII of the ICCAT Treaty contains 
more complex requirements than most treaties. Article VIII provides:
1. a) The Commission may, on the basis of scientific 
evidence, make recommendations designed to maintain the 
populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes that may be taken 
in the Convention area at levels which will permit the 
maximum sustainable catch. These recommendations shall 
be applicable to the Contracting Parties under the 
conditions laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
b) The recommendations referred to above shall be made:
(i) at the initiative of the Commission if an appropriate 
Panel has not been established or with the approval of at 
least two-thirds of all the Contracting Parties if an 
appropriate Panel has been established;
(ii) on the proposal of an appropriate Panel if such a Panel 
has been established;
(iii) on the proposal of the appropriate Panels if the 
recommendation in question relates to more than one 
geographic area, species or group of species.
2. Each recommendation made under paragraph 1 of this 
Article shall become effective for all Contracting Parties 
six months after the date of the notification from the 
Commission transmitting the recommendation to the 
Contracting Parties, except as provided in paragraph 3 of 
this Article.
3. a) If any Contracting Party in the case of a 
recommendation made under paragraph 1 (b) (i) above, or
57 ICCAT website, Management, at http://www.iccat.es (visited Sept. 16, 2003).
58 ICCAT Treaty, supra note 50, at art. VIII.
59 Id. at art. 111(3).
60 Id. at art. VIII.
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any Contracting Party member of a Panel concerned in the 
case of a recommendation made under paragraph 1 (b) (ii) 
or (iii) above, presents to the Commission an objection to 
such recommendation within the six months period 
provided for in paragraph 2 above, the recommendation 
shall not become effective for an additional sixty days.
b) Thereupon any other Contracting Party may present an 
objection prior to the expiration of the additional sixty days 
period, or within forty-five days of the date of the 
notification of an objection made by another Contracting 
Party within such additional sixty days, whichever date 
shall be the later.
c) The recommendation shall become effective at the end 
of the extended period or periods for objection, except for 
those Contracting Parties that have presented an objection.
d) However, if a recommendation has met with an 
objection presented by only one or less than one-fourth of 
the Contracting Parties, in accordance with subparagraphs
(a) and (b) above, the Commission shall immediately notify 
the Contracting Party or Parties having presented such 
objection that it is to be considered as having no effect.
e) In the case referred to in subparagraph (d) above the 
Contracting Party or Parties concerned shall have an 
additional period of sixty days from the date of said 
notification in which to reaffirm their objection. On the 
expiry of this period the recommendation shall become 
effective, except with respect to any Contracting Party 
having presented an objection and reaffirmed it within the 
delay provided for.
f) If a recommendation has met with objection from more 
than one-fourth but less than the majority of the 
Contracting Parties, in accordance with subparagraphs (a) 
and (b) above, the recommendation shall become effective 
for the Contracting Parties that have not presented an 
objection thereto.
g) If objections have been presented by a majority of the 
Contracting Parties the recommendation shall not become 
effective.
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4. Any Contracting Party objecting to a recommendation 
may at any time withdraw that objection, and the 
recommendation shall become effective with respect to 
such Contracting Party immediately if the recommendation 
is already in effect, or at such time as it may become 
effective under the terms of this Article.
5. The Commission shall notify each Contracting Party 
immediately upon receipt of each objection and of each 
withdrawal of an objection, and of the entry into force of 
any recommendation.61
There are two particularly noteworthy features of Article VIII. The first, like the 
IWC (discussed below), is the long period of time that states have to file their objections. 
The second is something of a contingency system that varies the effect of the objection 
depending upon how many states object and whether or not they affirm their objection.
With regard to the length of time in which objections may be registered, a 
recommendation ordinarily becomes effective six months after it is transmitted to the 
parties. Should any state present an objection, however, the time is extended by 60 
days. In this case, as other states are notified of the objection any other party wishing to 
object may do so within that 60 days or up to 45 days after the notification of the 
objection, whichever is later.64
The ICC AT Treaty also makes the effect of an objection contingent upon the 
number of states that support it. If only one state or less than one-fourth of the state 
parties object to a recommendation, those objections have no effect65 unless the state
61 Id.
62 Id. at art. VIII(2).
63 Id. at art. VIII(3)(a).
64 Id. at art. VIII(3)(b). This expanding timeframe in which to additional parties may file objections has 
been referred to as “leap-frogging.” See J u d ith  S w a n , F o o d  a n d  A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n iz a t io n  F ish e r ie s  
C ir c u la r  N o . 995, D e c is io n -M a k in g  in  R e g io n a l  F is h e r y  B o d ie s  o r  A r r a n g e m e n ts :  T h e  E v o lv in g  
R o le  o f  R F B s a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A g r e e m e n t  o n  D e c is io n -M a k in g  P r o c e s s e s  (Rome: FAO, 2004) 
(hereinafter FAO C i r c u l a r  N o . 995).
65ICCAT Treaty, supra  note 50, at art. VIII(3)(d).
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reaffirms its objection within 60 days.66 This procedure of re-affirmation is not required if 
a recommendation is met with objections by more than one-fourth of the state parties but
• • A7less than a majority. If a majority of states object, a highly improbable scenario 
considering a majority of states are required to adopt a recommendation, then the 
recommendation does not become effective at all.68
The requirement of re-affirmation of the objection where the number of objecting 
states is one-fourth or less indicates a degree of added pressure on those states choosing 
to avail themselves of the objection procedure when they are in a relatively small 
minority. Carroz and Roche conclude the requirement of re-affirmation in these cases is 
to discourage other states from immediately filing additional objections.69
By all accounts use of Article VIII has been extremely light. From when the 
ICCAT Treaty entered into force in 1969 through 2005, ICCAT had passed 
approximately 250 recommendations, resolutions and miscellaneous guidelines with the
7 0vast majority adopted since 1995. A survey of the measures adopted by ICCAT for 
w hich information is available as of June 2006, indicates that only three have 
encountered formal objections. These results are summarized in Table-2.
ICCAT is a regime where consensus, or at least the lack of formal disagreement, 
on conservation measures, is achieved with regularity. This has been attributed to the 
relatively high number and diversity of participants in the scientific processes of stock
66 Id. at art. VIII(3)(e).
67 Id. at art. VIII(3)(f).
68 Id. at art. VIII(3Xg)-
69 J.E. Carroz & A.G. Roche, The Proposed International Commission fo r  the Conservation o f  Atlantic 
Tuna, 61 Am. J. In t ’L L. 673 ,689  (1967).
70 See ICCAT website, Management, at http://www.iccat.int (visited June 10, 2006).
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assessments.71 Peer pressure among the high number of participants decreases the
possibility that a few polarizing positions will result in deadlock.72
Despite its infrequent use, the objection procedure has been the subject of debate
in ICCAT. At the 2001 ICCAT meeting two proposals were presented expressing
concern about the objection procedure.73 These were combined into one resolution for
discussion at the Plenary Session at the 2002 meeting.74 The draft resolution, introduced
by Canada, the EC, Japan and the US,75 read as follows:
Draft Resolution by ICCAT Regarding the Presentation 
of Objections in the Context of Promoting Effective 
Conservation and Management Measures Adopted by 
ICCAT.
Recalling that according to the Convention, the objective of 
the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is to conserve the resources of 
tuna and tuna-like fishes of the Atlantic Ocean so as to 
maintain their populations at levels that will permit the 
maximum sustainable catch for food and other purposes;
Conscious of Article VIII of the convention which provides 
that Contracting Parties may present objections to 
recommendations adopted by the Commission that are 
designed to maintain the populations of tuna and tuna-like 
fishes at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable 
catch; Concerned that the presentation of objections by 
ICCAT Contracting Parties has increased;
Considering that the presentation of an objection does not 
exempt a Contracting Party from the obligation to 
cooperate with Contracting Parties to ICCAT and pursue 
the objectives of ICCAT as regards the conservation of 
tuna and tuna-like fishes;
71 Jean-Jacques Maquire, Southern Bluefm Tuna Dispute, in CURRENT FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 211 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton 
Moore eds., The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 2000).
11 Id.
73 See ICCAT REPORT FOR BIENNIAL PERIOD 2002-2003 (PART I), 42 (Plenary Agenda Item 16.1.1) (2002), 
available at http://www.iccat.es, ICCAT Publications (visited Sept. 18, 2003).
74 Id.
75 Id. Plenary Agenda Item 16.1.2, at 42.
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And further considering that in conformity with the aims of 
the Commission and in view of the rights accorded by 
Article VIII of the Convention and taking account of the 
fundamental obligation of all Contracting Parties not to 
undermine the ICCAT objectives, it is essential that the 
terms relating to the presentation of objections be clearly 
defined;
The International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) resolves that:
1. Each Contracting Party that presents an objection 
pursuant to Article VIII of the Convention will provide to 
the Commission, at the time of presenting its objection, the 
reasons for its objection and the alternative conservation 
and management measures that it will adopt to ensure that 
ICCAT objectives are not undermined.
2. At each Commission meeting thereafter while its 
objection is maintained, the Contracting Party concerned 
will communicate to the Commission the alternative 
conservation and management measures it has adopted
to respect the objectives of ICCAT and their effectiveness.
3. The Executive Secretary should provide all Contracting 
Parties with the details of all information and 
clarifications that have been received in conformity to 
paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. Each year the Commission should consider the effectiveness of the 
measures identified in paragraph 2.76
Although this draft resolution failed to pass,77 the states that supported it
recognized that an unrestrained application of Article VIII could harm the objectives of
the convention. Significantly, the proposed resolution suggested limitations on the use of
objections; it indicated that use of the objection procedure does not exempt states from
76 Id. Draft Resolution by ICCAT Regarding the Presentation o f Objections in the Context o f  Promoting 
Effective Conservation and Management Measures Adopted by ICCAT, Annex 9.4, at 207 [hereinafter 
Draft Resolution].
77 Id. Plenary Agenda Item 16.1.4, at 43.
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78their duty to cooperate under the regime. Furthermore, the draft resolution would have
• • 7 0required those states invoking Article VIII to provide the reasons for their objection and
communicate the “alternative conservation and management measures” that they would
8 0adopt to respect ICCAT objectives and effectiveness. These alternative measures would
81then be subject to annual review.
In their support of the resolution, the US and EC emphasized the need to balance 
the right to object with the need to have effective conservation and management
87measures. In his opening remarks at the plenary session the delegate from Korea 
likewise expressed support for the substance of the proposed resolution. The Korean 
delegate stated that although the objection procedure should be necessary to secure the
8Trights of minority states, there was a possibility of its overuse. Therefore minority states 
should be very cautious in admitting the procedure, provide reasons for doing so and not 
undermine ICCAT conservation and management measures.84 Brazil, Morocco and 
Mexico, on the other hand, opposed the resolution indicating that any alteration of the
85right to object must be achieved only with an amendment to the ICCAT Treaty. 
Ultimately, the lack of agreement prevented the adoption of the draft resolution.
Despite the concerns that drove the unsuccessful draft resolution, the low activity 
under Article VIII renders it impossible to conclude that its use has undermined the
78 Id. Draft Resolution, Preamble, at 207.
79 Id. Draft Resolution, para. 1, at 207.
80 Id. Draft Resolution, para. 2, at 207.
81 Id. Draft Resolution para. 4, at 207.
82 Id. Plenary Agenda Item 16.1.3, at 42.
83 Id. Statements to the Plenary Session, Annex 4.1, Opening Statement by the Delegate from Korea, at 77.
84 Id.
85 Id. Plenary Agenda Item 16.1.3, at 42.
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ICCAT regime. Nevertheless, tuna remains one of the most exploited and overfished of
commercial stocks. The FAO noted this fact in SOFIA 2002.86 SOFIA 2002 reported:
Except for skipjack tuna in some areas, most tuna stocks 
are fully exploited in all oceans, and some are overfished or 
even depleted. Overcapacity of the tuna fleets has been 
pointed out as a major problem in several areas. Of 
particular concern are the stocks of Northern and Southern 
bluefin tunas in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans.
These are reported to be overfished and, in most cases, 
severely depleted. (Of the tuna stocks mentioned, ICCAT is 
responsible for the Northern bluefin tuna)87
Regardless of whether or not the ICCAT objection procedure has negatively 
impacted the regime to date, given the poor status of tuna stocks generally and the 
concern by some ICCAT members for abuse of the objection procedure, some additional 
precaution seems warranted. Even though the draft resolution that was debated in 2002 
was defeated, the precautionary measures suggested by it may signal a new direction in 
how objection procedures will operate in those regimes managing increasingly depleted 
stocks.
86 See SO FIA  2002, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND 
A q u a c u l t u r e  (2002), available at
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=7docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e00.htm [hereinafter 
SOFIA 2002],
87 Id, (parenthetical added). The Status o f  Fishery Resources, Marine Resources, available at 
http://www.fao.Org/docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm#P746_35154 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003). Even the 
relatively healthy status o f  the skipjack was reported with a cautionary note in SOFIA 2004. See Fo o d  a n d  
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 32-33 (2004) 
[hereinafter SOFIA 2004] (indicating that although the skipjack is one o f the top species in world fisheries 
production and some potential remains for increases in catches in certain areas the status o f skipjack stocks 
overall is highly uncertain).
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III. The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)88
The NEAFC of today is the successor of previous organizations that were
O Q
established to manage the fisheries of the Northeast Atlantic. The first was called 
simply the Permanent Commission and was formed in 1953 following a UK-led 
conference on overfishing.90 The Permanent Commission was mainly concerned with 
mesh size and fishing gear and soon after it began operation it was apparent it was 
insufficient to adequately manage Northeast Atlantic stocks.91 Additional diplomatic 
efforts gave rise to the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention that produced the first
QTNEAFC to succeed the Permanent Commission. The new organization enjoyed 
additional and stricter powers with which to better conserve and manage fish stocks.94 In 
1969 the NEAFC recommended a total ban on salmon fishing outside of national waters 
and in 1975 recommended a ban on industrial herring fishing in the area under its 
control.95
After member countries of the EEC withdrew from the NEAFC and the 
development of the 200nm EEZ, a brand new treaty was negotiated in 1980 providing for
88 The Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission [hereinafter NEAFC] was created by the Convention on 
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129 (entered into force 
Mar. 17, 1982), available at http://www.neafc.org [hereinafter NEAFC Treaty].
89 See A Short History o f  the NEAFC, at http://www.neafc.org (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter 
NEAFC Short History].
90 Id. The Permanent Commission was technically formed under the 1946 Convention for the Regulation of 
Meshes o f Fishing Nets and the Size Limits o f Fish. Information on the NEAFC, unofficial distribution of 
the NEAFC Secretariat (on file with author), at 4.
91 See NEAFC Short History, supra  note 89.
92 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S. 157 (entered into force 1963) 
(modification in effect June 4, 1974).
93 See NEAFC Short History, supra  note 89.
94 See id.
95 Id.
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the EEC to be a signatory.96 The Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the 
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries (NEAFC Treaty)97 established a new fishery organization, 
also with the name NEAFC, in November 1982.98 As of June 2006 the members of 
NEAFC were: Denmark (in respect of Faroe Islands and Greenland), Estonia, the EU, 
Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation.99 Most of the NEAFC Convention Area 
consists of states’ national waters but three large areas of the high seas comprise its 
Regulatory Area.100 The fish stocks managed by the NEAFC include redfish, blue 
whiting, mackerel and herring.101 In 1998, in an attempt to better serve the objectives of 
the NEAFC Treaty, the parties agreed to establish an independent secretariat based in 
London.102
The NEAFC Treaty provides that decisions taken by the NEAFC are to be by 
simple majority103 except for matters designated to require a “qualified majority” of two-
104thirds of the members present and voting. The adoption of recommendations 
concerning control measures relating to fisheries outside of a member state’s national 
jurisdiction is a matter specifically requiring a qualified majority.105 The NEAFC may 
also make recommendations concerning fisheries conducted within an area of national 
jurisdiction of a member state provided that state requests it to do so and the measure
96 See North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, Convention, available at http://www.neafc.org/ (visited 
Sept. 23, 2003) [hereinafter NEAFC Commission, Convention].
97 NEAFC Treaty, supra  note 88.
98 See NEAFC, Short History, supra  note 89; NEAFC Commission, Convention, supra note 96.
99 The current list o f  NEAFC members is available on the NEAFC website at http://www.neafc.org (last 
visited June 10, 2006).
100 A full geographic description and map o f  the NEAFC Convention Area and Regulatory Area is available 
at id.
101 A list o f  species managed by the NEAFC is available at id.
102 See id.
103 NEAFC Treaty, supra  note 88, at art. 3(9).
104 Id.
105 Id. at arts. 5(1) & 8(1).
96
receives that state’s affirmative vote.106 In exercising its functions the NEAFC seeks to
ensure consistency between recommendations addressed to those fisheries occurring 
within national waters and those beyond.107 To help insure that decisions are based on the 
best scientific evidence available, the NEAFC is advised by the International Council for 
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).108
Recommendations of the NEAFC are binding on its member states.109 States 
objecting to a recommendation, however, are not bound.110 Article 12 of the NEAFC 
Treaty establishes the objection procedure. It provides:
1. A recommendation shall become binding on the 
Contracting Parties subject to the provisions of this Article 
and shall enter into force on a date determined by the 
Commission, which shall not be before 30 days after the 
expiration of the period or periods of objection provided for 
in this Article.
2. (a) Any Contracting Party may, within 50 days of the 
date of notification of a recommendation adopted under 
paragraph 1 of Article 5, under paragraph 1 of Article 8 or 
under paragraph 1 of Article 9, object thereto. In the event 
of such an objection, any other Contracting Party may 
similarly object within 40 days after receiving notification
106 Id. at arts. 6(1) & 8(2).
107 Id. at art. 2.
108 Id. at art. 14.
In the interest o f  the optimal performance o f the functions set out in 
Articles 4, 5 and 6, the Commission shall seek information and advice 
from the International Council for the Exploration o f the Sea. Such 
information and advice shall be sought on matters related to the 
Commission's activities and falling within the competence o f the 
Council including information and advice on the biology and 
population dynamics o f the fish species concerned, the state o f  the fish 
stocks, the effect o f  fishing on those stocks, and measures for their 
conservation and management.
Id. at art. 14(1). The International Council for the Exploration o f the Sea (ICES) is an 
intergovernmental organization devoted to coordination and promotion o f  marine 
research in the North Atlantic. See ICES website, at http://www.ices.dk (visited Sept. 26, 
2003).
109 Id. at art. 12(1).
110 Id. at art. 12(2)(b).
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of that objection. If any objection is made within this 
further period of 40 days, other Contracting Parties are 
allowed a final period of 40 days after receiving 
notification of that objection in which to lodge objections.
(b) A recommendation shall not become binding on a 
Contracting Party which has objected thereto.
(c) If three or more Contracting Parties have objected to a 
recommendation it shall not become binding on any 
Contracting Party.
(d) Except when a recommendation is not binding on any 
Contracting Party according to the provisions of 
subparagraph (c), a Contracting Party which has objected to 
a recommendation may at any time withdraw that objection 
and shall then be bound by the recommendation within 70 
days, or as from the date determined by the Commission 
under paragraph 1, whichever is the later.
(e) If a recommendation is not binding on any Contracting 
Party, two or more Contracting Parties may nevertheless at 
any time agree among themselves to give effect thereto, in 
which event they shall immediately notify the Commission 
accordingly.
3. In the case of a recommendation adopted under 
paragraph 1 of Article 6, under paragraph 2 of Article 8, or 
under paragraph 2 of Article 9, only the Contracting Party 
exercising fisheries jurisdiction in the area in question may, 
within 60 days of the date of notification of the 
recommendation, object thereto, in which case the 
recommendation shall not become binding on any 
Contracting Party.
4. The Commission shall notify the Contracting Parties of 
any objection and withdrawal immediately upon the receipt 
thereof, and of the entry into force of any recommendation 
and of the entry into effect of any agreement made pursuant 
to subparagraph (e) of paragraph 2. 11
The procedure for objection under the NEAFC Treaty is similar to other fishery
treaties discussed in this chapter. Upon being notified that a recommendation has been
111 Id. at art. 12.
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adopted a state may lodge an objection within 50 days.112 Where this occurs any other 
state may also object within 40 days of notification that there has been an objection.113 If 
any additional states object within this additional 40-day period a further and final period 
of 40 days is added to allow other states to object to the measure.114 If three or more 
states object to a recommendation it will fail to bind any states in the regime.115 Absent 
this, a recommendation will enter into force and bind all non-objecting states no sooner 
than 30 days after the expiration of any and all objection periods.116 Article 12(3) 
provides that where the NEAFC adopts a recommendation directly concerning an area 
within a state’s fishery jurisdiction (i.e., EEZ), that state has 60 days from the date of
11 7notification in which to object. Should a state withdraw its objection, the 
recommendation becomes binding on that state after it is withdrawn or as contemplated
1 1 O
in Article 12(1) whichever is later. Article 13 provides that even where a 
recommendation is in force for a state, after the expiration of one year, a party may notify 
the Commission that it no longer wishes to be bound by that recommendation.119
From 1982 until 1995 the NEAFC did not adopt any conservation measures of 
consequence. Since 1995, however, at its Annual Meetings and several Extraordinary 
Meetings, the NEAFC has consistently adopted recommendations including catch quotas 
and allocations on behalf of its member states. From 1996 through 2005, NEAFC 
member states had registered a total of 30 objections applying to 20 separate 
recommendations. These are summarized in Table-3. Of these 20 recommendations 11
1,2 M at art. 12(2Xa).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 M at art. 12(2)(c).
116 Id. at art. 12(1).
1,7 M at art. 12(3).
118 M at art. 12(2)(d).
1,9 M at art. 13.
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applied to redfish, eight applied to mackerel and one applied to Atlanto-Scandian herring. 
Of the 30 objections, the Russian Federation exercised its right to object 14 times, Iceland 
13 times and Poland three times.
Not surprisingly, among the issues that have led to disagreements in the NEAFC, 
and consequently the inability to achieve consensus, is the catch quotas of individual 
states vis-a-vis key stocks. For example, Russia’s 1998 objection to the distribution of the
redfish TAC was based on its assertion that it was historically entitled to 33% of that
120catch. In that same year, Iceland asserted that proposed management measures for 
mackerel were unacceptable because it believed it should be treated as a coastal state with
191regard to the mackerel stock. As reflected by Table-3, mackerel regulation has been the
subject of several Icelandic objections. In all likelihood Iceland’s objection to the
mackerel quota on this basis will be repeated in future years.
Concerning redfish, Iceland is clearly on record as favoring a two-tiered
management scheme for fish caught at the higher and lower depths. Rejecting proposals
agreeable to all other NEAFC members, Iceland entered the following statement at the
Eighteenth Annual meeting:
Iceland expresses grave concern over the failure of NEAFC 
to agree on adhering to the scientific advice from ICES 
with regard to the management of oceanic Sebastes 
mentella [redfish] and deep sea Sebastes mentella in the 
Irminger Sea.
The lack of support for the relevant Coastal States' 
proposal to establish two separate management systems for 
these stock or stock components, as proposed by ICES, is a 
matter of great disappointment to Iceland, as it is most 
urgent to achieve responsible management of the stocks in
120 Summary Report o f  the Seventeenth NEAFC Annual Meeting, para. 19, available at 
http://www.neafc.org (visited Sept. 26, 2003).
121 Id. at para. 40.
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question. Furthermore, Iceland regrets that the Contracting 
Parties were not willing to do further work with a view to 
adopting an agreement at an Extraordinary Meeting before 
the start of the next fishing season.
Iceland will continue to work for a better understanding of 
the state of redfish stocks in the Irminger Sea and remains
convinced that they can only be managed successfully with122two separate management systems.
Despite such disagreements among member states and use of the objection 
procedure in the case of key species, according to the 2002 SOFIA Report, annual 
catches in the Northeast Atlantic are relatively stable, albeit at a high level.123 Serious 
management efforts by the NEAFC are fairly recent and therefore a full assessment of the 
success of the regime will not be possible for some time. A review of available 
information pertaining to NEAFC stocks, however, reveals some notable features. In 
particular, the work of the regime has been, and continues to be, limited by scientific 
uncertainty.
With regard to blue whiting, in 2003 ICES indicated that uncertainty of the stock 
size rendered it unable to assess the medium-term projection and evaluate harvest control 
measures.124 Similarly, in that same year ICES claimed there was insufficient information
19^to determine the distribution of the redfish stock. While uncertainty is a factor in
122 Summary Report o f  the Eighteenth NEAFC Annual Meeting, para. 28, available at 
http://www.neafc.org (visited Sept. 26, 2003).
123 See SOFIA 2002, supra  note 86, at The Status o f  Fishery Resources, Marine Fisheries; see also Figure 
7, Capture fisheries production in marine areas (Northeast Atlantic), available at 
http://www.fao.Org/docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm#P40_12993 (visited Sept. 26, 2003). SOFIA 2004 
reported that most commercial species o f the Northeast Atlantic were fully exploited, overexploited or 
depleted. SOFIA 2004, supra note 87, at 34 (figure 20).
124 See Answer to request from NEAFC concerning blue whiting to provide medium-term projections and 
to evaluate the harvest control rules, available at
http://www.ices.dk/committe/acfm/comwork/report/2003shy/may/blue%20whiting%20request%20NEAFC 
.pdf (visited Sept. 29, 2003).
125 See Answer to Special Request from NEAFC on Redfish, available at
http://www.ices.dk/committe/acfm/comwork/report/2003shy/may/smn-spec_req.pdf (visited Sept. 29,
2003).
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almost all environmental regimes, its impact can only be multiplied by states that refuse 
to be part of collective conservation and management measures.126
Concerning mackerel127 and redfish,128 the recurring objections by NEAFC 
member states has already been identified by one observer as a possible negative factor in 
the NEAFC’s management of those stocks.129 Iceland’s ongoing objection to the 
mackerel management scheme arises from its assertion that it should be treated like a 
coastal state.130 This objection, however, has no consequences for the fishery.131 Its 
objection to oceanic redfish measures concerns the unwillingness of the NEAFC to adopt 
two separate management schemes for redfish caught at different depths in the Irminger
132Sea. Adequate resolution of these issues could go a long way toward reducing 
utilization of the objection procedure. Continued use of the objection procedure will not 
likely be helpful in either achieving better scientific data or developing successful 
conservation and management schemes by the NEAFC in future years.
At the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting in 2004 NEAFC unanimously adopted a 
recommendation, proposed by the European Community, requiring member states
126 See Robin R. Churchill, Managing Straddling Fish Stocks in the North-East Atlantic: A Multiplicity o f  
Instruments and Regime Linkages-but How Effective a Management?, in Stokke, supra note 27 at 235.
127 See Table-4 for applicable objections by Iceland.
128 See Table-4 for applicable objections by Iceland and Russian Federation.
129 See Churchill, supra  note 126.
While it is still premature to make any considered evaluation o f the 
redfish regime, there must be worries that the regime will not provide 
effective management o f oceanic redfish. These worries are increased 
by the fact that a major fishing nation, Russia [has chosen] to stand 
outside the NEAFC recommendations . . .
Id. at 262.
130 See supra text accompanying note 121.
It needs to be clearly resolved whether mackerel are found within 
Iceland’s 200-mile zone; resolution o f  this question would 
hopefully bring Iceland into the regim e.. .  .[T]he mackerel regime 
is essentially flawed as long as Russia, the principal high seas 
fishing state, remains outside the regime.
Churchill, supra note 126, at 265.
131 E-mail from Kjartan Hoydal, NEAFC Secretary, to author (May 22, 2006) (on file with author).
132 See supra text accompanying note 122.
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entering objections under Article 12 or a termination of acceptance of a recommendation 
under Article 13 to present a reason for doing so as well as a description of the alternative 
conservation and management strategies it intends to pursue in lieu of the 
recommendation.133 This recommendation provided:
A Contracting Party which presents an objection to a 
recommendation in accordance with Article 12 or gives 
notice of the termination of its acceptance of a 
recommendation in accordance with Article 13, shall give a 
statement of the reasons for its objection or notice and a 
declaration of its intentions following the objection or 
notice, including a description of any alternative 
conservation and management measures which the 
Contracting Party intends to take or has already taken.134
Requiring states to provide reasons for their objections is practical and appears to be
growing in popularity. Chapter 5 will explore the value of the approach.
IV. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)135
The IOTC was created in 1996 under the framework of the FAO when the 
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC Treaty)
1 3Aentered into force. The IOTC is concerned with those species that migrate in and out of
133 Agenda Item 12, Amendment o f  the Convention and dispute settlement, Report o f the Twenty-Third 
Annual Meeting, available at http://www.neafc.org/reports/annual- 
meeting/docs/full_reports/23neafc_annualmeeting_report_2004.pdf (visited Oct. 23, 2005).
134 Annex K, Amendment o f  the Convention on Dispute Settlement, Report o f the Twenty-Third Annual 
Meeting, available at http://www.neafc.org/reports/annual-
meeting/docs/full_reports/23neafc_annualmeeting_annexes_2004.pdf (visited Oct. 23, 2005).
135 The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [hereinafter IOTC] was created by the Agreement for the 
Establishment o f the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Nov. 25, 1993, 1927 U.N.T.S. 329 (entered into 
force Mar. 27, 1996) [hereinafter IOTC Treaty], available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/iotc.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2003).
136 Id. The establishment o f  the IOTC is provided for in Article I o f the IOTC Treaty. Id. at art. I.
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the Indian Ocean and its adjacent seas.137 The major species under the IOTC’s mandate 
include yellowfin tuna, skipjack, southern bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna and swordfish.138 
Membership is generally open to coastal states in the Indian Ocean area and those states 
whose vessels fish in those waters for species covered by the IOTC Treaty.139 The 
objective of the IOTC is to facilitate cooperation among its member states “with a view 
to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization 
of stocks covered by [the IOTC Treaty] and encouraging sustainable development of 
fisheries based on such stocks.”140
To achieve this objective the IOTC is responsible for keeping under review the 
“conditions and trends” of its stocks and to gather, analyze and disseminate scientific 
information, catch and other statistics.141 As with other regional fishery organizations, the 
IOTC is empowered to adopt on the basis of scientific evidence conservation and 
management measures for its stocks.142 A scientific committee supplies its scientific 
advice.143 The IOTC Treaty also contemplates the establishment of sub-commissions to 
assist in the management of its species144 although as of June 2006 none had been 
constituted.145
137 Id. at art. II.
138 See IOTC website, Species Under IOTC Management, at http://www.iotc.org/EngIish/info/mission.php 
(visited Oct. 3, 2003).
139 IOTC Treaty, supra  note 135, at art. IV. As o f June 2006 the member states o f the IOTC were: 
Australia, China, Comoros, European Community, Eritrea, France, Guinea, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, 
Republic o f Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom and Vanuatu. See IOTC website, Commission Members, at 
http://www.iotc.org/English/info/comstruct.php (last visited June 10, 2006).
140 IOTC Treaty, supra note 135, at art. V (l).
141 Id. at art. V(2)(a).
142 Id. at art. V(2)(c).
143 Id. at art. XII(l).
144 Id. at art XII(2)-(4).
145 IOTC website, Structure o f the Commission, at http://www.iotc.org/English/info/comstruct.php (visited 
June 9, 2006).
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The IOTC Treaty calls for conservation and management measures to be adopted 
by a two-thirds majority of its members present and voting at IOTC meetings.146 These 
measures are binding on IOTC member states.147 The objection procedure of the IOTC 
Treaty is found in Article IX(5)-(8). It provides:
5. Any Member of the Commission may, within 120 days 
from the date specified or within such other period as may 
be specified by the Commission under paragraph 4, object 
to a conservation and management measure adopted under 
paragraph 1. A Member of the Commission which has 
objected to a measure shall not be bound thereby. Any 
other Member of the Commission may similarly object 
within a further period of 60 days from the expiry of the 
120-day period. A Member of the Commission may also 
withdraw its objection at any time and become bound by 
the measure immediately if the measure is already in effect 
or at such time as it may come into effect under this article.
6. If objections to a measure adopted under paragraph 1 are 
made by more than one-third of the Members of the 
Commission, the other Members shall not be bound by that 
measure; but this shall not preclude any or all of them from 
giving effect thereto.
7. The Secretary shall notify each Member of the 
Commission immediately upon receipt of each objection or 
withdrawal of objection.
8. The Commission may, by a simple majority of its 
Members present and voting, adopt recommendations 
concerning conservation and management of the stocks for 
furthering the objectives of this Agreement.148
The IOTC objection procedure is structurally similar to others discussed in this
chapter. Upon notification of the adoption of a measure state parties have 120 days within
146 IOTC Treaty, supra note 135, at art. IX(1).
147 Id.
148 Id. at art. IX(5)-(8).
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which to lodge a formal objection.149 If this occurs, any other state wishing to object may 
do so within a further period of 60 days that does not start to run until the 120 day period 
has expired.150 Should more than one-third of the IOTC members object, the measure 
would not come into effect for any state within the regime,151 although, the IOTC Treaty
I Ospecifies that states may still apply the measure voluntarily if they wish. In addition to
binding conservation and management measures requiring a two-thirds vote, the IOTC
may, by simple majority, adopt non-binding recommendations concerning the
1conservation and management measures of its stocks.
Since the IOTC began its substantive work through 2005 it adopted a total of 43
1 ^ 4resolutions. In that time the Article IX objection procedure has only been invoked 
once, in relation to Resolution 99/01.155 Resolution 99/01 was adopted in 1999 at the 
IOTC's Fourth Session. It is entitled, “On the Management of Fishing Capacity and on 
the Reduction of the Catch of Juvenile Bigeye Tuna by Vessels, Including Flag of 
Convenience Vessels, Fishing for Tropical Tunas in the IOTC Area of Competence.”156 
The state lodging the objection was the Republic of Korea and it was directed to a 
paragraph in the preamble.157 According to former IOTC Executive Secretary David 
Ardill Korea’s motivation for the objection was generally attributed to a
149 Id. at art. IX(5).
150 Id.
151 Id. at art. IX(6).
152 Id. “[B]ut this shall not preclude any or all o f them from giving effect thereto.” Id.
153 Id. at art. IX(8).
154 A complete list o f resolutions adopted by the IOTC can be obtained on its website. See IOTC website, 
Resolutions, available at http://www.iotc.org/English/resolutions.php (visited June 8, 2006)
155 E-mail from David Ardill, IOTC Executive Secretary to author (Sept. 18, 2003) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter IOTC communication].
156 The full text o f  Resolution 99/01 can be viewed at
http://www.iotc.org/English/resolutions/reso_detail.php?reso=6 (visited Oct. 7, 2003).
157 IOTC communication, supra note 155.
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158misunderstanding. Although this resolution expresses concern about excessive fishing, 
it does not create any significant obligations on the member states.159
As compared with other fishery regimes, a single instance of objection is 
uncommonly low. Perhaps more impressively, all substantive resolutions on conservation 
and management have so far been adopted by consensus.160 This is likely due to the fact 
that IOTC members have so far been extremely reluctant to resort to a voting 
procedure.161 As of 2006, there had never been a vote in the Commission, other than the
1 fOchoice of headquarters and the usual vote for the election of the Secretary. At first 
appearance, the presence of consensus seems to be a healthy sign for a resource 
management regime. This observation must be tempered, however, with the likelihood 
that consensus is being achieved at the lowest level of common agreement.
There is a clear need for substantial cooperation in the conservation of Indian 
Ocean tuna species, especially with regard to Northern and Southern Bluefin Tuna found 
in those waters.163 Optimistically speaking, the lack of formal reservations with regard to 
measures directed at Indian Ocean tuna could potentially be regarded as a healthy sign for 
those stocks and indicate a constructive example of cooperation within the regime. At the 
same time, it is useful to recall that the use or non-use of reservations is only one factor 
of many which might indicate a serious effort to manage a species. The IOTC has been 
severely criticized for not doing more to prevent illegal, unregulated, and unreported 
fishing in its area. In late 2003, an Australian official singled out the IOTC for not taking
l5*Id.
159 IOTC Resolution 99/01, supra note 156.
160 See IOTC communication, supra  note 155.
161 Id.
162 E-mail from Alejandro Anganuzzi, IOTC Executive Secretary, to author (June 11, 2006) (on file with 
author).
163 See SOFIA 2002, supra  note 86, at Part I, The Status o f  Fishery Resources, Marine Fisheries.
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positive measures to sustainably manage Indian Ocean tuna and protect those stocks from 
illegal fishers.164
On a basic level, the ability to achieve consensus in decision-making in a 
conservation and management regime is laudable. On the other hand, the presence of 
consensus at the lowest common denominator, falling short of a comprehensive 
management strategy that is able to meet the needs of the species, is likely of little 
benefit.
V. The International Whaling Commission (IWC)165
The IWC is the primary, but not the exclusive, international organization for the 
conservation and management of whales. As discussed in chapter 1, it is the decision­
making body of the ICRW regime. That agreement was drafted in the new spirit of 
international cooperation that followed World War II and was the first real attempt to 
apply a legal framework to whale exploitation.166 The IWC has a global mandate with 
regard to cetacean resources and therefore regulates virtually all large cetaceans found in 
the oceans, including coastal states’ EEZs. The IWC’s regulation of small cetaceans, i.e.,
164 See Press Release o f  10 December 2003, Illegal Fishing Under Pressure From International Actions, 
Senator, The Honorable Ian Macdonald, Minster o f Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, available at 
http://www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2003/03272m.html (visited June 13, 2004).
165 The IWC is the product o f  the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation o f  Whaling. See 
International Convention for the Regulation o f Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 
(entered into force Nov. 10, 1948) [hereinafter ICRW].
166 For a discussion o f  the long history o f whale exploitation and the events leading up to the drafting o f the 
ICRW see Howard Scott Schiffman, The Protection o f  Whales in International Law: A Perspective fo r the 
Next Century, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (1996).
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dolphins and porpoises, has been inconsistent over the years.167 The IWC is assisted in its 
work by a Scientific Committee which provides information on the status and size of 
whale stocks.168
The principal regulatory tool of the IWC is the periodic amending of its Schedule; 
the Schedule contains the measures adopted by the IWC to achieve the objectives of the 
ICRW. The most salient aspect of the Schedule is the catch limits it prescribes for 
specific cetacean species. IWC reservations are directed at the regulatory aspects of the 
Schedule: the catch quotas, chiefly.
The exemptive provision of the ICRW is found in Article V(3). To fully 
understand its contours and the work of the IWC generally it is instructive to consider the 
entirety of Article V. Article V provides:
1. The Commission may amend from time to time the 
provisions of the Schedule by adopting regulations with 
respect to the conservation and utilization of whale 
resources, fixing (a) protected and unprotected species;
(b) open and closed seasons; (c) open and closed waters, 
including the designation of sanctuary areas; (d) size limits 
for each species; (e) time, methods, and intensity of 
whaling (including the maximum catch of whales to be 
taken in any one season); (f) types and specifications of 
gear and apparatus and appliances which may be used; (g) 
methods of measurement; and (h) catch returns and other 
statistical and biological records.
2. These amendments of the Schedule (a) shall be such as 
are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes o f  
this Convention and to provide for the conservation, 
development, and optimum utilization o f the whale 
resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings; (c) shall 
not involve restrictions on the number or nationality of
167 See Alexander Gillespie, Small Cetaceans, International Law and the International Whaling 
Commission, in T he FUTURE OF CETACEANS IN A C h a n g in g  W o r l d  217-282 (William C.G. Bums & 
Alexander Gillespie, eds., 2003).
168 See IWC website, Meetings and Procedures, at
http://www.iwcoff1ce.0rg/commission/iwcmain.htm#meetings (visited Feb. 10, 2005).
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factory ships or land stations, nor allocate specific quotas to 
any factory ship or land station or to any group of factory 
ships or land stations; and (d) shall take into 
consideration the interests of the consumers of whale 
products and the whaling industry.
3. Each of such amendments shall become effective with 
respect to the Contracting Governments ninety days 
following notification of the amendment by the 
Commission to each of the Contracting Governments, 
except that (a) if any Government presents to the 
Commission objection to any amendment prior to the 
expiration of this ninety-day period, the amendment shall 
not become effective with respect to any of the 
Governments for an additional ninety days; (b) thereupon, 
any other Contracting Government may present 
objection to the amendment at any time prior to the 
expiration of the additional ninety-day period, or before the 
expiration of thirty days from the date of receipt of the last 
objection received during such additional ninety-day 
period, whichever date shall be the later; and (c) thereafter, 
the amendment shall become effective with respect to all 
Contracting Governments which have not presented 
objection but shall not become effective with respect to any 
Government which has so objected until such date as the 
objection is withdrawn. The Commission shall notify each 
Contracting Government immediately upon receipt of each 
objection and withdrawal and each Contracting 
Government shall acknowledge receipt of all 
notifications of amendments, objections, and 
withdrawals.169
Article V(2)(a) raises a striking issue in that it provides for amendments to the 
Schedule adopted by the IWC to be “such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and 
purposes of this Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and
1 7 0optimum utilization of whale resources; . . If states are able to opt out of Schedule 
amendments deemed necessary for the “objectives and purposes” of the ICRW then 
Article V(3) would seemingly offend the “object and purpose” requirement of treaty law.
169 ICRW, supra note 165, at art. V (emphasis added).
170 Id. at art V(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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The extent to which the “object and purpose” requirement applies to Article V, and other 
specific reservation mechanisms, will be considered in chapter 4.
Moving beyond the question of whether or not reservations to Schedule 
amendments are consistent with the “objectives and purposes” of the treaty (a query 
which arises largely because of the peculiarity in the text of the ICRW), one may explore 
the procedural mechanisms of reservation practice in the regime. A noteworthy feature of 
V(3) is the highly generous time-frame it accords states to lodge their objections. Article 
V(3)(a)-(c) is rather complex in its potential to delay the entry into force of Schedule 
amendments by adding successive periods to the time when additional states may wish to 
object.171 This complicated procedure was designed to protect the interests of whaling 
states and in the history of the IWC has led to confusion as to which Schedule 
amendments have been in force for which states. Similarly, the expanding time-frame 
contemplated by the objection procedure renders a survey of the usage of Article V(3) 
particularly difficult even in historical retrospect. This is because objections to measures 
adopted at an annual IWC conference might only be reported in future annual reports.
There is an even more substantial limitation to studying IWC objections. Because 
the reach of the IWC is global, managing numerous cetacean species, it is not particularly 
useful to quantify the number of times the Schedule has been revised as compared with 
the number of objections recorded. In almost every year the IWC has amended the
171 ICRW, supra note 165, at art. V(3)(a)-(c). To simplify, a Schedule amendment will enter into force 90 
days after the IWC has notified each government o f  its adoption unless a state objects in that 90 day period. 
If this happens an additional 90 days is automatically added in which any other state may also lodge an 
objection to that amendment. If any other state lodges an objection in that second 90 day period the 
amendment will enter into force for all non-objecting states after the expiration o f the second 90 day period 
or 30 days after the last objection is received, whichever is later.
172 See In t e r n a t io n a l  Re g u l a t io n  o f  W h a l in g : F rom  C o n se r v a t io n  of W h a lin g  to  C o n se r v a t io n  
of W h a le s  a n d  Re g u l a t io n  of  W h a l e -W a t c h in g  195 (Patricia Bimie, vol. I, New York: Oceania, 
1985).
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Schedule in some fashion. Some revisions are minor or technical while others relate 
directly to the number of whales that may be taken. Revising and updating catch limits is 
the principal action against which objections were lodged.
Despite these practical limitations, a review of IWC documents yields important 
information about the use of the objection procedure. A survey of IWC reports, as well as 
notations appearing on the successive revised Schedules, indicates that from 1949 to 
2005, 57 objections by 17 different state parties were recorded. Table-4 indicates the 
conservation and management measures adopted by the IWC that have drawn objections 
and from which states. These calculations do not include objections carrying over to 
future years. In other words, an objection registered in year one and withdrawn in year 
three, for example, is counted only once. The state that has lodged the most objections is 
Japan with 15. This is not surprising; Japan remains a stalwart champion of commercial 
whaling.
Perhaps the most important objections in the history of the IWC were those 
lodged to exempt states from the moratorium on commercial whaling that the IWC
1 77approved in 1982 and phased in over the following five years. The governments of 
Peru, Norway, the USSR and Japan all lodged objections to the moratorium although
173 THIRTY-THIRD R eport OF THE IWC 20-21 (1983). The commercial whaling moratorium amends Para.
10(e) o f the Schedule as follows:
Notwithstanding the other provisions o f paragraph 10, catch limits for 
the killing for commercial purposes o f whales from all stocks for the 
1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be 
zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best 
scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will 
undertake a comprehensive assessment o f the effects o f this decision on 
whale stocks and consider modification o f this provision and the 
establishment o f  other catch limits.
Amended Schedule o f  the ICRW, Para. 10(e), available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf (visited June 7, 2004).
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Peru withdrew its objection shortly thereafter.174 Japan eventually withdrew its objection
• • 1 with respect to certain species in certain areas. It is highly likely that the threat of
• • • 17  f \unilateral economic sanctions by the US was a factor in each of these withdrawals.
One of the most contentious issues concerning an objection arose in 2001 when 
Iceland, which had withdrawn from the IWC in 1992, indicated its intention to rejoin the 
IWC.177 At the Fifty-Third annual meeting of the IWC Iceland deposited an instrument of 
ratification containing a reservation, seeking to exempt it from the moratorium on
1 78commercial whaling. Although Iceland’s plan to return to the IWC with a reservation 
to the moratorium was blocked by a narrow vote at the Fifty-Third meeting, it ultimately
1 70succeeded in this effort at a special meeting of the IWC held the following year.
Iceland’s instrument of ratification provides Iceland:
adheres to the aforesaid Convention and Protocol with a 
reservation with respect to paragraph 10(e) of the Schedule 
attached to the Convention.. . .  Notwithstanding this, the 
Government of Iceland will not authorize whaling for
174 T h ir t y -Fo u r t h  Re p o r t  o f  th e  IWC 1 (1984). For a detailed conservationist’s account o f  the politics 
and diplomacy surrounding the adoption o f the moratorium including information about the vote and 
subsequent objections see D a v id  D a y , T he W h ale  W a r  (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1987).
175 See Footnotes relevant to Para. 10(e), available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf (visited June 7, 2004). “The Government 
o f Japan withdrew its objections with effect from 1 May 1987 with respect to commercial pelagic whaling; 
from 1 October 1987 with respect to commercial coastal whaling for minke and Bryde's whales; and from 1 
April 1988 with respect to commercial coastal sperm whaling.” Id.
176 See Schiffman, supra note 166, at 318-319.
177 See Iceland and her re-adherence to the Convention after leaving in 1992, at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/iceland.htm (visited Feb. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Iceland’s re­
adherence]. Iceland explained it withdrew from the IWC in 1992 because it did not believe the IWC was 
operating in accordance with the ICRW by failing to allow for sustainable whaling. See Press Release, 
Iceland Ministry o f Fisheries, IWC Press Release 08.06.01, at
http://govemment.is/interpro/sjavarutv/sjavarutv.nsf/pages/pressrelease (visited Sept. 13, 2003) [hereinafter 
Iceland Press Release 08.06.01].
178 See Iceland’s re-adherence, supra  note 177. The text o f the reservation Iceland proffered at the Fifty- 
Third and Fifty-Fourth annual meetings o f the IWC was different from that which it ultimately re-entered 
with. For the full text o f  Iceland’s final reservation see infra text accompanying note 180.
179 Iceland’s re-adherence, supra note 177. The most striking feature o f Iceland’s re-entry to the IWC is not 
its reservation, but rather the fact that after much procedural debate it was allowed to cast the deciding vote 
on the question o f its own re-admission! This decision raises novel questions about the behavior of 
international organizations generally.
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commercial purposes by Icelandic vessels before 2006 and, 
thereafter, will not authorize such whaling while progress is 
being made in negotiations within the International 
Whaling Commission on the Revised Management 
Scheme. This does not apply, however, in case of the so- 
called moratorium on whaling for commercial purposes, 
contained in paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule, not being 
lifted within reasonable time after the completion of the 
Revised Management Scheme.180
Iceland’s sweeping reservation to Paragraph 10(e) upon its re-entry is more in the 
character of a general reservation than an operation of Article V(3) where the objections 
target specific Schedule amendments at the time they are adopted. As such, pursuant to 
Article 20(3) of the Vienna Convention, acceptance of the reservation by the IWC was 
required because the ICRW is a constituent instrument of an international organization.181 
At the Fifty-Third Annual Meeting, to support its case for re-entry with this reservation 
Iceland pointed to several attempted general reservations to the ICRW by states seeking 
to join the IWC.182 These attempts by Argentina (1960), Chile and Peru (1979) and 
Ecuador (1991) were either unsuccessful or inconsequential in hindsight.183 As in most 
resource management and conservation agreements, the objection procedure, that is, 
specific reservations, are far more important to the work and effectiveness of the regime.
A study of the use of the IWC objection procedure reveals that states lodging 
objections quite often withdraw them very shortly thereafter (the dates of withdrawal of 
some key objections are noted in Table-4). This practice can likely be explained, at least
180 Iceland’s re-adherence, supra note 177.
181 See Chris Wold, Implementation o f  Reservations Law in International Environmental Treaties: The 
Cases o f  Cuba and Iceland, 14 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y 53, 73-118 (2003).
182 See Gillespie, Alexander, Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J, 
INT’L L. 977, 980(2003).
183 Gillespie observes that Iceland was rather selective in the cases it chose as examples. Id. at 981. In fact, 
Denmark also attempted a reservation 1948 but consistent with the unanimity rule in force at the time did 
not follow through when it deposited its instrument o f  ratification. Id. at 981-982. In 1980 China included a 
declaration stating any attempt by Taiwan to join the IWC was “illegal, null and void.” Id. at 982.
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in part, by the degree of isolation and international pressure experienced by states that
• • 1 Sdlodge objections. On several occasions, the IWC has raised the issue of outstanding 
objections by IWC members and statements were recorded urging states with active 
objections to withdraw them.
To identify just a few notable examples, in 1957 the IWC expressed regret that 
the Danish and Icelandic governments “were still unable to withdraw” their objections, 
lodged at a Schedule amendment adopted two tears earlier, prohibiting the taking of blue 
whales in the North Atlantic.185 The following year, the IWC “deeply regretted to learn” 
that Iceland was “still unable” to withdrew its objection to that same measure.186
At the Thirteenth meeting in 1962, the IWC observed that objections lodged by 
Japan, Norway, UK and USSR a year earlier concerning the opening of the blue whale 
seasons rendered those Schedule amendments “ineffective.”187 Those same states were 
then urged to “reconsider and withdraw their objections” to measures protecting 
humpback whales also adopted at the Twelfth meeting.188 This request was repeated at
1 RQthe Fourteenth meeting. At the Thirty-Fourth meeting the IWC passed a resolution 
urging those states that had filed objections to the banning of the use of the cold grenade 
harpoon to comply fully with its requirements.190
More recently, the IWC has registered its clear displeasure with Norway’s 
objection to the moratorium and its ongoing harvesting of minke whales. From 1995 
onward the IWC has singled out Norway by publishing the number of minke whales
184 Bimie, supra note 172, at 195.
185 E ighth  Re po r t  o f  th e  IWC 17 (1957).
186 N inth  Repo r t  of  th e  IWC 14(1958).
187 T h ir teenth  Re p o r t  o f  th e  IWC 9 (1962).
188 Id. at 5-6.
189 Fo u r t ee n th  Re po r t  of th e  IWC 5 (1963).
190 C h a ir m a n ’s Rep o r t  of t h e  T h ir ty -F o u r t h  A n n u a l  M ee tin g , T h ir ty -T h ird  re po r t  of th e  IWC 
38 (Appendix 4: Resolution on the Use o f the Cold Grenade Harpoon) (1983).
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killed under its objection and other IWC members have frequently called upon it to
reconsider its position.191 A blunt statement by several IWC members at the Forty-Sixth
meeting leaves no doubt about its intention:
In the Plenary, the UK observed that one Contracting 
Government has resumed commercial whaling, taking 157 
minke whales in the northeast Atlantic. It deplored 
Norway’s action which in its view weakens the 
credibility and reputation o f the IWC and urged it to 
reconsider its decision to exercise its objection to the IWC’s 
moratorium on commercial whaling. This statement was 
supported by the Netherlands, New Zealand, Ireland,
Germany, France, Brazil, Australia, Argentina and Spain.192
This sentiment was expressed even more forcefully with formal IWC resolutions adopted
in 1995,193 1996,194 1997195 and 1998.196
Article VIII of the ICRW is another provision that needs to be mentioned in a 
discussion of the exemptive mechanisms of this regime. Pursuant to Article VIII, 
individual members of the IWC may grant their nationals “special permits” for the 
purpose of scientific research on whales. Japan is the only state that has large research 
whaling programs and they are heavily criticized for doing so.197 Some environmentalists 
claim this practice is little more than a subterfuge to hold the place of commercial
191 C h a ir m a n ’s Re p o r t  o f  t h e  Fo r t y -S ixth  A n n u a l  M eeting , Fo r t y -F ifth Repo r t  of the IWC 24 
(1995).
192 Id., at para. 11.2 (emphasis added).
193 C h a ir m a n ’s Re p o r t  o f  t h e  Fo r t y -S e v en th  A n n u a l  M e e tin g , Fo r t y -S ixth  Repo r t  of the IWC 
44 (1996) (Appendix 6: IWC Res. 1995-5, Resolution on Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales).
194 C h a ir m a n ’s Re p o r t  o f  th e  Fo r t y -E ighth  A n n u a l  M ee tin g , Fo r t y -S e v e n t h  Repo r t  of the IWC 
50 (1997) (Appendix 5: IWC Res. 1996-5, Resolution on Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales).
195 C h a ir m a n ’s Re p o r t  o f  th e  Fo r t y -N inth  A n n u a l  M ee tin g , Fo r t y -E ight Repo r t  o f the IWC 46 
(1998) (Appendix 3: IWC Res. 1997-3, Resolution on Northeastern Atlantic Minke Whales).
196 C h a ir m a n ’s Re po r t  o f  th e  F iftieth  A n n u a l  M e eting , 1998 A n n u a l  Re po r t  of the  IWC 42 (1999) 
(Appendix 2: IWC Res. 1998-1).
197 See IWC website, The IWC and Scientific Permits, at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/permits.htm (visited July 10, 2005).
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1 08whaling during the moratorium. These critics point to the fact that the whale meat 
derived from these operations is ultimately sold commercially.199
There are numerous resolutions questioning the scientific value of research 
whaling and the IWC has repeatedly asked Japan to reconsider this practice.200 Recent 
commentary even suggests Japan’s actions under Article VIII constitute an “abuse of
901rights.” The extent to which the “abuse of rights” doctrine in international law serves 
as a factor to limit the exercise of exemptive provisions in general is considered in 
chapter 4.
To be clear, scientific research whaling pursuant to Article VIII does not offer the 
same direct exception to the moratorium available from Article V(3). On the other hand, 
it is another example of how states may exempt themselves from conservation and 
management measures deemed desirable by a majority of members of the IWC.
The use of the IWC’s exemptive mechanisms and other states’ reaction to it needs 
to be understood in the context of the metamorphosis of the organization itself from one 
that safeguarded the interests of whaling states to a forum committed to the protection of 
a special marine resource. One of the key factors explaining the transformation of the 
IWC from an organization more focused on conservation than utilization is the growth in
198 See Howard S. Schiffman, Scientific Research Whaling in International Law: Objectives and 
Objections, 8 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 473,482-484 (2002) (reviewing objections to the practice of  
scientific research whaling including the allegation that it is really commercial whaling in disguise).
™ Id.
200 The IWC has passed over 30 resolutions over the years generally expressing concern about permits 
granted under Article VIII and recommending that research be confined to non-lethal means to the greatest 
extent possible. See IWC Res. 2005-1, available at
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/resolution2005.htm (visited July 10, 2005).
201 See Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse o f  Right or Optimum Utilisation?, 5 ASIA 
PAC. J, ENVTL L. 33 (2000).
202 For a review o f  how the mission o f the IWC evolved in this way see Anthony D ’Amato & Sudhir K. 
Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 Am. J. INT’L L. 21 (1991).
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its membership. The original signatories of the ICRW in 1946 were 14 whaling states.
By 1982, the year the IWC adopted the moratorium, its membership had risen to 37 
states; many of those states joined the IWC with more conservationist tendencies.204
One explanation for the entry of non-whaling states into the IWC is that it gave 
these states an easy forum to register their “green” status. Another factor was the 
deliberate effort by environmental NGOs to see the ranks of the IWC swell with non-
AAZ #
whaling states to dilute the power of whalers. Whatever the reasons, the resulting legal 
and political friction between the few remaining advocates of commercial whaling and
207those who would see it end forever is still very much a part of the dynamic of the IWC.
In that environment it is very easy to see how an objection procedure would not only be a 
legal mechanism, but also an ideological platform.
The IWC’s record of management of cetacean resources is incontrovertibly poor, 
especially in its early years.208 This sad legacy clearly demonstrates that commercially 
exhausted species will not recover without genuine sacrifices on the part of states 
committed to their conservation. Realistically, the failure of the IWC is attributable to 
many different factors. These included: weak science; setting quotas above those 
recommended by scientists; setting quotas for many years in “blue whale units” instead 
of by individual species, and; in its early years, not allocating quotas between states.
203 The original signatories o f  the ICRW were all whaling states: Chile, Peru, Argentina, Denmark, USSR, 
Australia, France, United Kingdom o f  Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Brazil, the Netherlands, USA, 
Canada, New Zealand and the Union o f  South Africa. IWC website, at 
http://www.iwcoffice.Org/commission/convention.htm#convsigs (visited Feb. 10, 2005).
204 See D a y , supra note 174 for a chronicle o f the growth o f the IWC and details o f the dispositions o f IWC 
members at different phases o f  its development.
205 See Steinar Andresen, The IWC: More Failure Than Success?, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME 
Effe c t iv e n e ss: Co n f r o n t in g  Th e o r y  w ith  Evid en c e  397 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
206 Id. at 397-398.
207 See Ray Gambell, I am Here, Where Should I Be?, in Bums & Gillespie, supra note 167, at 65; 
Andresen, supra note 205, at 400. “. . .[T]he IWC today seems to be a fragile creature with considerable 
hostility between its two camps.” Id.
208 See generally D ’Amato & Chopra, supra note 202; D a y , supra note 174; Andresen, supra note 205.
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Even so, the objection procedure of Article V(3) was inescapably part of the 
problem, especially in the first four decades of the organization.209 This legal mechanism 
allowed states to evade what regulation, however inadequate, the IWC sought to impose 
yet remain technically compliant with the ICRW. When the use of the objection 
procedure is considered with the other significant reasons for the IWC’s failure it paints a 
tragic picture of commercial greed and a general lack of foresight.
Would whaling states have remained in the IWC without the ability to opt out of 
Schedule amendments? There is no simple answer to this question but Iceland’s 
withdrawal from the IWC in 1992 and subsequent readmission with a reservation in 2002 
is revealing on that point. Upon its application for re-admission, Iceland indicated “it is 
better to be a member of the IWC and have influence on the discussions there than to 
remain outside and have no chance to take part in the discussions in this forum on the 
sustainable use of whale stocks and other issues regarding whaling.”210
Iceland’s comment reflects the classic purpose of treaty reservations: offering 
flexibility to states that want to participate in a treaty regime without requiring total 
agreement from them. On the other hand, in the example of the IWC one can also see the 
classic downside of reservations. Specifically, how the lack of full cooperation by states 
can undermine important treaty objectives. Because of this duality the IWC represents the 
best and worst of reservations in international law.
209 See Day, supra note 174, at 28. “The IWC members often violated their own set quotas, if it did not suit 
them, by simply filing an ‘objection’ and continuing the kill.” Id. See also Andresen, supra note 205, at 
390. “The de facto veto right o f  the IWC members through the objection procedure made the ‘law of the 
least ambitious program’ [citation omitted] work unfailingly in [its early years]— that is, no decision went 
beyond the interests o f  the least enthusiastic . . . member.” Id.
210 Iceland Press Release 08.06.01, supra note 177.
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VI. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES)211
CITES is a clear example of a regime with extensive practice under its exemptive 
provisions, Articles XXIII and XV. The full text of CITES Article XXIII establishing the 
specific reservation mechanism is reproduced in full in chapter l.212 A review of state 
practice under Article XXIII is useful not just because of the many times states have 
availed themselves of it, but also because CITES has a global mandate and wide 
participation. As of June 2006 there were 169 parties to CITES.213 It is also a regime 
under which numerous and highly diverse species are protected. At the end of 2003 
CITES covered approximately 5,000 species of animals and 28,000 species of plants.214 
This includes many marine species.
The object of CITES is to reduce and regulate the trade of plant and animal
• 9 i cspecies and their products to protect them from over-exploitation. The restriction of 
trade in endangered animal and plant products logically serves to decrease both 
accessibility and demand for those products. The main mechanism through which this is 
achieved is a rigorous system of import and export permits that requires member states to 
use their domestic laws to regulate the trade of the designated species.
CITES establishes three appendices in which species are listed. Listing in each 
appendix provides progressively more stringent protection depending on the organism’s 
conservation status. Appendix I accords the highest level of protection and includes “all
211 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 13, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
212 See chapter 1, supra text accompanying note 159.
213 See CITES website, List o f  Contracting Parties, available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/parties/chronolo.shtml (last visited June 7, 2006).
214 See id. at CITES Species, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/species.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 
2003).
215 CITES, supra note 211, at Preamble.
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• • 71 f\species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade.” Trade of 
any Appendix I species or its products is severely restricted and is only authorized in
717exceptional circumstances. In those cases where trade in Appendix I species is 
permissible it must be accompanied by both import and export permits and advice by the 
scientific authorities of both states that the transaction is not detrimental to the survival of 
that species.218
Appendix II species include:
(a) all species which although not necessarily now 
threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in 
specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in 
order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival; 
and
(b) other species which must be subject to regulation in 
order that trade in specimens of certain species referred to 
in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought
91Qunder effective control.
Specimens of those species listed under Appendix II may only be traded when the 
scientific authorities of the exporting state determines the trade will not be detrimental to
770the survival of the species; when the management authority of the exporting state is
221satisfied the specimen was not obtained in contravention of the laws of that state; and
where the management authority of the exporting state is satisfied that any living 
specimens will be prepared and shipped in a manner that will “minimize the risk of
7 7 7injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.”
216 Id. at art. 11(1).
217 Id.
218 Id. at art. III.
219 Id. at art. II(2)(a)-(b).
220 Id. at art. IV(2)(a).
221 Id. at art. IV(2Xb).
222 Id. at art. IV(2)(c).
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Appendix III includes those species that any state party unilaterally “identifies as 
being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or 
restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other Parties in the control of 
trade.” The export of any species from any state that has included it in Appendix III 
may only occur where the management authority of the exporting state is satisfied that 
the specimen was not obtained in contravention of that state’s wildlife protection laws,224 
and where the management authority of that state is satisfied that any living specimen 
will be shipped and prepared so as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or 
cruel treatment.
Both Appendix I and II contain special provisions for those specimens introduced 
from the sea. With regard to Appendix I specimens, Article 111(5) specifies the procedure 
that must be followed. It provides:
The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species 
included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant of a 
certificate from a Management Authority of the State of 
introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the 
following conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction 
advises that the introduction will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species involved;
(b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is 
satisfied that the proposed recipient of a living specimen is 
suitably equipped to house and care for it; and
(c) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is 
satisfied that the specimen is not to be used for primarily 
commercial purposes.226
223 Id. at art. 11(3).
224 Id. at art. V(2)(a).
225 Id. at art. V(2)(b).
226 Id. at art. 111(5).
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With regard to Appendix II species obtained from the sea, Article IV(6) sets forth the 
requirements. Article IV(6) provides:
The introduction from the sea of any specimen of a species 
included in Appendix II shall require the prior grant of a 
certificate from a Management Authority of the State of 
introduction. A certificate shall only be granted when the 
following conditions have been met:
(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of introduction 
advises that the introduction will not be detrimental to the 
survival of the species involved; and
(b) a Management Authority of the State of introduction is 
satisfied that any living specimen will be so handled as to 
minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel
22 7treatment.
The importance of what CITES is attempting with Articles 111(5) and IV(6) is
worthy of emphasis. As CITES is a treaty that regulates trade, marine species that
originate in the ocean might only cross a single natural boundary when captured in the
high seas. In other words, a marine specimen may not be “traded” but rather come to rest
in the same state in which it was first introduced. Marine species would effectively fall
outside of CITES protection if not for these provisions.
With regard to Appendix II marine species, Article IV(6) must be read alongside
Article XIV(4) which provides:
A State party to the present Convention, which is also a 
party to any other treaty, convention or international 
agreement which is in force at the time of the coming into 
force of the present Convention and under the provisions of 
which protection is afforded to marine species included in 
Appendix II, shall be relieved of the obligations imposed 
on it under the provisions of the present Convention with 
respect to trade in specimens of species included in 
Appendix II that are taken by ships registered in that State
227 Id. at art. IV(6).
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and in accordance with the provisions of such other treaty, 
convention or international agreement.228
Article XIV(4) appears to eliminate the requirement of a certificate for 
introduction from the sea for Appendix II species where the specimens are taken by ships 
registered by a state that is also a party to another treaty that affords protection to that 
species and where that other treaty was in force at the time CITES entered into force.229
The export permit is the primary control mechanism of CITES because it is 
presumed that the state where an endangered species is found is in the best position to 
preserve it. In the case of marine specimens, however, the management and scientific 
authorities of the importing state (state of introduction) are charged with implementing 
the relevant CITES provisions where those species are listed in either Appendix I or II.231
The CITES COP is the body responsible for listing species in Appendix I and II. 
Article XI establishes the CITES COP and provides that it shall meet at least once 
every two years. Maintaining and amending the list of species in the appendices is 
certainly the central, although not exclusive, role of the COP. The importance of these 
face-to-face meetings to achieve the treaty objectives cannot be overemphasized as it
228 Id. at art. XIV(4). This provision helps to explain why the “downlisting” o f certain cetaceans from 
Appendix I to Appendix II has been such a key goal o f whaling states. See WILLEM WlJNSTEKERS, T he 
EVOLUTION OF CITES 96 (6th ed. Geneva: CITES Secretariat, 2001). The 9th, 10th and 11th COPs rejected 
proposals by Japan and Norway to transfer certain minke whale stocks from Appendix I to Appendix II 
where the IWC maintained zero quotas for those species. Id. By application o f Article XIV(4), if states are 
parties to both CITES and the ICRW, and cetaceans are merely listed in Appendix II, CITES would not 
limit trade in whale products by those states. This is all the more significant if those same states circumvent 
the IWC moratorium by a reservation or otherwise. For further discussion on the relationship between the 
IWC and CITES see infra notes 264-267.
229 W u n st e k e r s , supra note 228, at 95-96
230 D a v id  S. Fa v r e , In t e r n a t io n a l  T r a d e  in En d a n g e r e d  S pecies: A G u id e  to  CITES 89 (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1989).
231 For a more thorough discussion o f the CITES mechanisms and procedures applying to marine species 
see id. at 88-91.
232CITES, supra note 211, at art. XI.
233 Id. at art. XI(2).
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forces the member states to focus on the issues of CITES and the species it seeks to
234protect.
The specific reservation provision of Article XXIII allows states to register their 
specific reservations at two distinct points in time. First, states have a right to enter a 
specific reservation at the time they deposit their “instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession” to the treaty.235 Article XXIII(2) is a “one time opportunity”236 
and allows states to opt out of CITES obligations for those species already covered in 
CITES appendices at the time the state becomes a party. Historically, many states have 
invoked Article XXIII(2) upon entry into CITES because of economic self-protectionism 
in regard to trade in that species.237
In addition to the specific reservations permitted at the time of entry into the 
treaty, Article XXIII also refers back to Articles XV and XVI which provide for the 
amendment of the appendices by the COP. Article XV provides for the amendments of 
Appendix I and II and Article XVI provides for the amendment of Appendix III. 
Appendices I and II are by far the most important to the species protected by CITES. 
Since Article XV establishes its specific reservation mechanism at the same time as it
2:14 See Fa v r e , supra note 2 3 0 , at 2 5 8 -2 5 9 .
235 CITES, supra note 2 1 1, at art. XXIII(2).
2. Any State may, on depositing its instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
enter a specific reservation with regard to:
(a) any species included in Appendix I, II or III; or
(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation to a species included in 
Appendix III.
Id.
236 Fa v r e , supra note 230, at 322.
237 Id.
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establishes its amendment procedure, a textual analysis of the rather lengthy Article XV 
is necessary to understand the CITES exemptive mechanism. Article XV provides:
1. The following provisions shall apply in relation to 
amendments to Appendices I and II at meetings of the 
Conference of the Parties:
(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or 
II for consideration at the next meeting. The text of the 
proposed amendment shall be communicated to the 
Secretariat at least 150 days before the meeting. The 
Secretariat shall consult the other Parties and interested 
bodies on the amendment in accordance with the provisions 
of sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article 
and shall communicate the response to all Parties not later 
than 30 days before the meeting.
(b) Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority 
of Parties present and voting. For these purposes "Parties 
present and voting" means Parties present and casting an 
affirmative or negative vote. Parties abstaining from voting 
shall not be counted among the two-thirds required for 
adopting an amendment.
(c) Amendments adopted at a meeting shall enter into force 
90 days after that meeting for all Parties except those 
which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 
o f this Article.
2. The following provisions shall apply in relation to 
amendments to Appendices I and II between meetings of 
the Conference of the Parties:
(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to Appendix I or 
II for consideration between meetings by the postal 
procedures set forth in this paragraph.
(b) For marine species, the Secretariat shall, upon 
receiving the text o f the proposed amendment, immediately 
communicate it to the Parties. It shall also consult inter­
governmental bodies having a function in relation to those 
species especially with a view to obtaining scientific data 
these bodies may be able to provide and to ensuring co­
ordination with any conservation measures enforced by
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such bodies. The Secretariat shall communicate the views 
expressed and data provided by these bodies and its own 
findings and recommendations to the Parties as soon as 
possible.
(c) For species other than marine species, the Secretariat 
shall, upon receiving the text of the proposed amendment, 
immediately communicate it to the Parties, and, as soon as 
possible thereafter, its own recommendations.
(d) Any Party may, within 60 days of the date on which the 
Secretariat communicated its recommendations to the 
Parties under sub-paragraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph, 
transmit to the Secretariat any comments on the proposed 
amendment together with any relevant scientific data and 
information.
(e) The Secretariat shall communicate the replies received 
together with its own recommendations to the Parties as 
soon as possible.
(f) I f  no objection to the proposed amendment is received 
by the Secretariat within 30 days o f the date the replies and 
recommendations were communicated under the provisions 
o f sub-paragraph (e) o f this paragraph, the amendment 
shall enter into force 90 days later for all Parties except 
those which make a reservation in accordance with 
paragraph 3 o f this Article.
(g) I f  an objection by any Party is received by the 
Secretariat, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to 
a postal vote in accordance with the provisions o f sub- 
paragraphs (h) , (i) and (j) o f this paragraph.
(h) The Secretariat shall notify the Parties that notification 
o f objection has been received.
(i) Unless the Secretariat receives the votes for, against or 
in abstention from at least one-half of the Parties within 60 
days of the date of notification under sub-paragraph (h) of 
this paragraph, the proposed amendment shall be referred 
to the next meeting of the Conference for further 
consideration.
(j) Provided that votes are received from one-half of the 
Parties, the amendment shall be adopted by a two-thirds
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majority of Parties casting an affirmative or negative vote.
(k) The Secretariat shall notify all Parties of the result of 
the vote.
(1) If the proposed amendment is adopted it shall enter into 
force 90 days after the date of the notification by the 
Secretariat of its acceptance for all Parties except those 
which make a reservation in accordance with paragraph 3 
of this Article.
3. During the period o f 90 days provided for by sub- 
paragraph (c) o f paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph (I) o f 
paragraph 2 o f this Article any Party may by notification in 
writing to the Depositary Government make a reservation 
with respect to the amendment. Until such reservation is 
withdrawn the Party shall be treated as a State not a Party 
to the present Convention with respect to trade in the 
species concerned.
The first noteworthy feature of Article XV is that the appendices may be amended
“JQ i A
either at a COP or between COP meetings. Amendments at a COP are adopted by a 
two-thirds majority of those present and voting241 and enter into force 90 days after the 
COP meeting except for those states that have made a reservation.242 Appendices I and II 
may also be amended between COP meeting by a postal procedure established by Article 
XV(2). This procedure has rarely been invoked by the parties and even then only where 
there have been no objections to the amendment.243
Significantly, CITES sets forth special conditions for marine species whether the 
amendment is achieved by postal procedure or at a COP. When the amendment concerns 
marine species, in addition to communicating the proposed amendment to the state
238 CITES, supra note 211, at art. XV (emphasis added).
239 Id. at art. XV(1).
240 Id. at art. XV(2).
241 Id. at art. X V(l)(a).
242 Id. at art. X V (l)(c).
243 See FAVRE, supra note 230, at 313.
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parties, the Secretariat must also consult with inter-governmental bodies having a 
function in relation to those species to obtain scientific data and ensure coordination with 
the conservation efforts of those other bodies.244 Any views and data expressed by these 
bodies must be communicated to the parties along with the Secretariat’s own findings and 
recommendations.245
For amendments proposed both at a COP and by postal procedures, parties notify 
the depositary government (Swiss Confederation) in writing that they wish to make a 
reservation to the amendment.246 Where a state does so, until the reservation is withdrawn 
the reserving state is “treated as a State not a Party to [CITES] with respect to trade in the 
species concerned.”247 Therefore, the reserving state has no obligation to issue CITES 
import or export permits or inspect them as would otherwise be required. Despite this, 
CITES Article X, entitled “Trade with States not Party to the Convention,” addresses the 
issue of documentation when CITES parties trade with non-parties. Where such trade 
occurs CITES parties may accept “comparable documentation,” substantially conforming 
to CITES’ requirements, issued by the competent authorities of the non-party states.249
Amendments to Appendix III are dealt with in Article XVI. Article XVI provides:
1. Any Party may at any time submit to the Secretariat a list 
of species which it identifies as being subject to regulation 
within its jurisdiction for the purpose mentioned in 
paragraph 3 of Article II. Appendix III shall include the 
names of the Parties submitting the species for inclusion 
therein, the scientific names of the species so submitted, 
and any parts or derivatives of the animals or plants
244 CITES, supra note 211, at art. XV(2)(b).
245 Id.
246 Id. at art. XV(3).
247 Id.
248 Fa v r e , supra note 230, at 323.
249 CITES, supra note 211, at art. X. For a thorough discussion o f the contours o f Article X see Fa v r e , 
supra note 230, at 251-256, 323.
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concerned that are specified in relation to the species for 
the purposes of sub-paragraph (b) of Article I.
2. Each list submitted under the provisions of paragraph 1 
of this Article shall be communicated to the Parties by the 
Secretariat as soon as possible after receiving it. The list 
shall take effect as part of Appendix III 90 days after the 
date of such communication. At any time after the 
communication o f such list, any Party may by notification 
in writing to the Depositary Government enter a 
reservation with respect to any species or any parts or 
derivatives, and until such reservation is withdrawn, the 
State shall be treated as a State not a Party to the present 
Convention with respect to trade in the species or part or 
derivative concerned.
3. A Party which has submitted a species for inclusion in 
Appendix III may withdraw it at any time by notification to 
the Secretariat which shall communicate the withdrawal to 
all Parties. The withdrawal shall take effect 30 days after 
the date of such communication.
4. Any Party submitting a list under the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall submit to the Secretariat a 
copy of all domestic laws and regulations applicable to the 
protection of such species, together with any interpretations 
which the Party may deem appropriate or the Secretariat 
may request. The Party shall, for as long as the species in 
question is included in Appendix III, submit any 
amendments of such laws and regulations or any
• TCAinterpretations as they are adopted.
Article XVI allows individual member states to determine which species are 
deserving of Appendix III protection based on their own criteria. The procedure for 
reservations to Appendix III amendments may be distinguished from amendments to
appendices I and II in that a reservation to an Appendix III listing may be registered at
•  ^1 any time after the Appendix III listing is communicated to the other parties. The
250 CITES, supra note 2 1 1 , at art. XVI (em phasis added). For com m entary d iscu ssin g  A rticle XVI see  
F a v r e , supra note 230 , at art. 314 .
251 CITES, supra note 211, at art. XVI(2).
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reserving state is treated as one not a party to CITES with respect to trade in that species 
until the reservation is withdrawn.
Interestingly, unlike the objection procedure of several fisheries treaties and the 
ICRW discussed earlier in the chapter, the filing of a specific reservation in CITES (as 
well as the CMS discussed below) does not open a second period during which further 
reservations by other states may be entered. By limiting the period of time under which 
states may file their reservations, CITES and CMS make it more difficult for states to 
exempt themselves from the work of the regime. In so doing, CITES and CMS, 
demonstrate their focus on conservation, as opposed to the sustainable use, of the living 
resources under their care.
In various resolutions adopted by the COP, CITES parties have dealt with the 
issue of the effect of reservations. The most important of these is Conf. 4.25, entitled 
"Effect of Reservations;” it was adopted in 1983 at the Fourth COP. Conf. 4.25 states:
RECOGNIZING that Article XXIII of the Convention 
states that where a Party has a reservation on a species it 
shall be treated as a non-party State in respect of trade in 
that species;
RECOGNIZING further that Article XV, paragraph 3, of 
the Convention provides for reservations with regard to 
amendments to Appendices I and II but, at the same time, 
states that where a Party has such a reservation it shall be 
treated as a State not a Party with respect to trade in the 
species concerned;
NOTING that this has led to different interpretations of the 
Convention by Parties;
CONSIDERING that all Parties should interpret the 
Convention in a uniform manner;
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THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE 
CONVENTION
RECOMMENDS that:
a) any Party having entered a reservation with regard to the 
transfer from Appendix II to Appendix I of a species 
continue to treat that species as if it remained in 
Appendix II for all purposes, including documentation and 
control; and
b) by analogy, any Party having entered a reservation with 
regard to any species listed in Appendix I treat that species 
as if it were listed in Appendix II for all purposes, including 
documentation and control; and
CALLS on the Parties having entered reservations 
nevertheless to maintain and communicate statistical 
records on trade in the species concerned, as part of their 
annual reports, so that international trade in these species 
may be properly monitored.
Conf. 4.25 is important in that it highlights how the treatment of reserving states 
as non-parties with respect to trade in the affected species has led to different 
interpretations of the treaty. It then renders a rather practical suggestion. Specifically, that 
states with a reservation to Appendix I species, either as a result of an up-listing from 
Appendix II or otherwise, treat the species as if it was listed in Appendix II.254
With respect to marine organisms listed in the CITES appendices, the specific 
reservation procedure has been heavily used since the treaty entered into force. This
25' CITES Resolution, Conf. 4.25, available at http://www.cites.Org/eng/resols/4/4_25.shtml (visited Dec. 
22, 2003).
254 For commentary on the meaning and objectives o f Conf. 4.25 see Fa v r e , supra note 230, at 324; see 
also WUNSTEKERS, supra note 228, at 359. In Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. COP 13), the CITES COP 
recognized “that some importing countries that maintain reservations refuse to take into consideration . .  . 
Resolution Conf. 4.25 . . ., weakening in that way the conservation policies o f  producing countries that 
wish to protect their wildlife resources!.]” CITES Resolution, Conf. 11.3 (Rev. COP 13), at Preamble Para. 
10, available at http://www.cites.Org/eng/res/l 1/1 l-03R13.shtml (visited December 3, 2006). This 
Resolution also recognized “that the reservations made by importing countries allow loopholes through 
which specimens illegally acquired in the countries o f origin can find legal markets without any control 
whatsoever!.]” Id. at Preamble Para. 9.
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conclusion needs to be understood in the context of how CITES lists species. First, the 
term “species” is often used somewhat generically in CITES parlance (as it is in this 
thesis) and does not necessarily reflect an agreed upon level in the taxonomic hierarchy. 
Perhaps this is because the concept of speciation remains a matter of controversy among 
scientists.256
In any event, because the level of taxonomic classification under which some 
organisms are listed differs from others, it is extremely difficult to quantify the actual 
number of marine species that have received protection from CITES over the years. 
Specifically, some species are listed individually while others are listed simply as “all 
species of a higher taxon.” The latter classification typically includes many species of the 
designated class, order or family. In other words, a reservation entered against a listing 
specified to include “all species of a higher taxon” would potentially apply to many 
species, whereas, in the case of a listing of a single discreet species, the reservation would 
apply to only that one.
Therefore, although it is possible to quantify the number of reservations registered 
in relation to an identifiable list of marine organisms, the differing units of taxonomic 
classification under which these organisms are listed prevent a uniform assessment of 
reservation usage. In addition, since CITES does not list marine species any differently 
from the many thousands of species of fauna and flora under its purview, the matter of
255 Under Article I definitions, CITES simply defines “species” as “any species, subspecies, or 
geographically separate population thereofl.]” CITES, supra note 211, at art. 1(a). As Favre notes, Article 
1(a) does not suggest a biological definition and in fact does not define species at all. Fa v r e , supra note 
230, at 3. Instead, it provides a legally necessary clarification that parts o f species, that is, “[sjubspecies and 
geographically separate populations may be separated out, identified and listed for protection in one o f  
three Appendices o f [CITES]”. Id.
256 For an excellent work discussing competing scientific theories on the definition o f “species” see SPECIES 
CONCEPTS a n d  Ph y l o g e n t ic  t h e o r y : A D ebate  (Quentin D. Wheeler & Rudolf Meier eds., New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000).
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what constitutes a marine species, as opposed to a freshwater or terrestrial one, falls to 
the judgment of the one asking the question. In most cases the determination is 
straightforward. In other cases, however, certain birds or snakes, for example, it must be 
left to an informed judgment.
For the purposes of this study, those organisms that spend any significant part of 
their life-cycle in the marine environment are included in the review. The author accepts 
that in some cases others might reach different conclusions as to which organisms should 
be included.
With this cautionary note one can begin the quantitative review of specific 
reservations lodged against marine species listed in CITES appendices. Table-5 
summarizes the marine organisms listed by CITES, which states entered the reservations, 
when they were entered and when they were withdrawn where the date of withdrawal is 
available. Marine species listed by CITES, but not having drawn at least one reservation 
are not listed in Table-5.
Since CITES entered into force in 1975 through early 2005 it recorded a total of 
170 distinct reservations against marine organisms listed in Appendices I, II and III. This 
figure represents the total number of times reservations were lodged against marine 
species. It includes reservations to the listing of those same species in more than one 
appendix. For example, if a species was listed in both Appendix I and II at various times 
and drew reservations by three states while in Appendix I and two states while in 
Appendix II this was counted as a total of five reservations. Furthermore, if the same 
state filed a reservation against a species listed in both Appendix I and II, this was 
counted twice.
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A total of 24 states have entered at least one reservation to the listing of marine 
species. Not surprisingly, the order cetacea, that is, whales, dolphins and porpoises, has 
drawn more reservations than any other type of marine organism. The state that has 
recorded the most reservations is Austria with 31, followed by Iceland and Japan having 
entered 19 and 18 reservations, respectively. Canada and Palau are close behind with 16 
reservations apiece. All other states have recorded less than 10 reservations to marine 
organisms. The state that had the most reservations still in effect as of 2005 was Iceland 
with 19; seemingly, Iceland has never withdrawn a CITES reservation. See Table-5 for 
more specific details on reservation usage.
The fact that Austria, a land-locked state, has registered far more reservations to 
marine species than any other state is a matter requiring comment. Dr. Max Abensperg- 
Traun of the Austrian CITES Management Authority explains that before Austria was a 
member of the EU, its reservations to newly listed species allowed the matter to pass 
through the Austrian parliament and become part of the Austrian legal framework for 
CITES. Once that process was complete, the reservation could formally be 
withdrawn. Since Austria became a member of the EU (1995) this hurdle has become
259unnecessary.
257 E-mail from Dr. Max Abensperg-Traun, Representative o f Austria’s CITES Management Authority to 
author (Apr. 15, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Abensperg-Traun communication]. Dr. Andrea H. 
Nouak and Mr. Andreas Navratil o f  the Austrian Federal Ministry o f Agriculture, Forestry, Environment 
and Water Management explain that Austria had to enter a reservation with respect to each modification of 
CITES Appendices including deletion, down-listing and the addition o f new species. E-mail from Andrea 
Nouak, Austrian Federal Ministry o f Agriculture, Forestry, Environment and Water, to author (Dec. 14, 
2006) (on file with author). This was because such changes had to go to the Austrian Parliament, and had to 
become Federal Law, for those changes to be applicable to Austria. Id. In 1987, a change in the Austrian 
Federal Law (BG 255/1987) ended this time consuming procedure. Id. This law allowed changes to CITES 
Appendices to enter into force immediately, that is, without parliamentary approval. Id.
25 Abensperg-Traun communication, supra note 257.
259 Id.
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A review of the pattern under which CITES reservations are utilized, as reflected 
in Table-5, indicates they are often filed by a state and then withdrawn several years later. 
Apart from the Austrian example, in some cases this occurs upon an “up-listing” of the 
species as it is transferred from Appendix II to I. In other cases, a factor for the 
withdrawal could be political pressure from other state parties and conservation-minded 
NGOs. When discussing the success or failure of CITES, or the status of particular 
species under its protection, environmental activists, as well as scholars, often refer to 
states’ reservations. Reservations by Japan and other states have long been cited 
unfavorably in discussions of the status of the saltwater crocodile and sea turtles, for 
example.260
The Japanese reservations to sea turtles were in fact the target of intense, and
961ultimately successful, campaigns by environmental advocates. Those reservations were 
withdrawn under the threat of trade sanctions by governments, the US in particular, as
96 9well as pressure from NGOs. In the area of sea turtle conservation especially, it is 
inescapable that such tactics support CITES’ goals and probably contributes to its 
effectiveness.263
260 See Jarred Kassenoff, Treaties in the Mist, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L 359, 366-369 (1999); Brad L. 
Bacon, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Wildlife Agreements and the United States: Wading 
Through the Murk, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. Re v . 331, 336 (1999); Eric McFadden, Asian Compliance with 
CITES: Problems and Prospects, 5 B.U. INT’L L. J. 311, 313-315 (1987); Gwyneth G. Stewart,
Enforcement Problems in the Endangered Species Convention: Reservations Regarding the Reservation 
Clauses, 14 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 438-445 (1981).
261 E-mail from Mike Weber, Former Director o f the Sea Turtle Rescue Fund o f the Center for Marine 
Conservation to author (June 6, 2004) (on file with author); E-mail from Dr. Susan S. Lieberman, Director 
of the Global Species Programme o f World Wildlife Fund International, to author (June 6, 2004) (on file 
with author).
262 See David E. Sanger, Japan, Backing Down, Plans Ban on Rare Turtle Import, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
1991, at D6; Chris W old, The Status o f  Sea Turtles under International Environmental Law and 
International Environmental Agreements, 5 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 1 1 ,2 6  (2002 ).
263 For a general discussion o f  the perceived effectiveness of international instruments to sea turtle 
conservation including CITES and the role o f NGOs see Manjula Tiwari, An Evaluation o f  the Perceived
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The case of reservations to cetacean species needs to be considered in the context 
of CITES relationship with the IWC. This raises interesting questions about the 
relationship of regimes that are not unique to CITES and the IWC. CITES has addressed 
and institutionalized the relationship between the regimes in the realm of cetacean 
conservation. This was achieved very early in the history of CITES at the second COP in 
San Jose, Costa Rica in 1979.264 Several CITES resolutions demonstrate institutional 
support for the IWC and even indicate the IWC’s primacy in matters of cetacean 
conservation. Specifically, Resolutions 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 all recognize the goal of 
cetacean conservation and the important role played by the IWC in achieving this.266 This 
close relationship requires whaling states that are parties to both regimes to contend with 
two associated, yet distinct, conservation schemes.267
Considering the IWC moratorium and the presence of commercially valuable 
cetaceans in Appendix I of CITES, whaling states need to rely upon the use of 
reservations to some extent to achieve their objectives. At the moment, both Norway and 
Iceland maintain reservations under both regimes. This strategy, however, is not without 
cost. The public nature of reservations in these regimes coupled with the relative isolation 
experienced by these states on the issue makes it difficult to conclude that this is a 
desirable path — however strongly held the principle.
Effectiveness o f  International Instruments fo r  Sea Turtle Conservation, 5 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 145 
(2002).
264 See Alexander Gillespie, Forum Shopping in International Environmental Law: The IWC, CITES, and 
the Management o f  Cetaceans, 33 OCEAN DEV. &  INT’L L. 17 (2002).
265 Id. at 31-33.
266 Id.
267 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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Overall, the CITES regime has received mixed reviews. It is generally regarded as
'yc.Qhaving had a positive impact on fauna and flora protection and is even credited with a
'J  / Q
trend toward increased effectiveness. At the same time, it is also regarded as having 
significant limitations such as unforeseen financial costs and its tendency to ban, and not 
regulate, trade in key species.270 Its focus has often been those species of the highest
971commercial value as opposed to the most seriously endangered.
The role of reservations in CITES remains contentious. Perhaps more than in any 
other wildlife treaty regime the reservations of CITES have allowed wide participation in 
a multilateral conservation system while affording states an opportunity to sidestep 
conservation measures for those species in which they continue to trade. CITES is a trade 
treaty as much as it is a wildlife management agreement. One must accept that economic 
interests will always inform conservation efforts. Similarly, there is no dispute that 
sustainable exploitation of resources is entirely consistent with the letter and spirit of 
international environmental law. On the other hand, the presence of marine species in 
CITES appendices is by itself evidence that trade in these species has had detrimental 
consequences on their status. Ongoing trade in these species, pursuant to a lawful 
exemptive procedure or otherwise, will likely impede their recovery.
268 See P. VAN HEIJNSBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 27-28 
(Am sterdam : IOS Press, 1997).
269 See Maaria Curlier and Steinar Andresen, International Trade in Endangered Species: The CITES 
Regime, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME E ffe c t iv e n e ss , supra note 205, at 373-375.
270 Id. at 373-374.
271 Id., citing James P. Ross, ed. The Seventeen Lessons fo r  CITES from the Crocodilian Conservation 
Worldwide: A Report from  a Workshop held in Santa Fe, Argentina. IUCN/SSC Crocodile Specialist 
Group.
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VII. The Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or Bonn 
Convention)272
The CMS is another major agreement for the preservation of wildlife diversity 
that features specific reservations. The overall objective of CMS is to protect threatened 
species whose migratory routes take them through the territory of more than one state. 
Providing species with stability during all phases of their life-cycle, in other words, 
through the migratory route, is to increase their chances for survival and recovery.
To achieve this objective CMS places responsibilities on those states whose 
national boundaries are traversed in the migration of designated species, or “range states” 
as the treaty refers to them. CMS defines migratory species as “the entire population or 
any geographically separate part of the population of any species or lower taxon of wild 
animals, a significant proportion of whose members cyclically and predictably cross one 
or more national jurisdictional boundaries[.]”274
CMS, like CITES, uses an appendix system to designate those migratory species 
deserving of protection. Article III of CMS provides for Appendix I to list “endangered 
migratory species.” Range states of Appendix I species, that is, those that are
272 Convention on the Conservation o f Migratory Species o f Wild Animals, June 3, 1979, reprinted in 19 
I.L.M. 15 (Bonn, entered into force Nov. 1, 1983) [hereinafter CMS]. As o f May 2006 CMS had 97 parties.
273 CMS defines range state as follows:
“Range State” in relation to a particular migratory species means any State (and 
where appropriate any other Party . . .) that exercises jurisdiction over any part 
of the range o f  that migratory species, or a State, flag vessels o f  which are 
engaged outside national jurisdictional limits in taking that migratory species[.]
Id. at art. 1(1 )(h).
274 Id. at art. 1(1 )(a).
275 Id. at art. III. “’Endangered’ in relation to a particular migratory species means that the migratory 
species is in danger o f extinction throughout all or a significant portion o f its range[.] Id. at art. 1(1 )(e).
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endangered, have immediate and affirmative responsibilities under CMS including the
77 f\restoration of habitat and removal of obstacles to migration.
Article IV(1) defines those species to be listed in Appendix II. Appendix II 
contains those “migratory species having an unfavourable conservation status and which 
require international agreements for their conservation and management, as well as those 
which have a conservation status which would significantly benefit from the international 
cooperation that could be achieved by an international agreement.”277 Therefore, Article 
IV contemplates additional agreements to achieve favorable migratory conditions for the 
enumerated Appendix II species. Under CMS, species may be listed in both Appendix I 
and II.278
4. Parties that are Range States o f a migratory species listed in Appendix I shall 
endeavour:
a) to conserve and, where feasible and appropriate, restore those habitats o f  the 
species which are o f importance in removing the species from danger of  
extinction;
b) to prevent, remove, compensate for or minimize, as appropriate, the adverse 
effects o f activities or obstacles that seriously impede or prevent the migration 
o f the species; and
c) to the extent feasible and appropriate, to prevent, reduce or control factors 
that are endangering or are likely to further endanger the species, including 
strictly controlling the introduction of, or controlling or eliminating, already 
introduced exotic species.
5. Parties that are Range States o f a migratory species listed in Appendix I shall 
prohibit the taking o f  animals belonging to such species. Exceptions may be 
made to this prohibition only if:
a) the taking is for scientific purposes;
b) the taking is for the purpose o f enhancing the propagation or survival o f the 
affected species;
c) the taking is to accommodate the needs o f traditional subsistence users o f  
such species; or
d) extraordinary circumstances so require; provided that such exceptions are 
precise as to content and limited in space and time. Such taking should not 
operate to the disadvantage o f  the species.
6. The Conferences o f  the Parties may recommend to the Parties that are Range States o f a 
migratory species listed in Appendix I that they take further measures considered appropriate to 
benefit the species.
Id. at art. III(4)-(6).
211 Id. at art. IV(1).
278 Id. at art. IV(2).
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The CMS COP maintains the list of species found in the appendices and is 
generally the decision-making body of the treaty.279 The COP meets in regular session no 
more than once every three years.280 It is advised by a Scientific Council.281 In November 
2005 CMS held its eighth COP. As of June 2006 CMS Appendix I listed approximately 
120 migratory species282 while Appendix II enumerated over 200 species.283 As in 
CITES, some species are listed in both Appendix I and Appendix II. Similarly, as in 
CITES, the listings sometimes represent all species in a higher taxon therefore the actual 
number of species protected is inexact.
Of the species listed in Appendices I and II, marine organisms are well 
represented. This is to be expected, considering many marine organisms are highly
J Q Amigratory. The Global Register of Migratory Species asserts that of the estimated 5000 
migratory species in the world, approximately 1000 are fish. In addition, cetaceans, 
pinnipeds and turtles are true migrants and therefore are found in CMS appendices.
As in CITES, CMS parties may opt out of their obligations toward a particular 
species under CMS by filing a specific reservation. The specific reservation provision of 
CMS is Article XIV and is reproduced in full in chapter 1. Article XIV of CMS, in fact, 
is remarkably similar to Article XXIII of CITES. After expressly prohibiting general
279 Id. at art. VII.
280 Id. at art. VII(3).
281 Id. at art. VIII.
282 See Guide to the CMS (Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/pdf/CMS_Guide_Jan02_en.pdf (visited Jan. 26, 2003). The actual list of 
Appendix I species is available at Appendix I Species,
http://www.cms.int/documents/appendix/Appendixl_E.pdf (last updated Feb. 23, 2006).
283 The actual list o f Appendix II species is available at Appendix II Species, 
http://www.cms.int/documents/appendix/Appendix2_E.pdf (last updated Feb. 23, 2006).
284 Annex I of UNCLOS enumerates 17 highly migratory marine species including various species o f tuna, 
sharks and cetaceans.
285 See Global Register o f  Migratory Species website, Databasing Migratory Species, at 
http://www.groms.de/groms/index.html (last visited June 10, 2006).
286 Id.
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reservations,287 it then provides for parties, upon depositing their instrument of 
“ratification, acceptance, approval or accession” to enter a specific reservation “with 
regard to the presence on either Appendix I or Appendix II or both, of any migratory 
species.. .”288 In regard to the subject of that reservation, they would then not be regarded 
as a party until 90 days after the reservation is withdrawn.
In addition, as in CITES, CMS allows parties to file specific reservations at the 
time the species is listed in the Appendix. Article XI provides for the amendment of 
appendices:
1. Appendices I and II may be amended at any ordinary or 
extraordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties.
2. Proposals for amendment may be made by any Party.
3. The text of any proposed amendment and the reasons for 
it, based on the best scientific evidence available, shall be 
communicated to the Secretariat at least one hundred and 
fifty days before the meeting and shall promptly be 
communicated by the Secretariat to all Parties. Any 
comments on the text by the Parties shall be communicated 
to the Secretariat not less than sixty days before the 
meeting begins. The Secretariat shall, immediately after the 
last day for submission of comments, communicate to the 
Parties all comments submitted by that day.
4. Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority 
of Parties present and voting.
5. An amendment to the Appendices shall enter into force 
for all Parties ninety days after the meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties at which it was adopted, except 
for those Parties which make a reservation in accordance 
with paragraph 6 of this Article.
6. During the period of ninety days provided for in 
paragraph 5 of this Article, any Party may by notification in
287 CMS, supra note 272, at art. X IV (l).
288 Id. at art. XIV(2).
289 , ,
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writing to the Depositary make a reservation with respect to 
the amendment. A reservation to an amendment may be 
withdrawn by written notification to the Depositary and 
thereupon the amendment shall enter into force for that 
Party ninety days after the reservation is withdrawn.290
7Q1Article XI therefore allows any party to propose amendments to the appendices 
before a regular or extraordinary meeting of the COP. The proposal must state the 
reasons for the amendment and be based on the best scientific information available.
The proposal for amendment must be communicated to the Secretariat at least 150 days 
in advance of the COP meeting and is then communicated to the other parties for 
comment.294 Any comments must be received by the Secretariat not later than 60 days 
before the COP, and these too, are then distributed to the other parties.
At the COP meeting, amendments are adopted by a two-thirds majority of those 
parties present and voting and become binding 90 days afterwards, except for those
9Q7parties that make a reservation. Parties wishing to make a reservation must notify the 
Depositary (Germany) in writing and may withdraw the reservation in the same 
fashion. Where a reservation is withdrawn it becomes binding on the state 90 days 
after the withdrawal.299
Use of the specific reservation procedures of Articles XI(6) and XIV has been 
light in relation to the number of species listed in the appendices. Table-6 summarizes the 
specific reservations and some key declarations by CMS parties that apply to marine
290 Id  at art. XI.
291 Id. at art. XI(2).
292 Id. at art. XI(1).
293 Id. at art. XI(3).
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at art XI(4).
297 Id. at art. XI(5).
298 Id. at art. XI(6).
299 Id.
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species from its entry into force in 1983 through 2005. By the end of 2005 only three 
states: Denmark, France and Norway had entered specific reservations pertaining to 
marine species. In fact, these reservations account for most of the activity under Articles 
XI and XIV as non-marine species have drawn only two reservations in the CMS’s 
history.300
In addition to specific reservations, as noted above, another noteworthy practice 
in CMS is the taking of declarations by states establishing territorial limits on the 
application of the treaty. Australia, Chile, China, Denmark, New Zealand, Netherlands, 
Portugal and the UK all entered declarations that address their intention to define or limit 
the application of CMS to their territories in some fashion. This practice is helpful to 
clarify questions about the reach of CMS obligations where the sovereignty of territory is 
transferred from one state to another such as in the cases of Hong Kong and Macau.
As in other regimes, the order cetacea is well represented in CMS reservations. 
Table-6 indicates various whale and dolphin species were excluded from CMS protection 
by Denmark and Norway. The inclusion of certain cetacean species, especially small
TO 1cetaceans, has generated controversy at the COPs. The controversy, as well as the 
resulting reservations, demonstrates the view held by these states that whales and 
dolphins remain a consumable resource.
For Norway in particular, the practice of exempting cetaceans from protection 
establishes a consistent pattern across treaty regimes. One need only consider Norway’s 
use of reservations in the IWC, CITES and CMS to see that this is so. This strategy
300 Argentina and Bolivia entered reservations to the inclusion o f vicugna in Appendix I. An unofficial list 
o f CMS specific reservations maintained by the CMS Secretariat is available at 
http://www.cms.int/pdFreservations_terrotories_rev.pdf (last visited June 10, 2006).
301 See Gillespie, supra note 167, at 271. Gillespie discusses the context o f the COPs where certain small 
cetacean species were listed as well as the dispositions o f Norway and Denmark, the objecting states.
144
obviously serves to insulate Norway from legal obligations to conserve cetaceans in 
multiple treaty regimes. This is without question a lawful application of exemptive 
provisions. Whether or not it undercuts the goal of cooperation in the conservation and 
management for these species is another matter.
Most discussions of the effectiveness of CMS focus on the additional agreements 
it has spawned to fulfill its mandate in Articles IV(3)302 and IV(4)303 to conserve 
Appendix II species. Under the auspices of these articles, CMS parties have developed a 
number of progeny agreements. By June 2006, 15 such agreements had been concluded 
although not all of these are binding treaties.304 Among the binding treaties four apply to 
marine species and of these three have specific reservations provisions. These three are 
the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP); the Agreement 
on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous 
Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) and the Agreement on the Conservation of Small 
Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS). The fourth, the Agreement on the 
Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea,305 expressly prohibits reservations.306
302 CMS, supra note 272, at art. IV(3). Article IV(3) provides: “Parties that are Range States of migratory 
species listed in Appendix II shall endeavour to conclude AGREEMENTS where these should benefit the 
species and should give priority to those species in an unfavourable conservation status.” Id.
303 Id. at art. IV(4). Article IV(4) provides: “Parties are encouraged to take action with a view to concluding 
agreements for any population or any geographically separate part o f the population of any species or lower 
taxon o f wild animals, members o f  which periodically cross one or more national jurisdiction boundaries.” 
Id.
304 For information on these CMS agreements see Introduction to the CMS, at
http://www.cms.int/about/intro.htm (last visited June 10, 2006). The non-binding agreements are referred to 
as “Memoranda o f Understanding” or M oU’s.
305 Agreement on the Conservation o f Seals in the Wadden Sea, available at 
http://www.cms.int/species/wadden_seals/sea_text.htm (visited June 20, 2004).
306 Id. at art. XIV.
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VIII. The Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP)307
-1AO
ACAP is an Article IV(3) Agreement of CMS. It was opened for signature on
June 19, 2001 and entered into force on February 1, 2004.309 As of July 2005 ACAP had 
1^0eight ratifications. The Agreement maintains a list of threatened species of albatrosses 
and petrels (Annex I), seeks to establish conservation measures and implement an Action 
Plan (contained in Annex II) for those populations in decline and suffering a variety of 
threats during their migration.311 The MOP is the decision-making arm of the regime.312
ACAP expresses a preference for decision-making by consensus; however, where this is
• • • 11 ^not possible, by a two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting. Amending an
Annex is an action specifically requiring a two-thirds majority.314
The annex amendment process of ACAP allows parties to opt out of measures 
addressed to designated species or the specific elements of the Action Plan. Article XII(5) 
and (6) provide:
5. Any additional annex or amendment to an annex shall be 
adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Parties present and 
voting and shall enter into force for all Parties on the 
ninetieth day after the date of its adoption by the Meeting 
of the Parties, except for Parties that have entered a 
reservation in accordance with paragraph 6 o f this Article.
307 Agreement on the Conservation o f Albatrosses and Petrels, available at
http://www.acap.aq/index.php/acap/official_documents (visited June 20, 2004) [hereinafter ACAP],
308 Id. at art. 1(5).
j09 See ACAP Summary Sheet, at http://www.acap.aq/index.php/acap/official_documents (visited June 20,
2004).
310 See ACAP Contracting and non-contracting Parties, at http://www.acap.aq/acap/parties (last visited June 
10, 2006). As o f July 2005 the parties were Australia, Ecuador, Peru, France, New Zealand, Spain,
Republic o f South Africa and the UK. Signatories that had not yet ratified by Nov. 1, 2005 were Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile. Id.
311 See ACAP, supra note 307.
312 Id. at art. VIII(l).
313 Id. at art. VIII(9).
314 Id. at art. XII(4).
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6. During the period of ninety days provided for in 
paragraph 5 of this Article, any Party may, by written 
notification to the Depositary, enter a reservation with 
respect to an additional annex or an amendment to an 
annex. Such reservation may be withdrawn at any time by 
written notification to the Depositary, and the additional 
annex or the amendment shall enter into force for that Party 
on the thirtieth day after the date of withdrawal of the 
reservation.315
Therefore, amendments to an annex that could potentially include the addition of 
a new species in Annex I, or a modification to the Action Plan in Annex II, enter into 
force 90 days after its adoption by at least two-thirds of the voting parties at the MOP 
except for those parties that enter a reservation in writing within that 90-day period.316 
Where a party wishes to withdraw a reservation the amendment will bind them as well 30
O 1 -7
days after their written notification of withdrawal.
ACAP is a treaty that allows for states to become parties either by signature alone,
• i i othat is, without formal ratification, or by signature followed by ratification (the choice 
of procedure will probably be determined by considerations of domestic law and policy), 
and permits specific reservations to be made at the time a state becomes bound. Article 
XVII provides:
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be 
subject to general reservations.
2. However, a specific reservation in respect o f any 
species covered by the Agreement or any specific provision 
o f the Action Plan may be entered by any Range State or 
regional economic integration organisation on signature 
without qualification in respect o f ratification, acceptance
315 Id. at art. XII(5)&(6) (emphasis added).
316 Id.
3,7 Id. at art. XII(6).
318 Id. at art. XV. This type o f  provision makes sense in treaties like ACCOBAMS and ACAP with fewer 
parties than it does for larger, more wider-reaching agreements such as CITES and CMS. It offers a simpler 
alternative pathway to treaty membership.
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or approval or, as the case may be, on depositing its 
instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.
3. Such a reservation may be withdrawn at any time 
by the Range State or regional economic integration 
organisation which had entered it, by notification in writing 
to the Depositary. Such a State or regional economic 
integration organisation shall not be bound by the 
provisions that are the object of the reservation until thirty 
days after the date on which the reservation has been 
withdrawn.
4. The provisions contained in paragraph 1 of this 
Article do not preclude a Party to this Agreement that is not 
a Party to the Convention from making declarations or 
statements to the effect of clarifying its status vis-a-vis each 
instrument, provided that such declarations or statements 
do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
the provisions of this Agreement in their application to that 
Party.3'9
This exemptive provision, allowing for a reservation at the time of signature, as 
opposed to the time ratification as in CITES and CMS, is similar to the one found in 
ACCOBAMS (discussed below). Since ACAP entered into force in February 2004 until 
June 2006, no reservations had yet been filed.
319 Id. at art. XVII (emphasis added).
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IX. The Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea,
Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS)320
ACCOBAMS is an Article IV(4) agreement of CMS.321 The objective of 
ACCOBAMS is “to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status for [the]
•  "J99cetaceans” that migrate through the waters addressed by the treaty. The impetus for the 
treaty was the poor status of some local cetacean populations and the significant threats to 
them in the area covered by the agreement. To attain the goal of improved 
conservation, range states are required to take coordinated measures, prohibit the 
deliberate taking of cetaceans and cooperate to create and maintain a network of specially 
protected conservation areas.324 ACCOBAMS entered into force on June 1, 2001. By July 
2005 it had 18 parties.325
Annex I lists the cetaceans of the Mediterranean and contiguous area of the 
Atlantic in which the convention applies and Annex II sets forth the conservation plan to 
be undertaken by the parties. The ACCOBAMS MOP is the decision-making body of the
1 9 /  # 9 9 7
regime. A Scientific Committee advises and assists the MOP in its work. The first
320 Agreement on the Conservation o f Cetaceans o f the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous 
Atlantic Area, openedfor signature Nov. 24. 1996, 36 I.L.M. I l l , available at 
http://www.accobams.mc/Accob/Wacco.nsf/FramlFrDown70penFrameSet (last visited June 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter ACCOBAMS],
321 Id. at art. 1(4).
322 Id. at art. 11(1).
323 See Gillespie, supra note 167, at 278.
324 ACCOBAMS, supra note 320, at art. 11(1).
325 See ACCOBAMS Parties at http://www.accobams.org/accobams_parties_list.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2005).
326 ACCOBAMS, supra note 320, at art. 111(1).
327 Id. at art. IV.
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ACCOBAMS MOP was held in early 2002328 and the second was held in November 
2004.329
Article XV establishes the availability of specific reservations in ACCOBAMS. It 
provides:
The provisions of this Agreement shall not be subject to 
general reservations. However, a specific reservation may 
be entered by any State in respect of a specifically 
delimited part of its internal waters, on signature without 
reservation in respect of ratification, acceptance or approval 
or, as the case may be, on the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Such a 
reservation may be withdrawn at any time by the State 
which had entered it by notification in writing to the 
Depositary; the State concerned shall not be bound by the 
application of the Agreement to the waters which are the 
object of the reservation until thirty days after the date on 
which the reservation has been withdrawn.
The first notable aspect of this provision is that a party may limit the geographic 
scope of the agreement with a specific reservation. More exactly, a state may exclude 
areas of its internal waters from the treaty. This provision is the direct result of concerns 
expressed by Turkey during the treaty negotiation over the Sea of Marmara although it 
has not been invoked.331 The next noteworthy feature is that states may sign the treaty 
“without reservation in respect of ratification, acceptance or approval[.]” This is a 
rather subtle provision, similar to Article XVII of ACAP, that must be read in 
conjunction with Article XIII(l) which provides:
328 A press release detailing the work o f  the first ACCOBAMS MOP held Feb. 28, 2002-Mar. 3, 2002 is 
available at http://www.accobams.mc/Accob/Wacco.nsf7Fram5GblOpenFrameSet (visited June 20, 2004).
329 Information on the second MOP held Nov. 9-12, 2004 is available at 
http://www.accobams.org/index_science.htm (visited June 13, 2005).
330 ACCOBAMS, supra note 320, at art. XV.
331 E-mail from Marie-Christine Van Klaveren, Executive Secretary, ACCOBAMS Secretariat to author 
(Mar. 25, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter ACCOBAMS communication].
332 ACCOBAMS, supra note 320, at art. XV.
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1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by any 
Range State, whether or not areas under its jurisdiction lie 
within the Agreement area, or regional economic 
integration organization, at least one member of which is a 
Range State, either by:
a) signature without reservation in respect of ratification, 
acceptance or approval; or
b) signature with reservation in respect of ratification, 
acceptance or approval, followed by ratification, 
acceptance or approval.333
This was initially designed to allow the treaty to come into force more easily by allowing
states to become parties and enter reservations on signature without formally resorting to
the ratification process.334 As of yet, no state has availed itself of this provision and
ACCOBAMS members have launched their respective ratification processes.
The process of decision-making by the ACCOBAMS MOP that may lead to 
specific reservations is addressed in two key articles: Articles 111(6) and X. Article 111(6) 
provides:
6. All decisions of the Meeting of the Parties shall be 
adopted by consensus except as otherwise provided in 
Article X of this Agreement. However, if consensus cannot 
be achieved in respect of matters covered by the annexes to 
the Agreement, a decision may be adopted by a two thirds 
majority of the Parties present and voting. In the event of a 
vote, any Party may, within one hundred and fifty days, 
notify the Depository in writing of its intention not to apply 
the said decision.336
Therefore, ACCOBAMS expresses a preference that MOP decision-making occur 
by consensus. Where this cannot be achieved or where it is provided for elsewhere in the 
treaty, decisions are by a two-thirds majority of parties voting at a MOP. The last
333 Id. at art. XII(l).
334 See ACCOBAMS communication, supra note 331.
335 Id.
336 ACCOBAMS, supra note 320, at art. 111(6).
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sentence of this provision allows for states to notify the Depository in writing within 150 
days of a vote that it intends not to apply the decision. This needs to be considered in 
conjunction with Article X which provides for the amendment of the agreement including 
annexes. The relevant section of Article X provides:
4. Any amendment to an annex to the Agreement shall be 
adopted by a two thirds majority of the Parties present and 
voting and shall enter into force for all Parties on the one 
hundred and fiftieth day after the date of its adoption by the 
Meeting of the Parties, except for Parties that have entered 
a reservation in accordance with paragraph 5 o f this 
Article.
5. During the period of one hundred and fifty days provided 
for in paragraph 4 of this Article, any Party may by written 
notification to the Depositary enter a reservation with 
respect to an amendment to an annex to the Agreement.
Such reservation may be withdrawn by written notification 
to the Depositary, and thereupon the amendment shall enter 
into force for that Party on the thirtieth day after the date of 
withdrawal of the reservation.
In other words, the list of cetacean species maintained in Annex I and the 
Conservation Plan contained in Annex II can be amended on a two-thirds vote of parties 
present and voting at a MOP. The amendments will come into force 150 days for all 
parties except for those that filed written reservations. Reservations may be withdrawn in 
writing and then the amendment becomes effective for the withdrawing state 30 days 
after withdrawal. As of June 2006 no states had entered reservations under ACCOBAMS.
337 Id. at art. X(4)-(5) (emphasis added).
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X. The Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North 
Seas (ASCOBANS)338
ASCOBANS is an Article IV(4) agreement of CMS.339 It opened for signature in 
1992 and entered into force in 1994.340 It is open to all range states of small cetaceans 
that migrate through the Baltic and North Seas.341 Range states are defined as “any State, 
whether or not a Party to the agreement, that exercises jurisdiction over any part of the 
range of a species covered by this agreement, or a State whose flag vessels, outside 
national jurisdictional limits but within the area of the agreement, are engaged in 
operations adversely affecting small cetaceans[.]”342 ASCOBANS parties “undertake to 
cooperate closely in order to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status for 
small cetaceans.”343 Each party is required to apply the agreement to the waters under its 
jurisdiction.344 As of June 2006, ASCOBANS had ten parties.345
The ASCOBANS Annex is the conservation and management plan and it 
attempts, among other things, to improve habitat conservation, facilitate scientific 
research and limit bycatch and strandings.346 The Annex is not subject to reservations. 
Although ASCOBANS provides for a MOP347 that performs functions similar to those of
338 Agreement on the Conservation o f Small Cetaceans o f the Baltic and North Seas, entered into force 
Mar. 29, 1994), available at http://www.ascobans.org (visited Dec. 31, 2003) [hereinafter ASCOBANS].
339 Id. at art. 8.1.
340 See About ASCOBANS, The Agreement and its Parties at http://www.ascobans.org/index0101.html 
(visited Dec. 31, 2003) [hereinafter About ASCOBANS].
341 ASCOBANS, supra note 338, at 8.4.
342 Id. at art. 1.2(f).
343 Id. at art. 2.1.
344 Id. at art. 2.2.
345 For an up-to-date list o f  ASCOBAN parties see About ASCOBANS, The Agreement and its Parties, 
supra note 340. As o f June 2006 the ten ASCOBANS parties were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France 
Germany, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and the UK. Id  (last visited June 10, 2006).
346 ASCOBANS, supra note 338, at Annex.
347 Id. at art. 6. ASCOBANS held its fourth MOP in 2003.
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other regimes, the MOP does not modify or maintain the list of species covered by the 
agreement. This is because the treaty itself clearly establishes that it applies to all small
*AQcetaceans in the convention area.
As in other CMS treaties, parties may in their discretion exclude certain species
from the reach of the agreement by way of specific reservation. Article 8.6 is the
reservation procedure of ASCOBANS. It provides:
The agreement and its Annex shall not be subject to general 
reservations. However, a Range State or Regional 
Economic Integration Organization may, on becoming a 
Party in accordance with Article 8.4 and 8.5, enter a 
specific reservation with regard to any particular species, 
subspecies or population of small cetaceans. Such 
reservations shall be communicated to the Depositary on 
signing or at the deposit of an instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.349
This provision is rather straightforward and simply has the effect of allowing 
states to participate in the work of the regime while allowing them to specifically exclude 
from their obligations certain species, subspecies or population of small cetaceans. This 
may occur at signing or when depositing an instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession. This contrasts with other specific reservations discussed in this 
chapter in that those may be entered to measures adopted by the regime. As such, 
although it is labeled as a specific reservation, Article 8.6 is more in the nature of a 
general reservation. As of June 2006 no states had availed themselves of the Article 8.6 
reservation.
348 Id. at art. 1.1.
349 Id. at art. 8.6.
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Since it entered into force in 1994 the success of ASCOBANS can be regarded as 
limited at best.350 First, its level of participation by range states is not very high.351 
Second, ASCOBANS appears to have stimulated only modest beneficial activity from its 
member states. In addition, the ASCOBANS MOP has so far only adopted measures 
that are recommendatory in character. With regard to the question of its impact on the 
species it seeks to protect, it has not been in force long enough to render this 
determination nor could such success or failure easily be attributed to ASCOBANS’ 
efforts.353 Despite this, the non-utilization of the specific reservation procedure of Article 
8.6 coupled with the clear conservation focus of the regime can be regarded as a positive 
step for the small cetacean populations of the Baltic and North Seas.
Conclusions
This chapter focused on specific reservations provisions, their usage and impacts 
in key marine conservation regimes. The review of state practice suggests the classic 
purpose served by reservations is alive in fishery and marine conservation agreements. 
That is, they facilitate participation in the regime while offering states the flexibility to 
avoid objectionable conservation and management strategies. In the case of NAFO, the 
persistent use of the objection procedure by the EC in the 1980s and 1990s not only had 
an inescapably detrimental impact on key fish stocks but also strained relations within the
350 See Robin R. Churchill, The Agreement on the Conservation o f  Small Cetaceans o f  the Baltic and North 
Seas, in Bums & Gillespie, supra note 167, at 309-312.
351 Id. at 310. Churchill identifies the non-participation o f almost all coastal states o f the eastern Baltic, and 
more importantly, France, Norway and the EC as a significant limitation. Id.
352 Id. at 311-312.
353 Id. at 310-311.
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organization, most notably between the EC and Canada. Beyond any doubt, the pattern of 
reservations by the EC was a contributing factor in the Spain-Canada dispute.354
With a number of regimes, the NEAFC and IWC in particular, scientific 
uncertainty in stock assessment has historically interfered with the ability to effectively 
manage dwindling species. Persistent use of reservations in the face of such scientific 
uncertainty may raise even further questions about the value of objection procedures in 
law and policy.
The IOTC offers an objection procedure to its members that has thus far gone 
largely unutilized. Although there are ongoing concerns about the status of Indian Ocean 
tuna species, it is commendable that the members of this regime have been able to attain 
a measure of consensus at however modest a level.
In the cases of the IWC, CITES and CMS one can discern a clear strategy on the 
part of pro-whaling states to use reservations to preserve their rights to exploit cetaceans, 
trade and consume their products. This conclusion may be rather apparent to observers of 
marine conservation regimes. At the same time, it should be equally apparent that these 
reservations serve as a platform for ideological differences on the conservation and 
utilization of cetaceans.
In both the IWC and CITES, however, the record indicates that states resorting to 
reservations will often withdraw them when pressured to do so. This pressure may come 
from other states within the regime, NGOs or both. This was particularly so in the case of 
Japan’s reservations to sea turtles in CITES.
354 In contrast, the FAO has identified the objection mechanism in regional fishery organizations as a 
strategy to prevent disputes within a regime. See FAO CIRCULAR 995, supra note 64, at 11 (noting that 
failure to reach decisions may form the basis o f a dispute while the objection procedure facilitates dispute 
prevention).
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This chapter demonstrated that internal and international politics, advocacy and 
economics all play a role in determining whether or not states resort to, and maintain, 
reservations. By and large, the use of reservations in a legal regime is a public act and 
this carries with it a degree of exposure. The next chapter will examine regimes utilizing 
vetoes as opposed to specific reservations. In these regimes the application of exemptive 
provisions, and their consequences, are far less public.
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Chapter 3
A Review of Veto Provisions in Key Treaties
This chapter focuses on agreements that more or less require consensus or 
unanimity to adopt a conservation measure within the regime. In other words, the 
requirement of consensus or unanimity gives each of the parties in the regime a “veto” 
over any measure they deem objectionable. To be clear, the terms “consensus” and 
“unanimous” are not identical and it is useful to understand their distinction. 
“Consensus,” in the context of marine conservation agreements, means all states try to 
agree on a measure, as far as possible, and the measure may be adopted without resort to 
a formal vote.1 Unanimity, on the other hand, means that all states vote to adopt a 
measure or there is an indication of what would happen if there was a vote.
Despite this distinction, the requirement of “consensus” and the requirement of 
“unanimity,” will be considered together and treated as singular type of exemptive 
provision. To contrast this type of exemptive provision with the objection procedures and 
specific reservation procedures discussed in chapter 2, vetoes prevent a proposed measure 
from applying to any party, not just the one(s) objecting. This chapter will demonstrate
1 A definition o f “consensus” is provided in the Antigua Convention. “‘Consensus’ means the adoption o f a 
decision without voting and without the expression o f any stated objection.” Antigua Convention, infra 
note 55, at art. 1(5). The International Seabed Authority, established by UNCLOS, is an example o f an 
international organization that provides for majority voting, yet decisions are often reached by consensus. 
See The International Seabed Authority: Structure and Functioning, at
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/seabedarea/TechBrochures/ENG2.pdf (visited June 17, 2006). With regard to 
certain fundamental questions, the Council o f  the International Seabed Authority must take its decisions by 
consensus. The Western and Central Pacific Treaty (discussed infra) expresses a preference for consensus 
but then provides for a formal vote where this is impossible. For a scholarly discussion o f consensus and 
unanimity see H e n r y  G. SCHERMERS, In t e r n a t io n a l  In stitu tio n a l  La w  391-395 (Rockville, Maryland: 
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980). Schermers observes that “consensus is not a legal, but a political conception.
It differs from the legal concept o f  unanimity.” Id. at 393.
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that exemptive provisions are actually found along something of a continuum, as opposed 
to fitting neatly within a classification. In some cases, regimes calling for unanimity or 
consensus will contain fallback or alternate procedures if such consensus cannot be 
attained. The ACAP treaty discussed in chapter 2 expresses a preference for decision­
making by consensus but then offers its members a reservation procedure. The treaties 
discussed in this chapter raise the bar of agreement somewhat higher. They typically call 
for consensus or unanimity at the threshold and will invoke alternate procedures, of 
varying degrees of flexibility and sophistication, only where this fails. The initial treaties 
discussed in this chapter require decision-making by consensus or unanimity -  in other 
words, a “true veto.” The remaining treaties utilize both a veto and some form of an 
alternate procedure. In some cases, the alternate procedure involves a specific reservation 
provision similar to those discussed in chapter 2. In other cases, there is no specific 
reservation but a procedure to facilitate decision-making in the absence of agreement by 
the parties.
A striking feature that limits research on the effect of “veto” provisions must be 
noted at the outset. Where records of votes are kept at all, regimes requiring unanimity or 
consensus in decision-making tend not to preserve information about measures that do 
not attain such unanimity or consensus and are therefore not adopted. Consequently, it is 
extremely difficult to draw conclusions about how the dynamics of decision-making 
affect the relative success or failure of these regimes since too little is known about the 
actual working of their decision-making processes.
Primary source documents maintained by fishery and conservation regimes often 
do not supply sufficient information and need to be supplemented with scholarly writings
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and informed observations by participants. In fact, the need to resort to secondary 
sources, where available, is even more necessary than in the case of specific reservations. 
This is because regimes with decision-making by consensus or unanimity often do not 
keep formal records of votes and other proceedings where agreement is not achieved.
With this limitation in mind, one can begin to explore veto provisions and their impact on 
the effectiveness of certain fishery and conservation regimes.
I. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)2
The first regime discussed in this chapter utilizes a true veto. That is, unanimity of 
its members is necessary before measures may be adopted. The IATTC has a longer 
history than most other regional fishery organizations. It is the product of the 1949 
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC Treaty).3 The IATTC Treaty was initially bilateral, between the US and Costa 
Rica, but other states that participate in the tuna fishery in the Eastern Tropical Pacific are 
permitted to join.4 As of June 2006, the number of members had grown to fifteen with 
five additional cooperating non-parties since the treaty entered into force in 1950.5
2 The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission [hereinafter IATTC] was the product o f the Convention 
for the Establishment o f the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, U.S.-Costa Rica, 
80 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force March 3, 1950), available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/iattc.htm 
(visited Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter IATTC Treaty].
3 Id.
4 Id. at art. V(3).
5 See IATTC website, at http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm (last visited June 17, 2006). As o f  June 2006 
the members were: Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru, Republic o f Korea, Spain, US, Vanuatu and Venezuela. Id. The cooperating non-parties 
were: Canada, China, EU, Honduras and Chinese Taipei. Id.
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The IATTC is composed of “national sections” of one to four members that 
represent the interests of the individual parties.6 The key functions of the IATTC are the 
scientific study of yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) and skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelam is) and the kinds of fish commonly used as bait to fish tuna in the Eastern Pacific 
Ocean.7 IATTC also adopts recommendations of proposals, based upon scientific 
investigation, designed to keep the populations of covered fish stocks at “levels of 
abundance which will permit the maximum sustainable catch.”8 To understand IATTC 
objectives against the backdrop of the modem law of the sea, it is useful to recall that 
both yellowfin and skipjack tuna are enumerated in Annex I of UNCLOS as highly 
migratory species.
The IATTC veto is found in Article 1(8): “Each national section shall have one 
vote. Decisions, resolutions, recommendations, and publications of the Commission shall 
be made only by a unanimous vote.”9 There is no objection procedure found in the 
IATTC Treaty. There is a legitimate question as to whether the IATTC is empowered to 
take decisions binding upon its members or merely to supply them with 
recommendations. First, unlike other regimes examined in this thesis, the IATTC Treaty 
does not clearly state that its parties must carry out the decisions of the Commission. In 
addition, the language of Article II suggests a less rigid regulatory potential. In defining 
the functions and duties of the Commission with regard to the maintenance of tuna 
stocks, Article 11(5) features the word “recommend” and not any stronger language to
6 IATTC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1(1).
7 Id. at art. 11(1).
8 Id. at art. 11(5).
9 Id. at art. 1(8).
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provide for the powers of the Commission.10 Interestingly, however, Article 1(8) refers to
the work of the Commission as “[d]ecisions, resolutions and recommendations ..
without further elaboration.11 At the same time, “[w]hen agreement was reached at an
IGM [Inter-Governmental Meeting] the recommendations of that meeting were written in
the form of resolutions and passed on to the Commissioners for consideration and
possible adoption . . .” The reports of IATTC also demonstrate that the organization
1 ^collects information on compliance with resolutions. Therefore, at least with regard to 
certain decisions of IATTC, the parties appear to have indicated an intention to commit 
themselves. Furthermore, recent developments in this regime, specifically the adoption of 
the Antigua Convention (discussed below),14 suggest the IATTC will definitely be able to 
adopt binding measures in the future.15
Laying aside questions about the extent to which IATTC adopts binding 
measures, a review of the annual reports of IATTC indicates that much of its work has 
been in the nature of scientific study as opposed to direct regulation. In addition, the 
scientific findings indicated that the yellowfin and skipjack presented very different 
levels of abundance and therefore different management needs. As early as the 1950s 
IATTC studies concluded that the fishing effort for yellowfin had a real effect on stock
10 Id. at art. 11(5). Article 11(5) reads in its entirety: “The Commission shall perform the following functions 
and duties: Recommend from  time to time, on the basis o f scientific investigations, proposals for joint action 
by the High Contracting Parties designed to keep the populations o f fishes covered by this Convention at 
those levels o f abundance which will permit the maximum sustained catch.” Id  (emphasis added).
11 Id. at art. 1(8). For the full text o f Article 1(8) see supra text accompanying note 9.
12 See W illiam  H. B a y l if f , IATTC, Special Repo r t  13: O r g a n iz a t io n , Fu n c t io n s  a n d  
A ch ie v e m e n t s  of th e  In t e r -A m er ic a n  T ro pical  T u n a  C o m m issio n  7 (2 0 0 1 ) [hereinafter IATTC, 
Special  Repo r t  13].
13 See, e.g., IATTC, 20 0 4  ANNUAL REPORT 100 (2006).
14 See Antigua Convention infra note 55.
15 See id. at arts. VII (Functions o f the Commission) and XVIII (Implementation, Compliance and 
Enforcement by Parties).
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abundance.16 On the other hand, skipjack stocks showed themselves to be far more
• 17capable of sustaining a larger catch. The difference in population density between these 
two stocks ultimately dictated that fishing efforts were diverted from the yellowfin to the 
skipjack.18
Between the years of 1966 and 1979, IATTC was somewhat successful in 
adopting a catch quota for yellowfin in its regulatory area.19 After a hiatus of almost 20 
years IATTC was able to revive yellowfin regulation in 1998.20 A particular feature of 
the IATTC catch quota is that it was generally set on a first-come, first-served basis also 
referred to as a “global quota.”21 The global quota needs to be contrasted with the system 
of national allocation utilized by many other regional fishery organizations such as 
NAFO, for example. In application, the global quota means that when the quota is 
reached, the season closes, regardless of how much (or how little) each individual party 
has captured.22
While the global quota may have been the beginning of regulation, it was not the 
whole story. The IATTC regulatory framework developed “special allowances” to 
address particular needs of its members. These included special allowances for small
16 Bell M. Shimada & Milner B. Schaefer, A Study o f  Changes in Fishing Effort, Abundance, and Yield for  
Yellowfin and Skipjack Tuna in the Eastern Tropicail Pacific Ocean, 1 INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA 
C om m ission  B u l l . ,  3 5 1 ,3 8 7  (1956 ).
17 Id. “[I]t appears that the present rate o f catching is not large enough to have measurable effects on the 
average population size o f  skipjack, and that it is biologically possible to increase greatly the average 
annual catch o f this species on a sustainable basis.” Id.
18 See IATTC, 1965 A n n u a l  REPORT 9 (1966).
19 See R .R . CHURCHILL & A.V. L o w e , T h e  L a w  OF THE S e a  311 (3d. ed. Manchester: Juris, 1999); 
W illia m  T. B u r k e , I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  o f  t h e  S ea : D o c u m e n ts  a n d  N o t e s  3-104 (student ed.,
Detroit: Lupus Publications, Ltd., 1992).
20 See IATTC, SPECIAL REPORT 13, supra note 12, at 37-38 (2001).
21 B u r k e , supra note 19, at 3 -104 .
22 Id. For a fascinating eye-level account o f the issues faced by tuna fishers in the Eastern Pacific, including 
the impact o f IATTC regulations on fishing practices and procedures, see MICHAEL K. ORBACH, H u n te r s ,  
S ea m en , a n d  E n tr e p r e n e u r s :  T h e  T u n a  S e in e r m e n  o f  S a n  D ie g o  (Berkeley: Univ. o f California Press, 
1 9 77).
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vessels, members with tuna canneries but insignificant catches, newly constructed vessels 
of developing states and a “grace period” for those vessels which returned to port before 
the season closure date and then returned to sea for a second trip. These special 
allowances may have provided sufficient inducements to the parties to facilitate 
agreement.
As IATTC reports, the IGMs frequently had difficulty balancing the overall quota
with distribution of special allowances:
At IGMs attempts were made to reach agreement as to 
whether to accept the recommendations of the staff for the 
overall quota and as to distribution of special allowances, 
etc. The principal point of contention in most years was the 
special allowances; the developing nations that border the 
EPO wanted to base these allowances on such criteria as 
coastal adjacency to the resource and level of economic 
development, whereas some of the other nations were 
opposed to this. Also, such questions as international 
cooperation in the enforcement of regulations were 
discussed. When agreement was reached at an IGM the 
recommendations of that meeting were written in the form 
of resolutions and passed on to the Commissioners for 
consideration and possible adoption at the IATTC meeting, 
which was reconvened after the IGM was adjourned.24
The tuna fishers of the Eastern Pacific reported clear quota advantages of certain 
states. Michael K. Orbach describes the rights and exemptions enjoyed by IATTC fishers 
as follows:
[IATTC] sets certain limits on the amount of yellowfin tuna 
which may be taken by each member nation within certain 
zones. Some countries, Mexico for example, have special 
exemptions allowing them to fish after the close of the 
“season” within the limits of the zone until the boats 
under their flag have reached their particular allocation.
There is also a provision on a sliding scale according to 
boat size which allows for a percentage of each boat’s
23 IATTC, S pecial  Repo r t  13, supra note 12, at 36-37 (2001).
24 Id. at 7.
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catch to be yellowfin after the season has closed—on the 
theories that sometimes the schools are mixed and it is 
impossible to catch one without the other, and that smaller 
boats constitute less danger to the resource stocks.25
As previously noted, 1966 was the first year of substantial regulation. In that year 
not all states were able to meet the recommended deadline set for the season 26 In the next 
two years of regulation, IATTC reported that the “recommended conservation measures 
were promptly accepted and implementation of appropriate regulations by all countries 
fishing substantially in the area followed smoothly.. .”27 Despite the agreement by 
IATTC members necessary to achieve the quotas and the success of the implementation 
of regulations generally, the actual catch at the end of those seasons exceeded the 
recommended quota by about 8%.28 IATTC categorized this as a “slight overage” and 
noted “the reduction in fishing intensity brought about by restricting yellowfin catches ..
. was sufficient to assure that the stocks of yellowfin at the year’s end were in a healthy 
condition.29
The fact that IATTC members were able to achieve agreement on a global quota 
over a number of years, albeit balanced by special allowances, is noteworthy considering 
it greatly favors those states that have the largest and most capable fleets.30 Compared 
with the entirely inequitable distribution of Eastern Pacific tuna resources before IATTC, 
the global quota was still an improvement for developing states. Exemplifying the 
inequality that existed before IATTC, for many years the US took nearly 100 percent of
25 ORBACH, supra note 22 , at 135.
26 IATTC, 1968 A n n u a l  Re po r t  6 (1969).
21 Id.
28 Id.
30
29 Id.
BURKE, supra note 19, at 3 -1 0 4 .
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the tuna catch in the Eastern Pacific.31 Nevertheless, William T. Burke has identified the 
lack of effective distribution of allowable catch in the IATTC as a difficulty threatening 
the maintenance of a viable management program.32
As developing states in Latin America began to participate in the tuna fishery of 
the Eastern Pacific, they opposed the philosophy of developed states, particularly the US, 
which viewed migratory tuna as common property available to those able to harvest the
33resource. Instead, the developing states maintained that they enjoyed a special 
relationship to the tuna stocks and favored “allocating a portion of the allowable catch 
among themselves on the basis of adjacency to the resource, with the remainder being 
distributed in some way among harvesting nations.”34
In addition to establishing catch quotas for yellowfin, the IATTC members were 
able to reach agreement on certain additional conservation and management measures in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In 1969 the IATTC members agreed to an experimental fishing 
program for yellowfin that continued through the early 1970s. As part of the 
management scheme the parties agreed to set aside a portion of the yellowfin quota for 
incidental catches and the conditions for the calculation of the closing date of the 
season.36
In 1976 the mandate of the IATTC was expanded to include issues of dolphin 
mortality in tuna fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, a vexing problem that persisted
Id.
Id.
Id.
31
32
33
34 Id.
35 IATTC, 1971 A n n u a l  Re p o r t  43 (1972); IATTC, 1972 A n n u a l  Rep o r t  8 (1973).
36 IATTC, 1968 A n n u a l  Re p o r t  46 (1969); IATTC, 1971 A n n u a l  Repo r t  43-44 (1972); IATTC, 1972 
A n n u a l  Repo r t  9-10 (1973).
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T7through the 1980s. The persistent dolphin bycatch that accompanied tuna fishing in 
IATTC waters created one of the most visible environmental issues of all time: the 
“Tuna-Dolphin” dispute. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific adult tuna are found underneath 
dolphins swimming on the surface.38 Using purse-seine nets tuna fisherman can simply 
target the dolphins in order to net the tuna swimming below.39 Although a full discussion 
of the Tuna-Dolphin dispute is beyond the scope of this thesis, any informed student of 
fisheries law and policy should know that the Tuna-Dolphin dispute forced awareness of 
environmental concerns in the context of free trade.40 In particular, it raised the issue of 
when states may take unilateral action to suspend trade obligations in the face of 
environmental harm.41
The reduction of dolphin mortality in tuna fishing in the Eastern Pacific has 
clearly been a focus of IATTC since the mid-1970s. Albeit largely unsuccessful, these 
early efforts included an observer program and the development of fishing gear and 
practices that could reduce dolphin mortality.42 IATTC also supported research into the 
relationships between dolphin and tuna and the development of methods to separate 
dolphins from purse-seine nets.43 In 1992 IATTC adopted the “La Jolla Agreement,”
37 IATTC, 1989 A n n u a l  Re p o r t  7 (1991).
38 For a description o f dolphin mortality resulting from purse-seine fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific in 
the 1970s and 1980s see W illia m  T. B u r k e , T he N ew  In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  of F ish e r ie s: UNCLOS 1982 
a n d  B e y o n d  208-210; 230-232 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
39 Id. at 209, citing N A T ’L RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, DOLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDUSTRY (1992).
40 See Patric ia  B irnie &  A l a n  B o y l e , In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  & th e  En v ir o n m e n t  704-713 (2d. ed., 
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
41 See generally Daniel Bodansky, What's So B ad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?, 11 
EUR. J.INT’LL. 33 9  (2 0 0 0 ).
42 James Joseph, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, and 
Political Impacts, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 1,4-5 (1994); see also Chris Hedley, The 1998 Agreement on 
the International Dolphin Conservation Program: Recent Developments in the Tuna-Dolphin Controversy 
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 7 1 ,12-1A (2001).
43 IATTC, SPECIAL Rep o r t  13, supra note 12, at 28-34, 39-42 (2001).
167
seeking to reduce dolphin mortality in tuna fishing operations.44 Not all IATTC members 
joined the La Jolla Agreement but it did include several states that were not parties to 
IATTC.45 Although non-binding, the La Jolla Agreement signaled the seriousness and 
scope of dolphin mortality resulting from fishing operations.
In 2000 the La Jolla Agreement was superseded by the Agreement on the 
International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP).46 AIDCP is a binding agreement 
that established mortality limits for individual stocks of dolphins and specifically sought 
to reduce dolphin bycatch and discard.47 It deepens and expands the objectives of 
reducing mortality in several other ways, including certification of captains and crews 
and the development of a system for tracking and verifying tuna harvested with and 
without dolphin mortality or injury.48
Apart from dolphin conservation, between 1979 and 1998, for the most part, 
IATTC was unsuccessful in its attempts to adopt conservation measures because the 200- 
nautical mile EEZ of UNCLOS has redefined the rights and obligations of coastal states 
with respect to the living resources found therein.49 Generally speaking, coastal states 
naturally reject the competence of a fishery organization to regulate in their waters 
without express authorization to do so. In 1998, however, when IATTC resumed its 
regulation for yellowfin, it specifically noted that yellowfin west and east of the
44 Id. at 40.
45 Id. at 40. Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico were not IATTC parties at the time but they joined the La Jolla 
Agreement (As o f  Nov. 2005 all were IATTC members except Colombia.) Id. Conversely, IATTC 
members France and Japan did not join the La Jolla Agreement. Id.
“ Id. a t40-41.
47 Id. at 41-42.
48 Id. at 41.
49 C h urchill  & Lo w e , supra note 19, at 311.
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Commission’s Yellowfin Regulatory Area were robust enough so that it was unnecessary 
to limit catches outside the regulatory area.50
IATTC regularly publishes detailed reports tracking the status of the fisheries 
under its management.51 Skipjack remain in relatively healthy condition but, as noted 
earlier in this thesis, most other tuna species are overexploited.52 Unfortunately, IATTC 
was only able to muster unanimity in its tuna regulation for little more than a decade, 
although since the late 1990s it has again been able to do so.
Any success enjoyed by IATTC in the realm of tuna conservation is offset by the 
alarming dolphin mortality that resulted from its fishing operations over many decades. 
Although it has responded to this issue since the mid-1970s, the depth and breadth of the 
problem deserved an earlier, and more forceful, response. IATTC parties demonstrated 
some cooperation and mutual interest in responding to the issue of dolphin mortality53 but 
it is reasonable to conclude that the level of agreement was less than what was called for 
by the scale of the problem.
The veto provision in IATTC decision-making has been a limiting factor in the 
success of the regime. It is reasonable to conclude that the inability to achieve agreement 
was at least partially responsible for the fact that IATTC did not establish tuna 
regulations for many years in its history. The actual application of IATTC regulations is 
instructive as well in that catch quotas were often balanced with special allowances for its 
member states. These special allowances addressed certain inequalities in the regime such
50 IATTC, S pecial  Rep o r t  13, supra  note 12, at 37-38 (2001).
51 See, e.g., Fishery Status Report No. 3, Tunas and Billfishes in the Eastern Pacific Ocean in 2004, 
available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFfiles2/FisheryStatusReport3.pdf (visited June 17, 2006).
52 See SOFIA 2002, The Status o f  Fishery Resources, Marine Resources, infra note 122. More recent data 
reinforces this conclusion. See SOFIA 2004, infra note 122, at 32-33.
53 Izadore Barrett, Development o f  a Management Regime for the Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishery 84 (1980) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Washington) (on file with author).
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as disparities in the technological capabilities among IATTC members and other interests 
of developing states. The availability of special allowances probably served as an 
inducement to secure unanimity in the decision-making process. While conceptually 
different from specific reservations and vetoes, they serve a utilitarian purpose and 
constitute exemptive provisions in their own right.
The presence of a veto provision in the IATTC Treaty is not surprising 
considering it was initially a bilateral agreement. The fact that the agreement 
contemplated additional parties54 further supports unanimous decision-making. This is 
because neither Costa Rica nor the US could have anticipated with certainty the extent to 
which future IATTC members would act favorably toward their interests. In 2003 the 
parties adopted a protocol known as the Antigua Convention55 to strengthen IATTC. As 
of June 2006, the Antigua Convention was not yet in force but it specifically embraces 
consensus decision-making within the regime.56
II. The Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)57
Like IATTC, the CCSBT also utilizes a true veto. The objective of the 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT Treaty) and the CCSBT 
is “to ensure, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum
54 IATTC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. V(3).
55 Convention for the Strengthening o f  the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by the 
1949 Convention Between the United States o f America and the Republic o f Costa Rica, available at 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf [hereinafter Antigua Convention].
56 Id. at art. IX.
57 The Commission for the Conservation o f  Southern Bluefin Tuna [hereinafter CCSBT] was established by 
the Convention for the Conservation o f  Southern Bluefin Tuna, May 10, 1993, 1994 Austl. T.S. No. 16 
(entered into force May 20, 1994) [hereinafter SBT Treaty],
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utilisation of southern bluefin tuna.”58 The southern bluefin tuna, or Thunnus maccoyii 
(SBT), is a valuable commercial species particularly in the Japanese sashimi market.59 
The SBT is a highly migratory species and is so designated in Annex I of UNCLOS. 
Because SBT breed in a single area (south of Java, Indonesia) they are managed as one 
breeding stock.60
The commercial harvest of the SBT began in the early 1950s and by the 1980s the 
SBT was severely overfished.61 In 1982, before the days of the CCSBT, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand began to manage the SBT fishery on an informal basis.62 In 1985 the 
three states agreed to a worldwide TAC of 38,650mt.63 In 1989, they agreed to a TAC of 
1 l,750mt with national allocations of 6,065mt for Japan, 5,265mt for Australia and 420 
for New Zealand.64 During these years the SBT stocks continued to decline and the issue 
of whether or not there was some recovery brought on by the conservation measures of 
the parties was the subject of a highly visible and contentious dispute:65 the SBT dispute 
discussed below.
The founding members of the CCSBT were Australia, New Zealand and Japan; 
the three states that principally fished for the SBT.66 In October 2001, the Republic of
cn
Korea joined as the fourth member. In August 2002, the membership of “The Fishing
58 Id. at art. 3.
59 See CCSBT website, About SBT at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about_s.html (visited June 22, 2004).
60 Id.
61 Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, SBT Cases, Aug. 4, 2000, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/bluefintuna/award080400.pdf (visited June 24, 2004) [hereinafter Award], 
at para. 22.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See CCSBT website, About the Commission at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (visited June 19, 
2006).
67 Id.
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Entity of Taiwan” became effective in the “Extended Commission.”68 In August 2004, 
Philippines was accepted as a formal cooperating non-member.69 “Cooperating non­
member” status is viewed as a transitional measure to full participation in the CCSBT and
• • 7 0membership in the treaty.
The SBT Treaty establishes the functions and powers of the CCSBT in Articles 6 
to 14. The management procedures and conservation measures adopted by the CCSBT 
are similar to those of other fishery organizations. The CCSBT has implemented a Trade 
Information Scheme to compile more accurate and complete data on SBT fishing by 
monitoring trade;71 devised an Action Plan to deal with problems presented by flags of
72convenience vessels; and, of course, set catch limits for its participating members (its 
inability to do this for a significant part of its history is discussed below).73
The veto provision of the SBT Treaty is found in Article 7. Article 7 provides: 
“Each Party shall have one vote in the Commission. Decisions o f the Commission shall 
be taken by a unanimous vote o f the Parties present at the Commission meeting.”74 There 
is no objection procedure to accompany the veto mechanism. Beyond any doubt, in the 
mid and late 1990s this veto mechanism proved to be a major limitation on the work of 
the regime. In fact, the SBT dispute between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand,
68 Id. This designation probably has more to do with Taiwan’s status in international relations generally 
than with issues o f  fishery management.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See CCSBT website, Management o f  SBT at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/management.html (visited June 
23, 2004). The Trade Information Scheme was implemented on June 1, 2000. Id. In addition to its data 
collection function it serves to deter Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) SBT fishing by denying 
access to markets. Id
72 Id. As in many other fishery regimes the extent o f  fishing activity attributed to flags o f convenience is a 
concern to the CCSBT. The full text o f  the Action Plan, adopted at the Sixth Annual Meeting o f the 
CCSBT, is available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/action_plan.pdf (visited June 
23, 2004).
73 See Management o f  SBT, supra note 71.
74 SBT Treaty, supra note 57, at art. 7 (emphasis added).
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and Japan on the other, will be remembered in the annals of both fisheries law and 
dispute settlement for many years to come. It should not be lost that this dispute was 
precipitated by the inability of these three states to reach agreement on acceptable catch 
limits for SBT.
The SBT dispute went as far as an arbitral tribunal constituted under the dispute 
settlement provision of UNCLOS (Part XV) and the background facts of the dispute are 
set forth in the Tribunal’s Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility.75 In May 1994, the 
CCSBT set a TAC of 1 l,750mt76 with national allocations remaining at their 1989
77levels. After 1994 Japan regularly sought increases in its share of the catch but this was
70
opposed by Australia and New Zealand. As a result of the impasse no unanimity could
70be reached. Because the CCSBT was unable to establish new catch limits the parties 
maintained the 1994 level.80
In addition to seeking increases in the TAC and its allocation, Japan sought 
agreement for a joint experimental fishing program (EFP) to increase scientific
Q 1
knowledge about the SBT stock. The fish taken in the EFP would have been above
82Japan’s regular commercial catch.
In 1996, the CCSBT adopted a set of “Objectives and principles for the design 
and implementation of an [EFP]” but was not able to reach agreement on the size of the
01
EFP catch or other specifics on how it would be achieved. At a minimum, the three
75 Award, supra note 61, at paras. 21-34.
76 Id. at para. 24.
77 See supra text accompanying note 64.
78 Award, supra note 61, at para. 24.
79 Id.
80 r J
173
states did agree “on the objective of restoring the parental stock [of SBT] to its 1980 level 
by the year 2020.”84
At the CCSBT meeting in 1998 Japan indicated that it would voluntarily adhere to 
its previously agreed quota of SBT in its commercial catch but would nevertheless
Of
commence a unilateral three-year EFP. This was met with vigorous protests from 
Australia and New Zealand but in the summer of 1998 Japan proceeded to catch
o/:
approximately 1,464mt of SBT pursuant to a pilot EFP. Although the parties engaged in 
consultations to resolve the matter, Australia and New Zealand fervently believed that 
Japan’s unilateral EFP “was misdirected and that its design and analysis were
8 7fundamentally flawed.” In particular, they maintained that “Japan’s EFP did not justify
88what they saw as the significant increased risk to the SBT stock.”
Australia and New Zealand asserted the dispute was not simply under the SBT 
Treaty but also under UNCLOS and sought a remedy pursuant to the UNCLOS dispute
o q  t
settlement mechanism. To preserve their rights pending the outcome of the dispute 
settlement process, Australia and New Zealand, invoking the precautionary principle, 
sought an order of provisional measures in the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) for Japan to discontinue its unilateral EFP.90
Although a complete discussion of the ensuing litigation before the ITLOS and 
the subsequently constituted arbitral tribunal is beyond the scope of this thesis, those 
proceedings were both fascinating and instructive on a number of issues related to marine
84 Id.
85 Id. at para. 25.
86 Id.
87 Id. at para. 26.
88 Id.
89 Id. at paras. 27-32.
90 Id. at paras. 33-34.
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conservation. These include the availability of provisional measures in the ITLOS to 
address claims of environmental harm brought about by excessive fishing,91 the contours
QOof the precautionary principle/approach and the applicability of UNCLOS dispute 
settlement procedures generally to fishery disputes principally arising from other marine
93agreements.
To summarize the key features of those proceedings, Australia and New Zealand 
were successful in the ITLOS in obtaining an order of provisional measures (Order) 
against Japan, indicating that the Japanese EFP was to be counted against its previously 
agreed national allocation of 6065mt, and that all parties were to ensure that no action 
would be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute.94 One of the most salient 
features of the Order is that several separate opinions by ITLOS judges distinguished 
between the “precautionary principle” and the “precautionary approach.” Specifically, the 
separate opinions by Judges Laing,95 Treves96 and Shearer97 indicate the preference in 
fisheries law for the less demanding and more flexible concept of a precautionary
91 See Malcolm D. Evans, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Provisional Thinking or Provisional 
Measures, 10 Y.B INT’L ENVTL. L. 7 (1999); Howard S. Schiffinan, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: 
ITLOS Hears Its First Fishery Dispute, 2 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 3 18 (1999).
92 See Howard S. Schiffinan, The Precautionary Approach at the ITLOS: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 
5 INT’L J. GLOBAL E n v t l .  I s s u e s  78 (2005); S.M. Garcia, The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries: 
Progress Review and Main Issues (1995-2000), in CURRENT FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE FOOD AND 
A g r i c u l t u r e  O r g a n iz a t io n  o f  t h e  U n it e d  N a t io n s  4 7 9 ,5 0 0 -5 0 2  (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton 
Moore eds., The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000); Adriana Fabra, The LOSC and the 
Implementation o f  the Precautionary Principle, 10 Y.B INT’L ENVTL. L. 15 (1999); David Freestone, 
Caution or Precaution: “A Rose By Any Other Name ... ”?, 10 Y.B INT’L ENVTL. L. 25 (1999).
93 See Howard S. Schiffinan, UNCLOS and Marine Wildlife Disputes: Big Splash or Barely a Ripple?, 4 J. 
I n t ’l  W i l d l i f e  L. & P o l y  2 5 7  (2001 ).
94 See SBT Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order o f Provisional Measures o f August 27 
1999, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited June 25, 2004).
95 Separate Opinion by Judge Laing, SBT Cases, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited 
June 25, 2004).
96 Separate Opinion by Judge Treves, SBT Cases, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited 
June 25, 2004).
97 Separate Opinion by Judge a d  hoc Shearer, SBT Cases, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html 
(visited June 25, 2004).
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approach as opposed to a precautionary principle. The concept of precaution and its 
value to marine conservation will be developed much more fully in chapter 4.
The impact of the ITLOS Order of provisional measures was to be short-lived. 
When the SBT dispute reached the arbitral tribunal it ultimately concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction." Accordingly, the ITLOS Order was dissolved100 although the tribunal did 
note that the parties could not simply “disregard the effects of the Order or their own 
decisions made in conformity with it.”101
Although the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Award) in the SBT
1 09dispute was the source of considerable debate among scholars, it was nevertheless
noteworthy as an early application of the dispute settlement machinery of UNCLOS. 
Needless to say, the Award was surely a disappointment to those who would prefer to see 
UNCLOS’ provisions in the area of marine conservation, balanced and meaningful as 
they are, applied to a wide range of living resource disputes. On the other hand, because 
there is no doctrine of precedent in international law, the reasoning in the Award is not 
binding on future courts and tribunals. In fact, the ITLOS did not adopt that reasoning in
1 nithe MOX Plant case. In that case the ITLOS ordered provisional measures even where
98 The separate opinions o f  Judges Laing and Shearer are most illuminating on the difference between the 
precautionary principle and the precautionary approach. For a more detailed discussion o f these separate 
opinions and their treatment o f  the concept o f precaution, see Schiffinan, supra note 92.
99 See Award, supra note 61.
100 Id. at para. 66.
101 Id. at para. 67.
102 For a major work o f scholarship examining the various and subtle implications o f the Award see 
Bernard H. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 Am. J. INT’L L. 277 
(2001). For an article critical o f the Award see David A. Colson & Peggy Hoyle, Satisfying the Procedural 
Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute Settlement Mechanisms o f  the 1982 Law o f  the Sea Convention: 
Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It Right?, 35 OCEAN D e v . & INT’L L. 59 (2003). For an article 
supportive o f the Award see Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitral Tribunal D id Get 
It Right: A Commentary and Reply to the Article by David A. Colson and Dr. Peggy Hoyle, 34 OCEAN D e v , 
& INT’L L. 369 (2003).
103 See The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order o f Provisional Measures o f December 3, 
2001, available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited Ma. 15, 2005).
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the obligations of several treaties other than UNCLOS were also potentially applicable.104 
With regard to future disputes over highly migratory and straddling stocks, Article 30(2) 
of the Fish Stocks Treaty, which was not in force at the time of the SBT dispute, will 
potentially extend the reach of Part XV of UNCLOS.105
While the ultimate contribution of the SBT cases to the jurisprudence of fisheries 
law, and dispute settlement more generally, remains to be seen,106 it is significant that it 
arose from the inability of the states in the regime to reach agreement on a most 
fundamental matter: the TAC. On the one hand, the exemptive provision found in Article 
7 shielded Japan from being outvoted by Australia and New Zealand, the more 
conservation-minded members of the CCSBT. On the other hand, it created an impasse 
that was wholly inconsistent with cooperative fisheries management.
Would Japan have joined the SBT Treaty if not for the veto supplied to it by 
Article 7? This is an interesting question, but entirely a matter of speculation. Even so, it 
is logical to conclude that Article 7 provided Japan with a measure of comfort to protect
104 Id. “Considering that, even if  the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contain 
rights or obligations similar to or identical with the rights or obligations set out in [UNCLOS], the rights 
and obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from those under [UNCLOS][.]” Id. at 
para. 50.
105 Article 30(2) o f  the Fish Stocks Treaty provides:
The provisions relating to the settlement o f disputes set out in Part XV 
o f [UNCLOS] apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between States 
Parties to this Agreement concerning the interpretation or application of  
a subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to 
straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks to which they are 
parties, including any dispute concerning the conservation and 
management o f such stocks, whether or not they are also Parties to 
[UNCLOS].
106 A growing number o f scholars have addressed the long-term effects o f the SBT dispute on 
environmental governance and international dispute settlement mechanisms. See, e.g., Bill Mansfield, 
Compulsory Dispute Settlement After The Southern Bluefin Tuna Award, in OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE 
2 1 st C e n t u r y : In st it u t io n a l  Fr a m ew o r k s  a n d  Re s p o n se s  225 (A.G. Oude Elferink & D.R. Rothwell 
eds., Netherlands: Brill, 2004); Tim Stephens, The Limits o f  International Adjudication in International 
Environmental Law: Another Perspective on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 19 INT’L J. MARINE & 
COASTAL L. 177 (2004); Cesare Romano, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints o f  a World to Come
. . . Like It or Not, 32 OCEAN DEV. & In t ’l L. 313 (2001).
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its interests within the CCSBT. Like reservations, this is the fundamental purpose of a
veto within a regime.
According to Mary Harwood, an official of the Australian Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and a member of the negotiating team for Australia in
the diplomatic talks that produced the SBT Treaty, Article 7 was not a particularly
contentious issue in the treaty negotiations.107 This was likely due to the fact that the SBT
Treaty “followed on quite a few years of informal quota-setting by consensus and the
108treaty carried that mode of decision making into a legal form.”
Interestingly, however, one of the more contentious issues in the negotiation was 
the dispute settlement provision.109 As demonstrated by the SBT dispute, the prospect for 
binding dispute settlement pursuant to Article 16 is subject to specific consent110 -- in 
other words, a veto. Australia pressed hard not to include this veto power but Japan 
insisted dispute settlement not be mandatory.111 This is perhaps attributable to the 
different way in which Far Eastern and Western cultures view litigation generally.
Why has unanimity been so difficult to achieve within the CCSBT? Apart from 
the somewhat obvious observation that Australia and New Zealand approach matters of 
fishery conservation and utilization differently, one scholar suggests a more technical 
answer. Jean-Jacques Maguire observes that the Scientific Committee of the CCSBT uses
107 E-mail from Mary Harwood, Executive Manager, Biosecurity Australia, Australian Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to author (July 5, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harwood 
communication]. Mary Harwood was involved in SBT management between 1986 and 1998 in various 
roles including Assistant Secretary, Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch in the Australia Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. She was a member o f Australia’s negotiating team for several rounds 
of the negotiations that produced the SBT Treaty.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 SBT Treaty, supra note 57, at art. 16(2).
111 Harwood communication, supra note 107.
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119a virtual population analysis to calculate stock size. In fact, unlike other fishery 
analysis, the techniques applied by CCSBT scientists have a tendency “to emphasize and
I  i  -j
perhaps even exaggerate the uncertainties.” “Whereas in other fora, scientists would 
agree about historical estimates of stock size but happily disagree about current stock 
size, in CCSBT, scientists disagree about both.”114
On one level such profound disagreements about stock size might suggest a more 
cautionary course of action by the parties; it also helps to explain why Japan chose to 
clarify the uncertainties through an EFP. At the same time, it is also easy to understand 
how such scientific uncertainty translates into genuine disagreement at the operational 
level of conservation and management.
Since the SBT dispute, the parties have been able to reach agreement on the 
adoption of an Action Plan,115 resolutions concerning research activities,116 the trade
117information scheme (discussed above) and a resolution on illegal, unregulated and
1 , o
unreported fishing. Perhaps more importantly, the parties were able to agree on the
112 Jean-Jacque Maguire, Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute, in Nordquist and Moore, supra note 92, at 203.
113 Id. at 204.
114 Id.
115 See CCSBT website, Action Plan, at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/action_plan.pdf (visited June 28, 2004); see also 
Resolutions Pursuant to the 2000 Action Plan, at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/resolutions_on_the_action_plan.pdf (visited June 28, 
2004).
116 See CCSBT website, Resolutions on Research Activities, at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/resolutions_on_research_activities.pdf (visited June, 
28, 2004).
117 See CCSBT website, SBT Statistical Document Program, at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/trade_information_scheme.pdf (visited June 28,
2004).
118 See CCSBT website, Resolution on Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU) and 
Establishment o f a CCSBT Record o f Vessels over 24 meters Authorized to Fish for Southern Bluefm 
Tuna, at
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/resolution_on_authorised_24m_vessel_list.pdf 
(visited June 28, 2004).
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following allocations for 2003-2004: Japan, 6,065mt; Australia, 5,265mt; Republic of 
Korea, l,140mt; Fishing Entity of Taiwan, l,140mt and New Zealand, 420mt.119
Although the SBT litigation did not resolve the fundamental differences that 
separated the parties concerning conservation and management of the resource,120 it is 
likely that the proceedings served as a catalyst for the improved functioning of the 
CCSBT.121 The renewed spirit of cooperation may have resulted from the fact that the 
SBT dispute flagrantly exposed the dysfunction of the regime. Sadly, the price of 
improved cooperation was costly and time-consuming litigation.
In judging the success of the CCSBT and the effect of the exemptive provision,
the most revealing evidence is not found by a scrutiny of the SBT dispute but rather the
unequivocally weak conservation status of the SBT stock that gave rise to it. To re-iterate
a critical point noted in chapter 2 in relation to ICCAT, the 2002 SOFIA reported the
following about world tuna stocks:
most tuna stocks are fully exploited in all oceans, and some 
are overfished or even depleted. Overcapacity of the tuna 
fleets has been pointed out as a major problem in several 
areas. Ofparticular concern are the stocks o f Northern and 
Southern bluefin tunas in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific 
oceans. These are reported to be overfished and, in most 
cases, severely depleted.
The poor status of the fishery is probably the best measure of the success or 
failure of the CCSBT regime. Even though the CCSBT has taken important steps to
119 See CCSBT website, Management of SBT, Catch Levels, at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/management.html (visited June 28, 2004).
120 Stephens, supra note 106, at 186.
121 See id. at 183-184; Mansfield, supra note 106, at 263.
122 SOFIA 2002, The Status o f Fishery Resources, Marine Resources, at
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=//docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm (visited May 15,
2005) (emphasis added). SO FIA  2004 emphasizes that “[t]unas comprise the single most important 
resource exploited in the high seas.” FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, SO FIA  2004 29 (Rome, 
2004) [hereinafter SO FIA  2004].
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conserve and manage the resource, the veto provision embodied in Article 7 has been a 
limiting factor creating an impasse in the regime. Admittedly, the extent of its impact is 
impossible to quantify and it is also only one of several factors that contributed to the 
poor status of the SBT. The other factors included scientific uncertainty, significant 
differences in conservation and management philosophy among the regime members as 
well as free riders. Yet, different scientific interpretations and divergent philosophies are 
ultimately expressed in the decision-making process. The impasse was perhaps 
precipitated by questionable scientific estimates but the resulting dispute worsened 
tensions. The resources devoted to prosecuting and defending the litigation and 
arbitration in the SBT dispute could have been devoted to the primary mission of the 
organization: the conservation and management of a badly depleted commercial fish 
stock.
In all probability a cooperative effort to manage the fishery would not have been 
possible without Article 7. Hypothetically speaking, would a majority voting system have 
better served the objectives of the regime? This would likely have resulted in Australia 
and New Zealand consistently outvoting Japan. For Japan to consent to majority voting, 
instead of a veto, it is reasonable to presume it would have insisted upon a reservation or 
objection procedure to exempt itself from the will of the other two members.
Indisputably, the exemptive provision at work in the SBT Treaty has had a negative 
impact on the work of the regime. The veto, coupled with other factors, has already 
limited the effectiveness of the CCSBT in a dramatic way. It is doubtful whether a 
reservation procedure, the only realistic alternative, would have produced a superior 
result.
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III. The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO)123
The Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean 
(NASCO Treaty) takes a step beyond the classic veto. The NASCO Treaty not only 
requires unanimity in the first instance, but also allows its members a secondary review, 
with an opportunity to object to measures already voted upon. An objection will veto the 
measure for all parties. The NASCO Treaty was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 
1983. Its proximity to UNCLOS is not a coincidence and it refers to a specific goal of 
UNCLOS, namely the management of “anadromous” stocks.124 Anadromous species are 
those, like salmon, that spend most of their life-cycle in the marine environment but
p c
spawn in fresh water (i.e., rivers). UNCLOS addresses anadromous species (along with 
catadromous species and marine mammals) with special provisions in recognition of their
1 9Ahighly migratory character and their greater vulnerability to capture. Article 66 of 
UNCLOS provides, inter alia, that the “state of origin” of anadromous species has the
197primary interest and responsibility for the stocks. NASCO results specifically from 
Article 66(5).
123 The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization was established by the Convention for the 
Conservation o f Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, Mar. 2, 1982, 1338 U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force 
Oct. 1, 1983) available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/nasco.htm [hereinafter NASCO Treaty]. As of 
June 2006, the parties to the NASCO Treaty were Canada, Denmark (in respect o f the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland), EU, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation and US.
124 Id. at Preamble.
125 CHURCHILL & Lowe, supra note 19, at 314. By contrast, the term “catadromous” species refers to those 
living resources, like eels, which spawn in the marine environment but spend most o f their lives in fresh 
water. Id. at 316.
126 Patricia W. Bimie, The Conservation and Management o f  Marine Mammals and Anadromous and 
Catadromous Species, in DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW 357, 358 (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, Ellen Hey ed., 1999).
127 UNCLOS, infra note 212, at art. 66(1). Article 66, entitled “Anadromous stocks” in its entirety provides:
1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the 
primary interest in and responsibility for such stocks.
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The NASCO Treaty applies to salmon stocks that migrate beyond areas of 
national jurisdiction of coastal states in a designated area of the North Atlantic,128 
although, as discussed below, NASCO regulatory measures may apply in the waters of a 
member state with that state’s specific consent. NASCO has the following organs: a
2. The State o f origin o f  anadromous stocks shall ensure their 
conservation by the establishment o f appropriate regulatory measures 
for fishing in all waters landward o f the outer limits o f its exclusive 
economic zone and for fishing provided for in paragraph 3(b). The 
State o f  origin may, after consultations with the other States referred to 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 fishing these stocks, establish total allowable 
catches for stocks originating in its rivers.
3. (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in 
waters landward o f  the outer limits o f exclusive economic zones, 
except in cases where this provision would result in economic 
dislocation for a State other than the State o f origin. With respect to 
such fishing beyond the outer limits o f the exclusive economic zone, 
States concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving 
agreement on terms and conditions o f such fishing giving due regard to 
the conservation requirements and the needs o f  the State o f origin in 
respect o f  these stocks.
(b) The State o f  origin shall co-operate in minimizing economic 
dislocation in such other States fishing these stocks, taking into account 
the normal catch and the mode o f operations o f such States, and all the 
areas in which such fishing has occurred.
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement 
with the State o f  origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, 
particularly by expenditures for that purpose, shall be given special 
consideration by the State o f origin in the harvesting o f stocks 
originating in its rivers.
(d) Enforcement o f  regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond 
the exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State 
o f  origin and the other States concerned.
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters 
landward o f  the outer limits o f  the exclusive economic zone o f a State 
other than the State o f origin, such State shall co-operate with the State 
o f origin with regard to the conservation and management o f such 
stocks.
5. The State o f origin o f anadromous stocks and other States fishing 
these stocks shall make arrangements for the implementation o f the 
provisions o f  this article, where appropriate, through regional 
organizations.
128 NASCO Treaty, supra note 123, at art. 1(1).
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Council,129 a Secretariat130 and three regional Commissions.131 The regional commissions 
are: the North American Commission,132 the West Greenland Commission,133 and the 
North-East Atlantic Commission.134
The complex organizational structure of NASCO decentralizes decision-making 
and distributes authority to three regional commissions.135 This permits the member states 
in a region to take the lead in adopting regulatory measures applicable to that region.136 
The regional commission system also addresses the distinctive features of Atlantic 
salmon fisheries including their exploitation and the migratory patterns of the relevant 
stocks.137
The NASCO Treaty specifically prohibits fishing beyond areas of national
1TRjurisdiction; in other words, it bans fishing for these resources on the high seas. Within 
states’ EEZs it prohibits fishing outside of the 12 nm territorial sea except in the West 
Greenland Commission area where salmon may be caught up to 40 nm from the
129 Id. at art. 3(3)(a).
130 Id. at art. 3(3)(c).
131 Id. at art. 3(3)(b).
132 Id. at art. 3(3)(b)(i). The North American Commission is comprised o f Canada and the US. Id. at art. 
10(a).
133 Id. at art. 3(3)(b)(ii). The West Greenland Commission is comprised o f Canada, Denmark, the EC and 
the US. Id. at art. 10(b). See also, Members o f the West Greenland Commission, NASCO website, at 
http://www.nasco.int (visited Aug. 25, 2004).
134 NASCO Treaty, supra note 123, at art. 3(3)(b)(iii). The North-East Atlantic Commission is comprised 
o f Denmark in respect o f the Faroe Islands, the EC, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Although Sweden is 
specifically listed in the NASCO Treaty as a member o f  the North-East Atlantic Commission, after Sweden 
became a member o f the EC in 1995, the EC has represented Sweden’s interests in NASCO.). Id. at art. 
10(c). The Russian Federation acceded to the NASCO Treaty in 1986 and is a member o f the North-East 
Commission. See NASCO, Summary Information at http://www.oceanlaw.net/orgs/nasco.htm (visited Aug. 
20, 2004).
135 See BURKE, supra note 38, at 185.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 186.
138 NASCO Treaty, supra note 123, at art. 2(1).
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1 ^ 0baseline. In addition, within the North-East Atlantic Commission area salmon may be 
caught within the area of fisheries jurisdiction of the Faroe Islands.140
The NASCO Council provides a forum for the study, analysis and exchange of 
information among the parties on matters relating to the salmon stocks covered by the 
treaty.141 The Council supervises and coordinates the activities of the regime and its 
constituent bodies.142 This includes the authority to make recommendations to the parties 
on the enforcement of laws and regulations concerning salmon stocks, although it may 
not do so on matters concerning the management of salmon harvests within a party’s 
fishery jurisdiction.143 Upon the specific request of a regional Commission, the Council 
has the authority to make recommendations to that Commission on regulatory measures 
proposed by the Commission.144 The NASCO Treaty leaves enforcement of all measures 
to member states. They are ultimately responsible for compliance and implementation145 
and must inform NASCO annually of all such measures they employ to accomplish 
this.146
The NASCO Treaty sets forth similar, yet slightly different, functions of the 
regional Commissions. While they all provide a forum for consultation and cooperation 
of the parties,147 and, generally speaking, may propose regulatory measures for fishing in 
the waters of member states with respect to salmon originating in the rivers of other
139 Id. at art. 2(2)(a).
140 Id. at art. 2(2)(b).
141 Id. at art. 4(1 )(a).
142 See id. at art. 4.
143 Id. at art. 4(2).
144 Id. at art. 4(3).
145 M a t  art. 14(1).
146 Id. at art. 14(2).
147 Id. at arts. 7(1 )(a) (North American Commission) and 8(a) (West Greenland and North-East Atlantic 
Commissions).
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14RNASCO member states, the North American Commission is singled out. The North 
American Commission may take measures “to minimize” catches in waters under the 
jurisdiction of one member of salmon that originates in the rivers of another,149 to 
propose “regulatory measures for salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of a member 
which harvests amounts of salmon significant to another party in whose rivers that 
salmon originates”150 and “to minimize” bycatch of salmon originating in the rivers of 
other members.151 In carrying out their function, the Commissions are guided by 
scientific evidence and advice provided by the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Sea (ICES).152
The veto mechanism of the NASCO Treaty is established in Articles 11 and 13. 
The decision-making and exemptive provisions of the NASCO Treaty are even more 
complex than its institutional structure. Article 11 provides:
1. Each Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure.
2. Each member of a Commission shall have one vote in its 
proceedings. In addition, in the case of the North American 
Commission, the European Economic Community shall 
have the right to submit and vote on proposals for 
regulatory measures concerning salmon stocks originating 
in the territories referred to in article 18. In the case of the 
North-East Atlantic Commission, Canada and the United 
States of America shall each have the right to submit and 
vote on proposals for regulatory measures concerning 
salmon stocks originating in the rivers of Canada or the 
United States of America, respectively, and occurring off 
East Greenland.
148 Id. at arts. 7(1 )(b) and (c) (North American Commission) and 8(b) (West Greenland and North-East 
Atlantic Commissions).
149 Id. at art. 7(1 )(b).
150 Id. at art. 7(1 )(c).
151 Id. at art. 7(2).
152 Id. at art. 9(a).
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3. Decisions of a Commission shall be taken by the 
unanimous vote of those present and casting an affirmative 
or negative vote. No vote shall be taken unless two thirds of 
those entitled to vote on the matter concerned are 
present.153
Article 11 sets forth the voting procedures of the Commissions. It first provides 
for each Commission to adopt its own rules of procedure154 indicating a lack of 
uniformity in the decision-making processes of the regime. Next, it provides for each 
party to have one vote in the proceedings.155 In the North American Commission, the 
European Economic Community has the right to submit and vote on proposals 
concerning salmon stocks originating in its own territory.156 In the North-East Atlantic 
Commission, Canada and the US have the right to submit and vote on regulatory 
proposals concerning salmon originating in their rivers respectively that occur off East 
Greenland.157 Article 11(3) establishes the veto within the Commissions by requiring 
unanimity of those present and casting either an affirmative or negative vote. 
Interestingly, there is no provision directly addressing the status of abstentions, however, 
the implication of Article 11(3) seems to be that abstentions do not destroy what would 
otherwise be a unanimous vote. Article 11(3) also requires a quorum of two-thirds before 
Commission votes can be taken.159
153 Id. at art. 11.
^  Id. at art. 11(1).
155 Id. at art. 11(2).
156 Id. Article 11(2) invokes Article 18 to define the territorial scope o f the EEC’s voting power in the 
North American Commission. Article 18 provides: “This Convention shall apply, insofar as the European 
Economic Community is concerned, to the territories in which the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community is applied and under the conditions laid down in that Treaty.” Id. at art. 18.
157 Id. at art. 11(2).
158 Id. at art. 11(3).
159 Id.
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Beyond the requirement of unanimity in Article 11, Article 13 gives Commission 
members a further opportunity to object and therefore defeat the proposed measure on 
behalf of all Commission members. Article 13 provides:
1. The Secretary shall, without undue delay, notify the 
members of a Commission of any regulatory measure 
proposed by that Commission.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, a regulatory measure proposed 
by a Commission under article 7, paragraph 1 (b) or (c), or 
article 8, sub-paragraph (b), shall become binding on its 
members 60 days after the date specified in the Secretary's 
notification or, if a later date is determined by the 
Commission, on such date.
3. Any member in whose areas of fisheries jurisdiction a 
regulatory measure would apply may, within 60 days of the 
date specified in the Secretary's notification, lodge an 
objection to it. In this case the regulatory measure shall not 
become binding on any member. A member which has 
lodged an objection may at any time withdraw it. Thirty 
days after all objections are withdrawn the regulatory 
measure shall become binding, subject to paragraph 2.
4. After the expiration of one year from the date on which a 
regulatory measure becomes binding, any member in 
whose area of fisheries jurisdiction the regulatory measure 
applies may denounce it by written notice to the Secretary.
The Secretary shall immediately inform the other members 
of such denunciation. The regulatory measure shall cease to 
be binding on all members 60 days after the date of receipt 
by the Secretary of the notice of denunciation or, if a later 
date is indicated by the member, on such date.
5. A Commission may propose an emergency regulatory 
measure having effect prior to the expiration of the 60-day 
period referred to in paragraph 2. The members shall make 
best efforts to implement the measure, unless there is an 
objection by a member within 30 days after the 
Commission has proposed it.160
160 Id. at art. 13.
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Where NASCO seeks to regulate salmon harvests in the fisheries jurisdiction of a 
state, Article 13, in essence, requires the specific consent of that state before the measure 
can become effective. Article 13(1) provides that when a Commission proposes a 
regulatory measure, the Secretariat is to notify the members of that Commission without 
undue delay.161 When a Commission proposes regulatory measures for salmon fisheries 
under the jurisdiction of a member where the salmon originates in the rivers of another 
party, the measure becomes binding on the members of that Commission 60 days after 
the date specified in the Secretary’s notification unless the Commission sets a later 
date.162
A member in whose waters the regulatory measure would apply may lodge an
163objection within 60 days of the date specified in the Secretary’s notification. Where 
this occurs the regulatory measure is effectively vetoed and it does not bind any member 
of the Commission.164 An objection may be withdrawn at any time by the state that 
lodged it.165 In this case, it would become binding 30 days after the withdrawal.166
Even after a regulatory measure becomes binding on members of a Commission 
the NASCO Treaty gives its members a “second look” at the measure. As with CCAMLR 
and SEAFO (discussed below) the double veto serves to provide the members some 
reassurance by establishing an additional level of security to protect their interests.
After a regulatory measure has been in effect for one year, any member in whose 
waters the measure applies may denounce the measure in writing to the Secretary who
161 Id. at art. 13(1).
162 Id. at art. 13(2).
163 Id. at art. 13(3).
164 Id.
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then communicates it to the other members of the Commission.167 Sixty days after the 
Secretary receives notification of the objection the measure will cease to have effect for 
all members; if the member specifies a later date then that date will be the date that the
1 A8measure ceases to be binding.
In the case of an objection, a Commission may propose an “emergency regulatory 
measure” within the 60 days contemplated by Article 13(2).169 This obviously has the 
purpose of salvaging the measure that was the object of the objection.170 The parties must 
make “best efforts” to give effect to the measure unless a member objects within 30 days 
after it was proposed.171
As of June 2006 the objection procedures of Article 13(3) and 13(4) have never
1 79been invoked. According to NASCO Secretary Malcolm Windsor, however, use of the
1 79objection has “come close” only once. This was in relation to a textual vote taken after 
an annual meeting, at which a proposal for a measure had been tabled, and it was agreed 
the vote would occur inter-sessionally.174 Accordingly, one cannot conclude that the 
objection procedure is unnecessary in the presence of the veto. The availability of the 
objection procedure probably brings states an added measure of security.
To address the question of the effectiveness of the NASCO Treaty it is useful to 
examine the record of regulations adopted by each Commission as well as data on the 
status of salmon stocks in the area covered by the treaty. At the outset, it is instructive to 
note that NASCO, as an institution, acknowledges its difficulty in the establishment of
Id. at art. 13(4).
168 Id.
169 Id. at art. 13(5).
170 Id
171 Id.
172 E-mail from Malcolm Windsor, NASCO Secretary, to author (June 14, 2006) (on file with author).
173 E-mail from Malcolm Windsor, NASCO Secretary, to author (June 20, 2006) (on file with author).
174 Id.
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regulatory measures “because of the widely different perspectives of the salmon resource,
and because the [NASCO Treaty] required unanimous agreement on these measures.”175
This point is worthy of emphasis: NASCO acknowledges the veto as a limiting factor in
its ability to carry out its regulatory responsibilities.
Despite the complex and decentralized decision-making procedure and the
requirement of unanimity, NASCO has nevertheless been moderately successful at
promulgating regulatory measures in furtherance of the Treaty’s objectives. An
exhaustive review of all of the measures adopted or debated by each Commission is not
necessary to gauge NAS CO’s contribution to fishery conservation and management. A
review of some of the key issues NASCO has addressed since its establishment in 1984
offers helpful insights into the achievements and limitations of the regime.
Since 1984 the North-East Atlantic Commission has adopted regulations
1
pertaining to the fishery of the Faroe Islands. Through the 1980s that Commission 
successfully reached agreements on catch limits, limits of the fishing season and the
1 77numbers of licenses that could be issued to pursue salmon in the Faroese area. In 1991 
the Commission reached agreements facilitating private organizations to provide
1 7ftcompensation to those Faroese fisherman that did not fish their NASCO quota. In the 
years following 1991, commercial salmon fishing in the Faroese area has been reduced to
1 70nominal catch levels.
175 NASCO, T en  Y ea r  Re v ie w  o f  th e  A c t iv ities  o f  the  N o rth  A t l a n t ic  S a l m o n  O rg a n iza tio n  12 
(1984-1994) [NASCO, T e n  Y e a r  Re v ie w ],
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. Since the second half o f  1991, commercial salmon fishing in the Faroese area has been minimal. See 
id.
179 Id. In 1996, 1997 and 1998 the “total nominal catch” was set at 470, 425 and 380 tonnes, respectively. 
NASCO, Repo r t  o n  th e  A c t iv ities  o f  th e  N o r th  A tl a n tic  S a l m o n  Co n se r v a t io n  O rg an iza tio n  
11 (1995-1997) [hereinafter NASCO, 1995-1997]. In 1999 and 2000 the “total nominal catch” was set at
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In 1993 the West Greenland Commission successfully adopted a regulatory 
measure establishing a mechanism for setting catch quotas from 1993 through 1997.180 
This mechanism relied heavily upon scientific advice from the ICES.181 Under this 
regulatory measure catch quotas for the West Greenland fishery were set at 213, 157 and 
77 tonnes in 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively.182 In the late 1990s the West Greenland 
Commission agreed that the West Greenland catch would be limited to the amount used 
for internal consumption in Greenland.183 This measure prohibited commercial export.184
In addition to these matters where the NASCO Commissions were able to achieve 
unanimity, there were also a number of instances where they were unable to do so. In 
1996 the West Greenland Commission could not agree on a catch quota but agreed to 
work towards the revision of the 1993 mechanism185 mentioned above. At the 1997 
meeting, however, the Commission agreed to an addendum to the 1993 mechanism.186
The North American Commission has also experienced difficulty in reaching 
agreement. In 1996, for example, the US put forth a proposal to close the salmon fishery
1 8 7in certain parts of Labrador in 1996 and 1997. The parties failed to agree on the
1 Q O
adoption of this measure. To put this in context, however, failure to agree on this 
measure does not indicate that either Canada or the US is negligent in its salmon
330 and 300 tonnes, respectively. NASCO, REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC SALMON 
C o n se r v a t io n  O r g a n iz a t io n  11 (1998-1999) [hereinafter NASCO, 1998-1999]. “There was no fishery 
for salmon at the Faroes in 1999, but in 2000 a commercial fishery resumed with a total catch o f 8 tonnes.” 
NASCO, Repo r t  o f  th e  A c t iv it ie s  o f th e  N o r th  A t l a n t ic  S a l m o n  C o n se r v a t io n  O rg an iza tio n  12 
(2000-2001).
180 NASCO, 1995-1997, supra note 179, at 11.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 NASCO, 1998-1999, supra note 179, at 11.
185 NASCO, 1995-1997, supra  note 179, at 11.
186 Id.
™ Id. at 14.
188 Id.
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conservation obligations. In fact, both the US and Canada have taken significant steps in
response to the Atlantic salmon crisis.189 Admittedly, it is difficult to assess the extent to
which these efforts are pursuant to the work of NASCO’s North American Commission.
The differing views of the status of anadromous stocks and competing
interpretations of Article 66 of UNCLOS among NASCO members may be a limiting
factor within the regime. “The EEC holds one state of origin view, namely that these fish
are theirs and that it has either a propriety interest in them or at least the sole right to
determine their level of exploitation, wherever it might occur.”190 The US, on the other
hand, takes the position that states of origin have primary, but not exclusive, rights to the
resource.191 Significantly, Article 66 seems to support the US view by adopting the word
“primary” in Article 66(1)192 as opposed to a more definite expression of exclusive right.
In any case, one point is certain: Article 66(5) requires states of origin, as well as other
interested fishing states, to address the regulation of fishing for anadromous stocks
through regional organizations like NASCO.
Even factoring in the presence of free-riders in the history of the regime, NASCO
has, more or less, successfully brought together a number of states holding disparate
interests in North Atlantic salmon stocks. Differing interests among NASCO members
serve to highlight the fact that unanimous decision-making is heavily burdened with the
need to please all participants in the process. Even where unanimity can be achieved, the
1 01results are often obtained at the lowest common threshold. In addition, the process is
189 Id.
190 BURKE, supra note 38 , at 186.
191 Id.
192 See supra note 127 and accom panying text for the full text o f  A rticle 66.
193 Jill L. Bubier, International Management o f  Atlantic Salmon: Equitable Sharing and Building 
Consensus, 19 OCEAN D e v . & INT’L L. 3 5 ,4 9  (1988 ).
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typically slow.194 For NASCO, however, slowness has not actually been a serious 
problem because of the beneficial effect of unilateral legislation passed by members 
during times of impasse.195
Irrespective of the specific effects of the veto in NASCO, Jill Bubier asserts that 
greater interdependence among states favors consensus decision-making in international 
regimes generally because minority actors are more likely to participate in regimes where 
they know they will not be outvoted.196 While this observation may well be true in most 
regimes featuring a veto provision, and to a large degree is probably true in NASCO, this 
must be qualified by the fact that NASCO experienced a problem of salmon fishing by 
non-member states in the late 1980s and early 1990s.197 In the winter of 1989/1990 
NASCO became aware that a number of vessels fishing for salmon on the high seas north
1 QOof the Faroe Islands had been re-flagged to non-parties, namely Panama and Poland.
This unregulated fishing activity, reflecting both the “free-rider” and “flags of 
convenience” problems common to many fishery organizations, threatened to undermine 
the conservation efforts of NASCO members.199
NASCO sought to address the problem by improving cooperation on surveillance, 
increasing diplomatic initiatives directed at those states engaged in fishing outside of the 
NASCO framework and, most importantly, drafting a Protocol for adoption by non­
194 Id. at 48.
195 Id. at 50.
196 Id. at 48.
197 NASCO, T en  Y e a r  Re v ie w , supra note 175, at 4-5. In defense o f Bubier, she published her observation 
that the veto encouraged wider participation in NASCO over a year before NASCO received reports o f the 
free-riding fishing vessels.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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parties.200 The Protocol calls for states that are not parties to the Convention to prohibit 
salmon fishing beyond their areas of fisheries jurisdiction201 and to provide information 
to NASCO on the measures they adopt to implement the Protocol.202 As of June 2006 no 
state had ratified the Protocol.203 However, following diplomatic efforts, both Panama 
and Poland have taken action consistent with it 204 The production of the Protocol was a 
warning shot to free-riders that served its purpose; there have been no additional 
sightings of vessels fishing for salmon in international waters since 1994.205 
Significantly, once UNCLOS entered into force (1994), pursuant to the provision on 
anadromous stocks, high seas salmon fishing became illegal except for those states 
suffering “economic dislocation.”206 Free-rider states would clearly not qualify under the 
“economic dislocation” exception.
The fact that non-member states seek to bypass the regulatory framework of a 
regional fishery organization should come as no surprise. Significantly, even without 
ratification by a single state, the Protocol served to demonstrate the resolve of NASCO 
parties to address the free-rider issue. Even in light of the relative success of the Protocol, 
however, the fact that NASCO has had to contend with free-riders suggests that the veto 
in decision-making does not necessarily encourage all states availing themselves of the 
fishery to participate in the regime. Of course, one must distinguish between states that
200 Id. at 5. The text o f the Protocol Open for Signature by States Not Parties to the Convention is available 
at http://www.nasco.int/pdf/nasco_res_ncpprotocol.pdf (visited March 28, 2005) [hereinafter NASCO 
Protocol].
201 NASCO Protocol, supra note 200, at art. 1(a).
202 Id. at art. 2.
203 E-mail from Malcolm Windsor, NASCO Secretary, to author (June 20, 2006) (on file with author).
204 E-mail from Malcolm Windsor, NASCO Secretary, to author (Mar. 24, 2005) (on file with author).
205 E-mail from Malcolm Windsor, NASCO Secretary, to author (June 20, 2006) (on file with author).
206 See UNCLOS, infra note 212, at art. 66(3)(a). For the full text o f  Art. 66 see supra note 127.
207 The suggestion that the veto encourages wider participation in regimes and discourages free-riders is 
discussed later in this chapter. See infra text accompanying notes 346-348.
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have a genuine long-term interest in a fishery, and states whose “interest” arises merely 
as a result of the accident of flag registration. The veto is likely to be an inducement to 
the former category of states, but not the latter.
Regardless of whether or not additional mechanisms in the decision-making 
process of NASCO could be adopted successfully, and whatever disagreements there are 
among NASCO members that make it difficult to reach unanimity in its Commissions, 
NASCO undeniably reflects a serious institutional effort to address complicated marine 
conservation issues. Despite this, many commercial salmon stocks continue to have a 
poor status. The decline of North Atlantic Salmon stocks in the 1980s and 1990s is well 
documented.208
The veto provision of NASCO has not completely prevented the organization 
from adopting important conservation regulations. At certain times, however, the 
requirement of unanimity has clearly limited the regional Commissions in what they were 
able to accomplish. Considering the measures NASCO was able to adopt, it is helpful to 
remember that even though ICES provides useful scientific input, the measures adopted 
are principally the product of a political process of negotiation. Therefore, it follows that 
these measures were probably accepted at the lowest common denominator in order to 
reconcile the different views of salmon conservation and management held by NASCO 
members.
The conservation and management of anadromous species must balance the 
sovereign interests of the states in whose rivers the stocks spawn and states in whose 
EEZs they are caught. This balancing act is even more delicate than the more common
208 See John Kocik and Russell Brown, Atlantic Salmon, at http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/af/salmon/ 
(visited Aug. 28, 2004); see also Fen Montaigne, Everybody Loves Atlantic Salmon, 204 NATIONAL 
G eo g raphic  100 (July, 2003).
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tension between coastal states and distant water fishing states because it pits sovereign 
resource interests against each other. This scenario clearly requires a high level of 
cooperation by all interested states. NASCO demonstrates logic by devolving the 
questions of conservation and utilization to regional commissions best able to address the 
needs of the resource. This means that decision-making is limited to those members 
having an interest (as a state of origin or EEZ) in salmon in the Commission areas. By 
virtue of their treaty membership, NASCO parties “consent” to the jurisdiction of the 
Commissions. The NASCO veto of Articles 11 and 13 seem like a reasonable price to 
pay to attract the very necessary participation of those states whose waters comprise the 
migratory routes of North Atlantic salmon stocks.
IV. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in 
the Central Bering Sea (“Donut Hole Agreement”)2
The Donut Hole Agreement embraces decision-making by consensus but with a 
highly sophisticated fallback procedure where consensus cannot be obtained. The treaty 
was the result of an “urgent necessity” to protect pollock stocks in the Central Bering 
Sea.210 The particular problem addressed by the treaty was the legal and geo-political
209 Convention on the Conservation and Management o f  Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, June 
16, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 67 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 8, 1995), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/bering.htm [hereinafter “Donut Hole Agreement”]. As o f June 2006, the 
Donut Hole Agreement had six parties: China, Japan, Republic o f Korea, Poland, Russian Federation and 
the US.
210 Id. at Preamble. The “Convention Area” is defined in Article I. Article I provides:
This Convention applies to the high seas area o f the Bering Sea beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth o f the 
territorial sea o f  the coastal States o f  the Bering Sea is measured . . . ,  
except as otherwise provided in this Convention. Activities under this 
Convention, for scientific purposes, may extend beyond the 
Convention Area within the Bering Sea.
Id. at art. 1.
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status of the Central Bering Sea. It is high seas bounded on all sides by the EEZs of the 
US and Russia.211 The Donut Hole Agreement follows Article 123(a) of UNCLOS that 
mandates states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas to cooperate and coordinate in 
the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources. As 
discussed in chapter 1, the Donut Hole Agreement was a response to the excessive 
fishing of the distant-water fishing states of China, Japan, Poland and Korea which not 
only involved illegal incursions into Russian and US waters for straddling pollock stocks
91 T
but also led to the collapse of the fishery. Years before the Donut Hole Agreement was 
negotiated Russia and the US expressed concern about uncontrolled fishing by the distant
214water states.
The Donut Hole Agreement was the product of ten negotiating sessions held
91 r
between February 1991 and February 1994. One of the most striking features of the 
treaty is the clear agreement demonstrated by the US and Soviet Union over the need to
• * 9 1 6cooperate with each other on the conservation objective. This was in fact a
211 For a review o f the geography o f the Bering Sea including a geo-political map detailing the relevant area 
of the ocean see David A. Balton, The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: Regional Solution, Global 
Implications, in Stokke, infra note 357, at 144-146. See also Brian Potter, Policy Paper 29, Improving 
Regimes to Manage Natural Resources: Lessons from  an Example o f  United States-Republic o f  Korea 
Pollock Negotiations, available at http://www-igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/policy_papers/pp2904.html 
(visited Mar. 20, 2005). In the Central Bering Sea the EEZs o f Russia and the US surround an area of high 
seas known commonly as the “Donut Hole.”
212 UNCLOS, opened fo r  signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), at 
art. 123(a). For a thorough discussion o f the application o f UNCLOS to overfishing in the Central Bering 
Sea see Lourene Miovski, Solutions in the Convention on the Law o f  the Sea to the Problem o f  Overfishing 
in the Central Bering Sea: Analysis o f  the Convention, Highlighting the Provisions Concerning Fisheries 
and Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525 (1989).
213 See supra chapter 1, at notes 202-203, citing CHURCHILL & Lo w e , supra note 19, at 306-307. To recount 
one instance, in January 1988 four Japanese vessels, among others, were videotaped illegally fishing 38 
miles inside the US EEZ. Balton, supra note 211, at 150. For a background discussion o f fishing in the 
Bering Sea, including the legal framework through the 1980s, see William T. Burke, Fishing in the Bering 
Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International Law o f  Fisheries, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1989).
214 See Miovski, supra note 212, at 525-532. For a complete discussion o f the history o f  the pollock fishery 
in the Bering Sea and the dispositions o f the US and Soviet Union see Balton, supra note 211.
215 Balton, supra note 211, at 151.
216 Id.
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continuation of the bilateral effort these states demonstrated previously to improve the 
fishery.217 Even though this collaboration occurred in the years immediately following 
the end of the Cold War, the cooperative effort on a matter of environmental concern by 
two traditional rivals is noteworthy nonetheless. Eventually, the two coastal states agreed 
that a multilateral framework including the participation of the distant water fishing states
918was necessary to address the problem.
The objectives of the Donut Hole Agreement are set forth in Article II:
1. to establish an international regime for conservation, 
management, and optimum utilization of pollock resources 
in the Convention Area;
2. to restore and maintain the pollock resources in the Bering 
Sea at levels which will permit their maximum sustainable 
yield;
3. to cooperate in the gathering and examining of factual 
information concerning pollock and other living marine 
resources in the Bering Sea; and
4. to provide, if the Parties agree, a forum in which to 
consider the establishment of necessary conservation and 
management measures for living marine resources other 
than pollock in the Convention Area as may be required in 
the fUture.219
The operational bodies of the regime are an Annual Conference of the Parties
9 9 0  • • 991  ___(Annual Conference) and a Scientific and Technical Committee. The Annual 
Conference serves as the main decision-making body in the regime. Its key functions are, 
among other things, to establish an “allowable harvest level” (AHL) for pollock for the
9 9 9  9 9 1succeeding year and an “individual national quota” (INQ) for each party.
217 Id. at 151-152.
218 Id  at 152.
219 Donut Hole Agreement, supra note 209, at art. 11(1 )-(4).
220 Id. at art. 111(1 )(a).
221 Id. at art. 111(1 )(b).
222 Id. at art. IV(l)(a).
223 Id. at art. IV(l)(b).
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Decision-making in the Annual Conference is provided for in Article V. This is 
where the veto provision of the Donut Hole Agreement is found. In the negotiation of the 
treaty, the positions of the parties with regard to decision-making split between the US 
and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the distant water fishing states on the other.224 
The US-Soviet position was that the coastal states should have a veto over substantive
99^decisions. In contrast, the distant water states argued that simple majority votes should
9 9  Adecide substantive matters. To them, this reflected the sovereign equality of the
9 9 7parties. Naturally, the US and Soviet Union rejected this formula because it meant the
990
more numerous distant water states would be able to outvote them on all key issues.
The distant water states proposed a compromise that allowed all parties to veto
9 9 0substantive decisions in the Annual Conference. For the coastal states, a veto available
9T0to all treaty members was problematic. David A. Balton describes the coastal states’
objections to sharing the veto power with the distant water fishing states:
This decision-making formula presented two difficulties 
from the perspective of the coastal states. First, it could 
create a deadlock within the Annual Conference and thus 
prevent changes in the status quo, namely unregulated 
fishing in the Doughnut Hole. Because the coastal states 
were seeking to change this status quo, they worried that 
a consensus-based decision-making structure would 
frustrate their objectives. Second, the [distant water 
fishing states’] proposal did not address a fundamental 
question: what would happen if the Annual Conference 
could not achieve consensus on a critical question, such 
as the establishment of the AHL for pollock in a given
224 See Balton, supra note 211, at 158.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 159.
230 Id.
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year?231
Further negotiation produced a veto enjoyed by all states. As in IATTC and 
CCSBT there is no objection procedure to accompany the veto. The veto, however, is 
backed up by a rather complex and novel “default” decision-making procedure when the 
parties are deadlocked.232 The veto provision of the Donut Hole Agreement is found in 
Article V. Article V is reproduced in full in chapter l.233 To summarize its key features, 
each party has one vote in decisions taken at the Annual Conference.234 Unless otherwise 
provided, decisions taken at the Annual Conference on matters of substance are by 
consensus.235 A matter is deemed to be of substance if any party considers it to be of
936substance. Decisions on matters not deemed to be of substance are taken by simple
937majority of the voting members.
Establishing the AHL for the succeeding year is specifically deemed to be a 
matter that must be determined by consensus. The AHL is based upon an assessment
930of the Aleutian Basin pollock biomass by the Science and Technical Committee. If 
every effort to achieve consensus fails, the AHL is determined by a procedure set forth in 
the treaty Annex.240
The Annex, which is deemed to be an integral part of the treaty,241 sets forth a 
contingency mechanism requiring the US and Russian Federation, the coastal states of
231 id.
T ld
233 Chapter 1, supra note 200.
234 Donut Hole Agreement, supra note 209, at art. V (l).
235 Id. at art. V(2).
236 Id.
237 Id. at art. V(3).
238 Id. at art. VII(l).
239 Id.
240 Id. at art. VII(2).
241 Id. at art. XIV(l).
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the Bering Sea, to nominate one institution apiece to jointly determine the Aleutian Basin 
pollock biomass (spawning adult portion of the population).242 This is to be based on 
scientific and technical information reviewed by the Scientific and Technical 
Committee.243 If there is insufficient scientific and technical information to allow the two 
institutions to determine the biomass, the Annex provides that the biomass for a 
specifically designated geographic region, as determined by the US institution, shall be 
deemed to be 60% of the Aleutian Basin pollock biomass.244 Based on this calculation, if 
the biomass is less than 1.67 million mt the AHL must be set at zero and there will be no 
directed fishing of the stock.245 If, on the other hand, the biomass is equal to or greater 
than 1.67 million mt, a table provided in the Annex determines the AHL.246 The table 
increases the size of the catch based on the size of the biomass.247
Not surprisingly, the contingency provision of the Annex has been invoked on a 
regular basis. From 1996 through 2003 the Annual Conference has demonstrated the 
greatest difficulty in achieving consensus on the AHL although the parties do agree 
generally on the poor status of pollock in the region. At the First Annual Conference, 
held in Moscow in 1996, the parties agreed there was insufficient scientific information
948to estimate the abundance of the stock. Likewise, at the Second Annual Conference the
242 Id. at Annex, Part 1(a), available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refrn/cbs/convention_description.htm 
(visited Aug. 12, 2004).
243 Id.
244 Id. at Annex, Part 1(b).
245 Id. at Annex, Part 1(c).
246 Id. at Annex, Part 1 (d).
247 Id.
248 Report o f the First Annual Conference, Nov. 13-16, 1996, Moscow, Russia, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Aug. 12, 2004), at para. 7.
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parties reached consensus that the AHL should remain at zero for 1998.249 Accordingly, 
no INQs were established for 1998.250
At the Third Annual Conference in 1998, however, the parties failed to achieve 
consensus so the procedure in the Annex was invoked 251 The Annex dictated that the 
AHL for 1999 be set at zero and therefore no INQs were established.252 Not surprisingly, 
the distant water fishing states of Korea, China, Japan and Poland all wanted to see an 
AHL set while the coastal states of Russia and the US were more cautious, opposing the 
setting of an AHL for 1999.253 At the Fourth Annual Conference the 2000 AHL was set 
at zero.254 At this meeting again, the distant water states sought a nominal AHL while 
Russia and the US preferred to keep it at zero.255 Despite the zero AHL, however, the 
parties agreed to authorize trial fishing in the Convention Area. At the Fifth Annual 
Conference consensus could not be achieved, and, based upon the provisions set forth in 
the Annex, the AHL was again set at zero.257 Here again the parties expressed relatively 
consistent positions with regard to whether or not an AHL, even at a token level, was 
advisable.258 This was effectively the result of the Sixth,259 Seventh,260 Eighth261 and 
Ninth262 Annual Conferences as well.
249 Report o f the Second Annual Conference, Nov. 5-Nov. 7, 1997, Seattle, Washington, US, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Aug. 12, 2004), at para. 6.E.7.
250 Id. at para. 6.F.
251 Report o f the Third Annual Conference, Nov. 30-Dec. 4, 1998, Tokyo, Japan, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Aug. 12, 2004), at para. 6.E.18.
252 Id. at para. 6.F.
253 Each party’s position on whether or not an AHL should be set for 1999 is set forth in id. at para. 6.E.
254 Report o f the Fourth Annual Conference, Nov. 8-Nov. 12, 1999, Pusan, Republic o f Korea, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Aug. 12, 2004), at para. 6.D.15.
255 Id. at para. 6.D.
256 Id. at para. 6.F.
257 Report o f the Fifth Annual Conference, Nov. 6-Nov.lO, 2000, Shanghai, China, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Mar. 29, 2005), at para. 6.D.12.
258 Id. at para. 6. At the Fifth Annual Conference, however, despite a difference o f opinion over the ability 
to set a sustainable AHL, Japan willingly accepted the zero AHL because o f the “critical condition” of the 
stock. See id. at para. 6.D.2.
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The dispositions of the parties to the Donut Hole Agreement should come as no 
surprise. The question of whether or not an AHL for Central Bering Sea pollock should 
be set, clearly reflects the differing levels of caution one would expect from states that 
have a proprietary interest in the resource and those that do not. The US and Russia, as 
coastal states surrounding the Donut Hole, have to consider the status of pollock not just 
in the high seas area but also their own EEZs. As discussed above, the agreement itself 
was a response to the excessive fishing of the distant water states, some of which 
involved illegal incursions in the US and Russian EEZs. Accordingly, the US and 
Russia have demonstrated far more caution concerning the utilization of the resource than 
the distant-water fishing states of Japan, China, Poland and Korea.
This is not to imply that distant-water states have no stake in the successful 
management of the resource or that these particular states have been reckless in their 
conduct in the regime. On the contrary, the treaty itself sets the bar very high on the 
question of when pollock may be harvested. Mere participation in this regime signals 
seriousness about conservation. At the same time, there is an important observation about 
fisheries law apparent in this regime: the greater stakeholder status experienced by 
coastal states with regard to straddling stocks gives these states a greater sensitivity to the 
long-term conservation of these resources.
259 Report o f the Sixth Annual Conference, Sept. 17-Sept. 21, 2001, Gdynia, Poland, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Mar. 29, 2005), at para. 6.D.12.
260 Report o f the Seventh Annual Conference, Sept. 16-Sept. 19, 2002, Moscow, Russia, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Mar. 29, 2005), at para. 6.D.12.
261 Report o f the Eighth Annual Conference, Sept. 15-Sept. 19, 2003, Portland, Oregon, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Mar. 29, 2005), at para. 6.4.3. At the Eighth 
Annual Conference Japan and Korea recommended that the AHL be set at 2,40 lmt for 2004. Id. at para. 
6.4.1. The US and Russia, on the other hand, recommended it be set at zero. Id. at para. 6.4.2.
262 Report o f the Ninth Annual Conference, Sept. 7-Sept. 9, 2004, Kushiro, Japan, available at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/default.htm (visited Mar. 29,2005), at para. 6.4.
263 See supra text accompanying note 213.
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The relatively short history of this regime reflects the great difficulty in achieving 
consensus among interested states on questions of sustainable use of a living marine 
resource. On a deeper level, the different interests that the parties have vis-a-vis the 
resource helps to explain why. The default mechanisms in the Donut Hole Agreement 
empower the coastal states to a greater degree than the other parties. The proprietary 
interest that coastal states have in straddling stocks justifies this empowerment and 
probably serves the long-term conservation and utilization goals. This lesson of the 
Donut Hole Agreement should not be lost in future treaties addressing the conservation 
and management of dwindling fishery resources that straddle coastal waters and the high 
seas.
V. The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR)264
The CCAMLR Treaty requires that its conservation and management measures be 
adopted by consensus but then permits individual members to enter a reservation to 
exempt themselves from a given measure. The CCAMLR Treaty was initially designed to 
address concerns about the effects of krill fishing on the conservation status of various
264 The Commission for the Conservation o f Antarctic Marine Living Resources [hereinafter CCAMLR] 
was established by the Convention on the Conservation o f Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 
1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982) [hereinafter CCAMLR Treaty]. As o f June 2006 
CCAMLR had 24 members. See CCAMLR website, Member Contacts, at
http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/E/ms/contacts.htm (last visited June 20, 2006). There are also eight parties to the 
CCAMLR Treaty that are not members o f CCAMLR. See id. While in most regimes membership in the 
regulatory commission is coextensive with treaty membership, Article VII o f the CCAMLR Treaty 
provides for commission membership for those states that participated in the meeting where the Convention 
was adopted as well as acceding parties only so long as the acceding states (or the states o f acceding 
regional economic integration organizations) are “engaged in research or harvesting activities in relation to 
the marine living resources to which this Convention applies.” CCAMLR Treaty supra at art. VII(2)(a)-(c).
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' J f . C
Antarctic marine organisms; this not only included krill but also birds, seals and fish.
This concern for ecological links between species is a noteworthy feature of
9CCAMLR. The most important commercial species managed by CCAMLR is the 
Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) which is more widely recognizable by
9f>7its common name: Chilean sea bass.
' J f . QLike other regimes, CCAMLR’s efforts are driven by scientific advice and the
‘J f . Qminimization of risk to the marine ecosystem (that is, the precautionary approach) is a
9 7 0key feature of the regime. CCAMLR operates within a broader legal regime governing 
Antarctica, known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).271 The two main hallmarks of 
the ATS are scientific cooperation and the protection of the Antarctic environment.272 A
265 See CCAMLR website, General Introduction, at http://www.ccamlr.0rg/pu/e/gen-intr0 .htm (visited June 
29, 2004). Interestingly, even though krill is central to the Antarctic marine ecosystem it did not actually 
come under CCAMLR’s regulatory framework until 1991. See Steinar Andresen, The Convention on the 
Conservation o f  Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR): Improving Procedures but Lacking 
Results, in En v ir o n m e n t a l  Regim e Effectiv en ess: Co n fr o n tin g  T h eo r y  with  E v id en c e  405,412  
(Edward L. Miles et al eds., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
266 See CCAMLR website, General Introduction. The “ecosystem approach” to resource management is 
apparent in the first articles o f the CCAMLR Treaty. “Antarctic marine living resources means the 
populations o f fm fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species o f living organisms, including birds, 
found south o f the Antarctic Convergence.” CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 264, at art. 1(2). “The Antarctic 
marine ecosystem means the complex o f relationships o f Antarctic marine living resources with each other 
and with their physical environment.” Id. at art. 1(3). Perhaps most importantly, Article 11(3)(b) recognizes 
as a guiding principle of conservation the “maintenance o f the ecological relationships between harvested, 
dependent and related populations o f Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration o f depleted 
populations . . .” Id. at art. II(3)(b).
267 See generally, SeaWeb website, Patagonian Toothfish, at
http://www.seaweb.org/background/book/toothfish.html (visited July 10, 2004) [hereinafter SeaWeb].
268 See CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 264, at art. IX.
269 Id. at art. II(3)(c).
270 See CCAMLR website, General Introduction, supra note 265. The application o f the precautionary 
approach as a limiting factor on the use of exemptive provisions will be discussed in chapter 4 infra.
271 See generally T he ANTARCTIC Legal REGIME (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra eds., 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). The cornerstone o f the Antarctic Treaty System is the 
Antarctic Treaty, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, Dec. 1, 1959 (entered into force June 23, 1961) [hereinafter Antarctic 
Treaty], In addition to CCAMLR, the other key agreements that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System are 
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and the Convention for the Conservation 
of Antarctic Seals. For texts o f these treaties and explanations o f their operation see British Antarctic 
Survey website, The Antarctic Treaty, at http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/About_Antarctica/Treaty/index.html 
(visited July 1, 2004).
272 See British Antarctic Survey website, The Antarctic Treaty Explained, at 
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/About_Antarctica/Treaty/treatyperu.html (visited July 2, 2004).
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key feature of the ATS is the role of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties 
(ATCPs).273 The ATCPs adopt recommendations on a variety of issues concerning 
Antarctica including the environment and scientific research.274
CCAMLR’s scope is clearly more comprehensive than any other branch of the 
ATS.275 Among CCAMLR’s conservation and management activities it determines catch 
levels for harvested species and adopts measures aimed at minimizing the potential
9 7  f\ •impact of fishing activities on non-target species. To better implement these objectives 
CCAMLR is developing a unified regulatory framework to manage all fisheries in the
9 7 7geographic area under its mandate.
The veto provision of the CCAMLR Treaty is found in Article XII. It is
97 0  > #
reproduced in its entirety in chapter 1. The key language is Article XII(l): “Decisions 
of the Commission on matters of substance shall be taken by consensus. The question of
9 7 0whether a matter is one of substance shall be treated as a matter of substance.”
Decisions on non-substantive matters are taken by simple majority of the members
90A
present and voting. This provision is reasonably straightforward and further declares 
that with any decision CCAMLR must make clear whether a regional economic 
integration organization (as of June 2006, the only such organization was the EC) will 
participate in the decision-making, and, if so, whether its member states which are
273 Christopher  C. Jo y n e r , G o v er n in g  the Frozen  Co m m o n s: The A n tar ctic  Regim e a n d  
Env ir o n m en ta l  Pro te c t io n  22 (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 See CCAMLR website, Commission, at http://www.ccamlr.0rg/pu/E/cc/intr0 .htm (visited July 2, 2004).
277 See CCAMLR website, Regulatory Framework, at http://www.ccamlr.0rg/pu/E/sc/reg-frw-intro.htm 
(visited July 2, 2004).
278 Chapter 1, supra text accompanying note 194.
279 CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 264, at art. 12(1).
280 Id. at art. 12(2).
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members of CCAMLR will also do so.281 The CCAMLR Treaty specifies that where this 
is an issue the number of parties participating in the decision-making shall not exceed the 
number of member states of the regional economic organization that are members of 
CCAMLR.282 This prevents the EC from having any additional voting power in 
CCAMLR beyond that held individually by its member states. Where this is not a factor, 
a regional economic integration organization has one vote.
As noted in chapter 1, the requirement of consensus in decision-making has 
precedent in the ATS. Specifically, Article IX of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty provides: 
“The measures . . . shall become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those 
measures.”284
Steinar Andresen provides a scholarly discussion of the history of some key 
elements of the CCAMLR Treaty, including the decision-making procedure. He 
observes several features that are worthy of review. For example, the Soviet Union and 
other fishing states favored decision-making by consensus. Argentina and Chile also 
supported consensus decision-making not only to protect their harvesting interests but 
more importantly to preserve their national claims in Antarctica.
Non-harvesting states, on the other hand, suggested other possible voting
700 70Q
procedures. The United States favored two-thirds majority voting. This would have
281 Id. at art. 12(3).
282 Id.
283 Id. at art. 12(4).
284 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 271, at art. IX. For an explanation o f why the ATS adopts consensus 
decision-making see infra text accompanying notes 321-322.
285 Andresen, supra note 265, at 405-429.
286 Id. at 420.
287 Id.
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enabled non-harvesting states to outvote harvesting states290 and likely would have led to 
greater use of the CCAMLR specific reservation/objection mechanism discussed below. 
The controversy over consensus voting was not limited to the adoption of
9 Q 1conservation measures but also the work of the Scientific Committee. Australia 
proposed that “whenever possible” decisions of the Scientific Committee should be by
9 0 9consensus. The Soviet Union, viewing the Scientific Committee as a largely political 
body and not a scientific one, went even further and insisted that it adopt its
9QTrecommendations by consensus. Even though the Soviet position prevailed, an 
important provision was inserted requiring the Scientific Committee to inform the wider 
CCAMLR commission of “all the views” expressed about matters addressed.294
As noted above, in addition to the requirement of decision-making by consensus, 
CCAMLR also contains a specific reservation procedure. Article IX(6) of the CCAMLR 
provides:
6. Conservation measures adopted by the Commission in 
accordance with this Convention shall be implemented by 
Members of the Commission in the following manner:
(a) the Commission shall notify conservation measures to 
all Members of the Commission;
(b) conservation measures shall become binding upon all 
Members of the Commission 180 days after such 
notification, except as provided in sub-paragraphs (c) and 
(d) below;
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 421.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
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(c) if a Member of the Commission, within ninety days 
following the notification specified in sub-paragraph (a), 
notifies the Commission that it is unable to accept the 
conservation measure, in whole or in part, the measure 
shall not, to the extent stated, be binding upon that Member 
of the Commission;
(d) in the event that any Member of the Commission 
invokes the procedure set forth in sub-paragraph (c) above, 
the Commission shall meet at the request of any Member of 
the Commission to review the conservation measure. At the 
time of such meeting and within thirty days following the 
meeting, any Member of the Commission shall have the 
right to declare that it is no longer able to accept the 
conservation measure, in which case the Member shall no
9QSlonger be bound by such measure.
To summarize Article IX(6), once conservation and management measures are
j Q / r
adopted by CCAMLR the parties are formally notified. Measures become binding 180
9 0 7days thereafter unless within 90 days of receiving the notification a CCAMLR member
9QRserves notice that it is unable to accept the measure in whole or in part. In that case, to 
the extent stated, the measure will not bind that party.299 Where this objection procedure 
is invoked, CCAMLR will meet at the request of any member to review the measure.300 
Within 30 days of that meeting, any additional member may declare that it too is no 
longer able to accept the measure, in which case it will no longer be bound by it.301 
The requirement of decision-making by consensus backed up by an objection
0^9 •procedure has been referred to as a “double veto.” The objection procedure has only 
been invoked twice in CCAMLR’s history. The first time was by Chile in 1991 when
295 CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 264, at art. IX(6).
296 Id. at art. IX(6)(a).
297 Id. at art. IX(6)(b).
298 Id. at art. IX(6)(c).
299 Id.
300 Id. at art. IX(6)(d).
301 Id.
302 See Andresen, supra note 265, at 409. See also Internet Guide to International Fisheries Law, 
CCAMLR, Summary Information, at http://www.oceanlaw.net/orgs/ccamlr.htm (visited July 5, 2004).
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Chile indicated that for practical reasons it was unable to comply with the five-day catch 
reporting requirements in respect of its vessels operating in the longline fishery for 
Toothfish in a designated area (Conservation Measure 37/X). Even this example is 
hardly indicative of disagreement within the regime because Chile indicated it would 
comply on a voluntary basis with the purpose of the measure and did not object to any 
cross-reference of that measure.304 Moreover, the measure was modified in 1992 
(Conservation Measure 51/XI) and Chile did not object at that time. The objection 
procedure was used a second time in early 2006 when Russia objected to new 
requirements for the reporting of vessel movements.
The fact that a “double veto” exemptive provision like Article IX(6) has hardly 
ever been invoked should not be surprising. Its use would require a party to change its 
mind about a conservation or management measure that it had voted for less than 90 days 
before. This type of double veto is also observed in SEAFO (discussed below). 
Pragmatically speaking, the double veto probably serves to provide some reassurance to 
parties. It encourages them to engage in multilateral decision-making by giving them the 
option of backing out of conservation or management measures shortly after they are 
adopted if they wish to do so.
303 E-mail from Dr. Denzil G.M. Miller, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, to author (Sept. 2, 2003) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Miller Communication 2003]. Conservation Measure 37/X entitled, “Effort and 
Biological Data Reporting System for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 48.3 for the 1991/92 
Season” is available at http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/pubs/cr/91/il0.pdf (visited July 6, 2004). The system of 
classification codes for CCAMLR Conservation Measures has changed over the years and the codes 
presented in connection with the Chilean objection reflect the system in effect at the time.
304 Miller Communication 2003, supra note 303.
305 Id. Conservation Measure 5 1/XI entitled, “Five-day Catch and Effort Reporting System” is available at 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/pubs/cr/92/i9.pdf (visited July 6, 2004).
306 E-Mail from Dr. Denzil G.M. Miller, CCAMLR Executive Secretary, to author (June 22, 2006) (on file 
with author). Russia’s objection was to paragraph 14 o f Conservation Measure 10-04 (2005). Conservation 
Measure 10-04 (2005) entitled “Automatic Satellite-Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS)” is 
available at http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/e-pubs/cm/05-06/10-04.pdf (visited June 24, 2006).
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How successful overall has CCAMLR been at adopting conservation and 
management measures? From the first meeting of CCAMLR in 1982 through 2005
0^7CCAMLR adopted a total of 322 conservation and management measures. Of these, 66 
conservation measures, along with 13 resolutions, were in force at the end of 2005.308 A 
summary of the work of CCAMLR indicates that the number of new conservation and 
management measures adopted by the body increased steadily with noticeable increases 
each decade. From 1982 through 1990 (9 years) CCAMLR adopted 28 measures, from 
1991 through 2000 (10 years) 185 measures and from 2001 through 2005 (5 years) 109 
measures.309 This trend likely reflects not only greater cooperation within the regime but 
also the deepening seriousness of Antarctic conservation issues.
Despite the availability of data, an extensive quantitative historical review of the 
conservation and management measures adopted by CCAMLR is of limited value 
because measures year-to-year typically cross-reference and modify others. Because 
some measures are supported or modified by others and some are more or less 
independent, it is difficult to assess the value or impact of individual conservation 
measures. In addition, the conservation and management measures are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated as the number adopted increases steadily;310 the work of the 
regime is heavily loaded in the later years. For these reasons, the analysis herein is 
largely confined to conservation and management measures in force at the time of this
307 See CCAMLR website, Summary o f Conservation Measures Adopted Each Year, at 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05-06/05_graph.pdf (visited June 21, 2006) [hereinafter CCAMLR 
Summary by Year].
308 For links to all conservation measures and resolutions in force at the end o f 2005 see CCAMLR website, 
Schedule o f Conservation Measures in Force 2005/06, at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05- 
06/toc.htm (visited June 21, 2006).
309 See CCAMLR Summary by Year, supra note 307.
310 See Olav Schram Stokke, The Effectiveness o f CCAMLR, in GOVERNING THE ANTARCTIC: T he 
Effectiv en ess  a n d  Leg itim a c y  of the  A nt a r c t ic  T reaty  Sy stem  142 (Olav Schram Stokke & Davor 
Vidas eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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writing, as this is likely to yield the most accurate assessment of the present work of the
regime.
Before further analysis of the effectiveness of CCAMLR can proceed, however, 
there is another exemptive provision in CCAMLR that requires discussion. This is found 
not in the text of the treaty itself but rather a statement attached to it by the Chairman of 
the conference that produced the CCAMLR Treaty. The Chairman’s Statement was made 
on May 19, 1980 and regards the application of the CCAMLR Treaty to the waters 
adjacent to the French islands of Kerguelen, Crozet and others in the Convention area 
where all CCAMLR parties recognize state sovereignty. The Chairman’s statement is as 
follows:
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
CONFERENCE ON THE CONSERVATION OF 
ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES
1. Measures for the conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources of the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet, 
over which France has jurisdiction, adopted by France prior 
to the entry into force of the Convention, would remain in 
force after the entry into force of the
Convention until modified by France acting within the 
framework of the Commission or otherwise.
2. After the Convention has come into force, each time the 
Commission should undertake examination of the 
conservation needs of the marine living resources of the 
general area in which the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and 
Crozet are to be found, it would be open to France
either to agree that the waters in question should be 
included in the area of application of any specific 
conservation measure under consideration or to indicate 
that they should be excluded. In the latter event, the 
Commission would not proceed to the adoption of the 
specific conservation measure in a form applicable to the 
waters in question unless France removed its
213
objection to it. France could also adopt such national 
measures as it might deem appropriate for the waters in 
question.
3. Accordingly, when specific conservation measures are 
considered within the framework of the Commission and 
with the participation of France, then:
(a) France would be bound by any conservation measures 
adopted by consensus with its participation for the duration 
of those measures. This would not prevent France from 
promulgating national measures that were more strict than 
the Commission’s measures or which dealt with other 
matters;
(b) in the absence of consensus, France could promulgate 
any national measures which it might deem appropriate.
4. Conservation measures, whether national measures or 
measures adopted by the Commission, in respect of the 
waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet, would be 
enforced by France. The system of observation and 
inspection foreseen by the Convention would not be 
implemented in the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and 
Crozet except as agreed by France and in the manner so 
agreed.
5. The understandings, set forth in paragraphs 1-4 above, 
regarding the application of the Convention to waters 
adjacent to the Islands of Kerguelen and Crozet, also apply 
to waters adjacent to the islands within the area to which 
this Convention applies over which the existence of State 
sovereignty is recognised by all Contracting Parties.
IllNo objection to the statement was made.
In summary, the Chairman’s Statement recognizes France’s superior position to 
decide unilaterally whether or not to apply or reject CCAMLR conservation measures 
with regard to the adjacent waters (i.e., EEZ) of the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands in the 
CCAMLR area. For other islands, where all CCAMLR Treaty members recognize state 
sovereignty, the right to exclude CCAMLR coverage also applies. France insisted on this
311 Statement by the Chairman o f the Conference on the Conservation o f Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, May 19, 1980, available at http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/E/pubs/bd/ptl.pdf (visited July 7, 2004).
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exemptive procedure because the CCAMLR regulatory area overlapped with France’s
919national jurisdiction over Kerguelen and Crozet.
Joyner and Chopra characterize the French disposition in regard to Kerguelen and 
Crozet in the negotiations as follows: “France has always been a strong defender of its 
national interest; the stubbornness with which it held up the conclusion of the CCAMLR 
convention to secure its position over the 200-mile zones of Crozet and Kerguelen islands 
is an example. . . .” France’s behavior in the Antarctic has opened it up to criticism and 
allegations that it is insensitive to environmental issues.314 In the wider context of 
fisheries law, however, France’s exclusion is not so unusual. Measures adopted by 
fisheries commissions do not normally apply within an EEZ without the consent of the 
coastal state.
For several conservation measures in force at the end of 2005, this exemption was 
applied not only to Kerguelen and Crozet but also Prince Edwards Islands, a South
91 c
African territory. Of the 79 CCAMLR conservation and management measures in 
force at the end of 2005 a total of 16 excluded the adjacent waters of at least one island 
group. Fourteen measures were excluded from Kerguelen; 14 measures were excluded 
from Crozet and 12 were excluded from Prince Edwards. These results are summarized in 
Table-7.
312 Andresen, supra note 265, at 420-421.
313 See Joyner and Chopra, supra note 271, at 20.
314 Id.
315 See CCAMLR website, Summary o f Conservation Measures and Resolutions in Force, at 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05-06/02-summary.pdf (visited June 21, 2006). For useful 
information about Antarctic Islands see The South Atlantic & Sub-Antarctic website, at 
http://www.btintemet.com/~sa_sa/ (last visited July 9, 2004). For a discussion about the status o f sub- 
Antarctic islands in CCAMLR see Erik Jaap Molenaar, CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries, 16 In t ’l 
J. M a r in e  & Co a st a l  L. 465,477-482 (2001).
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Even considering these territorial exclusions, it is significant that CCAMLR has 
been successful reaching agreement 322 times. Very little information is publicly 
available about measures that fail to achieve consensus. It is true, however, that while 
CCAMLR conservation and management measures may go through many drafts, none 
have been rejected by vote; CCAMLR does not keep formal records on measures that do 
not reach consensus.316 This naturally raises the question: how many potential measures 
are proposed, debated but never reach a vote?
According to Dr. Beth C. Clark, conservation and management measures having 
to do with actual fisheries are typically discussed outside the main meeting in private 
session where no views are recorded.317 When contentious fishery issues are considered, 
as they frequently are in CCAMLR, there is often further discussion at the time the
110
meeting report is adopted but still no views are recorded. If the measure is not adopted 
there is usually no mention of it in the final report. “The final report which the public 
sees is highly sanitized with little or no controversy recorded.”
The main reason why the drafters of the CCAMLR Treaty adopted decision­
making by consensus in the first place is that it reflects the unresolved sovereignty claims 
in the Antarctic.321 This observation is supported by the fact that consensus decision­
making is common throughout the entire ATS system.322
316 CCAMLR communication, supra note 303.
317 E-mail from Dr. Beth C. Clark, Director and Scientist, The Antarctica Project, to author (Aug. 29, 2003) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Clark communication].
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Beth C. Clark & Alan D. Hemmings, Problems and Prospects fo r the Convention on the Conservation 
o f Antarctic Marine Living Resources Twenty Years On, 4 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POLY 47, 5 1 (2001).
322 Id. For the text o f the veto provision in the Antarctic Treaty see supra text accompanying note 284.
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Turning to the question of CCAMLR’s effectiveness, Steinar Andresen generally
3 9 3classifies it as a regime of low effectiveness. In its favor, CCAMLR is credited with 
significantly increasing the scientific knowledge base about Antarctic marine resources 
and the ecosystem.324 This is especially laudable since knowledge of the Southern Ocean
39^ecosystem was practically non-existent before CCAMLR. Joyner notes positively that 
CCAMLR covers all fisheries in the Southern Ocean. It has also adopted particularly
9 9 7strong measures in an effort to decrease incidental mortality. On the other hand, 
CCAMLR’s conservation and management measures were slow in coming and have 
failed to bring about the necessary reversal of the degradation of the Antarctic marine
328ecosystem.
With regard to CCAMLR’s most important target species, the Patagonian 
Toothfish, it is widely accepted that CCAMLR has not done enough to address Illegal,
3 9 0Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing. Toothfish are especially vulnerable to the
33Heffects of IUU fishing because they are slow growing and late maturing. Because of its 
poor status, the Toothfish has been the subject of campaigns by environmental NGOs.331 
More significantly, in 2001 at CITES COP 12 Australia submitted a proposal to
3 39include Toothfish in Appendix II. This proposal was ultimately withdrawn, however,
323 Andresen, supra note 265, at 405.
324 Id. at 411.
325 Id.
326 JOYNER, supra note 273, at 141.
327 Id.
328 Andresen, supra note 265, at 414.
329 See Clark & Hemmings, supra note 321, at 52-53; see SeaWeb, supra note 267; see Traffic website, 
Illegal Fishing Continues to Threaten Patagonian Toothfish, at http://www.traffic.org/toothfish/ (visited 
July 15, 2004)[hereinafter Traffic website].
330 Clark & Hemmings, supra note 321, at 52-53.
331 See Traffic website, supra note 329; EnvironmentalAction.net, Patagonian Toothfish, at 
http://www.environmentalaction.net/antarctica/toothfish/ (visited July 15, 2004).
332 U.S. Dept, o f the Interior website, U.S. Leads Efforts to Conserve Seahorses and Patagonian Toothfish 
at CITES, at http://www.doi.gov/news/021115.htm (visited July 16, 2004).
217
when the United States facilitated an agreement between Australia and Chile on the 
monitoring of harvests and other aspects of international trade of Toothfish. This was 
adopted in CITES Resolution Conf. 12.4 entitled, “Cooperation between CITES and the 
[CCAMLR] regarding trade in [Tjoothfish.”334 Despite these efforts Toothfish stocks are 
undeniably over-exploited.
The overall decline of the Toothfish stock has stimulated enforcement measures 
by France in the waters off Kerguelen and Crozet. The matter of France’s aggressive 
enforcement of its national fishing laws is evident in a number of applications for prompt
t t r
release of vessels made to the ITLOS. Specifically, in The Camuoco (Panama v. 
France), The Monte Confurco (Seychelles v. France) and The Grand Prince (Belize 
v. France)™ France demonstrated a determination to address the issue of illegal fishing 
in the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet. In fact, it has conducted enforcement 
operations in the waters off Kurguelen since 1978. The pursuit of vessels fishing 
illegally in the CCAMLR area is not limited to France. Australia also engaged in this type 
of operation in the Volga case340 and some other less well-known examples of hot pursuit
333 Id.
334 The full text o f CITES Conf. 12.4 is available at http://www.cites.org/eng/resols/12/12-4.shtml (visited 
July 16, 2004).
335 See Schiffman, supra note 93, at 263-267. UNCLOS Article 292 empowers the ITLOS to entertain 
applications for prompt release o f vessels. In the relatively short history o f the ITLOS, these applications 
comprise a significant portion o f its docket.
336 See ITLOS website, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Proceedings and Judgments, Case No. 5, The 
“Camouco” Case (Panama v. France), Prompt Release (visited Mar. 20, 2005).
337 See ITLOS website, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Proceedings and Judgments, Case No. 6, The 
"Monte Confurco” Case (Seychelles v. France), Prompt Release (visited Mar. 20, 2005).
338 See ITLOS website, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Proceedings and Judgments, Case No. 8, The 
"GrandPrince” Case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release (visited Mar. 20, 2005).
339 Stokke, supra note 310, at 149.
340 See ITLOS website, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html, Proceedings and Judgments, Case No. 11, The 
"Volga” Case (Russian Federation v. Australia), Prompt Release (visited Mar. 20, 2005).
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of vessels allegedly engaged in illegal fishing.341 This would indicate that despite the 
exclusion of certain CCAMLR measures from these waters, national enforcement actions 
may complement multilateral conservation efforts.
Perhaps a more compelling conclusion suggested by these ITLOS applications for 
prompt vessel release is that these proceedings are essentially fishery disputes expressed 
in alternate form. As such, they underscore weaknesses in the CCAMLR conservation 
and management scheme, specifically fishing by flag of convenience non-members. The 
past is prologue in that they probably foreshadow other disputes over access to Toothfish.
As fishery resources dwindle, it is likely that enforcement actions by coastal states 
will become increasingly aggressive.342 Greater attention will need to be paid not only to 
substantive conservation and management efforts but also to the dispute settlement 
mechanisms that may be invoked to address the conflicts inevitably arising from such 
actions. Even regimes like CCAMLR that feature decision-making by consensus, and 
demonstrate a certain level of cooperation, will not be immune from these disputes. The 
presence of free-riders and IUU vessels virtually guarantee them.
The question of the availability of suitable dispute settlement mechanisms is 
particularly acute considering that, like the SBT Treaty, CCAMLR provides for binding 
dispute settlement only by consensus. Article XXV provides for the possibility of dispute 
settlement either by arbitration or the ICJ but this is only available “with the consent in 
each case of all Parties to the dispute[.]”343 This may be thought of as yet another veto 
provision in the regime. For those parties to CCAMLR that are also members of the Fish
341 See Erik Jaap Molenaar, Multilateral Hot Pursuit and Illegal Fishing in the Southern Ocean: The 
Pursuits o f  the Viarsa 1 and the South Tomi, 19 INT’L J. M arine & COASTAL L. 19 (2004).
342 Schiffman, supra note 93, at 267.
343 CCAMLR Treaty, supra note 264, at art. XXV(2).
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Stocks Treaty, Article 30(2) of the latter extends the reach of the UNCLOS dispute 
settlement mechanism to those disputes involving stocks that could be characterized as 
straddling.344
Turning to the impact of the veto provision, it is fair to conclude that consensus 
decision-making in CCAMLR induces states with claims of territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica to participate in the regime. The veto protects them from being forced to 
accept decisions without their consent. It is useful to recall that the Antarctic Treaty 
essentially holds in abeyance claims of sovereignty.345 Therefore, it stands to reason that 
where states are limited in their ability to take unilateral prescriptive and enforcement 
action, participation in a multilateral regime offering them veto power over decisions 
affecting their interests, is an inducement to their participation.
For similar reasons, the veto power encourages accession by non-party fishing
states.346 Stokke observes:
[Wjhile non-party fishing nations may have preferred to 
have been included in its formation, CCAMLR did offer 
clear rewards for those who chose to join, i.e. full 
membership in the decision-making body of a convention 
which explicitly included rational use among its objectives.
Such membership was particularly attractive because of the 
decision-rule adopted: the consensus and reservation 
procedures provided each member with a double-veto 
regarding restrictions on the harvesting operations of its 
vessels.3 7
If veto provisions encourage membership, it naturally raises the question whether 
vetoes also serve to minimize the impact of free-riders which would otherwise negatively 
affect the work of regime (as discussed earlier in this chapter, NASCO has had to contend
344 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
345 Antarctic Treaty, supra  note 271, at art. IV.
346 Stokke, supra note 310, at 132-134.
347 Id. at 133.
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with free-riders despite its use of a veto). If so, this benefit may offset limitations 
incurred by the fact that all conservation and management measures represent the lowest 
common denominator acceptable in the decision-making process. Sadly, the problem of 
free-riders, and IUU fishing generally (significantly, much IUU fishing is conducted not 
by free-riders but by CCAMLR parties)349 continues to vex the regime. CCAMLR readily 
points to the detrimental effect of IUU fishing on its conservation and management 
efforts.350 In response, it has adopted strict licensing requirements, a catch documentation 
scheme and a system for vessel inspection. CCAMLR also presently maintains IUU 
fishing vessel lists for both contracting and non-contracting parties. With regard to 
non-members engaged in unregulated fishing the first approach, however, is to seek their
i n
cooperation, and potentially their membership.
Regardless of whether or not the veto has encouraged membership, Christopher
C. Joyner views the CCAMLR veto as a limiting factor in the regime:
[I]t is worth asking whether out of respect for the wishes 
of only one or a few, the principle of consensus decision­
making can carry too exorbitant a price for all. Decision­
making by consensus demonstrated that cost by 
paralyzing [CCAMLR] for more than half a decade.
One must be mindful, though, of the real world of 
international politics. The fact remains that no formal 
decision-making procedure can compel governments to 
accept policies or enforce conservation measures that they 
perceive as contrary to their national interests. Had 
decision-making in CCAMLR been by majority vote, the
348 See supra text accompanying notes 197-206.
349 See Marcus Haward, IUU Fishing: Contemporary Practice, in Elferink & Rothwell, supra note 106, at 
87, 96.
350 See CCAMLR website, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing, at 
http://www.ccamlr.0rg/pu/E/sc/f1sh-monit/iuu-intro.htm (visited Mar. 19, 2005).
351 Id.
352 See CCAMLR Report XXIII (2004), at Item 8, available at 
http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/E/e_pubs/cr/04/i08.pdf (visited Mar. 19, 2005).
353 See Erik Jaap Molenaar, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Issues o f  Participation, 
Allocation and Unregulated Fishing, in Elferink & Rothwell, supra note 106, at 69, 76-77.
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the fishing conservation measures simply would have been 
ignored by the major finfishing states. 5
It is noteworthy that while Joyner views the veto as the cause of CCAMLR’s inability to
adopt conservation and measures in its early years, he also concedes that decision-making
by majority would likely not have produced a superior result.
Another observer suggests that the consensus requirement in CCAMLR favors the 
status quo and consistency at the expense of genuine problem solving. Bruce W. Davis 
notes:
[CJonsensus is a very demanding decision rule, since 
it enables one reluctant party to block any collective 
measure: a consensus rule favors the status quo. . . .
[E] specially in the early years [of CCAMLR] this rendered 
the development of information and conservation measures 
in the Southern Ocean a protracted and cumbersome 
process. Hence, to some extent, the consensus rule implies 
that consistency and acceptance have prevailed over
' I C C
problem-solving conduciveness.
Examining the question of how CCAMLR’s procedures compare with other 
regimes, Steinar Andresen compares CCAMLR decision-making favorably to that of the 
IWC:
In contrast to the development of the IWC,. . .  it appears 
that the generally consensus-driven ATS cooperation has 
gotten the upper hand and contributed to a more 
conciliatory atmosphere of learning and incremental 
growth. The difference is illustrated by the softer approach 
within CCAMLR using shaming as a means to change 
behavior on the part of reluctant members . . . This gradual 
positive change has occurred without changing the 
decision-making procedures, indicating that there are other 
factors behind this procedure (like increased trust, fewer 
stakes, and institutional growth) that are more important.
354 JOYNER, supra note 273, at 127.
355 Bruce W. Davis, The Legitimacy o f  CCAMLR, in Stokke & Vidas, supra note 310, at 237-238.
356 Andresen, supra note 265, at 422.
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While Andresen is correct that CCAMLR enjoys a more conciliatory atmosphere 
than that of the IWC, the manner in which reluctant states are addressed is sometimes 
similar. As discussed in chapter 2, the process of shaming reluctant members is, in fact, 
part of the IWC as well. A key difference between the IWC and CCAMLR, however, is 
that the IWC reflects the clear polarization of pro and anti-whaling camps. Despite the 
varying levels of commitment to the conservation of Toothfish, unlike the IWC, 
CCAMLR members generally (at least publicly) share the goals of sustainable 
management and use of that highly valuable fishery. This probably says more about the 
different characteristics of fishery and marine mammal conservation than it does about 
the format of the decision-making process in the respective regimes. Unlike the IWC, 
CCAMLR does not suffer from an ideological divide among its members. Instead, the 
issue is the applicability, compliance and enforcement with the measures it adopts.
Most specifically, CCAMLR’s main problem is how to address IUU fishing of 
Toothfish.357 This includes compliance issues with some of its own members.358 There is 
strong evidence of cheating in the CCAMLR system.359 The fact that there is widespread 
cheating within the ranks of CCAMLR members indicates that the decision-making 
apparatus neither achieves sufficient cooperation in the regime nor satisfies the interests 
of its members. Unfortunately, this must be viewed as a significant limiting factor. The 
extent to which this will successfully be addressed in the future may depend not so much 
on the internal politics of CCAMLR but also wider factors in fishery law.
357 Richard Herr, The International Regulation o f  Patagonian Toothfish: CCAMLR and High Seas Fishery 
Management, in G o v e r n i n g  H ig h  S e a s  F i s h e r i e s : T h e  INTERPLAY OF G l o b a l  AND R e g i o n a l  R e g i m e s  
308 (Olav Schram Stokke, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
358 Id. at 323.
359 Id. at 315.
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The new legal framework provided by the Fish Stocks Treaty raises hope and 
uncertainty for the future of CCAMLR. How will the Fish Stocks Treaty change the
balance of influence between coastal and flag states in Toothfish management?361 On a 
positive note, even before the Fish Stocks Treaty entered into force it arguably advanced 
Toothfish management by strengthening port state responsibilities and encouraging an
"IfS)
improved documentation scheme. If the Fish Stocks Treaty proves to be a major step 
forward in fisheries law, it might be easier for CCAMLR members to achieve consensus 
on matters, such as enforcement, that are informed by this new legal framework.
Undoubtedly, it is laudable that CCAMLR has demonstrated some institutional 
growth over the years. In addition, the ecosystem approach to conservation and 
management is forward-looking and is probably a harbinger of future regimes. Most 
notably, CCAMLR has had some success in achieving a measure of consensus in its 
regulation and conservation efforts and the veto provision may have encouraged wider 
participation in the regime. On the other hand, evidence of cheating puts consensus 
decision-making in a different light. The extent to which the veto is exercised appears 
secondary in the face of persistent violation of the measures adopted.
360 Id. at 322-323.
361 Id. at 323.
362 Id.
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TVI. The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO)363
Like CCAMLR, SEAFO utilizes both consensus decision-making and a specific 
reservation procedure. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery 
Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean (SEAFO Treaty) entered into force in 2003 
and was established to address the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the 
fishery resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean.364 The process to create SEAFO 
began in 1997 by several coastal states, Angola, Namibia, South Africa and the UK (in 
respect of St. Helena and its dependencies Tristan da Cunha and Ascencion Island), to
' I f L C
improve fisheries management in this specific region. Although the coastal states 
initiated the SEAFO, the participation of distant-water fishing states was a key feature of 
the genesis of the regime. In December 1997, the coastal states presented a draft of initial 
ideas for the formation of the organization to the distant water fishing states of the EC, 
Japan, Norway, the Russian Federation and the US. This was the first “Meeting of 
Coastal States and Other Interested Parties on a Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization for the South East Atlantic.” The draft was the basis for further 
negotiations and the participants met several more times between 1997 and 2001. One 
of the goals of these meetings was to encourage participation by as many interested states
363 The South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization was established by the 2001 Convention on the 
Conservation and Management o f Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic (entered into force April 
13,2003), available at http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/seafo.htm [hereinafter SEAFO Treaty].
364 Id. at art. 2.
365 Andrew Jackson, Developments in the Southeast Atlantic, 1997-1999: Meetings o f  Coastal States and 
Other Interested Parties on a Fisheries Management Organization fo r  the South East Atlantic (the SEAFO 
Process), in Nordquist and Moore, supra note 92, at 56.
366 Andrew Jackson, The Convention on the Conservation and Management o f  Fishery Resources in the 
South East Atlantic Ocean, 2001: an Introduction, 17 IN T’L J. M ARINE &  CO ASTAL L. 33, 35 (2001).
367 Id.
368 Id. at 36.
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as possible; this led to invitations to Ukraine, Iceland, Poland and the Republic of 
Korea.369
As the SEAFO Treaty is a more recent fisheries agreement, UNCLOS, the Fish 
Stocks Treaty and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries heavily 
influenced the objectives of the negotiations. The FAO was not only an observer at 
SEAFO meetings but also provided information about fishing in the area.371
SEAFO is concerned with straddling stocks and stocks found exclusively in the 
high seas. In fact, the SEAFO Treaty is the first to address the status of straddling
3 7 3stocks since the adoption of the Fish Stocks Treaty. SEAFO species include alfonsino, 
orange roughy, armourhead, wreckfish, deepwater hake and red crabs.374 Highly
3 7 c
migratory stocks were not included so as not to overlap with ICCAT.
3 7  c
The principal decision-making body in SEAFO is the Commission. Each party 
to the SEAFO Treaty is automatically a member of the Commission.377 The functions of 
the Commission are, among other things, to: identify conservation and management
3 7 0  3 7 0
needs; formulate and adopt conservation measures; determine TAC and/or levels of
3 8 0  381fishing effort; and determine the nature and extent of participation in fishing. As in
369 Id. For a discussion o f the desire to open SEAFO to as many interested states as possible see id. at 38- 
39.
370 Jackson, supra note 365, at 57.
371 Jackson, supra note 366, at 36.
372 Jackson, supra note 365, at 58.
373 First in on SEAFO Convention, THE NAM IBIA ECONOMIST, June 14, 2002, available at 
http://www.economist.com.na/2002/14june/06-14-06.htm (visited Aug. 1, 2004).
374 Jackson, supra note 365, at 58.
375 Id.
376 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 363, at art. 6.
377 Id. at art. 6(1).
378 Id. at art. 6(3)(a).
379 Id. at art. 6(3)(b).
380 Id. at art. 6(3)(c).
381 Id. at art. 6(3)(d).
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other regimes, a Scientific Committee assists the Commission in its work.382 A 
Compliance Committee provides the Commission with information, advice and 
recommendations on implementation and compliance with conservation and management 
measures. In addition to coordinating compliance activity, the Compliance 
Committee coordinates with the Scientific Committee on matters of common concern.385 
Typical of fishery regimes, the other bodies are assisted by a Secretariat.386
The SEAFO Treaty adopts both decision-making by consensus and a specific 
reservation provision. The veto provision is found in Article 17 and is reproduced in full 
in chapter 1,387
To summarize the key features, Article 17 requires that decisions of the SEAFO 
Commission on matters of substance be made by the consensus of members present.388 
The question of whether a matter is one of substance is treated as a matter of
i o q
substance. Decisions on non-substantive matters are taken by simple majority of the 
members present and voting.390
Regional economic integration organizations (i.e., EU) have only one vote.391 The 
SEAFO veto prevents coastal states from being out-voted by distant-water fishing states.
382 Id. atari. 10.
383 Id. at art. 9(2).
384 Id. at art. 9(3)(a).
385 Id. at art. 9(3)(b).
386 A/, a tart.ll.
387 Article 17 o f the SEAFO Treaty is reproduced in full in chapter 1, supra note 198. A similar decision­
making model requiring consensus on “important” matters and a simple majority on all other matters is 
found not only in several treaties discussed in this thesis but also in the Convention for the Conservation o f  
Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean, Feb. 11, 1992, 22 Law OF SEA BULL. 21 (1993), available 
at North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission website, Convention, http://www.npafc.org (visited May 
31, 2005). The North Pacific Anadromous Stocks Convention is not analyzed in this thesis because it 
prohibits directed fishing. Id. at art. 111(a).
88 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 363, at art. 17(1).
389 Id.
390 Id. at art. 17(2).
391 Id. at art. 17(3).
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This highlights the different perspectives held about fishery conservation and
management and the difficulty of reconciling those interests in a treaty regime. On a
functional level, the veto protects coastal states on questions of allocation.
The specific reservation provision that backs up the consensus decision-making
requirement is Article 23, entitled “Implementation,” provides:
1. Conservation and management and control measures 
adopted by the Commission shall become binding on the 
Contracting Parties in the following manner:
(a) the Executive Secretary shall notify promptly in writing 
all Contracting Parties of such a measure following its 
adoption by the Commission;
(b) the measure shall become binding upon all Contracting 
Parties 60 days after notification by the Secretariat of the 
measure's adoption by the Commission, pursuant to 
subparagraph (a), unless otherwise specified in the 
measure;
(c) if a Contracting Party, within 60 days following the 
notification specified in subparagraph (a), notifies the 
Commission that it is unable to accept a measure, that 
measure shall not, to the extent stated, be binding upon that 
Contracting Party; however, the measure shall remain 
binding on all other Contracting Parties unless the 
Commission decides otherwise;
(d) any Contracting Party which makes a notification under 
subparagraph (c) shall at the same time provide a written 
explanation of its reasons for making the notification and, 
where appropriate, its proposals for alternative measures 
which the Contracting Party is going to implement. The 
explanation shall specify inter alia whether the basis for the 
notification is that:
(i) the Contracting Party considers that the measure is 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Convention;
(ii) the Contracting Party cannot practicably comply with 
the measure;
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(iii) the measure unjustifiably discriminates in form or in 
fact against the Contracting Party; or
(iv) other special circumstances apply;
(e) the Executive Secretary shall promptly circulate to all 
Contracting Parties details of any notification and 
explanation received in accordance with subparagraphs (c) 
and (d);
(f) in the event that any Contracting Party invokes the 
procedure set out in subparagraphs (c) and (d), the 
Commission shall meet at the request of any other 
Contracting Party to review the measure. At the time of 
such a meeting and within 30 days following the meeting, 
any Contracting Party shall have the right to notify the 
Commission that it is no longer able to accept the measure, 
in which case that Contracting Party shall no longer be 
bound by the measure; and
(g) pending the conclusions of a review meeting called in 
accordance with subparagraph (f), any Contracting Party 
may request an ad hoc expert panel established in 
accordance with Article 24 to make recommendations on 
any interim measures following the invocation of the 
procedures pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d) which 
may be necessary in respect of the measure to be reviewed. 
Subject to paragraph 3, such interim measures shall be 
binding on all Contracting Parties if all Contracting Parties 
(other than those who have indicated that they are unable to 
accept the measure, pursuant to subparagraphs (c) and (d)) 
agree that the long term sustainability of the stocks covered 
by this Convention will be undermined in the absence of 
such measures.
2. Any Contracting Party which invokes the procedure set 
out in paragraph 1 may at any time withdraw its 
notification of non-acceptance and become bound by the 
measure immediately if it is already in effect or at such 
time as it may come into effect under this article.
3. This article is without prejudice to the right of any 
Contracting Party to invoke the dispute settlement 
procedures set out in Article 24 in respect of a dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention, in the event that all other methods to settle the
229
dispute, including the procedures set out in this article, 
have been exhausted.3 2
Article 23 is one of the most sophisticated exemptive provisions considered in this
thesis. Some of its elements are similar to the specific reservation provision of other
treaties but it is more thoughtful in its approach. To summarize its key feature, Article
23(1) provides for the conditions under which conservation, management and control
measures are binding. When a measure is adopted the Executive Secretary notifies the
parties in writing.393 The measure becomes binding on all partied 60 days hence,394 unless
within the 60 days a party serves notice that it is unable to accept the measure.395 Where a
party notifies SEAFO that it is unable to accept the measure it must provide a written
explanation of its reasons, and, where appropriate, its proposals for alternate measures
that it will implement in its place.396
Article 23(l)(d) enumerates four possible reasons for the objection which the
party must identify in its explanation. These are: (i) whether the party considers the
measure inconsistent with the Convention; (ii) whether the party cannot practicably
comply with the measure; (iii) whether the measure unjustifiably discriminates in form or
in fact against the party; or, (iv) other special circumstances that apply. When the
Secretariat receives the notification and explanation of non-acceptance it is circulated to
the other parties.397 At that point, any other party may request that SEAFO convene to
review the measure.398 Pending the results of this meeting any party may request that an
ad hoc panel of experts make recommendations on any interim measures that may be
392 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 363, at art. 23.
393 Id. at art. 23(1 )(a).
394 Id. at art. 23(1 )(b).
395 Id. at art. 23(1 )(c).
396 Id. at art. 23(1 )(d).
397 Id. at art. 23(1 )(e).
398 Id. at art. 23(1 )(f).
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appropriate following a notification of non-acceptance by a member.399 If all parties, 
other than those that did not accept the measure, agree that long-term sustainability of the 
stocks would be undermined without the measure, then the interim measures are binding 
on all states.400
Article 23(l)(d)(iv), “other special circumstances” deserves additional comment. 
This provision recognizes that a complete list of acceptable reasons for non-acceptance 
could not be enumerated at the time of the drafting. The nature of “special 
circumstances” is necessarily subjective. Apart from the ability of the other members to 
use their collective will to block the reservation, the good faith of a state invoking 
“special circumstances” could be challenged in the SEAFO Treaty’s dispute settlement 
procedures. In addition, Article 14, entitled “Flag State duties” potentially limits the 
freedom of action of states objecting to a conservation or management measure. For 
example, a party required to “take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that 
vessels flying its flag comply with the conservation and management and control 
measures adopted by the Commission and that they do not engage in any activities which 
undermine the effectiveness o f  such measures.”401
The overall importance of what Article 23 attempts to do cannot be 
overemphasized. It not only provides guidelines to states on when non-acceptance of a 
conservation or management measure may be appropriate but it also subjects objections 
by individual states to the specific consent of each other member. On its face, it would 
seem to demonstrate an abundance of caution about the exercise of the exemptive 
provision; however, like CCAMLR, the possibility of non-acceptance by a party only
399 Id. at art. 23(1 )(g).
400 Id.
401 Id. at art. 14(1) (emphasis added).
231
arises after the measure has been adopted by consensus in the first place. Therefore, the 
need for, and impact of, an objection procedure in a regime requiring consensus decision­
making would seem to be minimal. In essence, it gives members an additional 30 days to 
decide if they still support a particular measure. Even where they choose to exercise this 
option, they must survive the collective judgment of the other members on the necessity 
of an interim measure, if applicable. It seems highly likely that the inclusion of the 
objection procedure provided some comfort to states in the negotiating process but will 
be used little, if at all, and so ultimately not limit the regime in a significant way.
Another important feature of SEAFO is how it affects non-parties. Article 22 
requires parties to seek the cooperation of non-parties whose vessels fish in the 
Convention area.402 Non-parties enjoy benefits from their participation commensurate 
with their level of commitment to the conservation and management measures pertaining 
to the stocks they pursue.403 Parties are permitted to take action consistent with 
international law to deter fishing activities in the SEAFO area that undermine the 
effectiveness of the regime 404 Parties are also encouraged to take action to apply SEAFO 
measures de facto to the greatest extent possible to non-parties fishing in the Convention 
Area.405
Obviously, an evaluation of SEAFO will have to wait until it is able to establish 
itself as a functioning regime. In March 2004, SEAFO held its inaugural meeting in 
Swakopmund, Namibia 406 The permanent Secretariat will be located in Walvis Bay,
402 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 363, at art. 22(1).
403 Id.
404 Id. at art. 22(3).
405 Id. at art. 23(4).
406 See Maggi Barnard, Namibia, EC to H ead Up SEAFO, THE N A M IBIAN, Mar. 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.namibian.com.na/2004/march/national/042ECC3D72.html (visited, Aug. 1, 2004).
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Namibia.407 At the first meeting only basic rules of procedure and organization were 
adopted.408 As the regime begins its work, one feature of SEAFO that warrants attention 
is the potential impact of Article 22: that is, the effect of SEAFO upon non-party fishing 
vessels operating in the Convention area.409 Article 22 is consistent with the best spirit of 
the Fish Stocks Treaty and is similar to other provisions in regional fishery agreements 
(such as Article XII of the Donut Hole Agreement) that attempt to address free-riders. 
These provisions adopt a “carrot and stick” approach and raise as many questions as they 
answer. For example, considering the consensual nature of international law, what 
deterrent measures may members of a fishery organization impose on non-members? 
SEAFO will need to confront these limitations as it proceeds with its work. To the extent 
vetoes provide an inducement to non-member states to join the regime, the impact of 
free-riders is relevant to assessing success.
To return specifically to the matter of the veto and reservation provisions, when 
SEAFO begins to adopt conservation measures, observers concerned about their effects 
need to be alert to several key issues. These include: will the veto provision significantly 
limit the number and quality of measures SEAFO will be able to adopt? Will the veto 
coupled with the objection procedure encourage parties to vote in favor of conservation 
measures because they retain the option of ultimately not being bound? Will the strict and 
thoughtful requirements of Article 23 for invoking the objection procedure discourage its 
use or at least limit the use of the objection procedure to extreme cases? Will the fact that
407 Id.
408 Id. For a report o f  the first session o f SEAFO held in Swakopmund, Namibia from March 9-13, 2004 see 
http://www.mfmr.gov.na/seafo/articles/Commission_report/Meeting_Report_final_l.pdf (visited Aug. 3, 
2004).
409 SEAFO Signed and Sealed, THE N A M IBIA  ECONOMIST (2001), available at 
http://www.economist.com.na/2001/270401/storyl5.htm (visited Aug. 1, 2004).
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the SEAFO Treaty takes a major step toward applying the regime to non-parties 
encourage wider participation in the regime? Will the presence of two distinct exemptive 
provisions serve as a further inducement to wider treaty participation?
VII. Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean410
The last treaty regime considered in this chapter generally utilizes consensus 
voting for substantive matters but with alternative procedures where consensus cannot be 
obtained. The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Western and Central Pacific 
Treaty) is a new agreement that rests firmly on the framework established by UNCLOS 
and the Fish Stocks Treaty. In fact, it has been characterized as a “direct response” to the 
Fish Stocks Treaty.411 Furthermore, at the negotiating sessions that produced the draft 
convention, NAFO, ICCAT, IATTC, CCSBT, the Donut Hole Agreement and the 
incipient SEAFO all served as precedents.412
410 Convention on the Conservation and Management o f  Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean, 2000 (entered into force, June 19, 2004), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/westpac.htm (visited Sept. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Western and Central 
Pacific Treaty]. As o f  November 2005, the Western and Central Pacific Treaty had 24 parties including an 
arrangement with the fishing entity o f  Chinese Taipei. See Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, Status o f  the Convention at http://www.wcpfc.org (last updated Nov. 18, 2005).
411 Michael W. Lodge, The Draft Convention on the Conservation and Management o f Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, in Nordquist and Moore, supra note 92, at 19. See 
also Transform Aqorau, Tuna Fisheries Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: A Critical 
Analysis o f  the Convention fo r  the Conservation and Management o f  Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean and its Implications fo r  the Pacific Island States, 16 IN T’L J. MARINE &  
COASTAL L. 379 (2001). For a discussion o f how UNCLOS guided Western and Central Pacific governance 
see Martin Tsamenyi & Lara Manarangi-Trott, Role o f  Regional Organizations in Meeting LOS Convention 
Challenges: The Western and Central Pacific Experience, in Elferink & Rothwell, supra note 106, at 187.
412 Lodge, supra note 411, at 23.
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The Western and Central Pacific Treaty entered into force on June 19, 2004413 and 
seeks to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of Western and Central 
Pacific highly migratory fish stocks for present and future generations, in particular for 
human consumption.414 Due to their ecological and geographic vulnerability, the Western 
and Central Pacific Treaty singles out small island developing states for special
415assistance.
As with other fishery treaties, the Western and Central Pacific Treaty establishes a 
regional commission (Commission) to fulfill its objectives.416 The Commission is 
responsible for determining the TAC and total level of fishing effort in the Convention 
area for such highly migratory fish stocks as the Commission may decide.417 The 
Commission may adopt any other conservation and management measures and 
recommendations as may be necessary to ensure the long-term sustainability of those 
stocks 418 The Commission may adopt measures relating to the quantity of any species or 
stocks which may be caught;419 the level of fishing effort;420 limitations of fishing 
capacity, including measures relating to fishing vessel numbers, types and sizes;421 the 
areas and periods in which fishing may occur;422 the size of fish of any species that may
413 See Australian Department o f  Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Commission for the Conservation & 
Management o f Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western & Central Pacific Oceans, Fact Sheet, at 
http://www.affa.gov.au/content/output.cfm?ObjectID=DBOCl 12C-4802-4375-B4F112351E502DE4 
(visited Sept. 18, 2004).
414 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, supra note 410, at Preamble & art. 2.
415 Id at Preamble.
416 Id. at art. 9. The Commission held its first meeting in December 2004. See Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission website, at http://www.wcpfc.org (visited May 10, 2005).
417 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, supra note 410, at art. 10(l)(a).
418 Id.
419 Id. at art. 10(2)(a).
420 Id. at art. 10(2)(b).
421 Id. at art. 10(2)(c).
422 Id. at art. 10(2)(d).
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be harvested;423 the fishing gear and technology which may be used;424 and particular 
regions and subregions.425 The members of the Commission are required to base their 
actions on the best scientific evidence available426 and the precautionary approach.427
To perform its functions the Commission is assisted by two subsidiary bodies: a
428 429Scientific Committee and a Technical and Compliance Committee. These 
committees provide advice and recommendations to the Commission on the matters of 
their respective competence.430 Interestingly, the drafters of the Treaty saw fit to 
encourage these subsidiary bodies to adopt their reports by consensus, if possible 431 
Where they are unable to do so, the report must include the majority and minority views 
and may include differing views expressed by members with regard to any part of the
432report.
The preference for consensus in the work of the subsidiary bodies foreshadows 
the decision-making procedure of the Commission. Article 20 sets forth the elaborate 
decision-making apparatus for the Western and Central Pacific Treaty. Article 20 
provides:
1. As a general rule, decision-making in the Commission 
shall be by consensus. For the purposes of this article,
“consensus” means the absence of any formal objection 
made at the time the decision was taken.
423 Id. at art. 10(2)(e).
424 Id. at art. 10(2)(f).
425 Id. at art. 10(2)(g).
426 Id. at art. 5(b).
427 Id. at art. 5(c).
428 See id. at art. 12.
429 See id. at art. 14.
430 Id. at art. 11(1).
431 Id. at art. 11(4).
432 , ,
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2. Except where this Convention expressly provides that a 
decision shall be made by consensus, if all efforts to reach a 
decision by consensus have been exhausted, decisions by 
voting on questions of procedure shall be taken by a 
majority of those present and voting. Decisions on 
questions of substance shall be taken by a three-fourths 
majority of those present and voting provided that such 
majority includes a three-fourths majority of the members 
of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and 
voting and a three-fourths majority of non-members of the 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and voting 
and provided further that in no circumstances shall a 
proposal be defeated by two or fewer votes in either 
chamber. When the issue arises as to whether a question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one 
of substance unless otherwise decided by the Commission 
by consensus or by the majority required for decisions on 
questions of substance.
3. If it appears to the Chairman that all efforts to reach a 
decision by consensus have been exhausted, the Chairman 
shall fix a time during that session of the Commission for 
taking the decision by a vote. At the request of any 
representative, the Commission may, by a majority of those 
present and voting, defer the taking of a decision until such 
time during the same session as the Commission may 
decide. At that time, the Commission shall take a vote on 
the deferred question. This rule may be applied only once 
to any question.
4. Where this Convention expressly provides that a 
decision on a proposal shall be taken by consensus and the 
Chairman determines that there would be an objection to 
such proposal, the Commission may appoint a conciliator 
for the purpose of reconciling the differences in order to 
achieve consensus on the matter.
5. Subject to paragraphs 6 and 7, a decision adopted by the 
Commission shall become binding 60 days after the date of 
its adoption.
6. A member which has voted against a decision or which 
was absent during the meeting at which the decision was 
made may, within 30 days of the adoption of the decision 
by the Commission, seek a review of the decision by a
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review panel constituted in accordance with the procedures 
set out in Annex II to this Convention on the grounds that:
(a) the decision is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Convention, the Agreement or the 1982 Convention; or
(b) the decision unjustifiably discriminates in form or in 
fact against the member concerned.
7. Pending the findings and recommendations of the review 
panel and any action required by the Commission, no 
member of the Commission shall be required to give effect 
to the decision in question.
8. If the review panel finds that the decision of the 
Commission need not be modified, amended or revoked, 
the decision shall become binding 30 days from the date of 
communication by the Executive Director of the findings 
and recommendations of the review panel.
9. If the review panel recommends to the Commission that 
the decision be modified, amended or revoked, the 
Commission shall, at its next annual meeting, modify or 
amend its decision in order to conform with the findings 
and recommendations of the review panel or it may decide 
to revoke the decision, provided that, if so requested in 
writing by a majority of the members, a special meeting of 
the Commission shall be convened within 60 days of the 
date of communication of the findings and 
recommendations of the review panel.433
Article 20 begins with a clear expression of the treaty’s preference for consensus
in decision-making.434 It then goes on to define “consensus” as the absence of any formal
objection at the time the decision was taken.435 Except where the treaty specifically
requires consensus, when attempts to reach consensus are exhausted decisions are taken
by contingent means.436 Before this is explored, it is useful to review those instances
where the Western and Central Pacific Treaty requires consensus. These include the
433 Id. at art. 20.
434 Id. at art. 20(1).
435 Id.
436 Id. at art. 20(2).
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adoption and amendment of rules of procedure at meetings.437 Decisions relating to the 
allocation of TAC, the total fishing effort and the exclusion of vessel types also require
438consensus. In addition, a subsidiary committee established to make conservation 
recommendations to the Commission concerning an area north of the 20° parallel of north 
latitude must do so by consensus 439 The Commission must adopt and amend financial 
regulations by consensus440 as well as various matters of the budget.441 Perhaps most 
importantly, decisions about the accession of new members,442 the adoption of, and 
amendments to, Annexes443 and amendments to the treaty444 all require consensus.
Apart from these issues, when the Commission is unable to take its decisions by 
consensus it may do so by simple majority vote of those present and voting for 
procedural matters and by a three-fourths majority of those present and voting on 
substantive matters.445 When questions arise as to whether a matter is one of substance or 
procedure, this is treated as one of substance unless either the Commission decides by 
consensus, or the three-fourths majority required for substantive decisions, decides that it 
is not.446
437 Id. at art. 9(8).
438 Id. at art. 10(4).
439 Id. at art. 11(7).
440 Id. at art. 17(2).
441 See id. at art. 18.
442 Id. at art. 35(2).
443 Id. at art. 41(2).
444 Id. at art. 40(2).
445 Id. at art. 20(2). The three-fourth majority must include a three-fourths majority o f the members of the 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency present and voting as well as a three-fourths majority o f non­
members o f that organization. Id. With respect to both voting chambers, proposals cannot be defeated by 
two or fewer votes. Id. The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency is an organization that provides 
technical advice about fisheries matters to its member countries. See Pacific Islands Forum Fishery Agency 
website, at http://www.ffa.int/www/index.cfm (visited Sept. 19, 2004). In general, members o f the South 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency are the coastal states o f the Convention area, while non-members comprise 
distant-water fishing states.
446 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, supra note 410, at art. 20(2).
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When it appears to the chair of the Commission that consensus cannot be reached, 
the Chair must fix a time for a vote.447 One time only, the vote may be deferred to a point 
later in the session, if a member so requests, and, if a majority of the Commission votes 
to do so.448 For those matters where the treaty expressly provides for a decision by 
consensus, if the Chair concludes there will be an objection, the Commission may 
appoint a conciliator to try to reconcile the differences in order to salvage consensus.449
Ordinarily, decisions adopted by the Commission become binding on the 
members 60 days after they are adopted.450 In those cases where a decision is adopted not 
by consensus but by majority or super-majority vote, and a member votes against the 
measure, or where a member is absent from the meeting where a measure is adopted, that 
member may seek a review of the decision within 30 days of the date of adoption.451 
Annex II of the treaty provides for review by specially constituted panels.452 The only 
grounds for the review are: a) that the decision is inconsistent with Western and Central 
Pacific Treaty, the Fish Stocks Treaty or UNCLOS;453 or b) the decision unjustifiably 
discriminates in form or in fact against the member seeking review.454 Until the review 
panel issues its findings and recommendations, no Commission member is required to 
give effect to the decision.455
447 Id. at art. 20(3).
448 Id.
449 Id. at art. 20(4).
450 Id. at art. 20(5).
451 Id. at art. 20(6).
452 Id. Annex II, entitled “Review Panel” sets forth the composition and function o f the panels referred to in 
Art. 20(6). A review panel consists o f  three fishery experts. Id. at Annex II(2)(a). Decisions by the review 
panel are by majority vote. Id. at Annex 11(8).
453 Id. at art. 20(6)(a).
454 Id. at art. 20(6)(b).
455 Id. at art. 20(7).
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If the review panel finds that the Commission’s decision does not need to be 
modified, amended or revoked, the decision becomes binding on all members 30 days 
from the date the findings and recommendations of the review panel are communicated 
by the Executive Director.456 On the other hand, if the review panel recommends that the 
decision be modified, amended or revoked, at the next annual meeting the Commission 
must modify or amend the decision to conform to the findings and recommendation of 
the review panel.457 In the alternative, it may revoke the decision.458 If the Commission 
revokes the decision, however, it must, if requested in writing by a majority of members, 
convene a special meeting within 60 days of the date the review panel’s findings and 
recommendations are communicated.459 This offers a final attempt to salvage the 
measure.
Although Article 20 sets forth highly elaborate decision-making procedures, the 
Western and Central Pacific Treaty does not permit reservations or exceptions of any 
kind 460 Even so, as in UNCLOS, the bar to reservations does not prohibit members, at 
the time they become bound by the treaty, from issuing declarations and statements with 
a view to harmonizing their domestic laws with the treaty.461
Japan and other distant water fishing states were uneasy about the decision­
making procedure in light of the wide purview of the Commission on matters of 
conservation and management.462 Accordingly, at the final round of negotiations Japan
456 Id. at art. 20 (8 ).
457 Id. at art. 20 (9 ).
458 Id.
459 Id.
460 Id. at art. 37.
461 Id. at art. 38.
462 Laurence C ordonnery, A Note on the 2000 Convention fo r  the Conservation and Management o f  Tuna in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean , 33 OCEAN D e v . & INT’L L. 1, 5 (2002).
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and Korea sought to introduce an “opt out” procedure.463 The coastal states represented 
by the Forum Fishery Agency (FFA) strenuously opposed the inclusion of an objection 
procedure citing, among other things, that the question of quota allocations required 
consensus.464 The language of Article 20 represents a compromise reached at the last 
negotiating session to obtain the consent of Japan and Korea.465 Despite this, Japan and 
Korea voted against the Western and Central Pacific Treaty although both ultimately 
acceded.466
The decision-making apparatus of the Commission has been described by Michael
Lodge, the Secretary of the Multilateral High-Level Conference (MHLC) that produced
the treaty, as “without doubt the most controversial and innovative provisions” of the
regime.467 Commenting upon the draft Convention, Lodge notes the significance of the
decision-making mechanism and what it was intended to achieve:
The procedure that has been developed in article 20 . . . 
reflects the generally accepted view at MHLC that there 
must be recourse to a prompt and effective procedure 
for decision-making, which would avoid the possibility 
of deadlock on important and urgent conservation and 
management issues. . . . The objective of the scheme that 
has been proposed is to remove the traditional “opt-out” 
provision which is found in many existing fisheries 
agreements and which effectively permits States 
unilaterally to undermine the conservation and management 
measures agreed on by the majority.468
463 Id.
464 Id. For additional background, including the dispositions o f key players and a discussion o f other issues 
addressed in the negotiation o f  the Western and Central Pacific Treaty, see Violanda Botet, Filling in One 
o f  the Last Pieces o f  the Ocean: Regulating Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, 41 Va. J. 
INT’LL. 7 8 7 (2 0 0 1 ) .
465 Cordonnery, supra note 462, at 5.
466 Id. Korea acceded on October 26, 2004 and Japan acceded on July 8, 2005. See Western and Central 
Pacific Fishery Commission website, Status o f the Convention at http://www.wcpfc.org (visited June 21, 
2006).
467 Lodge, supra note 411, at 25.
468 Id. at 25-26.
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Lodge also emphasizes “that traditional decision-making procedures such as 
objection or consensus procedures, without adequate dispute settlement procedures, have 
rendered a number of fisheries organizations ineffective or have left member States no 
other course but to take unilateral enforcement action.”469 To this end the Western and 
Central Pacific Treaty incorporates the dispute settlement mechanism of the Fish Stocks 
Treaty.470
The Western and Central Pacific Treaty sets forth a very complex procedure for 
decision-making which does a great deal to facilitate consensus. It is significant that the 
treaty provides for the assistance of a conciliator and the guidance of a review panel 
when faced with deadlocked decision-making and objection by a Commission member. 
These achieve the objective of creating a decision-making structure that is an alternative 
to a reservation/objection procedure. Even though the Western and Central Pacific Treaty 
requires consensus for important decisions, it is more utilitarian than the simple “veto” 
found in the older treaties discussed in this chapter. Such treaties are ultimately restricted 
by the lowest common denominator phenomenon where a single member can derail a 
carefully crafted conservation or management measure. The Western and Central Pacific 
Treaty offers additional opportunities to achieve consensus and meet the needs of 
reluctant states. Such a decision-making structure surely offers a glimpse of the future of 
marine conservation regimes.
469 Id. at 25.
470 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, supra note 410, at art. 31.
243
Conclusions
The veto provisions considered in this chapter demonstrate certain realities about 
the regimes that utilize them. First, they prevent any conservation or management 
measure from being imposed on an unwilling participant. Second, the measures that are 
adopted must be fashioned at the “lowest common denominator” of the parties’ interests 
in order to be acceptable to all members. Even at this level, there are likely significant 
tradeoffs in the negotiation process in order to achieve consensus. The extent to which 
this actually occurs, however, is uncertain. This is because details surrounding decision­
making are scarce in those regimes requiring consensus or unanimity. Specifically, the 
official reports of those regimes typically do not contain much information about 
conservation measures that are considered, but never adopted.
Two regimes, the CCSBT and the IATTC, demonstrate that highly contentious 
disputes can arise and fester where agreement on key matters of resource utilization 
cannot be achieved. In particular, the SBT dispute flowed directly from deadlocked 
decision-making in the CCSBT. On the other hand, the requirement of consensus or 
unanimity is in all probability necessary to attract states with divergent and competing 
views into the regime in the first place. This was clearly the case in the Donut Hole 
Agreement. In that regime the coastal states, Russia and the US, wanted the veto so that 
they would not be out-voted by distant water fishing states. Conversely, the distant water 
fishing states successfully bargained to make the veto available to all members, not just 
the coastal states. At a minimum, this suggests that regimes utilizing decision-making by
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consensus or unanimity should also have a provision for addressing deadlocks as well as 
a dispute settlement mechanism.
CCAMLR and SEAFO are particularly relevant because they utilize specific 
reservations in addition to decision-making by consensus. This effectively creates a 
“double veto” in the regime. This has the effect of giving states a second look at a 
conservation or management measure to decide if they wish to be bound by it. In these 
regimes, the measure will bind all parties except those that object to it. The double veto 
allows any state that is content to have others bound by a measure, support the measure in 
the first instance, but then exempt itself from compliance. Accordingly, a state that 
exercises a double veto in this way may be considered a free-rider of sorts.
SEAFO is significant in that it provides for interim measures in the face of 
objections. These interim measures bind all states, even an objecting state, if all other 
parties agree that the long-term sustainability of stocks will be threatened without them. 
This process effectively subjects an exemption by one state to the specific consent of 
every other state in the regime. SEAFO is also noteworthy in that it requires states to 
come forward with a reason for its exemption and a possible alternative conservation plan 
to compensate for the extra consumption allowed by the exemption. As noted in chapter 
2, this strategy for dealing with exemptive provisions seems to be gaining currency and is 
now applied in NEAFC.
The exemptive provision of NASCO gives states a second look at the measure 
after it has been adopted by unanimous vote, but an objection will veto the measure for 
all parties. This is because the NASCO veto may only be exercised by the state in whose
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waters the measure applies. This reflects the principle that a measure should not apply to 
the waters of a coastal state without its consent.
The Donut Hole Agreement is noteworthy in that it establishes contingent or 
“default” procedures for decision-making when consensus cannot be achieved. Other 
regimes provide for some type of review of those measures where achieving or 
maintaining consensus is problematic. This can take the form of a special meeting (e.g., 
CCAMLR), consideration of an emergency measure (e.g., NASCO) or the assistance of a 
review panel and conciliation (e.g., Western and Central Pacific Treaty).
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the exemptive provisions used by a variety of marine 
agreements and their effect on the work of those regimes. Chapter 4 will discuss key legal 
principles that inform and possibly limit the use of reservations and vetoes in marine 
conservation and resource management treaties.
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Chapter 4
Legal Limitations to the Use of Exemptive Provisions
The emerging body of international environmental law provides a context for the 
use of exemptive provisions that did not exist even a few decades ago. New principles 
concerned with more effective management of living resources, and the rules governing 
the behavior of states within treaty regimes, need to be examined for their potential to 
limit the exercise of reservations and vetoes in conservation and management bodies. 
When evolving concepts in international environmental law are considered alongside 
more traditional principles of treaty law, a legal landscape begins to emerge. This 
landscape suggests certain boundaries to the use of exemptive provisions, that, albeit ill- 
defined, merit consideration. This chapter identifies several of these legal concepts and 
takes a first step toward applying them to the use of exemptive provisions.
While some of these limiting factors, such as the “object and purpose” 
requirement of the Vienna Convention and the Precautionary Approach, have been raised 
earlier, others, such as the “duty to cooperate” and “abuse of rights” are discussed in this 
chapter for the first time. This chapter focuses exclusively on how these factors might 
impact the use of exemptive provisions by state parties. Considering the dearth of state 
practice and scholarly commentary applying these factors to reservations and vetoes the 
discussion often takes place at a theoretical, and sometimes even speculative, level. 
Nevertheless, the ability to identify and work within these limitations is of clear value to
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those seeking to understand the role of exemptive provision in conservation and 
management regimes in the 21st Century.
I. The “Object and Purpose” Requirement
Perhaps the most compelling legal requirement to apply to reservations is found in 
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As noted in chapter 1, the 
requirement that reservations be compatible with the “object and purpose” of the treaty 
from which they arise was first recognized in the Genocide Case and was later codified in 
the Vienna Convention.1 Although Article 19 was clearly intended to apply to general 
reservations the question of its application to specific reservations requires greater 
scrutiny. This section seeks to build upon the earlier discussion of the “object and 
purpose” requirement, and develops the proposition that “object and purpose” is too 
logical not to apply equally to both specific reservations and general reservations. The 
more important question is not whether “object and purpose” applies to specific 
reservations and objections, but rather determining when that threshold is breached and 
the consequences, if any, that flow from such a breach. By any measure, the “object and 
purpose” requirement found in Article 19 is inapplicable to veto provisions. This is 
because vetoes are not reservations at all but rather simple manifestations of voting 
procedures within regimes. On the other hand, to the extent states are expected on a more 
general level to uphold the “object and purpose” of a treaty as a matter of customary law, 
or as a general principle of treaty law, “object and purpose” applies to vetoes as well. The
1 See chapter 1, supra at III.A.3 (“The Requirement that Reservations be Consistent with the ‘Object and 
Purpose’ of the Treaty”).
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extent to which “object and purpose” exists apart from the Vienna Convention will be 
discussed in due course. The appropriate starting point, however, is Article 19 of the 
Vienna Convention.
Even though Article 19 was reproduced earlier in this thesis, a review of its text is 
necessary to understand the analysis that follows. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention 
provides:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified 
reservations, which do not include the 
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty.2
The first noteworthy feature of Article 19 is found in the chapeau. The temporal element 
of when a state is permitted to formulate a reservation is limited to: “signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding” to the treaty. This perhaps suggests that specific 
reservations and objection procedures, formulated in response to ongoing decision­
making within a regime, might be excluded by its own terms from Article 19. 
Furthermore, since “specified reservations” are recognized in Article 19(b), and they are 
separated from the “object and purpose” requirement of Article 19(c) by the conjunction 
“or” does the Vienna Convention imply that “specified reservations” are per se consistent 
with the treaty’s object and purpose? Even more importantly, Article 19(c) provides for 
the “object and purpose” standard to apply “in cases not falling under [subparagraphs] (a)
2 Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 330 (entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1980) (emphasis added).
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and (b)[.]” This, too, indicates that perhaps the “object and purpose” test is meant to 
apply only in cases where the reservation is not specifically provided for in the treaty 
instrument. After all, if the drafters of a treaty saw fit to include specific reservations in 
the decision-making machinery of a regime are they not presumptively legitimate vis-a- 
vis Article 19?4
To further complicate the applicability of the Vienna Convention to specific 
reservations, one might look at a truly fundamental requirement of its application: the 
Vienna Convention clearly sets out in Article 1 that it “applies to treaties between 
states.”5 Since a conservation and management decision of an international organization 
(i.e., fishery organization, COP or commission) is not per se a treaty, but rather pursuant 
to a treaty mandate should a reservation to such a decision fall outside the requirements 
of the Vienna Convention at the threshold? Applying nothing more than the definition of 
“treaty,” the answer is probably that, in a very strict sense, a specific reservation to a 
conservation or management decision falls outside of the requirements of Article 19. This 
is because the reserving state does not agree with the measure; therefore the definition of 
“treaty” found in Article 2(1) does not apply. Despite this, the object and purpose 
requirement does apply to the behavior of states in relation to the objectives of the 
underlying treaty, and for the reasons developed below, one may conclude that the 
“object and purpose” requirement applies to specific reservations.
3 Id. at art. 19(c) (emphasis added).
4 See Howard S. Schiffinan, Reservations in Marine Environmental Treaties: Practical Observations and 
Legal Limitations, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2005).
5 Following Article 1, Article 2(1 )(a) then proceeds to define “treaty” as “an international agreement 
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” Vienna 
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2(1 )(a).
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If in the strictest sense Article 19 of the Vienna Convention does not apply to 
specific reservations, how then are specific reservations governed by “object and 
purpose”? To begin, international legal scholars often assert that key principles of treaty 
law set forth in the Vienna Convention, including those applying to reservations, are not 
only conventional law but customary law as well.6 In this case, that argument is 
satisfactory only to a limited degree. This is because some of the same questions about 
the application of Article 19 outlined above would also apply if the substance of Article 
19 were applied as custom. The better argument is that the “object and purpose” 
requirement is in reality far broader and deeper than the language of Article 19. In fact, it 
governs the behavior of states vis-a-vis their treaties generally, not simply with regard to 
reservations.
To address the discrete question of whether or not the Vienna Convention applies 
to specific reservations is to squarely face the temporal limitation in the chapeau of 
Article 19. Those who would automatically apply the requirements of Article 19 to all 
reservations of any stripe need to contend with this obstacle. On the other hand, while 
this may raise a question about the direct applicability of Article 19 to certain reservation 
provisions, it does not diminish the applicability of “object and purpose” as an important 
principle of treaty law to be respected at all times. This temporal element may be a more 
or less procedural mechanism to fix the timeline for acceptance or objection of the
6 See Alain Pellet, Special Rapporteur, First Report on the Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to 
Treaties, Int’l Law Comm., 47th Sess., at para. 157, A/CN.4/470 (1995); see also Alexander Gillespie, 
Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EUR. J. IN T’L L. 977, 987 (2003) 
(concluding that the reservation provisions o f the Vienna Convention apply to the behavior o f ICRW 
parties by virtue o f their status as customary law). Further evidence o f the widespread acceptance o f the 
“object and purpose” standard is that the draft articles o f the Vienna Convention contained virtually the 
identical language to that ultimately adopted in Article 19. See S h a b t a i  R o s e n n e , T h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t i e s : 
A G u id e  t o  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  V i e n n a  C o n v e n t i o n  174 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana 
Publications, 1970).
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reservation by other states. Furthermore, simply because the “object and purpose” 
standard is recognized in an article containing a temporal element does not mean that it 
does not also exist apart for that temporal element.
A wider reading of the Vienna Convention helps to illustrate why the “object and 
purpose” standard rises to the level of customary law and need not be confined by the 
temporal limitation of the Article 19 chapeau, or to general reservations. The Vienna 
Convention provides in several different articles, not simply those pertaining to 
reservations, that state parties must act at all times in accordance with a treaty’s object 
and purpose. Article 18, for example, obliges states which have signed a treaty “to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” before it enters into
Q
force. Similarly, Article 41 provides that two or more parties to a multilateral treaty may 
modify the agreement as between themselves in certain cases but only where such 
modification “does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with 
the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.”9 Even more 
well known is Article 31 which provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in light of its object and purpose.”10
Reinforcing the “object and purpose” standard is the legal principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. Like “object and purpose,”pacta sunt servanda is recognized in the Vienna 
Convention. Article 26 provides: “[ejvery treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
7 Specifically, Article 20(5) provides for a 12 month time-frame in which other states may raise an 
objection to a reservation. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20(5). This runs from either the date of 
notification of the reservation or the date the reserving state expressed its consent to bound, whichever is 
later. Id.
8 Id. at art. 18 (emphasis added).
9 Id. at art. 41(l)(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
10 Id. at art. 31(1) (emphahsis added).
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and must be performed by them in good faith.”11 Like the “object and purpose” standard,
although pacta sunt servanda is recognized in the Vienna Convention, it clearly exists
apart from it. Pacta sunt servanda has been described as “one of the oldest principles of
international law . . .  it guarantees to states the right to conclude treaties with binding 
1 0effect.” The legal covenant of good faith is so ubiquitous that it goes beyond a general 
principle of law -  it is a foundation of international law.
Accordingly, states attempting reservations, either general or specific, should not 
be able to invoke technical readings of the Vienna Convention’s syntax to avoid the 
“object and purpose” requirement. In short, whether “object and purpose” applies to 
specific reservations by operation of the Vienna Convention, or by operation of 
customary international law, the logical result is that it applies and all reservations, be 
they general or specific, should be judged by this meaningful, if not entirely functional, 
standard of treaty law.
Perhaps the most instructive case study that raised the question of the status of 
specific reservations vis-a-vis the “object and purpose” requirement is the objection 
procedure of the ICRW. As noted in chapter 2, a striking feature of Article V(2)(a) of the 
ICRW is that it describes amendments to the Schedule adopted by the IWC to be “such as
are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to provide
1 ^for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of whale resources; . . .” If 
Schedule amendments are defined as necessary to carry out the “objectives and purposes” 
of the ICRW, then the exemptive mechanism is curious. That is, the ability to opt out of
11 Id. at art. 26.
12 Ja m e s  R. Fox, D i c t i o n a r y  o f  In t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  C o m p a r a t i v e  L a w  237 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
Oceana Publications, 1997).
13 International Convention for the Regulation o f Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 
(entered into force Nov. 10, 1948), at art V(2)(a) (emphasis added).
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Schedule amendments seems to go directly against the mandate that reservations be 
consistent with the “object and purpose” of the treaty. This is especially so since the 
ICRW places no restrictions on the right of states to object to Schedule amendments.
A scholarly analysis by Alexander Gillespie considered the status of the Vienna 
Convention’s reservations provisions and their applicability to the IWC.14 He cautiously 
concluded that the Vienna Convention’s rules applied as a matter of customary law and 
provided the appropriate framework to address reservation issues.15 Gillespie’s view is 
supportable in both theory and practice. Even so, as developed above, the “object and 
purpose” requirement has a broader scope than that found in Article 19(c) of the Vienna 
Convention.
Might one argue that all reservations pursuant to V(3) of the ICRW are 
inconsistent with the “objectives and purposes” of V(2)(a)? This is fanciful considering 
the drafters obviously saw fit to permit reservations to Schedule amendments in the very 
same article of the treaty. On the other hand, a pattern of reservations directed at one or 
more endangered or over-exploited species might run afoul of the “objectives and 
purposes” requirement of Article V(2)(a).
To ask state parties to respect the “object and purpose” of a treaty is as much a 
matter of common sense as legal doctrine. It naturally follows the general principle that 
law is binding. Could any jurist or scholar ever reasonably conclude that a reservation, be 
it general or specific, would be permissible where it offends the stated objectives and 
recognized purposes of its treaty? The question is rhetorical.
14 Alexander Gillespie, Iceland’s Reservation at the International Whaling Commission, 14 EU R . J. INT’L L. 
977,986-998 (2003).
15 Id. at 988. “Working upon the assumption that the [Vienna Convention] represents the customary 
international law on reservations, it is now appropriate to work through the [Vienna Convention], with 
regard to Iceland’s attempted reservation.” Id. at 988.
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In the case of specific reservations, where they are provided for in a treaty 
instrument, it is reasonable to presume at the threshold that their exercise is consistent 
with object and purpose. This presumption, however, should be rebuttable by scientific 
evidence that greater consumption or trade rendered permissible by the reservation is 
potentially harmful to the conservation objective. Applying a rebuttable presumption, 
which is an evidentiary standard well known in common law,16 gives credence to the fact 
that drafters saw fit to include specific reservations as a legitimate part of the regime yet 
still allow for scrutiny under an object and purpose analysis. A rebuttable presumption is 
even more desirable considering the “object and purpose” test, however necessary, can be 
amorphous to apply in practice.
Moving beyond the conclusion that the exercise of all exemptive provisions must 
respect the “object and purpose” of its treaty, one is left with the far more daunting task 
of applying the “object and purpose” test on an operational level. After all, neither the 
Genocide Case nor the Vienna Convention provides a functional test to determine “object
1 7and purpose” and most scholars would agree the concept itself lacks precise definition. 
This issue is rendered even more problematic when the “object and purpose” test is 
applied as customary law as opposed to operation of the Vienna Convention. This is 
because one cannot automatically assume that the contours of the customary standard are 
identical to those of the Vienna Convention.
16 See Je r o m e  P r i n c e , R i c h a r d s o n  o n  E v i d e n c e  § 58 (10th ed., Brooklyn, N.Y.: Brooklyn Law School, 
1973).
17 In fact, when the ICJ decided the Genocide Case, the notion of “object and purpose” was criticized for its 
“uncertainty and subjectivity.” See Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on 
Reservations to General Multilateral Treaties, 64 BRIT. Y .B .  INT’L L. 245,251 (1993).
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Undoubtedly, any attempt to apply the “object and purpose” standard to a
contentious question of treaty interpretation is highly complex and would raise as many
questions as it answered. Jan Klabbers observes:
While identifying a treaty’s object and purpose may well 
be “the heart of the matter”, before approaching the 
identification of a given treaty’s object and purpose 
several preliminary questions of a more or less 
methodological nature must be asked and answered.
Are object and purpose notions which can be viewed in 
isolation, or are they to be studied and interpreted as one 
single notion? Does the term “object and purpose”, 
with respect to a given treaty, always mean the same thing?
Does the object and purpose of a treaty include the object 
and purpose of individual treaty provisions or parts of a 
treaty, or is it limited to the treaty as a whole? How should 
treaties consisting of various interrelated documents be 
regarded? To be sure, these questions are not merely 
academic .. ., they underlie each and every claim made 
in regard to any given treaty’s object and purpose,
1Xalbeit usually only implicitly.
In addition to Klabbers’ questions, in the case of exemptive provisions in marine 
conservation treaties we must ask: under what circumstances would a purported specific 
reservation or objection run afoul of “object and purpose”? Could a state’s veto of a 
conservation measure offend “object and purpose” even if that veto was permissible 
under the decision-making mechanism? Who would make this determination and what 
would be the effect of the violation? Absent a clear record of state practice or scholarly 
commentary addressing these precise questions, they remain theoretical for the time 
being. The review of reservation usage in the earlier chapters, however, offers some 
guidance.
18 Jan K la b b e r s , Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose o f  Treaties, 8  FINNISH Y .B  INT’L L. 
138, 139(1997).
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The objective of conservation, albeit balanced with utilization in most cases, is the 
logical point of departure. Because all regimes under consideration embrace conservation 
as an objective, state behavior that tilts too heavily toward consumption would be 
slighting this important goal. To the extent reservations and vetoes are the vehicle by 
which states seek to exercise their self-styled prerogatives of greater consumption, at the 
expense of conservation, their usage should be subject to scrutiny. In those regimes 
where the conservation objective is clearly superior to that of utilization, such as CITES, 
CMS and CCAMLR to name some notable examples, the exercise of exemptive 
provisions must be viewed with even greater suspicion. Even where exemptive 
mechanisms are provided for in the underlying treaty, they must be exercised with respect 
for the stated objectives of that treaty. To conclude otherwise would elevate the right to 
exercise exemptive provisions above fundamental treaty objectives.
Applying “object and purpose” to vetoes, or even majority voting systems, is 
somewhat more abstract than the case of reservations. This is because the veto, or the 
decisive negative vote, is expressed through a simple vote. However, the same reasoning 
should apply. With both the specific reservation and the veto, the right to exercise the 
exemptive provision in a given circumstance is not in doubt. The more compelling 
question is whether or not the right to a reservation or veto shields the state from 
consequences that might flow from its exercise.
Confining the inquiry to specific reservations for the moment, which entity, if 
any, would be competent to judge their validity? Here too, the Genocide Case and the 
Vienna Convention are instructive. However, unlike the more theoretical question of 
whether or not specific reservations are bound by the “object and purpose” requirement,
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on this issue they are perhaps of more limited value. This is because specific reservations 
differ from general reservations in both time, that is, when they are invoked, and subject 
matter. To underscore this fundamental difference, general reservations, invoked at the 
time a state becomes bound by the treaty, apply only to treaty provisions. Specific 
reservations, by contrast, apply to particular measures adopted by the regime on an 
ongoing basis.
The ordinary mechanisms to judge the compatibility of general reservations do 
not fit as neatly when applied to specific reservations. In the case of general reservations, 
the rules governing how other states in a regime may respond to them are well 
understood. With respect to specific reservations, they are largely undeveloped. To the 
extent a similar legal framework applies to specific reservations, the signs are not 
encouraging at the present time for those who would advocate some type of institutional 
oversight to reservation practice.
The Genocide Case is a useful platform to begin an analysis of what mechanisms, 
if any, exist to judge “object and purpose” in modem treaties. The ICJ reasoned that 
“[t]he appraisal of a reservation and effect of objections that might be made to it depend 
upon the particular circumstances of each individual case.”19 The ability of other states to 
respond to reservations on a case-by-case basis as envisioned by the Genocide Case was 
codified in the Vienna Convention. Interestingly, in the drafting of the Vienna 
Convention, Japan, Philippines and the Republic of Korea proposed that if a majority of 
states objected to a reservation as being incompatible with the object and purpose of the
19 Genocide Case, Advisory Opinion o f28  May 1951. 1951 I.C.J. 15, 26.
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treaty, the reservation would not be effective.20 This approach was rejected21 and the 
extent to which acceptance by other parties is required is set forth in Article 20.
The extent to which Article 20 applies to specific reservations in the first instance 
raises many of the same issues that accompanied the earlier discussion of Article 19. As 
the preceding pages demonstrated, the application of the Vienna Convention to specific 
reservations cannot be taken for granted. If Article 19 does not apply, then Article 20 
would be similarly excluded. On the other hand, to the extent one might seek to subject 
specific reservations to some form of scrutiny by fellow treaty parties, Article 20 is of 
interest. The following analysis proceeds from the assumption that Article 20 applies to 
specific reservations, or at a minimum, provides a useful starting point for a discussion 
about the potential for some form of review. With this caveat, one can examine the 
language of Article 20.
Article 20, entitled, Acceptance of and Objection to Reservations, provides:
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not 
require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting 
States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the 
negotiating States and the object and purpose of a treaty 
that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all 
the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each 
one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires 
acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an 
international organization and unless it otherwise provides, 
a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent 
organ of that organization.22
20 Amendments to Article 16 as a whole, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.370, at para. 6(i).
21 Id. at para. 11(c).
22 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20(1 )-(3). Article 20(4)-(5) have been omitted. Article 20(4) 
applies to those “cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs” and addresses the effect o f other states’ 
acceptance or rejection o f reservations. Since specific reservations are “expressly authorized by a treaty”
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The most relevant paragraph is Article 20(1). Article 20(1) must be accorded 
great respect in determining not only the application of the Vienna Convention to specific 
reservations, but also the extent to which one is able to subject them to an “object and 
purpose” scrutiny. To take Article 20(1) at face value, other states would have little, if 
any, say in determining whether or not specific reservations are compatible with a 
treaty’s object and purpose. By definition, they are “authorized by a treaty” and therefore 
do not require other states to accept them unless otherwise provided by the treaty.
Nevertheless, Article 20(1) does not address a very real possibility: what if other 
states do not accept one or more proposed specific reservations? Both the Genocide Case 
and the Vienna Convention empower the other treaty parties to serve as guardians of the 
“object and purpose” standard. As noted above, this function occurs on a case-by-case 
basis. Can a clear statement of non-acceptance by other state parties overcome Article 
20(1) and subject specific reservations to greater scrutiny? An instructive test case would 
be where a state exercises a specific reservation or objection on a conservation measure 
that all other states in the regime clearly believed was necessary to achieve the 
conservation objective of the underlying treaty. If all other states promptly notify the 
reserving state of their rejection of the reservation, this presumably would create a factual 
and legal condition contrary to that contemplated in Article 20(1). In such case, the 
reserving state should not be allowed to assert that its reservation is valid simply because 
it is authorized by the treaty.
(Art. 20(1)) then Article 20(4) would appear to be inapplicable. Article 20(5) is largely procedural. It 
specifies that for the purposes o f  Article 20(2) and Article 20(4) a state’s reservation is accepted by any 
other state that has not objected to the reservation within a period o f twelve months.
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Article 20(2) seems to apply principally to general reservations, however, it 
recognizes that all states must accept a reservation where there are a limited number of 
negotiating states and such acceptance is necessary to preserve the “object and purpose” 
of the treaty. As Alexander Gillespie notes, Article 20(2) is of restricted application 
because it only addresses treaties with very few parties. Given that specific reservations 
are independently provided for in the text of the treaty, such consensus would seemingly 
not be necessary regardless of the number of parties. On the other hand, Article 20(2) 
highlights the collective interest that state parties have in preserving the “object and 
purpose” of their treaty.
Article 20(3) provides for the role of an international organization to judge the 
acceptability of a reservation where the reservation is addressed to its constituent 
instrument. An obvious hypothetical example of the application of Article 20(3) would be 
if a state sought to exclude or modify a certain provision of the UN Charter when it 
joined the UN. This act would clearly require the acceptance of the General Assembly. 
Here again, the Vienna Convention provision is most applicable to general reservations. 
At the same time, there is no question that marine conservation agreements that create 
decision-making bodies such as fishery commissions are the constituent instruments of 
international organizations. Even though specific reservations are not by themselves 
addressed to the constituent instrument, an interesting question is presented if they 
substantially impact the objectives of the organization. Could a specific reservation, or 
more probably, a pattern of specific reservations, interfere with the conservation 
objective of the organization to a degree where the organization would lawfully be
23 Gillespie, supra note 6, at 992-993. Gillespie observes that Article 20(2) is a “concession within the 
[Vienna Convention] to the traditional rule of reservations in international law” where consent by all other 
parties was required. Id. at 993.
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empowered to judge their acceptability? This question remains theoretical for the time 
being but is not so fanciful considering that, as noted in chapter 1, the ordinary 
mechanism through which state parties judge the “object and purpose” of a proffered 
reservation is either by acceptance or rejection.24 Where the rejection by other states is 
motivated by concern for the treaty’s conservation objective, this might be a basis to 
assail the appropriateness of the reservation and rebut the presumption of its validity. 
Chapter 5 will discuss the potential for collective review of specific reservations within 
treaty regimes.
This section discussed the extremely important, yet poorly defined, “object and 
purpose” standard in treaty law. Despite enormous practical and conceptual difficulties in 
applying the “object and purpose” standard to exemptive provisions, critical observers of 
marine conservation treaties must nevertheless attempt to do so. In the abstract, it is 
impossible to draw a bright line between those exemptive provisions that are valid vis-a- 
vis the “object and purpose” requirement and those that are not. At a minimum, however, 
a consistent pattern of reservations or vetoes allowing a state to consume greater 
quantities of a living resource with a poor conservation status would suggest a violation 
of this very basic and well-accepted, albeit amorphous, standard of treaty law.
Although international organizations and their members clearly have an interest in 
the extent to which specific reservation usage is compatible with the “object and 
purpose” of a treaty’s objectives, at the moment, Article 20(1) would seem to presume 
their validity at the threshold. For the time being this likely precludes direct action by an 
organization, and by individual members within a regime, against the exercise of specific 
reservations in most cases. On the other hand, given the demands of more effective
24 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20(4)(a)-(c).
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resource conservation and management it would be unwise to preclude this possibility as 
the law evolves.
Broadly speaking, unlike general reservations there is no established mechanism 
of any consequence for other state parties, either individually or collectively, to register 
their objection to specific reservation usage. This is because they are specifically 
authorized in the treaty instrument. Even so, Article 20(1) recognizes that treaty 
instruments might provide otherwise. Perhaps this is a signal to the drafters of future 
marine conservation agreements to contemplate some type of institutional oversight to 
regulate specific reservations. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, this is already in place in
? C 'JIL
NEAFC and SEAFO. In the case of vetoes, perhaps some type of fall back decision­
making procedure can be employed when consensus cannot be reached. This, too, as 
noted in chapter 3, is already in place in the Donut Hole Agreement. Certain 
suggestions along these lines will be explored in chapter 5.
II. The Precautionary Approach
One of the most controversial concepts of international environmental law is the 
Precautionary Approach. There is an ever-expanding body of scholarship examining 
Precaution in the various contexts of environmental conservation, including fisheries law, 
but very little that addresses its role in the exercise of exemptive provisions. This is 
understandable in that its status as a legal principle, and the contours of its application, 
are still matters of considerable debate.
25 See chapter 2 supra, at III (NEAFC).
26 See chapter 3 supra, at VI (SEAFO).
27 Id. at IV (Donut Hole Agreement).
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Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration provides an early statement of Precaution:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.
This definition of the Precautionary Approach was endorsed and reiterated verbatim in
the key documents of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in
Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002.29
In its simplest form the Precautionary Approach is a risk management concept. 
Precaution requires actors to proceed carefully and intelligently when faced with 
scientific uncertainty. In addition, they must not allow the fact of that uncertainty from 
standing in the way of proactive conservation measures. Because marine conservation 
regimes manage living resources, many with an undeniably poor conservation status, it is 
easy to appreciate the role of Precaution in decision-making. Chapter 2, for example, 
discussed the impact of scientific uncertainty in NEAFC and the IWC. When one 
considers the importance of scientific data in the decision-making process, for example, 
the setting of catch limits in a fishery, the value of Precaution is apparent. Significantly, 
when Precaution is applied to living resource management, it favors conservation over 
consumption.
To be clear, Precaution is not universally accepted as a valuable tool of 
environmental stewardship. The discussion of the SBT dispute in chapter 3 briefly noted
28 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15, June 14, 1992, 21 I.L.M. 874 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
29 See Report o f the World Summit on Sustainable Development (hereinafter WSSD), para. 109(f), U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF/199/20, available at http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/documents.html 
(visited July 3, 2005); WSSD Plan o f Implementation, para. 109(f), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm (visited July 3, 2005). The 
WSSD is commonly referred to as “Rio+10.”
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the debate over the terms “Precautionary Principle” versus “Precautionary Approach.”30 
This is a reflection of the wider debate over its normative character and the scope of its 
application. As either a Principle or an Approach, Precaution has numerous detractors.
This is understandable in that any fair assessment of Precaution’s many possible
11
applications exposes potential problems, including the potential for abuse. Opponents of 
Precaution argue it unfairly “shifts the burden” to those who seek to utilize a resource to a 
point where they must prove a negative. To its proponents, Precaution helps to 
guarantee that necessary conservation objectives will be respected, especially in light of 
the reckless consumption of the past.
Realistically, there will always be doubts about scientific evidence and 
devastating environmental harm may occur before scientific questions can be resolved. 
Precaution is intended to address risks at a point when they are still manageable, as 
opposed to responding to harm once it has occurred. The necessarily speculative element 
inherent in this approach, particularly its inestimable potential to limit economic activities 
such as commercial fishing, is at the core of the controversy. In considering the role of 
Precaution in environmental decision-making, and the controversy it generates, Nicolas 
de Sadeleer observes: “[djecision-making processes must henceforth take all risks into 
account, whatever their degree of certainty. By leaving behind the realm of rational
30 See chapter 3, supra at Section II, CCSBT.
31 See David Vanderzwaag, The Precautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection: Slippery 
Shores, Rough Seas, and Rising Normative Tides, 33 OCEAN D EV . &  IN T’L L. 165 (2002).
32 See P a u l  D r i e s s e n , E c o - I m p e r i a l i s m : G r e e n  P o w e r , B l a c k  D e a t h  27-28 (Bellevue, WA: Free 
Enterprise Press, 2003); see also Howard S. Schiffinan, The Precautionary Approach at the International 
Tribunal fo r  the Law o f  the Sea: the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, 5 IN T’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL ISSUES 78, 84 
(2005).
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certainty, [Precaution necessarily gives rise to controversy and its practical application to 
conflict.”33
One point of controversy is whether or not Precaution rises to the level of 
customary international law. Proponents of the notion that Precaution is custom can point 
to its presence in a growing number of treaties and soft-law instruments as well as 
numerous examples of precautionary decision-making in domestic environmental 
policy.34 At the same time, opponents can just as easily point to the wide spectrum of 
interpretations attached to the term and the observation that Precaution is perhaps “too 
vague” in both definition and application to be considered custom.35 Even if Precaution 
has not yet acquired the status of customary international law, and this is probably the 
better scholarly conclusion at the present time, it surely seems to be headed in that 
direction.
33 N icolas de  S a d e l e e r , En v ir o n m e n t a l  Prin ciples: Fro m  Political  S lo g a n s to  Leg al  R ules 91 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
34 See The P r e c a u t io n a r y  P rinciple  a n d  In t er n a tio n a l  La w : The Ch allen g e  of Im ple m en t a t io n  
37-49 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds., The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) [hereinafter 
Freestone and Hey]. Precaution has been invoked in a number of key legal cases. In 1995 Judge 
Weeramantry invoked the Precautionary Principle to address “...possible environmental damage o f an 
irreversible nature...” Request for an Examination o f the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 o f the 
Court’s Judgment o f  20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Dissenting Opinion o f  
Judge Weeramantry, 1995 I.C.J. 317, 342-344. In 1998, in the Beef Hormones Case, the Appellate Body of 
the World Trade Organization considered an argument by the EC that the Precautionary Principle was 
already a part o f customary international law. See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), at VI [hereinafter Beef Hormones Case]. In 1999, the 
ITLOS noted the parties to the SBT dispute should act with “prudence and caution” to ensure effective 
conservation o f the stock. Southern Bluefm Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), ITLOS Order o f  
Aug. 27, 1999, Request for Provisional Measures, available at, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (visited 
Dec. 13, 2006).
35 Freestone and Hey, supra note 34, at 36-37. Significantly, in all o f the cases referred to in note 34 supra, 
the actual legal rulings failed to specifically recognize Precaution as part o f customary international law. In 
the Beef Hormones Case, for example, the WTO Appellate Body observed: “Whether [the Precautionary 
Principle] has been widely accepted by Members as a principle o f general or customary international law 
appears less than clear.” B eef Hormones Case, supra note 34, at VI.
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This debate notwithstanding, Precaution is now indisputably a normative factor in 
modem international environmental law. Numerous treaties and other instruments adopt 
it in some form. In the area of marine conservation especially, it is now widely embraced. 
Several key soft law instruments adopt the Precautionary Approach including Agenda
"X 7 o q21 and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. More importantly, recent 
fishery treaties, including SEAFO,39 the Western and Central Pacific Treaty40 and the 
Antigua Convention41 of IATTC, specifically adopt the Precautionary Approach in 
fishery conservation and management. In the case of whales, although the ICRW was 
drafted well before Precaution was introduced as a structured concept, the moratorium 
and the whale sanctuaries developed by the IWC in the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
precautionary in nature.42 CITES embraced the Precautionary Approach by resolution in 
1994 43 NAFO,44 NASCO45 and NEAFC46 have all taken similar action.
36 For an excellent review o f  the history o f Precaution and its present status in international law see A rie 
Tr o u w b o r st , E v o lu tio n  a n d  S t a t u s  of the  Pr e c a u t io n a r y  Principle  in In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  1-54  
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).
37 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 
(vol. II) (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21], available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm (visited June 23, 2005). 
Chapter 17 o f Agenda 21 addresses protection o f the oceans. Paragraphs 17.21-17.22 refer to the 
Precautionary Approach.
38 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (1995) [hereinafter 
Code o f Conduct], available at
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm (visited June 
23, 2005). The Precautionary Approach is addressed in paragraphs 6.5 and 7.5.
39 SEAFO Treaty, (entered into force April 13, 2003), Arts. 3(b) & 7, available at 
http://www.intfish.net/treaties/swafo.htm (visited July 6, 2005).
40 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, 2000 (entered into force, June 19, 2004), Art. 5, available at 
http://www.intfish.net/treaties/westpac.htm (visited July 6, 2005).
41 Antigua Convention, 2003, Art. 4, available at
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf (visited July 2, 2005).
42 See S im on  M a r r , T he Pr e c a u t io n a r y  Principle in the La w  o f the S e a : M o d e r n  D ec isio n  M ak in g  
in In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  149-151 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003).
43 CITES Resolution, Conf. 9.24, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/09/09-24R13.shtml (visited July 
4, 2005). Conf. 9.24 is entitled, “Criteria for Amendments to Appendices I and II.” Annex 4 o f Conf. 9.24 
is “Precautionary measures.”
44 See Report o f NAFO Scientific Council Workshop on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries 
Management March 31-April 4, 2003, available at Scientific Council Reports 2003, 
http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/frames/reports.html (visited June 25, 2006).
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Perhaps no legal instrument embraces the Precautionary Approach as 
meaningfully as the Fish Stocks Treaty. The Fish Stocks Treaty offers a highly developed 
definition of Precaution. Article 6, entitled “Application of the precautionary approach” 
provides:
1. States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to 
conservation, management and exploitation of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to 
protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine 
environment.
2. States shall be more cautious when information is 
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of 
adequate scientific information shall not be used as
a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and 
management measures.
3. In implementing the precautionary approach, States 
shall:
(a) improve decision-making for fishery resource 
conservation and management by obtaining and sharing the 
best scientific information available and implementing 
improved techniques for dealing with risk and uncertainty;
(b) apply the guidelines set out in Annex II and 
determine, on the basis of the best scientific information 
available, stock-specific reference points and the action to 
be taken if they are exceeded;
(c) take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to 
the size and productivity of the stocks, reference points, 
stock condition in relation to such reference points, levels 
and distribution of fishing mortality and the impact of 
fishing activities on non-target and associated or dependent 
species, as well as existing and predicted oceanic, 
environmental and socio-economic conditions; and
45 See Agreement on Adoption o f a Precautionary Approach, NASCO doc. CNL (98)46, available at 
http://www.nasco.int/pdFnasco_res_adoptprec.pdf (visited June 25, 2006); Action Plan for Application o f  
the Precautionary Approach, NASCO doc. CNL (99)48, available at 
http://www.nasco.int/pdPnasco_res_actionplan.pdf (visited June 25, 2006).
46 See NEAFC Press Release, Nov. 21, 2005, available at http://www.neafc.org/news/docs/2005-press- 
release_final.pdf (visited June 25, 2006).
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(d) develop data collection and research programmes to 
assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or 
dependent species and their environment, and adopt plans 
which are necessary to ensure the conservation of 
such species and to protect habitats of special concern.
4. States shall take measures to ensure that, when 
reference points are approached, they will not be exceeded. 
In the event that they are exceeded, States shall, without 
delay, take the action determined under paragraph 3 (b) to 
restore the stocks.
5. Where the status of target stocks or non-target or 
associated or dependent species is of concern, States shall 
subject such stocks and species to enhanced 
monitoring in order to review their status and the efficacy 
of conservation and management measures. They shall 
revise those measures regularly in the light of
new information.
6. For new or exploratory fisheries, States shall adopt as 
soon as possible cautious conservation and management 
measures, including, inter alia, catch limits and effort 
limits. Such measures shall remain in force until there are 
sufficient data to allow assessment of the impact of the 
fisheries on the long-term sustainability of the stocks, 
whereupon conservation and management measures based 
on that assessment shall be implemented. The latter 
measures shall, if appropriate, allow for the gradual 
development of the fisheries.
7. If a natural phenomenon has a significant adverse 
impact on the status of straddling fish stocks or highly 
migratory fish stocks, States shall adopt conservation and 
management measures on an emergency basis to ensure 
that fishing activity does not exacerbate such adverse 
impact. States shall also adopt such measures on an 
emergency basis where fishing activity presents a 
serious threat to the sustainability of such stocks. Measures 
taken on an emergency basis shall be temporary and shall 
be based on the best scientific evidence available.47
47 Fish Stocks Treaty, art.6, openedfor signature Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. G.A. Doc. A/  CONF. 167/37, reprinted 
in 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001).
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The application of the Precautionary Approach, as defined in Article 6, is 
regarded as a “general principle” of the Fish Stocks Treaty.48 As such, it is intended to 
have general application and is therefore not limited to cases of scientific uncertainty.49 
This broader application was not universally accepted in the negotiations of the Fish 
Stocks Treaty but prevailed in the final draft.50 Specifically, both distant water and 
coastal states disagreed about the insertion of the word “widely” to modify the 
application of the Precautionary Approach.51
Several aspects of Article 6 highlight the importance of Precaution to straddling 
and migratory fish stocks. First, 6.1 clearly provides for the Precautionary Approach to 
apply widely to “conservation, management and exploitation.” This signifies that 
Precaution should apply not only to purely conservation-oriented decisions, such as the 
reduction of bycatch, but also to the central issues of resource utilization, such as the 
determination of catch-limits.
Article 6.2 develops the notion of scientific uncertainty by including information 
that is “uncertain, unreliable or inadequate.” Of great significance, Article 6.2 mandates 
that states “shall be more cautious” when they are faced with uncertainty. This 
demonstrates the intention, noted above, to apply Precaution as the norm, not only where 
scientific evidence is questionable.52 Cases of uncertainty warrant an even higher level of 
caution. One observer even suggests that reference to “adequate scientific information,” 
as opposed to the more common “best scientific information available” (appearing, for
48 Id. at art. 5(c).
49 Fr a n c isc o  O r r eg o  V ic u n a , T he C h a n g in g  In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  o f H igh S ea s F isheries 162 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
50 Id.
51 See I n t ’l  I n s t . S u s t a in a b le  D e v ., 7:54 E a r t h  N e g o t ia t io n s  B u l l .  , available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/vol07/0754012e.html (visited July 2, 2005).
52 VICUNA, supra note 49, at 162.
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example, in Article 6.3(a)) signals a less stringent requirement for when Precautionary 
measures should attach. The fact that the Fish Stocks Treaty was adopted by consensus 
underscores this unequivocal statement in support of Precautionary decision-making.54
Apart from the question of uncertainty, Article 6.3(a) seeks to improve decision­
making by mandating that decisions shall be based on the “best scientific information 
available.” Although the issue of the quality of scientific information is intimately bound 
up with Precaution, the requirement to rely upon the “best scientific evidence available” 
can be viewed as a limiting factor in its own right. This will be explored in the next 
section.
Article 6.3(b) of the Fish Stocks Treaty is most intriguing from the standpoint of 
exemptive provisions. This is because it requires states to apply guidelines, set forth in 
Annex II, to determine “stock-specific reference points and the action to be taken if they 
are exceeded.”55 Stock-specific reference points are determined in advance of fishery 
operations and seek to identify the safe biological limits of exploitation that a stock may
53 SADELEER, supra note 33, at 204.
54 See TROUW BORST, supra  note 36, at 77.
55 Annex II elaborates the definition o f stock specific reference points as follows:
1. A precautionary reference point is an estimated value derived 
through an agreed scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state 
o f  the resource and o f  the fishery, and which can be used as a guide for 
fisheries management
2. Two types o f  precautionary reference points should be used: 
conservation, or limit, reference points and management, or target, 
reference points. Limit reference points set boundaries which are 
intended to constrain harvesting within safe biological limits within 
which the stocks can produce maximum sustainable yield. Target 
reference points are intended to meet management objectives.
3. Precautionary reference points should be stock-specific to account, 
inter alia, for the reproductive capacity, the resilience o f each stock and 
the characteristics o f  fisheries exploiting the stock, as well as other 
sources o f  mortality and major sources o f uncertainty.
Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 47, at Annex II, paras. 1-3.
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sustain.56 Considering that reference points inform decisions such as the determination of 
TAC, and the Fish Stocks Treaty contemplates action if those reference points are 
exceeded, the Precautionary Approach implies a limitation on the right of states to opt out 
of each decision. Article 6.4 reinforces the sanctity of stock reference points by requiring 
states to take measures to ensure that when reference points are approached, they are not 
exceeded. When they are exceeded, states must take action “without delay” to restore the 
stocks.
Proponents of objection procedures will no doubt find this reasoning 
unpersuasive. They could argue that where objection procedures in fishery treaties are 
specifically provided for in those agreements, reference points may be exceeded by states 
lawfully invoking those procedures. This argument is not without merit in that an 
objection mechanism specifically provided for in a fishery treaty is the lex specialis and 
therefore should prevail over a possibly inconsistent requirement found in the Fish Stocks 
Treaty. Similarly, one could argue that because 6.3(b) and 6.4 do not directly contravene 
the operation of specific reservation mechanisms then there is no conflict at all. For 
example, it might be possible for a state to invoke a specific reservation in a certain case 
yet still remain true to overall conservation objectives -  perhaps by implementing 
alternative conservation strategies. If so, it would be hard to argue that its conduct 
offends the spirit of Precautionary obligations.
On the other hand, it is undeniable that the Fish Stocks Treaty is intended to 
improve existing practices in fishery regimes and expands upon the law of the sea 
established by UNCLOS. The application of the more developed precautionary measures
56 Patricia  B irnie  a n d  A l a n  B o y l e , In t e r n a t io n a l  La w  & the En v ir o n m en t  675 (2d ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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of the Fish Stocks Treaty is a key mechanism to accomplish this.57 An example discussed 
in chapter 2 highlights the significance of emerging precautionary standards. In the days 
before the Fish Stocks Treaty, the excessive unilateral quotas set by the EC following its 
objections to NAFO quotas, could likely be judged a breach of precautionary obligations.
At a minimum, the precautionary requirements of the Fish Stocks Treaty are an 
interpretive tool to be applied to the relevant provisions of UNCLOS.58 In fact, this can 
be taken a step further. By its terms, the parties to the Fish Stocks Treaty must apply the 
Precautionary Approach to the conservation and management of all straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks on the high seas.59 This introduces the Precautionary Approach into 
the work of most fishery organizations, even those that do not specifically contain 
precautionary provisions in their constituent instruments.
The Fish Stocks Treaty unequivocally adopts the use of stock-specific reference 
points to implement the Precautionary Approach. The Fish Stocks Treaty is also an 
agreement later in time in relation to most fishery treaties. Fidelity to its mandates, 
including those requiring states to abide by stock reference points, is a virtue when 
judging the behavior of states within fishery regimes that manage straddling and highly 
migratory stocks on the high seas. Accordingly, departure from a quota, TAC and stock 
reference points through the use of exemptive provisions may be viewed as a failure to 
apply the Precautionary Approach as envisioned by the Fish Stocks Treaty and other key 
instruments. Naturally, the more important factor will be what the state does after the
57 See M a r r , supra note 42, at 146 (arguing the stricter precautionary provisions o f  the Fish Stocks Treaty 
are both the lex specialis and lex posterior  to UNCLOS provisions and therefore superior to them).
58 See Jaye Ellis, The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the Precautionary Principle as Interpretive Device 
and Rule o f  Law, 32 OCEAN DEV. &  In t ’l L. 289 (2001). The use o f a subsequent instruments and 
agreements to interpret an earlier treaty is codified in Article 3 1(2)-(3) o f  the Vienna Convention.
59 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 47, at art. 3(1).
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exercise of the exemptive provision. For example, setting a responsible unilateral quota, 
following an objection to a quota set by fisheries organization, should not be viewed as a 
violation of the Precautionary Approach.
III. Duty to Base Decision-Making on the Best Scientific Evidence Available
Another normative element in international environmental law, fisheries law in 
particular, that is closely related to the Precautionary Approach is the duty to base 
decisions on conservation and management on the best scientific evidence available. This 
duty can be traced to UNCLOS. In Article 61(2) of UNCLOS, for example, coastal states 
are required to maintain the living resources of the EEZ, and protect against their over­
exploitation, by “taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it.”60 With 
regard to the conservation of living resources on the high seas, when determining the 
allowable catch, Article 119 requires states to take measures based on “the best scientific 
evidence available” to maintain or restore populations at levels that can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield.61
The FAO Code of Conduct recognizes that “[conservation and management
fDdecisions for fisheries should be based on the best scientific evidence available . . .  [.]” 
Similarly, in their application of the Precautionary Approach, states and fisheries
60 UNCLOS, opened fo r  signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), at art. 
61(2) (emphasis added).
61 Id. at art. 119(1 )(a) (emphasis added).
62 Code o f Conduct, supra  note 38, at para. 6.4 (emphasis added).
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management organizations should determine stock-specific reference points based on 
“the best scientific evidence available. . . [.]”
Several recent fishery treaties including SEAFO,64 the new Antigua Convention65 
of IATTC and the Western and Central Pacific Treaty66 mandate that measures be 
adopted based upon the best scientific evidence available. Some older treaties also make 
decision-making explicitly reliant upon scientific evidence. CCAMLR adopts “best
fnscientific evidence” while NASCO requires its commissions to take into account the 
“best available information” including advice form ICES and other appropriate scientific
z o
organizations. CITES also calls for appendices to be amended upon the “best 
information available.”69 The CCSBT requires states to consider “relevant scientific
7 0evidence” when deciding upon allocations.
Once again, the most widely applicable statement is found in the Fish Stocks 
Treaty. Article 5(b) declares that states shall give effect to their duty to cooperate (the 
“duty to cooperate” is considered in the next section) by ensuring measures adopted are 
based on the “best scientific evidence available.” Article 6 invokes “best scientific 
evidence” in implementing the Precautionary Approach. Specifically, Article 6.3(a) 
requires states to obtain and share the “best scientific evidence available” to improve
71decision-making for fishery conservation. Article 6.3(b) requires states to apply the
63 Id. at para. 7.5.3 (emphasis added).
64 SEAFO Treaty, supra note 39, at art. 3(a).
65 Antigua Convention, supra note 41, at art. VII(c)-(d).
66 Western and Central Pacific Treaty, supra note 40, at arts. 5(c)-(d) & 6(1 )(a).
67 CCAMLR Treaty, May 20, 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982), at art. IX(f).
68 NASCO Treaty, Mar. 2, 1982, 1338 U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1983), at art. 9(a).
69 CITES Resolution, Conf. 9.24, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/09/09-24R13.shtml (visited July 
4, 2005).
70 SBT Treaty, May 10, 1993, 1994 Austl. T.S. No. 16 (entered into force May 20, 1994), at art. 4(a).
71 For the full text o f Article 6 o f the Fish Stocks Treaty see supra text accompanying note 47.
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Annex II guidelines “on the basis of the best scientific evidence available” to determine
79the stock-specific reference points.
Even in those treaties that do not specifically adopt the “best scientific evidence” 
standard in decision-making, a common feature of regimes that manage living resources 
is the role of a scientific committee to aid the decision-making body in its work. Since the 
great majority of conservation and management measures are informed by scientific 
input, vetoes that block them, and specific reservations that allow individual states to 
depart from them, would appear to undermine the “best scientific evidence” requirement. 
To ask the question more pointedly: are exemptive provisions consistent with the 
requirement to base decisions about conservation and management on the best available 
scientific evidence? Obviously, there is no single answer to this question, as it will 
depend heavily on individual facts and circumstances, namely the conservation status of 
particular species and the level of scientific certainty attached to that determination. The 
reasonable conclusion, however, is that exemptive provisions, allowing states to catch or 
trade certain species, where competent scientific assessment counsels otherwise, would
7Tdevalue the duty to rely upon “best scientific evidence.”
To consider the issue from a slightly different angle, how shall states proceed 
when the best available scientific evidence is not very good? This scenario is precisely 
what the most classic application of the Precautionary Approach is intended to address.
As noted above, the exercise of exemptive provisions in this circumstance must be 
considered through the lens of the Precautionary Approach.
12 Id.
73 See Schiffman, supra note 4, at 1020.
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The requirement to base conservation and management decisions on the best 
available scientific information suggests an important limitation on the ability of states to 
depart from decisions reached within a regime, such as TAC, that were theoretically 
negotiated in good faith on the basis of such information. When this requirement is 
considered alongside the Precautionary Approach, as they are often intertwined, a very 
real legal limitation on the exercise of exemptive provisions begins to emerge.
IV. The Duty to Cooperate
Duly empowered decision-making bodies render conservation and management 
decisions within a regime. As discussed above, ideally, these decisions are guided by 
Precautionary thinking and they are based on the best available science. As importantly, 
these decisions represent the collective will of the members of the regime. The concept of 
collectivity is valuable in the management of living marine resources and is reflected in a 
key principle of international environmental law: the duty to cooperate.
The duty to cooperate in the conservation and management of high seas living
resources can be considered a matter of customary law. The ICJ recognized this
obligation in 1974 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland)™ The duty to
cooperate has been codified in UNCLOS. Article 118 of UNCLOS provides:
States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation 
and management of living resources in the areas of the 
high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living 
resources, or different living resources in the same area, 
shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the
74 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Iceland) 1974 I.C.J. 3, 31, at para. 72. See WILLIAM T. BURKE, T h e  
N e w  In t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  o f  F i s h e r i e s : UNCLOS 1982 a n d  B e y o n d  99, 122 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994).
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measures necessary for the conservation of the living 
resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate, 
co-operate to establish subregional or regional fisheries
nc
organizations to this end.
A noteworthy feature of Article 118 is that it identifies “subregional or regional 
fisheries organizations” as the appropriate forum to express cooperation. To be sure, 
Article 118 will not deter proponents of the liberal exercise of exemptive provisions in 
marine conservation treaties. Taken on its face, the duty to cooperate as expressed in 
Article 118 is satisfied by negotiations toward conservation measures, not necessarily 
agreement about them. The last sentence simply calls for cooperation to establish 
fisheries organizations. Clearly, Article 118 is written prospectively, contemplating the 
establishment of, and participation in, new fisheries organizations. This UNCLOS 
provision does not stand alone in its call for cooperation but rather is accompanied by 
other, more specific, legal pronouncements. For this reason, Article 118 is not conclusive 
on the particular matter of whether or not the exercise of exemptive provisions may 
impact the duty to cooperate. Article 118 must be interpreted along with other provisions 
from both UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Treaty that further define the duty to 
cooperate.76
In the cases of straddling and shared stocks, UNCLOS Article 63 mandates that 
states seek agreement on measures for their conservation, either directly, or, through an
77appropriate organization. Similarly, for highly migratory species (which are enumerated
75 UNCLOS, supra note 60, at art. 118. Article 118 is entitled, “Co-operation o f States in the conservation 
and management o f living resources.”
76 See Bob Applebaum & Amos Donohue, The Role o f  Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, in 
D e v e l o p m e n t s  in  In t e r n a t i o n a l  F i s h e r ie s  L a w  218,232 (Ellen Hey, ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999).
77 UNCLOS, supra note 60, at art. 63. Article 63(1) addresses shared stocks while Article 63(2) addresses 
straddling stocks. Interestingly, Article 63(1) refers to the objectives o f “conservation and development.” 
Article 63(2), by contrast refers only to conservation.
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in Annex I of UNCLOS), Article 64 requires states to cooperate “with a view to ensuring 
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization . . .”78 Once more, 
specific reference is made to cooperation through “appropriate international
70organizations.” In fact, Article 64(1) specifically provides that “[i]n regions for which 
no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal states and other States whose 
nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish such an 
organization and participate m its work.” For anadromous stocks, UNCLOS Article 66 
calls for cooperation on a more limited scale because the states in whose rivers they 
originate have the primary responsibility for them.81 Even here, however, UNCLOS
87underscores the role of regional organizations.
In the case of marine mammals, UNCLOS Articles 65 and 120 require states to 
cooperate with a view to their conservation and “in the case of cetaceans shall work 
through appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management and
87study.” Again, UNCLOS calls for cooperation in the context of appropriate 
international organizations.
Bob Applebaum and Amos Donohue note that despite repeated references to 
cooperation through organizations, UNCLOS does not assign to them any specific 
duties.84 Furthermore, several articles of UNCLOS seem to value direct cooperation, that 
is, cooperation outside of the organizational context, as much as cooperation through
78 Id. at art. 64(1).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at art. 66(1).
82 Id. at art. 66(5).
83 Id. at art 65. Art. 120 extends the requirements o f Art. 65 to the high seas.
84 See Applebaum and Donohue, supra  note 76, at 224.
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competent organizations.85 In fact, a careful reading of certain UNCLOS articles would 
indicate that states might be able to avoid entirely the use of regional fishery 
organizations to fulfill their duty to cooperate.86 While this may be true, the value of 
collective management of a resource located in a common area is apparent. Accordingly, 
cooperation in the context of organizations is recognized with greater frequency and 
specificity.
The Fish Stocks Treaty likewise contains strong references to the duty to
cooperate, including the role of regional organizations. These obligations are naturally
more developed than those found in UNCLOS. Article 8 of the Fish Stocks Treaty further
equates the duty to cooperate in conservation and management with the work of
appropriate international organizations. Article 8(3) provides in relevant part:
. . . .  States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and 
relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to 
cooperate by becoming a member of such organization or a 
participant in such arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the 
conservation and management measures established by such 
an organization or arrangement. States having a real interest 
in the fisheries concerned may become members of such
O O
organizations or participants in such arrangements. . .
Interestingly, the particular wording of Article 8.3 raises questions about the level 
of participation necessary to satisfy the duty. Because the substantive clauses are 
separated by the conjunction “or” one could argue that states can satisfy their duty to 
cooperate merely “by becoming a member” of a relevant international organization. That 
is, mere good faith participation in the work of the regime (e.g., the negotiation of TAC
85 Id. at 232. Articles 63 and 64, for example.
86 Id.
87 The Code o f Conduct (para. 6.12) and Agenda 21 (paras. 17.57-17.61), while not excluding the 
possibility o f direct cooperation, both reinforce the concept that cooperation shall occur in the context of  
subregional and regional organizations.
88 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 47, at art. 8.3.
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and national allocations, the sharing of scientific data, etc.) could potentially satisfy the 
duty to cooperate even if exemptive provisions were invoked at the end of the decision­
making process.
The goal of this key provision is to encourage new entrants to fishery 
organizations; a careful reading of Article 8.3 suggests exemptive provisions are an 
inducement to membership. On the one hand, a state can satisfy its duty to cooperate by 
joining applicable fishery organizations. On the other hand, a state that pursues those 
stocks but does not become a member must agree to apply the conservation and 
management measures of the organization. As demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3, 
membership often carries with it the privilege of opting out of such measures. Peter 
Orebech et al. find it odd that Article 8.3 imposes greater obligations on non-members 
and speculate this serves as an inducement to join fishery organizations.89 This 
observation is probably correct and reinforces the classic objective of reservations 
discussed in chapter 1 -- reservations encourage treaty membership through the promise 
of greater flexibility.
Article 8.3 focuses on membership and not substantive compliance with the 
decisions of the regime. Moving beyond Article 8, there is strong evidence that the 
drafters did in fact envision considerable compliance by regime members.90 Several other 
articles of the Fish Stocks Treaty support this interpretation. In further defining the role
89 See Peter Orebech et al., The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 119, 
125(1998).
90 A background paper discussing the duty to cooperate that was prepared by the Division o f Ocean Affairs 
and the Law o f the Sea, in advance o f  the Second Session o f the negotiations o f the Fish Stocks Treaty, 
referred to the duty to cooperate as “not merely hortatory” (para. 66), “fundamental” (para. 67) and “a duty 
with substantive content.” (para. 68). A/CONF.164/INF/5, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
St r a d d l in g  F ish  St o c k s  a n d  H ig h l y  M ig r a t o r y  F ish  S t o c k s , Selec ted  d o c u m e n t s  399-432 (Jean- 
Pierre Levy and Gunnar G. Schram (eds.), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996) [hereinafter 
Background Paper].
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of organizations, the Fish Stocks Treaty helps to bring the meaning of “duty to
cooperate” into sharper focus. Article 10, entitled “Functions of subregional and regional
fisheries management organizations and arrangements,” provides:
In fulfilling their obligation to cooperate through 
subregional or regional fisheries management organizations 
or arrangements, States shall:
(a) agree on and comply with conservation and 
management measures to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks;
(b) agree, as appropriate, on participatory rights such as 
allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort;
(c) adopt and apply any generally recommended 
international minimum standards for the responsible 
conduct of fishing operations;
(d) obtain and evaluate scientific advice, review the status 
of the stocks and assess the impact of fishing on non-target 
and associated or dependent species;
(e) agree on standards for collection, reporting, verification 
and exchange of data on fisheries for the stocks;
(f) compile and disseminate accurate and complete 
statistical data, as described in Annex I, to ensure that the 
best scientific evidence is available, while maintaining 
confidentiality where appropriate;
(g) promote and conduct scientific assessments of the 
stocks and relevant research and disseminate the results 
thereof;
(h) establish appropriate cooperative mechanisms for 
effective monitoring, control, surveillance and 
enforcement;
(i) agree on means by which the fishing interests of new 
members of, or participants in, the organization or 
arrangement will be accommodated;
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(j) agree on decision-making procedures which facilitate 
the adoption of conservation and management measures in 
a timely and effective manner;
(k) promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
accordance with Part VIII;
(1) ensure the full cooperation of their relevant national 
agencies and industries in implementing the 
recommendations and decisions of the subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement; and
(m) give due publicity to the conservation and management 
measures established by the organization or arrangement.91
Article 10(a) clearly mandates not only agreement on conservation and 
management measures, but also compliance with them, to ensure long-term 
sustainability. This would seem to be a devastating blow to the use of both reservations 
and vetoes in the face of the duty to cooperate. Article 10(b), by contrast, requires states 
to “agree, as appropriate” with “participatory rights” such as allocation of allowable 
catch, but excludes any reference to compliance. Since matters of allocation are the most 
likely to draw exemptions this omission is puzzling, but may be critical. Is it possible that 
the duty to cooperate simply requires states to seek to agree, in good faith, on 
participatory rights, but if agreement cannot be reached, exemptive provisions may be 
invoked? If so, this type of distinction between Articles 10(a) and 10(b) would be 
troubling in that it would imply questions of allocation and participatory rights are 
somehow separate from conservation and management.
A possible explanation is that Article 10(b) refers principally to the criteria for 
determining participatory rights such as historical percentages, contribution to research, 
etc., whereas 10(a) refers to the actual allocations ultimately decided upon by the
91 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 47, at art. 10.
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organization. This interpretation is reasonable but is not immediately apparent from the 
text of subparagraph (b).
Is it conceivable that Article 10(a) refers to TAC while 10(b) refers to national 
allocation? This interpretation is also problematic in that it would require individual 
states to comply with decisions on TAC while not expecting similar compliance on 
national allocation. On the other hand, this interpretation is plausible if the state sets a 
responsible unilateral quota following the objection, or objects for a reason other than 
increased consumption (e.g., Iceland’s objections in NAFO to the management of the 
shrimp catch through “effort days” as opposed to the setting of a TAC). In the more 
likely scenario, however, where the objection is motivated by a desire for a greater catch, 
the TAC is automatically compromised by a departure from the quota. This is because the 
latter is a fraction of the former. Practically speaking, individual states only have control 
over whether or not their national allocation is complied with, not whether the TAC as a 
whole is respected. To take this a step further, it is reasonable to conclude that when a 
state exceeds its allocation it is undermining TAC.
Accordingly, the better interpretation of Article 10(a)-(b) is that TAC and national 
allocation are inextricable, and, taken together, constitute conservation and management 
measures (addressed by 10(a)). Furthermore, any textual omission notwithstanding, the 
word “agree” used in Article 10(b) should logically contemplate some measure of 
compliance where decisions on participatory rights are actually achieved by the 
organization.
Article 10(j) is also relevant to defining the duty to cooperate vis-a-vis exemptive 
provisions. Article 10(j), which appears to refer to the negotiation of new fishery
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organizations rather than existing ones, requires states to “agree upon decision-making 
procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and management measures in a 
timely and effective manner.” Decision-making procedures certainly include exemptive 
provisions. While Article 10(j) does not specifically address exemptive provisions, it 
does not seem to favor them. Exemptive provisions, by definition, restrict the application 
of conservation and management measures. In addition, Article 10(j) requires attempts to 
achieve decision-making in a “timely and effective manner” (emphasis added). Regarding 
timeliness, chapter 2 discussed the expanding time-frames states often have within which 
to invoke specific reservations (e.g., ICRW and ICC AT). This may undermine the 
timeliness objective, especially where the purpose of the expanding time-frame is to 
invite additional states to avail themselves of the specific reservation procedure. With 
regard to effectiveness, in light of the examples reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, it is easy to 
argue that the exercise of exemptive provisions at least has the potential to impede the 
effectiveness of marine conservation regimes.
Yet another provision of the Fish Stocks Treaty that develops the duty to
cooperate with implications for exemptive provisions is Article 18.1. Article 18.1 is
entitled “Duties of the Flag State” and provides:
A State whose vessels fish on the high seas shall take such 
measures as may be necessary to ensure that vessels flying 
its flag comply with subegional and regional conservation 
and management measures and that such vessels do not 
engage in any activity which undermines the effectiveness 
o f such measures?2
Theoretically, a state that exercises a specific reservation against a given 
conservation and management measure and then permits a vessel flying its flag to act in
92 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 47, at art. 18.1 (emphasis added).
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accordance with that exemption would be offending this provision. If the drafters of the 
Fish Stocks Treaty intended to honor the use of objection procedures, Article 18 would 
be a logical place for them to have done so. Any mention of objection procedures 
creating an exception to the flag state’s duty to comply with, and not undermine, 
conservation and management measures adopted by an organization is conspicuous by its 
absence. The spirit of Article 18 is reinforced and expanded upon in Article 19 
“Compliance and enforcement by the flag State” and Article 20 “International 
cooperation in enforcement.” In addition, Article III of the FAO Compliance
Q-3
Agreement contains responsibilities similar to those of Articles 18 and 19 of the Fish 
Stocks Treaty.
Another important aspect of the duty to cooperate that may impact the use of 
exemptive provisions is cooperation vis-a-vis developing states. As every student of 
international environmental law is aware, it is fundamental to respect the special needs of 
developing states when considering environmental goals.94 Articles 24 through 26 of the 
Fish Stocks Treaty address these needs in the context of fisheries. Article 24 mandates 
that the special requirements of developing states shall receive full recognition.95 States 
must also recognize the need to ensure that measures do not place a disproportionate 
burden of conservation on developing states.96 The exercise of exemptive provisions, on a 
limited and rational basis, to ensure greater access to fish stocks for developing states, 
would seem to be a reasonable way to achieve these objectives.
93 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 24, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 969 (entered into force Apr. 24, 2003) 
[hereinafter FAO Compliance Agreement].
94 See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 28, at Principle 6.
95 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 47, at art. 24.1.
96 Id. at art. 24.2(c).
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Apart from the special interests of developing states, which are so deeply rooted 
in international environmental law, the use of exemptive provisions may be hard to 
reconcile with the duty to cooperate in the context of regional conservation and 
management organizations. To be clear, neither the Fish Stocks Treaty, nor any other 
relevant legal instrument, expressly prohibits the use of exemptive provisions. So, too, it 
cannot be said that the duty to cooperate automatically precludes the exercise of 
reservations or vetoes in marine conservation agreements. On a grander scale, however, 
where states separate themselves from conservation and management measures deemed 
desirable by other states enjoying a similar interest in the same resource, it is difficult to 
conclude that this fulfills either the letter or the spirit of the duty to cooperate -  a duty 
which has become so prominent in international environmental law in recent years.
Both specific reservations and vetoes are rendered suspect by the duty to 
cooperate. In the case of reservations, states exempt themselves from measures that other 
members of the regime have chosen to accept. In so doing, they become a free rider of 
sorts. In the case of vetoes, the indictment may be even more serious. This is because a 
state that exercises a successful veto, has, by itself, defeated a conservation and 
management measure acceptable to all other members of the organization. In so doing, 
the veto negates the efforts of all, not just one.
The migratory nature of fish stocks and many marine mammals necessitates that 
all states with an interest in their long-term sustainability cooperate in their conservation 
and management. In fact, the living marine resources of the high seas may be the ultimate 
common resource. Exemptive provisions by nature reflect unilateral interests over 
collective interests. Tragically, they too often signal short-term economic interest over
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long-term sustainability. The duty to cooperate may not expressly prohibit the use of 
exemptive provisions, but it surely does not favor them either. One may fairly conclude 
that the more exemptive provisions are invoked in conservation and management 
regimes, the less cooperative those regimes become.
V. Abuse of Rights
The last legal factor examined in this chapter is abuse of rights. The doctrine of 
abuse of rights is rooted in the civil law system but is analogous to the common law 
doctrines of equity, reasonableness and good faith.97 On the plane of international law, 
abuse of rights may be regarded as a general principle of law.98 Applying the concept of 
abuse of rights to exemptive provisions, the matter can be framed as follows: Even 
though states enjoy a lawful right to exercise reservations and vetoes, can these rights be 
exercised to a point of excess, or abuse, whereby the rights of other states are 
compromised? In other words, just because the right to exercise exemptive provisions is 
legitimate does not mean that it is unlimited. The doctrine of abuse of rights suggests a 
theoretical upward limit on the right to exercise exemptive provisions.99
Two articles of UNCLOS highlight the relevance of the abuse of rights doctrine to 
ocean governance. Article 87(2) requires states to exercise their high seas freedoms with 
“due regard” for the rights of other maritime users. Even more specifically, Article 300, 
entitled “Good faith and abuse of rights” provides: “States parties shall fulfil in good faith
97 See Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse o f  Right or Optimum Utilisation?, 5 ASIA 
PAC. J. ENVTL L. 33, 37 (2000).
98 Id.
99 Schiffman, supra note 4, at 1021.
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the obligations assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction 
and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an 
abuse o f right”100
The Fish Stocks Treaty reiterates Article 300 of UNCLOS almost verbatim in 
Article 34. To the extent goals of conservation, cooperation and the application of the 
Precautionary Approach are objectives of UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Treaty, and the 
analysis herein indicates they are, states must act respectfully of these objectives, even as 
they pursue their own legitimate maritime interests. States that seek to secure a larger 
share of a common marine resource may be interfering with the rights of other states that 
enjoy similar interests in that same resource.
Gillian Triggs has applied the concept of abuse of rights to the issue of the
Japanese scientific whaling program. As discussed in chapter 2, scientific whaling can
perhaps be considered an exemptive provision in its own right because it permits the
capture of whales, whose meat is ultimately destined for market, outside of the confines
of the IWC moratorium on commercial whaling. Triggs concludes:
International law recognizes the principle of an abuse of 
right where a right is exercised for a purpose for which 
it was conferred and is a sham to avoid a legal obligation.
The principles of abuse of right and good faith and the 
precautionary approach provide a jurisprudential basis 
on which to challenge the legality of scientific whaling by 
Japan.101
While most observers would agree a “sham” represents a clear case of abuse, one 
probably does not need to go that far to identify an abuse of a right in international law. A 
reckless disregard for the conservation status of a resource through an excessive use of an
100 UNCLOS, supra note 60, at art. 300 (emphasis added).
101 Triggs, supra note 97, at 59.
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exemptive provision should be enough to meet this standard. This is ultimately a matter 
of concern for the other states in the regime and potentially a subject for dispute 
settlement.
Conclusions
The factors discussed in this chapter come together to form the legal landscape in 
which exemptive provisions must operate. While exemptive provisions are in principle 
lawful, they do not exist in a legal vacuum. We must consider the exercise of exemptive 
provisions in relation to other important objectives in international law including the 
“object and purpose” requirement, the Precautionary Approach, the duty to base 
decisions on the best scientific information available, the duty to cooperate and the abuse 
of rights doctrine. As demonstrated, the ability of states to exercise exemptive provisions 
is not absolute. On the contrary, these significant legal obligations, individually and 
collectively, require that exemptive provisions be exercised with prudence, respect for the 
rights of other states and the conservation objectives of the treaties in which they are 
found. In fact, the factors discussed in this chapter should also inform the behavior of 
states in those regimes that utilize simple or qualified majority voting. For example, 
where a state knows that its negative vote will defeat a conservation measure, its vote 
should be guided by “object and purpose,” the Precautionary Approach and the other 
factors discussed herein.
To focus specifically on exemptive provisions, however, some of the limiting 
factors discussed in this chapter may be inapplicable in individual cases; in other cases,
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all may apply. To be clear, in some cases, none of these factors will apply. This would be 
the case where the exemption does not directly relate to a conservation measure, but 
rather matters such as criteria for allocation (e.g., Iceland’s objection in NAFO to 
allocation of “effort days” versus TAC in the shrimp harvest) or harmonization of 
domestic laws (e.g., Austria’s reservations to the listing of numerous species in CITES 
before it became a member of the EU) to identify some examples. Similarly, even where 
a state exercises an exemptive provision it is fair to take into account its actions 
thereafter. For example, despite the exemption, is the state setting for itself a responsible 
domestic quota, or, is it pursuing the resource to excess?
The need to judge the actions of states on case-by-case bases highlights the 
importance of raising the level of scrutiny on the use of exemptive provisions. As will be 
discussed in chapter 5, this can include calling upon states to explain the reasons they are 
invoking exemptive provisions (as is presently the case in SEAFO and NEAFC). In other 
words, the overall behavior of states needs to be considered before their use of exemptive 
provisions can be judged. Nevertheless, even as states are given opportunities to justify 
their actions, the legal factors discussed in this chapter are now increasingly important 
components of the legal landscape.
As the legal landscape evolves, taken together, the factors discussed in this 
chapter create a powerful synergy that clearly favors conservation over utilization. 
Together these factors are a “check and balance” and suggest a theoretical upper limit to 
the use of reservations and vetoes. An analysis of this limit can only occur on a case-by- 
case basis but the discussion herein suggests a continuum. At one end is a single 
reservation or veto directed against a conservation measure adopted on behalf of a
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species with a reasonably good status. In this case, it would be difficult to say the use of 
the exemptive provision is objectionable. At the other end of the spectrum, however, is a 
pattern of reservations or vetoes directed against a species with a demonstrably poor 
conservation status. This scenario is much more problematic. Realistically, most cases 
fall in between these hypothetical extremes.
The more profound questions are: who shall determine when these limitations are 
breached and what are their effects? Until more law and commentary exists addressing 
these key questions they remain largely theoretical for the time being. Even so, it is 
increasingly likely these questions will need to be addressed on a practical level. To do 
this, states will need to look to their traditional remedies for violations of international 
law and their dispute settlement mechanisms. More importantly, are decision-making 
bodies able to provide greater oversight to the use of exemptive provisions? At present, 
with very few exceptions, neither conservation and management organizations, nor their 
members, are explicitly empowered to offer a meaningful response to the use of 
exemptive provisions within the regime. The next chapter discusses some suggestions for 
future practice that might make it easier for them to do so.
292
Chapter 5 
Suggestions for Future Practice
As existing marine conservation regimes struggle to meet present needs, and 
newer regimes are developed in the future, exemptive mechanisms must evolve to help 
guarantee they do not contribute to the decline of our oceans. At a minimum, states must 
explore ways to refine them to help ensure that they do not undermine conservation 
objectives. This chapter highlights several key points from previous chapters and sets 
forth a short list of suggestions for the future of exemptive provisions in marine treaties.
Even though chapter 4 identified legal factors that may limit the use of exemptive 
provisions, the reader should note at the outset that this chapter does not advocate their 
complete elimination from the marine conservation and management regimes of the 
future. International law has classically regarded reservations in the modem era as a way 
to encourage wider participation in regimes. There is ample evidence from the preceding 
chapters to indicate that exemptive provisions are helpful, if not necessary, to “widen the 
tent” of conservation and management organizations and accommodate a variety of 
interests within the regime. This includes the differing interests of coastal and distant 
water fishing states, developed and developing states, new entrants to a regime as well as 
traditional consumers of a resource. In the IWC and CITES in particular, for better or 
worse, specific reservations help to preserve cultural differences by allowing states which 
view certain marine resources differently, greater access to, and trade in, these resources. 
Preserving this flexibility within rational limits is laudable. On the other hand, we now 
have a compelling responsibility to elevate the conservation objective to an even higher
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priority. The suggestions discussed in this chapter are designed to foster the objective of 
conservation, while preserving the benefits of exemptive provisions.
There is a growing drumbeat in international law to scrutinize the practices of 
environmental institutions to improve their effectiveness. This duty was recognized by 
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg) Plan of 
Implementation to better achieve the goal of sustainable development.1 In the area of 
fisheries, the Fish Stocks Treaty recognizes the responsibility to examine existing fishery 
organizations for the purpose of strengthening them and improving their effectiveness.2 
Relevant to exemptive provisions, the Fish Stocks Treaty specifically highlights 
improved decision-making as a strategy to prevent disputes.3
More recently, the 2005 Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries 
and the [Fish Stocks Treaty] called for the review and strengthening of regional fisheries 
management organizations and identified specific measures to improve decision-making.4 
To the extent exemptive provisions are not practiced in the most efficient or responsible 
way, this scrutiny has the potential to improve the way they are applied in the future.
1 See Johannesburg Plan o f Implementation, A/CONF. 199.20, at paras. 140-161.
2 Fish Stocks Treaty, openedfor signature Dec. 4, 1995, U.N. G.A. Doc. AJ CONF. 167/37, reprinted in 34 
I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (entered into force Dec. 11, 2001), at art. 13.
3 Id. at art. 28.
4 See Ministerial Declaration, Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, available at www.fisheriesgovemanceconference.gc.ca (visited July 20, 
2005), at para. 4. The measures to improve decision-making within fisheries organizations included 
reliance upon best scientific information available (para. 4(A)(i)); incorporation o f the precautionary 
approach (para.4(A)(ii)); incorporation o f the ecosystem approach in fisheries management with due 
consideration to the work o f scientific bodies and initiatives (para.4(A)(iii)); the use o f criteria for 
allocations which properly reflect the interests and needs o f coastal states and developing states (para. 
4(A)(iv)); compatibility between high seas conservation and management measures and those for areas 
under national jurisdiction (para. 4(A)(v)).
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I. Lessons from Key Fishery Regimes
Four agreements mentioned in the previous chapters that warrant additional 
reflection are ICCAT, SEAFO, Western and Central Pacific Treaty and the Donut Hole 
Agreement. The more thoughtful and responsible ways in which these regimes apply 
their decision-making process, including exemptive provisions, can serve as a model for 
future agreements. The regimes discussed in this section demonstrate a greater sensitivity 
for the potential impacts of their exemptive provisions and are therefore worthy of 
comment in a review of beneficial practices.
A. ICCAT: the benefit of reaffirming an objection
As described in chapter 2, objections to recommendations adopted by ICCAT 
require reaffirmation by the state making it unless a sufficient number of other states also 
object to that measure. Although the practice of reaffirmation of an objection may seem 
like a symbolic act it renders the exercise of a reservation somewhat more public and 
reflects a certain degree of isolation of the states invoking it. The requirement of 
reaffirmation may not be enough of a safeguard but is a step in the right direction.
In 2001 and 2002 ICCAT considered a draft resolution that would have 
strengthened this by requiring states to present reasons for their objections. The proposed 
resolution also highlighted that the use of the objection procedure does not release states 
from their duty to cooperate. As noted, this draft resolution was ultimately defeated but it 
surely demonstrated a greater seriousness about the use of reservations in the regime. The
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limited use of ICCAT’s objection procedure may, by itself, indicate the success of the 
reaffirmation requirement and the willingness of the regime members to use the 
exemptive mechanism judiciously.
B. SEAFO: the benefit of “reasons and review”
SEAFO is another regime that demonstrates a more sophisticated and intelligent 
exemptive mechanism. This is not surprising considering it was so heavily influenced by 
UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Treaty. Like other regimes discussed in chapter 3, SEAFO 
utilizes consensus decision-making backed up by a specific reservation provision. With 
regard to the latter, Article 23 of the SEAFO Treaty requires a state entering an objection 
to provide a written statement of its reasons for doing so. Even more impressive is 
SEAFO’s use of a special meeting of the Commission to review the measure and the 
possibility for an ad hoc expert panel to make recommendations on interim measures 
during this process. These interim measures will bind all parties if all non-objecting states 
determine the SEAFO Treaty would be undermined in the absence of such measures. The 
requirement of providing in writing a reason for the objection and the possibility of 
institutional review can be termed “reasons and review.” This places the burden squarely 
on the reserving state to justify its actions.
The SEAFO Treaty raises the bar considerably on the use of the objection 
procedure and has the effect of subjecting intended objections to several levels of review. 
The requirement that a state seeking an objection must provide a written reason, coupled 
with the additional review outlined above, forces those states to exercise a much greater
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degree of care in their use of the exemptive mechanism. Future regimes can adopt this 
approach requiring states invoking an exemptive provision to come forward with an 
alternative conservation strategy that will compensate for the greater consumption that 
would potentially result from their exemption.
As noted in chapter 2, in 2004 NEAFC embraced the requirement of a declaration 
to explain the reasons for an objection and an alternative conservation and management 
strategy. A proffered alternative conservation strategy could then be judged by the other 
members of the regime to determine if it was sufficient to protect the conservation 
objective. Chapter 2 also noted that a similar proposal was considered in NAFO from the 
late 1990s through 2001.5
States will likely think twice about invoking objections where there is a 
possibility those objections will be rejected based on conservation necessity as 
determined by the other members of the organization. The fear that objections will not 
pass muster in this way will probably not completely end their use (nor is this necessarily 
a desirable goal) but it does build in a badly needed layer of protection into the decision­
making process to help guarantee that conservation objectives are not compromised.
C. Western and Central Pacific Treaty: the benefit o f seeking reconciliation
As a newer agreement, the Western and Central Pacific Treaty is sensitive to 
potential adverse effects that may arise from the inability to achieve consensus on the 
adoption of conservation and management measures. That is why Article 20 provides for 
the services of a conciliator and a review panel to help reconcile concerns of states that
5 See chapter 2, supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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might vote against a measure. The findings of the review panel may lead to modification, 
amendment or revocation of the measure.
The Western and Central Pacific Treaty takes additional steps to help ensure 
consensus by adopting measures that are designed to address the concerns of potentially 
dissenting states. The use of the conciliator and review panel not only protects the 
interests of member states, it also helps to safeguard the conservation objectives that may 
be imperiled by an inability to adopt a measure.
D. The Donut Hole Agreement: protecting the rights o f coastal states
The Donut Hole Agreement addressed in chapter 3 is noteworthy for the creative 
way it balances the interests of coastal states and distant water fishing states. If consensus 
regarding the AHL cannot be attained, the Annex provides for a complex contingency 
mechanism whereby the coastal states, Russia and the US, nominate one institution 
apiece to jointly determine pollock biomass. If this proves impossible, the Annex 
provides that the biomass will be determined on the basis of the calculations of the US 
institution.
There is a lesson to be learned from the Donut Hole Agreement: where regimes 
must balance the interests of coastal states and distant water fishing states, there may be a 
valid reason to favor slightly the views of coastal states in the case of a deadlock. In fact, 
this type of preferential designation is entirely legitimate in the era of UNCLOS. This is 
because coastal states do in fact have a greater interest than distant water states in the 
conservation and management of highly migratory and straddling stocks, marine
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mammals, anadromous and catadromous species that occur both in their waters and the 
high seas. This notion reflects the proprietary and more permanent connection coastal 
states enjoy in relation to these species. It is reasonable, if not optimistic, to conclude that 
because of their greater interest in these resources, when all else is equal, coastal states 
will be more likely than distant water states to safeguard the long-term sustainable use of 
these resources.
Articles 63 through 67 of UNCLOS recognize the particular interests of coastal 
states with regard to the species mentioned above. This is reinforced in Article 116 
entitled, “Right to fish on the high seas.” Article 116 provides in relevant part: “[a]ll 
States have a right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: ...
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter alia, 
in article 63, paragraph 2 and articles 64 to 67[.]”
One way to apply the obligation of Article 116(b) to the work of conservation and 
management organizations would be to adopt decision-making procedures that reflect the 
interests of coastal states to a greater degree than those of distant water states. Protecting 
the rights of coastal states could take the form of majority voting generally, yet coupled 
with a right of coastal states to veto a TAC that they deem to be set too high. The Donut 
Hole Agreement provides an excellent example of a workable, albeit complex, default 
procedure that empowers coastal states to a greater degree than distant water states. Of 
course, one cannot assume that coastal states will always be more conservation-minded in 
their approach to resource management. In fact, the history of several regimes discussed 
in this thesis would so indicate. Nevertheless, coastal states enjoy a greater connection to
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the resource found in their waters and, as demonstrated by the Donut Hole Agreement, 
this can be harnessed effectively as part of the regime’s decision-making process.
Naturally, the downside of a decision-making mechanism that favors the interests 
of coastal states is that it might have a chilling effect on membership in the regime. 
Specifically, distant water states might choose to stay outside of the regulatory 
framework. To the extent distant water states participate, however, if the interests of 
coastal states are only given priority when decisions cannot be reached by consensus, 
distant water states will have an incentive to reach agreement.
The practice of the Donut Hole Agreement, allowing coastal states to provide the 
critical scientific information upon which decisions about catch limits will be determined 
when consensus cannot be achieved, gives coastal states a somewhat louder voice in the 
regime. This protects the rights of coastal states, the parties recognized by UNCLOS as 
having the greatest interest in the resource, but it may also foster better conservation and 
management in the process.
II. Lessons from Human Rights Law
The question of how best to deal with the practice of reservations is not limited to 
environmental and resource management treaties. Other domains of international law 
face similar issues. In the field of human rights law, the matter has received a certain 
amount of attention in recent years. While it is clear there is no “magic bullet” to be 
imported from human rights law, it is instructive to examine how similar questions are 
addressed in this related discipline. It is crucial to note at the outset that the mechanism of
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specific reservations as discussed in this thesis does not have an analog in human rights 
treaties. Instead, reservations to human rights treaties are typically addressed to treaty 
provisions. In fact, a critical point to keep in mind when comparing reservation practice 
in human rights law with wildlife law is that the terms “general reservations” and 
“specific reservations” are used very differently from the way they are used in this thesis. 
In the literature of human rights law the term “general reservation” typically refers to the 
disfavored practice of entering a reservation that is vague and imprecise.6 “Specific 
reservation,” on the other hand, tends to refer to the preferred practice of entering a 
reservation that is narrowly tailored to address a particular treaty provision so as to 
clearly indicate which treaty obligation is not undertaken.7 There is another important 
distinction in nomenclature the reader should be aware of before reading this section: the 
term “objection” in the context of a general reservation refers to the response by other 
states to the proffered reservation, not the “opt out” procedure itself, as was typical of 
treaties discussed in chapter 2.
Regardless of the obvious differences, both human rights law and environmental 
law wrestle with similar problems. Most notably, how to deal with excessive 
reservations; how to determine whether or not a reservation is incompatible with the 
treaty’s object and purpose and how to treat a reservation (and the state that entered it) 
when it is deemed incompatible with “object and purpose.”
6 See, e.g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24, General Comment on Issues Relating to 
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] or the 
Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 o f  the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994), at para. 19 [hereinafter General Comment 24]; William A. Schabas, 
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Discrimination Against Women and the 
Convention on the Rights o f  the Child, 3 W m . & MARY J. WOMEN & L.79, 89-90 (1997).
7 General Comment 24, supra note 6, at para. 19.
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The Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights cautioned 
against the excessive use of reservations in human rights treaties.8 More specifically, the 
Vienna Declaration encouraged states to formulate their reservations as precisely as 
possible; ensure that they are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty; 
and regularly review them with a view to withdrawing them.9 Beyond a plea for states to 
formulate their reservations in a responsible way, human rights law has also employed, to 
a limited degree, judicial and institutional review.
To a certain extent the ability of states to enter reservations to human rights 
treaties has been the subject of judicial scrutiny. The Genocide Case and the Belilos Case 
discussed in earlier chapters both resulted injudicial guidance on the scope of reservation 
usage. In 1995, in Loizidou v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the 
“severability” of invalid reservations that it recognized in Belilos}0 Collective and 
institutional review within a regime of reservations attempted by member states is also 
found in human rights law. What follows are some notable examples.
A. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms o f Racial Discrimination
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) excludes those reservations that are objected to by at least two-thirds of its 
parties.11 In other words, a sufficient number of treaty parties (at least one-third) must
8 Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF. 157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993), at para. 1.26.
9 Vienna Declaration, supra note 8, at para. II.5.
10 Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
11 International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 
entered into force  Jan. 4, 1969, at art. 20(2). Article 20(2) provides:
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approve of the reservation for it to be acceptable. In practice, this provision has not had 
much impact in that relatively few objections to reservations have been recorded and the 
two-thirds majority threshold has never been met.12
The CERD mechanism of “peer approval” is a step back towards the traditional
unanimity rule of reservations in international law that pre-dated the Genocide Case. This
approach has the benefit of imposing a collective, albeit not necessarily strict, standard of
review. In human rights law this type of mechanism serves the goals of achieving
universality in human rights obligations while seeking to preserve the integrity of the
treaty provisions. In marine conservation agreements, a similar “peer review” mechanism
could be useful to safeguard against unsustainable practices, however it could potentially
chill treaty membership just as easily. Rather than subject their practices to collective
review some states may choose to remain outside of the regime. Even so, the possibility
for some form of “peer review” of exemptive provisions in future conservation and
management treaties deserves serious consideration. As discussed in chapter 3, this type
• 1 ^of “peer review” system is effectively what has been implemented m SEAFO.
In 2003, the CERD Committee seemed to step back from the language of the 
treaty when it acknowledged that its authors were “optimistic” in believing that
A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose o f this 
Convention shall not be permitted, nor shall a reservation the effect o f  
which would inhibit the operation o f any o f the bodies established by 
this Convention be allowed. A reservation shall be considered 
incompatible or inhibitive if at least two thirds o f the States Parties to 
this Convention object to it. Id.
12 See Catherine Redgwell, The Law o f  Reservations in Respect o f  Multilateral Conventions, in H UM AN  
R ig h t s  a s  G e n e r a l  N o r m s  a n d  a  S t a t e ’s  R ig h t  t o  O p t  O u t : R e s e r v a t i o n s  a n d  O b j e c t i o n s  t o  
H u m a n  R ig h t s  C o n v e n t i o n s  3, 13-14 (J.P. Gardiner, ed., Brit. Inst. In ti & Comp. L, 1997).
13 See chapter 3, supra at VI (SEAFO).
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objections from two-thirds of its members could be obtained against reservations.14 At 
the same time, the Committee recognized that it could promote, by the consideration of 
states’ reports, appropriate recommendations to states “to consider changing or 
withdrawing their reservations.”15 In so doing, although the Committee weakened the 
argument that treaty organizations have a capacity to stand in judgment of reservations in 
a strict legal sense, it furthered the viewpoint that “peer pressure” might accomplish what 
“peer review” cannot.
B. The Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) simply prohibits reservations incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention.16 Interestingly, the drafters rejected a reservation provision 
identical to that of CERD because of the view that the Vienna Convention rules 
concerning reservations were sufficient to safeguard goals of universality and treaty
1 7integrity. Leading scholars judge this view to be wrong and unsupported by the history
1 fiof the CEDAW since its entry into force. The Committee established under CEDAW is
14 See Preliminary Opinion o f the Committee for the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination on the Issue o f  
Reservations to Treaties on Human Rights: March 13, 2003, CERD/C/62/Misc.20/Rev.3, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/7e 1 fl db49519d71 dc 1256d3300355906?0pendocument 
(visited Dec. 29, 2005), at para. 1.
15 Id. at para. 4.
16 Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 
entered into force  Sept. 3 1981, at art. 28(2).
17 See L i e s b e t h  L i j n z a a d , R e s e r v a t i o n s  t o  UN H u m a n  R ig h t s  T r e a t i e s  300 (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995).
18 See, e.g., id., at 300; Hanna Beate Schopp-Schilling, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination 
ofAll Forms o f  Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments?, in 
R e s e r v a t i o n s  t o  H u m a n  R ig h t s  T r e a t i e s  a n d  t h e  V i e n n a  C o n v e n t i o n  r e g i m e : C o n f l i c t , 
H a r m o n y  o r  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  3, 6-7 (Ineta Ziemele, ed., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
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not expressly empowered to judge the compatibility of reservations,19 and, at least in its
9 0early years, was reluctant to do so. This reluctance is largely attributable to a legal 
opinion the Committee obtained from the UN Secretariat Office of Legal Affairs in 1984 
inquiring who had the power to judge compatibility with “object and purpose.”21 The 
opinion reasoned that the “functions of the Committee do not appear to include a 
determination of the incompatibility of reservations, although reservations undoubtedly 
affect the application of [CEDAW] and the Committee might have to comment thereon in
99its reports in this context.”
Following the World Conference on Human Rights, the CEDAW Committee
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became somewhat more active in its approach to reservations. In General 
Recommendation 21 (1994) the Committee highlighted the potential detrimental impacts 
of reservations to certain key human rights and encouraged states to work toward 
withdrawing them.24 In 2004, the CEDAW Committee adopted a report entitled, 
“Declarations, reservations, objections and notification of withdrawal of reservations 
relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
9<r
Women.” The report set forth detailed facts about reservation practice under the regime
19 See generally, Jennifer Riddle, Making CEDAW Universal: A Critique o f  CEDA W ’s Reservation Regime 
Under Article 28 and the Effectiveness o f  the Reporting Process, 34 GEO. W A SH . IN T ’L L. REV. 605 (2002).
20 See Schopp-Schilling, supra note 18, 12-18 ; see also Redgwell, supra note 12, at 15.
21 Sch5pp-Schilling, supra note 18, at 12-13.
22 United Nations, Ways and means o f  expediting the work o f  the Committee. Report o f  the Secretariat, 
CEDAW/C/2001/II/4 (30 May 2001), Annex VI, pp. 33-34, quoted in Schopp-Schilling, supra note 18, at 
13.
23 Schopp-Schilling, supra note 18, at 18.
24 CEDAW, General Recommendation 21, paras. 41-47, available at
http://www.un.Org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom21 (visited Aug. 1, 
2005). General Recommendation 21 builds upon General Recommendation 20 (1992) which raised the 
issue o f introducing a procedure to address reservations within the regime. See CEDAW, Alain Pellet, 
Special Rapporteur, First Report on the Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties, Int’l Law 
Comm., 47th Sess., A/CN.4/470 (1995).
25 Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination Against 
Women (13th Meeting, August 2004), “Declarations, reservations, objections and notification o f
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including a list of reservations, objections to them by other state parties with 
accompanying explanations of the objection, and, a statement as to which reservations 
had not yet been withdrawn.26 This report will likely make it easier for those concerned 
about the negative impact of these reservations, including state parties and human rights 
NGOs, to target those states that have not yet withdrawn their reservations. If employed 
in marine conservation regimes such public reporting of reservations and the responses to 
them would probably serve a constructive purpose. This is in accordance with the goal of 
“transparency” discussed later in this chapter.
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human 
Rights Committee
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)27 of 1966 is 
one of the premier legal instruments in human rights law and is often referred to as one of 
the component instruments of the “International Bill of Rights.” The ICCPR establishes 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) to help achieve the objectives of the treaty and 
work to advance human rights in general. Like other human rights treaties, the ICCPR
9 0has experienced a significant number of reservations. Although the HRC does not have 
explicit authority to consider the validity of reservations, the question of its competence
withdrawal o f reservations relating to the Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f Discrimination 
against Women,” CEDAW/SP/2004/2, available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/statesmeeting/thirteenth/CEDAW-SP-2004-2E.pdf (visited 
Aug. 1,2005).
26 Id.
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force  Mar. 23, 1976.
28 Id. at Part IV. For a detailed review o f functions and procedures o f the HRC see KIRSTEN A. Y O U N G , THE 
L a w  a n d  P r o c e s s  o f  t h e  U.N. H u m a n  R ig h t s  C o m m it t e e  (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 
2002).
29 See Marcus G. Schmidt, Reservations to United Nations Human Rights Treaties -  The Case o f  the Two 
Covenants, in Gardiner, supra note 12, at 20-34.
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to do so has been raised with increasing frequency.30 In 1994, in General Comment 24, 
the HRC squarely addressed the matter of reservations to the ICCPR and the issue of 
whether or not it has the capacity to judge their compatibility with object and purpose.31 
General Comment 24 declared that “[i]t necessarily falls to the [HRC] to determine 
whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the 
[ICCPR].. .”32 While it is true that the HRC reached this decision in part “[b]ecause of the 
special character of a human rights treaty”33 it also noted that it is “particularly well 
placed to perform this task.”34
The reasoning in General Comment 24 should resonate with those seeking greater 
institutional oversight to exemptive provisions in marine conservation agreements. In 
General Comment 24 the HRC attempted to achieve greater effectiveness of the ICCPR 
by confronting the practice of reservations.35 In the years since the HRC adopted General 
Comment 24, it has met with some criticism from key states36 including France,37 UK38
TOand US. Among the concerns expressed by these states were questions about the
30 See generally, id. at 23-24.
31 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 24(52), General comment on issues relating to reservations 
made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to 
declarations under article 41 o f the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994).
32 Id. at para. 18.
33 Id.
34 Id. In 2006 the ILC provisionally adopted draft guidelines on reservations. See Report o f the International 
Law Commission, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). Guideline 3.2, entitled “Competence to assess the 
validity o f reservations” specifically recognizes the competence o f “treaty implementation monitoring 
bodies” to rule on the validity o f  reservations. Id. at 297.
35 See E le n a  A. B a y l i s ,  General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem o f  Reservations to Human Rights 
Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. IN T ’L L. 277 ,278  (1999).
36 See International Human Rights Instruments, The Practice o f Human Rights Treaties Bodies with 
Respect to Reservations and International Human Rights Treaties, Seventeenth Meeting o f  Chairpersons o f  
the Human Rights Treaties Bodies, Geneva, 23-24 June 2005; Fourth Inter Committee Meeting o f the 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Geneva, 20-22 June 2005, HRI/MC/2005/5, June 13, 2005, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf898586bldc7b4043cl256a450044f331/c8d46c8edaf5ad5bcl2570260047 
4635/$FILE/G0542365.pdf (visited Dec. 29, 2005), at para. 19.
37 Report o f the Human Rights Committee, Fifty-First Session, Vol. I, A/51/40, para. 367 and annex VI.
38 Report o f the Human Rights Committee, Fiftieth Session, Vol. I, A/50/40, para 481 and annex VI.
39 Id.
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competence of the HRC to judge the compatibility of reservations. It is also clear that the 
HRC has been less than vigorous in applying General Comment 24. In its consideration 
of a 2002 communication concerning the impact of a German reservation on a matter of 
parental rights, the HRC failed to scrutinize the compatibility of the German reservation 
even where the author of communication specifically invoked General Comment 24 on 
those grounds.40
Despite a lack of universal support among the member states of the ICCPR, those 
concerned about the effectiveness of conservation treaties should appreciate the spirit of 
General Comment 24. Accordingly, interested observers must similarly consider the 
potential capacity of bodies created under conservation treaties to play a role in 
regulating, or at least reviewing, the exercise of exemptive provisions of their respective 
regimes. One might argue that the organizational structures created by fishery and 
conservation agreements serve more of a normative function, and are therefore more 
conducive to conduct a critical review of exemptive provisions, than the bodies created 
under human rights treaties. If certain activities of the HRC, such as determinations about 
the ICCPR’s object and purpose, can be justified by arguments of “implied powers”41 
then an excellent argument could be made that similar powers must reside in 
conservation and management organizations.
Examining the issue from the other side, however, one can identify important 
differences between human rights treaties and marine conservation treaties. First, 
committees under human rights treaties comprise individuals serving in their personal, as
40 See Human Rights Committee, Communication N. 1115/2002: Germany. CCPR/C/80/D/1115/2002, 
available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/2blbdbc58254f93bcl256e91004ad574?Opendocument (visited 
Dec. 29, 2005), at paras. 3.9 & 6.3-6.4.
41 YOUNG, supra note 28, at 64-78.
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opposed to representative, capacity. These individuals may be more willing to review a 
state’s reservation than a body acting under a marine conservation treaty. In the latter 
case, these bodies are composed of members formally representing their governments. 
Secondly, a human rights body has a natural opportunity to evaluate a state’s 
reservations: that is, the treaty’s reporting procedure. These procedures are frequently 
established under human rights treaties as part of their compliance mechanism.42 Similar 
procedures are far less common in marine conservation treaties.
Whatever similarities or differences exist between human rights treaties and 
marine conservation treaties, the most important variable is the will to evaluate 
exemptive provisions at an organizational level. The will to act in this way cannot be 
assumed. Individual member states might wish to preserve their own prerogatives to 
exercise exemptive provisions and might therefore be reluctant to stand in judgment of 
other states for doing so.
To be clear, as in conservation agreements, bodies created under human rights 
treaties are not specifically empowered to judge reservations. Nevertheless, human rights 
bodies are increasingly taking a more active role in the governance of reservation 
practice. This may discourage states from making reservations in the first instance. More 
likely, it could encourage them to tailor their reservations more narrowly or withdraw 
them earlier than they otherwise would. Greater scrutiny from human rights bodies may 
also facilitate “collateral” strategies to limit potential detrimental impacts of reservations 
on human rights obligations. For example, a condemnation of a reservation by a human 
rights body might make it easier for NGOs to identify and influence recalcitrant states.
42 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 27, at art. 40.
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This same potential exists in international environmental law and deserves further 
attention.
To examine the issue through a different lens, it is even easier to argue that 
collective or institutional review of exemptive reservations for compatibility with “object 
and purpose” is more appropriate in conservation agreements than human rights treaties. 
This is because reservations to human rights treaties are typically motivated by cultural or 
religious differences of the member states. To judge these reservations is to judge a 
cultural or religious value from the standpoint of international law. Understandably, legal 
institutions may want to avoid such highly sensitive and emotionally charged questions 
as, for example, determining whether or not reservations by Islamic countries preserving 
the primacy of sharia (Islamic law) over international human rights standards are 
compatible with a treaty’s object and purpose.43
In the case of conservation treaties, cultural significance of the regulated 
resources is certainly relevant, especially in the case of marine mammals; however, the 
ultimate issue with regard to the legitimacy of reservations is overwhelmingly one of 
science. Simply put, is the additional consumption or trade permitted through the use of 
reservations ecologically sustainable? As such, it might be appropriate to enlist the 
assistance of scientific committees to help determine the extent to which the exercise of 
exemptive provisions in a given case is consistent with the conservation objectives of the 
treaty.
43 For discussion o f reservations to human rights treaties motivated by Islamic law, particularly with regard 
to the rights o f women, see Jane Connors, The Women’s Convention in the Muslim World, in Gardner, 
supra note 12, at 85; Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil? An Analysis o f  the Provisions o f  the Women’s 
Convention in the Law as Stipulated in S hari’ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995 ).
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III. A New Role for Scientific Committees: “Best Scientific Evidence” meets 
exemptive provisions.
As noted in the earlier chapters, scientific committees assist the work of virtually 
every marine conservation and management regime. In addition, as discussed in chapter 
4, the “best scientific evidence available” must inform the conservation and management 
measures adopted by these regimes. In many cases, the question of whether or not the 
exercise of an exemptive provision in a given case is consistent with the conservation 
objective of the regime requires a scientific, as much as a legal, assessment. Accordingly, 
it is reasonable to seek the input of the scientific committee to evaluate the potential 
impact of greater consumption of the resource rendered permissible by the exercise of an 
exemptive provision, if indeed the exemption is one that contemplates greater 
consumption. This approach is analogous to requiring an “environmental impact 
assessment” which is well established in national legal systems and is recognized in 
Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration.44 Moreover, the requirement of an impact assessment 
is consistent with the best spirit of the Precautionary Approach.45
Expanding the role of scientific committees to assess the exercise of exemptive 
provisions would likely not require any amendment to existing treaties. In the case of a 
specific reservation, the COPs, MOPs and commissions discussed in chapters 2 and 3 
could each adopt, as appropriate, a resolution requiring the secretariat to transmit the 
proposed reservation to the regime’s scientific committee for review and input. The
44 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 17, June 14, 1992, 21 I.L.M. 874 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration], Principle 17 provides: “Environmental impact assessment, as a national 
instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact 
on the environment and are subject to a decision o f a competent national authority.” Id.
45 See  N i c o l a s  d e  S a d e l e e r ,  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r i n c i p l e s :  F r o m  P o l i t i c a l  S l o g a n s  t o  L e g a l  R u l e s  
86-89 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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scientific committee could then be asked to issue a report within a specified period of 
time assessing the potential impact of the reservation and the level of scientific certainty 
upon which its determinations are based. Consistent with the ecosystem approach to 
marine conservation and management, this assessment should include the potential 
impact on dependent and associated species. The scientific report could then be 
transmitted to other state parties for further review.
In the case of regimes utilizing vetoes, the task of the scientific committee would 
be to assess the impact of not adopting each proposed conservation and management 
measure at that time. Ideally, this should take place in advance of voting so that each 
member would have the benefit of the scientific assessment before they cast their vote. 
Where this is not possible, and a veto is cast, the decision-making body should be able to 
reintroduce the measure for further consideration once the scientific assessment is 
available.
Of course, most conservation and management measures are frequently 
implemented shortly after their adoption and timeliness of decision-making is a factor to 
be respected. Fishery regimes in particular, work on an annual cycle before the opening 
of the fishing season. Meaningful review of exemptive provisions might require a 
widening of this window of time, and, where necessary, a treaty amendment to ensure the 
work of the organization can be completed within its annual cycle.
Where a review can be accomplished successfully, if the assessment of the 
scientific committee suggests additional consumption at that time would be detrimental, 
the exempting state would be acting contrary to scientific advice. In this way, states intent 
upon invoking a reservation would be exposing their unilateral actions to greater scrutiny
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and possible criticism. In future regimes, the decision-making body could be specifically 
empowered to approve or block the reservation on the advice of the scientific committee.
Authorizing scientific committees to evaluate the potential impact of exemptive 
provisions has the added benefit of protecting states seeking greater consumption, when 
the scientific evidence in fact supports increased consumption. Whaling states, for 
example, would likely embrace this approach as they have long maintained that the best 
scientific evidence supports greater consumption of certain whale species.46
Naturally, a greater empowerment of the scientific committee requires sufficient 
confidence that it will act neutrally and be guided only by scientific evidence. Concerns 
to the contrary will undermine this suggestion. It is also possible that scientists might be 
unwilling to make clear-cut decisions about the suitability of an exemptive provision 
because of uncertainties about the science. As noted in chapter 3, this seemed to be the 
case in the CCSBT prior to the SBT dispute. Where there is disagreement about the 
scientific evidence, however, it would seem the decision-makers should be guided by 
Precaution and treat the attempted exemption with suspicion. Ultimately, under optimal 
circumstances, subjecting exemptive provisions to greater scientific scrutiny within the 
regime is both fair and responsible.
46 See, e.g., Yasuo lino & Dan Goodman, Japan’s Position in the International Whaling Commission, in 
T h e  F u t u r e  o f  C e t a c e a n s  i n  a  C h a n g i n g  W o r l d  3,9-11 (William C.G. Bums & Alexander Gillespie, 
eds. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003); see also A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence 
Available: The Whaling Moratorium and Divergent Interpretations o f  Science, 29 WM. & M A R Y  ENVTL. L. 
&  POL’Y r e v . 375 (2005).
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IV. The Value of Greater Transparency in the Decision-Making Process
The call for greater transparency in the workings of international organizations 
has become almost axiomatic in recent years. In the case of fishery regimes, Article 12 of 
the Fish Stocks Treaty specifically calls for transparency in the activities of subregional 
and regional fisheries management organizations.47 Transparency facilitates the 
participation of a greater number of interested actors including NGOs, journalists and 
scholars. When the decision-making of conservation and management organizations is 
open to public scrutiny it becomes harder for states that are genuinely undermining 
efforts to maintain their unsustainable practices. These states can more easily be 
subjected to “name and shame” campaigns orchestrated by environmental NGOs and 
more conservation-minded states. IWC resolutions critical of practices by Japan and 
Norway are excellent examples. With greater transparency, journalists can more 
accurately report the work of these organizations and scholars can more easily analyze 
the success or failure of their efforts.
With regard to the efforts of scholars, as noted in the early chapters of this thesis, 
the use of reservations and vetoes in a given regime is rarely reported as a freestanding 
statistic in the reports of the organization, if at all. In the case of specific reservation and 
objection procedures, treaty secretariats sometimes do not preserve accurate or consistent 
records of their use. In the case of vetoes, regimes often do not preserve records of those 
measures that are not adopted. Furthermore, reports on debates over conservation and 
management measures at the regular meetings of commissions, COPs and MOPs are
47 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 12.
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often sanitized for public consumption. To be fair, this is not always the case. Even where
it is true, however, one must understand why states prefer to keep their decision-making
more or less private. Scott Barrett observes:
There has been a trend in recent years of making 
negotiations more transparent and accessible to the 
media and NGOs. Superficially, this may seem to 
advance the cause of cooperation. However, it is as 
likely to have precisely the opposite effect... States 
prefer to negotiate in private for good reason.
Compromise is an essential lubricant to negotiation, 
and it would be extremely difficult for a country to 
compromise on its stated principles in full public 
view. Transparency can thus promote entrenchment
A Q
of positions.
Barrett is correct to the extent consensus, or other useful compromise, can 
actually be achieved. Where it cannot, and environmental harm results, the clear 
preference must be for a more public process to expose this and bring political and legal 
pressure to bear on recalcitrant or uncooperative states. Cases discussed in the earlier 
chapters indicate that political pressure has been employed against states maintaining 
unpopular reservations. In the most noteworthy example, the case of Japan’s reservations 
to the listing of sea turtles in CITES appendices, the record is clear that political pressure 
from other states and environmental NGOs was a significant factor in convincing Japan 
to withdraw its reservations. While fair-minded observers should agree that applying 
political pressure to coerce states to withdraw reservations should be exercised 
responsibly, the option to do so must be maintained.
The goal of greater transparency could be achieved in a variety of ways. Most 
notably, transparency should mean generally open access by NGOs, journalists and
48 S c o t t  B a r r e t t , E n v i r o n m e n t  &  S t a t e c r a f t : T h e  S t r a t e g y  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  T r e a t y  M a k i n g  
145 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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scholars at regular meetings, including most aspects of decision-making. Treaty 
secretariats could demonstrate a commitment to greater transparency by making available 
information concerning decision-making beyond that which is ordinarily found in 
meeting reports. This should include minutes of meetings, drafts of rejected proposals 
and statistics of the number of times exemptive provisions are invoked in the history of 
the regime. At a minimum, information concerning the exercise of exemptive provisions 
should be easily accessible to any interested party. This means, for example, reporting 
such information clearly and accurately in organizational reports. In whatever form it 
takes, greater transparency in conservation and management regimes will make it easier 
to identify and scrutinize the practices of states invoking exemptive provisions.
V. Invoke Dispute Settlement Mechanisms to Combat Abuses
Where a state exercises an exemptive provision to a point of abuse, other states 
within that regime should be prepared to call them to account. This can best be achieved 
though an appropriate mechanism of dispute settlement. In the case of fisheries, even 
where fishery treaties do not themselves contain a suitable dispute settlement mechanism, 
the Fish Stocks Treaty extends Part XV of UNCLOS to a wide range of fishery disputes, 
even if those members of the Fish Stocks Treaty are not also members of UNCLOS.49 
Specifically, Part XV will apply to disputes “concerning the interpretation or application 
of a subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks 
or highly migratory fish stocks . . . including any dispute concerning the conservation and
49 Fish Stocks Treaty, supra  note 2, at art. 30.
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management of such stocks[.]”5° For the moment, this provision has limited reach 
because relatively few states are parties to the Fish Stocks Treaty. To examine Article 30 
in another light, however, it signals a generally greater role for Part XV, including the 
ITLOS, in the realm of fishery disputes in future years.
States that are parties to marine conservation and management regimes that 
believe their own interests in marine resources are undermined by an excessive use of 
exemptive provisions by another member should consider raising this matter in a 
competent dispute settlement forum. As noted in earlier chapters, both the Spain-Canada 
and the SBT disputes arose from disagreements over the effects of exemptive provisions 
in their respective regimes.
Whether or not states will have sufficient confidence in the ability of international 
tribunals to adjudicate such matters competently, including application of the relevant 
science, remains to be seen. As is often the case with decisions about appropriate 
modalities in international dispute settlement, questions of time, cost and uncertainty of 
outcome will inform the behavior of states. An additional consideration is that even 
where states believe they are aggrieved by other states’ use of exemptive provisions they 
may not want to pursue the matter for fear this will interfere with their own claims when 
and if they decide to invoke exemption provisions themselves. However real this 
possibility, the option of legal dispute settlement should be present to challenge 
unsustainable practices arising from the use of exemptive provisions.
In future years, international tribunals could be called upon to determine whether 
the exercise of exemptive provisions in a given set of circumstances comprises a 
violation of the “object of purpose” of the applicable treaty -  the conservation objective, 
50 Id. at art. 30(2).
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in particular. A tribunal might also determine whether the use of exemptive provisions in 
a given case constitutes an abuse of rights under the treaty, a breach of the duty to 
cooperate or a failure to apply the Precautionary Approach, among other issues. Future 
agreements should clearly make these questions part of the jurisdictional competence of 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the treaty. A good case can be made for simpler, 
more specialized, dispute resolution bodies within conservation and management 
organizations themselves, as opposed to full-blown proceedings before international 
tribunals. SEAFO and the Western Central Pacific Treaty serve as role models in this 
regard and could well be the template for future regimes.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions
This thesis has attempted to illuminate and analyze one of several key challenges 
to ocean governance. Although reservation and veto provisions in marine conservation 
agreements are not singularly responsible for the decline of our marine resources, they 
have contributed to unsustainable management.
Chapter 1 discussed the crisis of the oceans, fisheries in particular, as well as the 
historical context for reservations and vetoes in law and policy. Reservations and vetoes 
are traditionally hailed in international law as necessary to encourage treaty membership. 
Marine conservation regimes are no exception. Exemptive provisions undoubtedly lead to 
increased participation. They offer states, which might otherwise be hesitant about 
binding themselves to conservation measures, an incentive to join fishery and marine 
mammal regimes. It is clear that the “wider tent” comes at a price. Simply put, exemptive 
provisions allow states an opportunity to avoid those measures with which they disagree. 
While it is both simplistic and unwarranted to condemn every exercise of reservations 
and vetoes in marine conservation agreements, there are compelling grounds to view 
them with suspicion.
The early chapters revealed a wide range of state practice, both in the extent to 
which exemptive provisions are utilized across the spectrum of marine conservation 
agreements, as well as the motivations for their use. The review of specific reservations 
in chapter 2 suggested that although the basic mechanism for specific reservations is 
similar in many regimes, there are significant differences in their usage. Some regimes,
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such as NAFO and the IWC have recorded heavy use while the exemptive provision of 
the IOTC has gone largely utilized. In the case of NAFO, through most of the 1980s, the 
EC’s pattern of objections to annual quotas not only contributed to the decline of a key 
fishery, but also strained relations between the EC and Canada. This might be the most 
extreme example of the use of an exemptive provision discussed in this thesis. At a 
minimum, one can safely conclude that this pattern of objections precipitated the Spain- 
Canada fishery dispute of 1995. Similarly, and not surprisingly, chapter 2 suggested that 
traditional consumers or traders of a given resource were more likely to exempt 
themselves from conservations and management measures concerning that resource. This 
is particularly apparent in those regimes that manage marine mammals (i.e., IWC, CMS 
and CITES).
The survey of state practice in the regimes that manage marine mammals 
demonstrates that pro-whaling states are clearly pursuing a strategy to preserve their 
rights to exploit cetaceans. These states view the consumption of whale products as a 
matter of culture and tradition and the exercise of exemptive provisions, for better or 
worse, allows them to express this preference.
Chapter 3 examined veto provisions. That is, those regimes that adopt decision­
making by consensus. Chapter 3 underscored that measures which are ultimately adopted 
must be fashioned at “the lowest common denominator” to gain the acceptance of all 
states in the regime. The veto may be necessary to attract states with divergent interests 
into the regime in the first place. The best example of this is the Donut Hole Agreement. 
Here, the coastal states Russia and the US sought the veto so as not to be outvoted by 
distant water fishing states. At the same time, vetoes can lead to deadlocks and disputes
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among member states. This was certainly the case with the SBT dispute of the late 1990s. 
In some cases, regimes utilize both decision-making by consensus and a specific 
reservation mechanism. These regimes, including CCAMLR and SEAFO, effectively 
create a “double veto” which offers states a second opportunity to decide if they wish to 
be bound by the measure. Some regimes provide for default mechanisms where 
consensus cannot be obtained. The Donut Hole Agreement, for example, empowers its 
coastal states to provide stock status information, upon which the harvest level is then 
determined, if the state parties cannot reach consensus. CCAMLR calls for a special 
meeting to address a state’s objection and the Western and Central Pacific Treaty 
provides for the assistance of a review panel and conciliation.
Chapter 4 identified and analyzed legal factors that inform and potentially limit 
the use of exemptive provisions in marine conservation and management regimes. These 
factors include the “object and purpose” requirement of treaty law; the Precautionary 
Approach; the duty to base decision-making on the best scientific evidence available; the 
duty to cooperate and the abuse of rights doctrine. Some of these factors are key 
principles of the evolving discipline of international environmental law, some are 
textually based in UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Treaty, and some derive from classic 
treaty law.
Although the use of exemptive provisions remains presumptively lawful, 
especially as they are provided for by the operation of the treaty, the factors discussed in 
chapter 4 create an emerging legal landscape that needs to be considered by states 
invoking reservations and vetoes. When exemptive provisions are exercised, they need to
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be judged on a case-by-case basis to determine if these meaningful legal limitations are 
respected.
Chapter 5 explored some suggestions for future practice. These suggestions 
highlighted laudable practices reviewed in the earlier chapters. This included the benefit 
of reaffirming an objection (ICCAT), and the utility of providing a reason for an 
objection, as called for in SEAFO and NEAFC. The Donut Hole Agreement serves as an 
example of a regime that can protect the rights of coastal states through its creative 
default procedure and the Western and Central Pacific Treaty brings elements of dispute 
settlement into play when decision-making is deadlocked.
“Peer review,” as contemplated by SEAFO, essentially elevates the use of 
exemptive provisions to a matter of multilateral concern within the regime. This 
approach, typically entailing some form of institutional review of reservations, has been 
applied, with a questionable degree of success, in human rights law. Nevertheless, the 
idea of subjecting exemptive provisions to the scrutiny of other interested states within 
the regime is perhaps the best hope for more intelligent use of exemptive provisions in 
marine conservation regimes going forward. In such a process, states seeking to exercise 
exemptive provisions would not only need to come forward with an explanation of their 
intended actions, but perhaps also set forth an alternative conservation strategy to 
compensate for the increased consumption or trade.
Raising the level of scrutiny on exemptive provisions need not be within the 
exclusive purview of the states of a particular regime. States remain the primary actors in 
international law but they are by no means the only interested parties. Greater 
transparency within conservation and management regimes will increase participation by
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others. This includes NGOs, journalists and scholars who can help identify unsustainable 
practices. Future treaty practice should make information about the exercise of 
reservations and vetoes more readily available so that the work of these regimes will be 
more susceptible to scrutiny.
In some notable cases, reservations have been withdrawn when appropriate 
pressure has been brought to bear on states pursuing unsustainable practices. Japan’s 
ultimate withdrawal of its reservations to the listing of sea turtles in CITES appendices is 
probably the best example. This would not have occurred but for the coordinated 
campaign by environmental NGOs and other conservation-minded actors.
Similarly, policy-makers must work more closely with scientists to develop 
progressively more effective conservation strategies. Chapter 5 suggested a possibly 
expanded role for scientific committees to participate in a review process. Even though 
the CCSBT is an example of a regime where the scientific committee reflected the 
disagreement of the parties, the highest quality scientific evidence available must be the 
cornerstone of decision-making. This serves the emerging legal obligation to base 
decisions on the best scientific evidence available. The policy goals should be increased 
cooperation among interested parties, decision-making based upon sound science, not 
wishful thinking, and, overall, more responsible use of resources. In regimes managing 
marine mammals, those stalwart states that continuously seek to increase consumption 
should favor a linkage between scientific assessment and the exercise of exemptive 
provisions. With such a linkage, their exemptive provisions could be justified when clear 
scientific evidence supports greater exploitation.
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The greatest challenge encountered in the research and writing of this thesis was 
in the collection of information used to compile the summary tables referred to in chapter 
2 and 3 (presented in Appendix). As noted throughout, the use of specific reservations 
and vetoes is rarely reported as an easily accessible statistic in regular regime reports. It 
was often necessary to supplement this primary source archival research with information 
provided in correspondence with treaty secretariats, as well as secondary scholarly 
sources. In regimes utilizing vetoes, measures that do not achieve consensus are possibly 
not even recorded at all. Despite this difficulty, producing the record of the usage of 
exemptive provisions in key regimes is the principal contribution of this thesis. Secondly, 
the record of usage has made possible an analysis of the impact of these provisions on the 
regimes in which they are exercised, as well as their impact on certain marine resources. 
As importantly, this thesis links the exercise of reservations and vetoes in marine 
conservation agreements to an array of obligations and practices found elsewhere in 
international law. Finally, this thesis offers several suggestions about how exemptive 
provisions could be constructed and applied in marine conservation agreements to 
improve future practice.
Future conservation and management regimes should be drafted with greater 
sensitivity to the impact of exemptive provisions. Fortunately, states seem to be 
awakening to this reality and newer regimes are subjecting exemptive provisions to a 
higher standard of review. SEAFO and the Western Central Pacific Treaty serve as good 
“role models” in this regard. On the scholarly side, future research should follow the 
exercise of exemptive provisions in the regimes examined herein, as well as others that
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will be concluded in the future. Ongoing research should seek to correlate the use of these 
provisions with the status of key stocks.
The unsustainable consumptive practices that have brought us to the present crisis 
of our oceans must be challenged with vigor and determination. Anything less will not 
reverse the damage that has been done. We must take note of the potential for exemptive 
provisions to cause further harm and therefore develop improved strategies in law and 
policy to ensure that reservations and vetoes will no longer be part of the problem. In a 
world of highly diverse states, reservations and vetoes serve the laudable goals of greater 
inclusion and flexibility in resource management. At the same time, the price for this 
cannot be unsustainable use of our precious ocean resources. Failure to respect long-term 
sustainability will ultimately rob us of that which we value most. Greater scrutiny now, 
with the objective of more efficient decision-making in the future, is not only desirable it 
is essential. This thesis was intended to be a step toward that goal.
History will judge our generation not only for the wars we fight, the machines we 
build, the diseases we cure and the genes we engineer. We will also be judged for what 
we preserve of the natural world. Our stewardship of the oceans is nothing less than a 
measure of what we achieve as a civilization. Classic treaty law, the law of the sea and 
international environmental law are the domains of public international law that shape the 
role of reservations and vetoes in marine conservation agreements. We must challenge 
each of these disciplines to improve this important aspect of ocean governance. The good 
news is that we still can.
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W eb st er ’s N ew  W o r l d  D ic t io n a r y  (2d. co l. ed ., N e w  York: S im on & Schuster, 1982).
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Table-1: NAFO Objection Procedure Summary
Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
1979 catch quota for Div. 3M Redfish EEC
1983 allocation of catch quotas for 1984 for Cod in Div. 3M 
and Redfish in Div. 3M and 3LN (P-l/83)
Spain
1984 allocation of catch quotas for 1985 for Cod in Div. 3M 
and 3NO and Redfish in Div. 3LN (P-l/84)
Spain
allocation of catch quota for 1985 for Redfish in Div. 
3LN (P-l/84)
Portugal
1985 proposal for regulation of particular stocks, i.e., Cod in 
Div. 3M, Cod in Div. 3NO, Redfish in 3M and 3LN, 
American plaice in 3M and 3LNO, Yellowtail in 
3LNO, Witch in 3NO, Capelin in 3NO, squid {Illex) in 
3 and 4 for 1986 (P-l/85)
Spain (objected to 
proposal with the 
exception of zero TAC 
for Capelin in Div. 
3NO)
allocation of catch quotas for 1986 for Cod in Divisions 
3M and 3NO, Redfish in Divisions 3M and 3LN, 
American plaice in Divisions 3M and 3LNO,
Yellowtail in Div. 3LNO and Witch in Div. 3NO (P- 
1/85)
EEC
allocation of American plaice in Div. 3M and 3LNO, 
Redfish n Div. 3M and 3LNO, Cod in Div. 3M and 
3NO and Squid {Illex) in Subareas 3and 4 (P-l/85)
Portugal
proposal for information regarding 3L cod (P-2/85) Spain
proposal for moratorium on directed fishery for 3L Cod 
outside 200 miles, during 1986 (P-3/85)
Portugal, Spain
1986 allocation of catch quotas for 1987 for Cod in Div. 3M 
and 3NO, Redfish in Div. 3M and 3LN, American 
plaice in Div. 3M and 3LNO, Yellowtail in Div. 3LNO, 
Witch in Div. 3NO, Capelin in Div. 3NO and Squid 
{Illex) in Subareas 3 and 4 (P-l/86)
EEC (later withdrawn as 
to Squid)
proposal for closing directed fishery for 3L Cod outside 
200 miles during 1987
EEC
1987 allocation of catch quotas for 1988 for Cod in Div. 3M 
and 3NO, Redfish in Div. 3M and 3LN, American 
plaice in Div. 3M and 3LNO, Yellowtail in Div. 3LNO, 
and Witch in Div. 3NO (P-l/87)
EEC (later withdrawn as 
to zero TAC for 3M 
Cod in 1988)
proposal for closing directed fishery for 3L Cod outside 
200 miles during 1988 (P-2/87)
EEC
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Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
1988 allocation of catch quotas for 1989 for Cod in Div. 
3NO, Redfish in Div. 3M and 3LN, American plaice in 
Div. 3M and 3LNO, Yellowtail 3LNO, and Witch in 
Div. 3NO (P-2/88)
EEC
proposal for closing directed fishery for 3L Cod outside 
200 miles during 1989 (P-3/88)
EEC
1989 allocation of catch quotas for 1990 for Cod in Div.
3NO, Redfish in Div. 3LN, American plaice in Div. 3M 
and 3LNO, Yellowtail in Div. 3LNO, and Witch in 
Div. 3NO (P-l/89)
EEC
proposal for closing directed fishery for 3L Cod outside 
200 miles during 1990 (P-2/89)
EEC
1990 allocations of Redfish 3LN and Witch 3NO 
(P-l/90) FC Doc. 90/12
EC
closing a directed fishery for 3L Cod outside 
200 miles during 1991 (P-2/90) FC Doc. 
90/12
EC
1991 marking of small boats carried on fishing 
vessels and fixed fishing gear (P-2/91) FC Doc. 
91/1
USSR
change the heading of rule from 
“Notification” to “Vessel Requirements” 
(P-3/91) FC Doc. 91/1
USSR
new rule for “Marking of Fishing Vessels” 
(P-4/91) FC Doc. 91/1
USSR
new rule requiring documents of national 
authorities to be carried on vessels (P-5/91) 
FC Doc. 91/1
USSR
change the designation of certain 
notification rules (P-6/91) FC Doc. 91/1
USSR
new rule re: logbook entries and reporting 
requirements of member countries (P-7/91) 
FC Doc. 91/1
USSR
change of wording of rule (P-9/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule (P-10/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule (P-l 1/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule (P-l2/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule (P-l 3/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
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Table-1: NAFO Objection Procedure Summary
Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
requirement that NAFO Executive 
Secretary transmit certain information to 
contracting parties (P-l4/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
requirement that all contracting parties 
ensure hail reports be sequentially numbered 
(P-15/91)FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording (inclusiveness) of rule 
(P-l6/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording (inclusiveness) of rule 
(P-l7/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
requirement that certain surveillance 
aircraft have call signal clearly displayed 
(P-l8/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-l9/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-20/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
addition to rule (21/91) 
FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-22/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
additional rule regarding air 
surveillance and surveillance reports 
(P-23/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-24/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-25/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
expand reporting requirements 
(P-26/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
new Annex re: surveillance report 
(P-27/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change of wording of rule 
(P-28/91) FC Doc. 91/7
Russia
change reporting requirements 
(P-29/91) FC Doc. 91/9
Russia
concerning NAFO inspection seal 
(P-30/91) FC Doc. 91/12
Russia
concerning Hail System Message Format 
(P-31/91) FC Doc. 91/13
Russia
closure of cod fishery in part of Regulatory Area 
in 1992 (P-32/91) FC Doc. 91/14
EEC
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Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
Quota Table for 1992
Redfish in Div. 3LN and Witch in Div. 3NO 
(P-33/91) FC Doc. 91/14
EEC
1992 Quota Table for 1993
Yellowtail in Div. 3LNO, A. plaice in Div. 3LNO, 
capelin in Div. 3NO 
(P-l4/92) FC Doc. 92/19
Russian Federation
1993 Quota Table for 1994
allocation of “block” quota to
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Russian Federation
(P-8/93) FC Doc. 93/18
Latvia, Russian 
Federation
1994 Quota Table for 1995
allocation of “block” quota to
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Russian Federation
(P-l/95) FC Doc. 94/13
Latvia, Russian 
Federation
1995 allocation of Greenland halibut in Subareas 2 and 3 for 
1995
(P-2/95) FC Doc. 95/1
Estonia, EU, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland
management of shrimp fishery 
(P-l5/95) FC Doc. 95/21
Iceland, Russia
Quota Table for 1996 allocation of “block” quota to 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Russian Federation (P- 
16/95) FC Doc. 95/23
Latvia, Russia
1996 experimental redfish fishery 
for vessels with 90mm mesh 
(P-6/96) FC Doc. 96/9
Cuba
3M shrimp management 
(P-7/96) FC Doc. 96/5
Iceland
Quota Table for 1997
allocation of “block” quota to Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia and Russian Federation (Russian Federation); 
allocation of “block” quota and “Others” for fishing 
Greenland halibut (Latvia)
(P-8/96) FC Doc. 96/13
Russian Federation, 
Latvia
1997 3M Shrimp Management 
(P-6/97) FC Doc. 97/8
Iceland
Quota Table for 1998
allocation of “block” quota of Cod 3M, Redfish 3M 
and Squid 3+4 to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Russian Federation and to footnote 1 of the Quota 
Table (Russian Federation, Latvia); fishing Greenland 
halibut (Latvia) (P-7/97) FC Doc. 97/14
Russian Federation, 
Latvia
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Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
1998 3M Shrimp Management 
(P-7/98) FC. Doc. 98/9
Iceland
Quota Table for 1999
allocation of “block” quota of Redfish 3M and Squid 
3+4 to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russian 
Federation and to footnote 1 of the Quota Table 
(Russian Federation, Latvia); fishing Greenland halibut 
(Latvia) (P-8/98) FC Doc. 98/13
Russian Federation, 
Latvia
1999 Quota Table for 2000
allocation of “block” quota of Redfish 3M and Squid 
3+4 to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russian 
Federation and “Others” re: fishing for Greenland 
halibut (P-6/99) FC Doc. 99/15
Latvia
3M Shrimp Management 
(P-7/99) FC Doc. 99/7
Iceland
2000 Management Measures for Shrimp in Div. 3M 
(P-9/00) FC Doc. 00/11
Iceland
Program for Observers and Satellite Tracking 
(P-10/00) FC Doc. 00/13
Iceland
Quota Table for 2001
allocation of “block” quota of Redfish 3M and Squid 
3+4 to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russian 
Federation (Latvia, Russian Federation); “Others” re: 
fishing for Greenland halibut (Latvia) (P-l 1/00) FC 
Doc. 00/21
Russian Federation, 
Latvia
2001 Quota Table for 2001 (Revised) -  Oceanic Redfish Div. 
IF (P-l/01) FC Doc. 01/4
Latvia, Lithuania, 
Ukraine
Management Measures for Shrimp in Div. 3M 
(P-2/01) FC Doc. 01/5
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland), Iceland, 
Latvia and Lithuania
2002 90% of fishing days, 3M Shrimp 
(P-5/02) FC Doc. 02/4
Iceland
“Others” quota for Greenland halibut 
(P-6/02) FC Doc. 02/5
Latvia
Schedule I -  Quota Table for 2003
allocation of “block” quota of Redfish 3M and “Others”
fishing for Greenland halibut
(P-7/02) FC Doc. 02/24
Latvia
Schedule I -  Quota Table for 2003 
Quota of 3L shrimp allocated to it 
(P-7/02) FC Doc. 02/24
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland)
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Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
Management Measures for Shrimp in Div. 3M (Part 
I.G)
(P-8/02) FC Doc. 02/24
Iceland
2002 Management Measures for Shrimp in Div. 3L (Part I.K) 
(P-13/02) FC Doc. 02/24
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland)
2003 Revised Quota Table for 2003 (re: 3L shrimp 
allocation)
Distribution of the TAC allocated for the NAFO 
regulatory area
(P-l/03) GF/03-046, 24 Jan. 2003
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland)
Pilot Project of Observers, Satellite Tracking and 
Electronic Reporting
Objection on the Observer Program regarding 100% 
coverage
(P-4/03) FC Doc. 03/12
Iceland
Quota Table for 2004 (CEM -  Annex I. A) 
Quota of 3L shrimp allocated to it 
(P-8/03) FC Doc. 03/19
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland)
Effort Allocation Scheme for Shrimp Fishery in NAFO 
Regulatory Area, 2004 (CEM-Annex I.B)
(P-9/03) FC Doc. 03/19
Iceland
2004 Quota Table for 2005 (CEM -  Annex I. A) 
Objection to allocation part of the management 
measures for 3L shrimp 
(P-5/04) FC Doc. 04/19
Denmark (in respect of 
Faroe Islands and 
Greenland)
Quota Table for 2005 (CEM -  Annex I. A)
Objection with respect to Oceanic Redfish SA 2, Div. 
IF and 3K and Yellowtail flounder in Div. 3LNO 
(P-5/04) FC Doc. 04/19
Ukraine
Effort Allocation Scheme for Shrimp Fishery in NAFO 
Regulatory Area, 2004 (CEM — Annex I.B)
(P-6/04) FC Doc. 04/19
Iceland
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Table-1: NAFO Objection Procedure Summary
Year Proposal (P) State(s) Objected
Table 1-NAFO Objection Procedure Summary
The information used to compile this table was obtained from direct communications with 
the NAFO Secretariat as well as NAFO/FC Doc. 02/10, Summary of Proposals and 
Resolutions of NAFO (including annual Quota Tables) (as of July 2002), Part I, Proposals 
and Resolutions for Amendments to the Convention and the Conservation and 
Enforcement Measures, (II) Proposals for international regulation of the trawl fishery, 
adopted by the Fisheries Commission (FC) of NAFO. Information on objections after 
2002 was obtained from NAFO/FC Doc. 05/4, Serial No. N5156, Summary of Status of 
Proposals and Resolutions of NAFO -  2000-2005 (Aug.). These documents were 
distributed by the NAFO Secretariat and are on file with the author. Reference to their 
contents herein is with permission from the NAFO Secretariat.______________________
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Table-2: ICCAT O bjection Summary
Year
Adopted
Rec.
Code
Recommendation State(s)
Objected
1997 97-8 regarding compliance in the Southern Atlantic 
Swordfish fishery
Brazil, South
Africa,
Uruguay
1998 98-5 limitation of catches of Bluefin tuna in Eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean
Morocco,
Libya
2000 00-1 Bigeye tuna conservation China
GO-
15*
Regarding Belize, Cambodia, Honduras and St. 
Vincents and the Grenadines unreported and 
unregulated catches of tuna by large-scale longline 
vessels in the Convention area
Barbados, 
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Table-2: ICCAT O
The information for 
as well as correspon*
)jection Summary
this table was compiled from a review of available ICCAT Reports 
fence with the ICCAT Secretariat.
*The objections to Recommendation 00-15 lodged by Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago 
were not confirmed and therefore Recommendation 00-15 entered into force for all 
Parties in 2002.
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Table-3: NEAFC Objection Summary
For Year Recommendation State(s)
Objected
1996 allocations of oceanic redfish Russian
Federation
1997 allocations of oceanic redfish Poland, Russian 
Federation
1998 allocations of oceanic redfish Poland, Russian 
Federation
recommendation for regulatory measures for Norwegian 
spring spawning (Atlanto Scandian) herring in waters 
beyond national jurisdiction
Poland
1999 distribution of redfish TAC Russian
Federation
1999, 
2000 and 
2001
recommendation on multi-annual management measures 
for mackerel
Iceland,
Russian
Federation
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2000 allocations of oceanic redfish (for 2000) Iceland
proposal adjusting multi-annual management measures 
for mackerel
Iceland,
Russian
Federation
2001 TAC of 95,000 tonnes of pelagic redfish in Convention 
Area
Iceland
recommendation for regulatory measures for mackerel 
including TAC of 65,000 tonnes
Iceland
2002 provisional TAC of 95,000 tonnes of redfish Iceland,
Russian
Federation
recommendation for management measures for mackerel 
including a TAC of 66,400 tonnes and allocations
Iceland
2003 recommendation for management measures of pelagic 
fishery for redfish
Iceland,
Russian
Federation
recommendation for management measures for mackerel Iceland,
Russian
Federation
2004 recommendation for management measures for pelagic 
redfish
Iceland,
Russian
Federation
recommendation for management measures for mackerel Iceland,
Russian
Federation
2005 recommendation for management measures for pelagic 
redfish
Russian
Federation
recommendation for management measures for mackerel Iceland,
Russian
Federation
2006 recommendation for management measures for pelagic 
redfish
Russian
Federation
recommendation for management measures for mackerel Iceland
Table-3: N]
The inform* 
Reports as 1\
EAFC Objection Summary
ition for this table was compiled from a review of available NEAFC Annual 
veil as correspondence with the NEAFC Secretariat.
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Table-4: IWC Objection Summary
Year/IWC
Report
Schedule Amendment(s) States(s) Objected
1949-1950
IWC/1
use of factory ships France
1951-1952
IWC/3
open season for sperm whales Australia
1954-1955
IWC/6
prohibition on taking of blue whales 
for period of 5 years in North Atlantic
Iceland, Denmark
prohibition on taking of blue whales in parts 
of North Pacific
Japan, Canada, USSR, 
USA
1955-1956
IWC/7
reduction of blue whale unit limit Netherlands, UK, 
Panama, South Africa, 
Norway, Japan, USA, 
Canada
1959-1960 
IWC/11
extends prohibition on killing blue whales 
Feb. 25, 1965
Iceland1
1960-1961
IWC/12
baleen whale catch limit in Antarctica 
for 1960/61, 1961/62
Japan,2 USSR2
reduction of blue and humpback whale 
Antarctic season; embargo on humpback 
whaling in designated Antarctic area
Japan, Norway, UK, 
USSR
1964-1965 
IWC/16
ban on taking of blue whales in designated 
area of Antarctic
Japan, Norway, 
UK, USSR4
1965-1966 
IWC/17
forbidding use of whale catcher on factory 
ships for sperm whales in designated area
Japan, Norway, 
USSR
1971-1972
IWC/23
catch restrictions on sperm whales for 
1971/72
pelagic season and 1972 coastal season in 
designated area
Japan, USSR
1973-1974
IWC/25
end of season date for whales of the Antarctic Japan
catch limit for minke whales Japan, USSR
prescribing the division of the sperm whale 
catch in the Southern Hemisphere into “areas”
Japan, USSR
1978-1979
IWC/30
catch limit for Spain-Portugal-British Isles 
stock
of fin whales in the North Atlantic for 1980
Spain
1981-1982 
IWC/3 3
forbidding use of cold grenade harpoon to kill 
minke whales for commercial purposes from 
beginning of 1982/83 pelagic and 1983 
coastal season
Brazil, ^  Iceland, Japan, 
Norway,6 USSR
1 Iceland withdrew its objection on Mar. 30, 1960.
2 Japan withdrew its objection on Dec. 19, 1962.
3 The USSR withdrew its objection on Apr. 9, 1962.
4 The governments o f  Japan, Norway, UK and USSR withdrew these objections in 1966.
5 Brazil withdrew its objection on Jan. 8, 1992.
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Table-4: IWC Objection Summary
Year/I WC 
Report
Schedule Amendment(s) States(s) Objected
prohibiting toothed whales to be taken from 
North Pacific, Western Division until catch 
limits including limitation on size and sex are 
established by IWC
Japan7
zero catch limit for Eastern South Pacific 
Bryde’s whale stock for 1982/83 pelagic 
season and 1983 coastal season
Chile
catch limit of 165 for Peruvian stock of 
Bryde’s whales in the Southern Hemisphere 
for 1982/83 pelagic season and 1983 coastal 
season
Peru
zero-catch limit* for commercial whaling for 
all stocks for 1986 coastal and 1985/86 
pelagic seasons and thereafter subject to 
review, amendment 10(e) of Schedule 
* (Moratorium)
(all objections filed in 
1983)
Japan8 Norway, Peru9 
USSR
1983-1984
IWC/35
catch limits of baleen whale stocks (excluding 
Bryde’s whale) within designated areas of the 
Southern Hemisphere
Brazil, Japan, USSR
1984-1985 
IWC/3 6
classification of Northeastern Atlantic stock 
of minke whales as Protection Stock
Norway
1994-1995
IWC/46
prohibiting commercial whaling in area 
designated as Southern Ocean Sanctuary
Japan (to the extent it 
applies to Antarctic 
minke stocks), Russia10
2002
IWC/Special
Mtg.
Iceland rejoins IWC with reservation Iceland
Table-4 IWC
The informatio 
well as specific
Objection Summary
n for this table was compiled from a review of the IWC Annual Reports as 
notations on the latest available revised Schedule.
6 Norway withdrew its objection on July 9, 1985.
7 Japan withdrew its objection with effect April 1, 1988.
8 Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium with effect from May 1, 1987 as to commercial pelagic 
whaling; Oct. 1, 1987 with respect to commercial coastal whaling for minke and Bryde’s whales, and; April 
1, 1988 with respect to commercial coastal sperm whaling.
9 Peru withdrew its objection to the moratorium on July 22, 1983.
10 Russian Federation withdrew its objection to the Southern Ocean Sanctuary on Oct. 26, 1994.
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Table-5 CITES Specific Reservations Summary
Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
Order Cetacea (Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises)
all species of a 
higher taxon
II Canada June 28, 1979 Oct. 30, 
1980
South Africa June 28, 1979 Feb. 17, 
1981
Family Platanistidae (River Dolphins)
Pontoporia 
blainvilli (La 
Plata)
III Denmark Oct. 24, 1977 June 28, 
1979
Family Ziphiidae (Beaked Whales)
Berardius 
(all species of a 
higher taxon)
I Austria July 29, 1983 Jan. 6, 1989
USSR July 29, 1983 April 26, 
1995
Berardius bairdii 
(Baird’s beaked 
whale)
I Japan July 29, 1983
Hyperoodon
(Bottlenose
dolphin)
(all species of a 
higher taxon)
I Austria July 29, 1983 Jan. 6, 1989
USSR July 29, 1983 April 26, 
1995
Hyperoodon
ampullatus
(Bottlenose
whale)
I Iceland April 2, 2000
Family Physeteridae (Sperm Whales)
Physeter catodon 
(Cachalot)
I Japan June 6, 1981
Norway June 6, 1981
Iceland April 2, 2000
Palau July 15, 2004
Family Monodontidae (Narwhal and Beluga)
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Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
Monodon
monoceros
(Narwhal/Unicom
whale)
III Denmark Oct. 24, 1977 June 28, 
1979
Family Delphinidae (Dolphins, Killer Whales, Pilot Whales and Melon-Headed Whales)
Delphinus delphis 
(Atlantic/common 
dolphin)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Globicephala 
melas (Long- 
finned pilot 
whale)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Lagenorhynchus 
acutus (Atlantic 
white-sided 
dolphin)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Lagenorhynchus
albirostris
(White-beaked
dolphin)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Orcinus orca 
(Killer whale)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Orcaella
brevirostris
(Irrawaddy
dolphin)
I Japan Jan. 12, 2005
Sot alia (River 
dolphins)
(all species of a 
higher taxon)
I Canada June 28, 1979 Oct. 29, 
1982
South Africa June 28, 1979 Feb. 17, 
1981
Sousa
(Humpback
dolphins)
(all species of a 
higher taxon)
I Canada June 28, 1979 Oct. 29, 
1982
South Africa June 28, 1979 Feb. 17, 
1981
Tursiops
truncates
(Bottlenose
dolphin)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Family Phocoenidae (Porpoises)
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Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
Neophocaena 
phocaenoides 
(Black finless 
porpoise)
I Canada June 28, 1979 Oct. 29, 
1982
Phocoena
phocoena
(Common/harbor
porpoise)
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Family Eschrichtiic ae (Grey Whales)
Eschrichtius 
robustus (Grey 
whale)
I Canada July 9, 1975 Oct. 29, 
1982
Family Balaenopteridae (Minke, Bryde’s, Sei, Fin, Humpback and Blue Whales)
Balaenoptera 
acutorostrata 
(Minke whale)
I Austria Jan. 1, 1986 Jan. 6, 1989
Brazil Jan. 1, 1986 May 7, 1991
Japan Jan. 1, 1986
Norway Jan. 1, 1986
Peru Jan. 1, 1986 Oct. 24, 
2001
USSR Jan. 1, 1986 April 26, 
1995
Iceland April 2, 2000
Palau July 15, 2004
II Iceland April 2, 2000
Balaenoptera 
bonaerensis 
(Antarctic minke 
whale)
I Austria Jan. 1, 1986 June 1, 1989
Brazil Jan. 1, 1986 May 7, 1991
Norway Jan. 1, 1986
Peru Jan. 1, 1986 Oct. 24, 
2001
USSR Jan. 1, 1986 April 26, 
1995
Iceland April 2, 2000
Japan July 19, 2000
Balaenoptera 
borealis (Sei
I South Africa Feb. 4, 1977 Feb. 17, 
1981
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Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
whale) USSR Feb.4,1977 April 26, 
1995
Canada Feb. 4, 1977 Oct. 29, 
1982
Australia Feb. 4, 1977 Aug. 27, 
1981
Japan (N/A within certain 
geographical limits)
June 6, 1981
Norway (N/A within certain 
geographical limits)
June 6, 1981
Iceland April 2, 2000
II Canada Feb 4, 1977 June 28, 
1979
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
South Africa Feb. 4, 1977 June 28, 
1979
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
Balaenoptera 
edeni (Bryde’s
I Peru July 29, 1983 Oct. 24, 
2001
whale) USSR July 29, 1983 April 26, 
1995
Japan July 29, 1983
Austria July 29, 1983 Jan. 6, 1989
Brazil July 29, 1983 May 7, 1991
Balaenoptera 
musculus (Blue
I Canada July 9, 1975 Aug. 11, 
1978
whale) Iceland April 2, 2000
Balaenoptera 
physalus (Fin
I Australia Feb. 4, 1977 Aug. 27, 
1981
whale) Canada Feb. 4, 1977 Oct. 29, 
1982
USSR Feb. 4, 1977 April 26, 
1995
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Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
South Africa Feb.4, 1977 Feb. 17, 
1981
Japan Nov. 4, 1980 
(within certain 
geographical 
limits);
June 6, 1981
Norway June 6, 1981
Iceland April 2, 2000
II Canada Feb.4,1977 June 28, 
1979
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
South Africa Feb. 4, 1977 June 28, 
1979
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
Megaptera
novaeangliae
(Humpback
whale)
I Canada July 9, 1975 Aug. 11, 
1978
St. Vincents & the 
Grenadines
Feb. 28, 1989
Iceland April 2, 2000
Family Balaenidae (Bowhead and Right Whales)
Balaenidae 
mysticetus 
(Bowhead/ 
Greenland Right 
whale)
I Canada July 9, 1975 Aug. 11, 
1978
Euhalaena (Right 
whale) (all 
species of a 
higher taxon)
I Canada July 9, 1975 Aug. 11, 
1978
Family Neobalaenidae (Pygmy Right Whales)
Caperea I Austria Jan. 1, 1986 Jan. 6, 1989
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Marine
Organism
Appendix Reservation by Date of 
Reservation
Date
Reservation
Withdrawn
marginata Brazil Jan. 1, 1986 May 7, 1991
Peru Jan. 1, 1986 Oct. 24, 
2001
Order Carnivora (Carnivores)
Family Odobenidae (Walruses)
Odobenus
rosmarus
III Denmark Oct. 24, 1977 Jan. 1, 1984
Order Pelecaniformes (Cormorants and Pelicans)
Family Pelecanidae (Pelicans)
Pelecanus crispus I Austria July 29, 1983 Jan. 6, 1989
Order Charadriiformes (Gulls and Shorebirds)
Family Scolopacidae (Sandpipers, Curlews, etc.)
Numenius
tenuirostris
I Austria July 29,
1983
Jan. 6, 1989
Order Testudinata (Turtles)
Family Cheloniidae (Marine Turtles)
Caretta caretta
(Loggerhead
turtle)
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 Feb. 4, 1977
Chelonia mydas 
(Green turtle)
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 Feb. 4, 1977
I France Aug. 9, 1978 Dec. 10, 
1984
Italy Dec. 31, 1979 Jan. 1, 1984
Japan Nov. 4, 1980 Oct. 22, 
1987
Suriname (reservation not 
applicable to population of 
Australia)
Feb. 15, 1981
Cuba July 19, 1990
Palau July 15, 2005
Eretmochelys 
imbricata 
(Hawksbill turtle)
I France Aug. 9, 1978 Dec. 10, 
1984
Japan Nov. 4, 1980 July 29, 
1994
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Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Feb. 28, 1989
Cuba July 19, 1990
Eretmochelys 
imbricata 
(Hawksbill turtle) 
(cont.)
I
(cont.)
Palau July 15, 2004
Eretmochelys 
imbricata bissa 
(Pacific
Hawksbill turtle)
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 Feb. 4, 1977 
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
Eretmochelys 
imbricata 
imbricata 
(Atlantic 
Hawksbill turtle)
I UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 July 3, 1978
Lepidochelys 
kempi (Kemp’s 
Ridley turtle)
I UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 July 3, 1978
Lepidochelys 
olivacea (Olive 
Ridley turtle)
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 Feb. 4, 1977 
(withdrawn 
as species 
transferred 
from II to I)
I Japan Nov. 4, 1980 Jan. 31, 
1992
Natator depressus 
(Flatback turtle)
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 1976 July 3, 1978
Family Dermochelyidae (Leatherback Turtles)
Dermochelys
coriacea
II UK (on behalf of HK) Oct. 31, 
1976
July 3, 1978
I Suriname Feb. 15, 
1981
Order Crocodylia (Crocodiles and Alligators)
Family Crocodylidae (Crocodiles)
Crocodylus
porosus
(saltwater
crocodile)
II UK (on 
behalf of 
HK)
Oct 31, 1976 March 7, 
1978
I Switzerland June 28, 1979 Jan. 1, 1983
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Germany June 28, 1979 July 2, 1982
France June 8, 1979 Dec. 10, 
1984
Italy Dec. 31, 1979 Jan. 1, 1984
Japan Nov. 4, 1980 Nov. 30, 
1989
Austria April 27, 1982 Jan. 6, 1989
Thailand April 21, 1983 Aug. 17, 
1987
Singapore Feb. 28, 1987 Aug. 31, 
1990
Palau Jan. 15,2004
II Austria Aug. 1, 1985 Jan. 6, 1989
Singapore Feb. 28, 1987 Aug. 31, 
1990
Order Acipenseriformes (Sturgeon and Paddlel Ish)
Family Acipenseridae (Sturgeon)
Acipenser
brevirostrum
I Canada July 9, 
1975
Oct. 29, 
1982
Acipenser
oxyrhynchus
I Canada July 9, 
1975
June 28, 
1979
Acipenser sturio I Austria July 29, 
1983
Jan. 6, 1989
Order Salmoniformes (Salmon, Trout and Pike)
Family Salmonidae (Salmon and Trout)
Coregonus 
alpenae (Longjaw 
cisco)
I Canada July 9, 
1975
Oct. 29, 
1982
Order Lamniformes (Mackerel S larks)
Family Lamnidae (Great White Shark, Mako Shark, Porbeagles)
Carchardon 
carcharias (Great 
White Shark)
II Iceland Jan. 12, 
2005
Japan Jan. 12, 
2005
Norway Jan. 12, 
2005
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[II Japan Oct. 29, 
2001
Norway March 26, 
2002
Palau July 15, 
2004
Family Cetorhinidae (Basking Shark)
Cetorhinus
maximus
III Japan Sept 13, 
2000
Norway June 11, 
2001
II Indonesia Feb. 13, 
2003
Iceland Feb. 13, 
2003
Republic of Korea Feb. 13, 
2003
Japan Feb. 13, 
2003
Norway Feb. 13, 
2003
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Order Orectolobiformes (Carpet Sharks)
Family Rhincodontidae (Whale Shark)
Rhincodon typus II Indonesia
Iceland
Japan
Rep. of Korea
Norway
Palau
Feb.
13,
2003
Feb.
13,
2003
Feb.
13,
2003
Feb.
13,
2003
Feb.
13,
2003
July
15,
2004
Order Veneroida (Clams and other bivalves)
Family Tridacnidae (Giant Clam)
all species of a II Austria Aug. 1, Jan. 6, 1989
higher taxon 1985
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Hippopus hippopus II Palau July 15, 
2004
Hippopus
porcellanus
II Palau July 15, 
2004
Tridacna crocea II Palau July 15, 
2004
Tridacna derasa II Austria July 29, 
1983
Jan. 6, 1989
Palau July 15, 
2004
Tridacna gigas II Austria July 29, 
1983
Jan. 6, 1989
Palau July 15, 
2004
Tridacna maxima II Palau July 15, 
2004
Tridacna squamosa II Palau July 15, 
2004
Order Mytiloida (Mussels)
Family Mytilidae (Sea Mussels)
Choromytilus II Switzerland June 28, Oct. 27,
chorus 1979 1987
(withdrawn 
as species 
removed 
from
appendices)
Order Syngnathiformes (Sea Horses)
Family Syngnathidae
Hippocampus (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Indonesia May
15,
2004
Japan May
15,
2004
Rep. of Korea May
15,
2004
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Norway May
15,
2004
Hippocampus demise II Palau July
15,
2004
Hippocampus kuda II Palau July
15,
2004
Order Coenothecalia (Blue Coral)
all species of a higher 
taxon
II Austria Aug. 5,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Order Alcyonacea (Soft Corals)
Family Tubiporidae (Organ/Pipe Coral)
all species of a higher 
taxon
II Austria Jan.
8,
1985
June 1,1989
Order Scleractinia (Stony Corals)
Family Pocilloporidae (Cauliflower Coral)
Pocillopora (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Seriatopora (all 
species of a higher 
taxon) (Bird’s nest 
coral)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Stylophora (all 
species of a higher 
taxon) (Cluster coral)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Acroporidae (Staghorn Coral)
Acropora (all species 
of a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Agariciidae (Lettuce Coral)
Pavona (all species 
of a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Fungiidae (Mushroon/Razor Coral)
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Fungia (all species of 
a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Halomitra (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Polyphylla (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Pectiniidae (Hibiscus Coral)
Pectiniidae (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Mussidae (Mushroom/Cactus Coral)
Lobophyllia (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug 1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Merulinidae (Horn Coral)
Merulina (all species 
of a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Faviidae (Brain Coral)
Favia (all species of 
a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Platygyra (all species 
of a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Family Caryophylliidae (Grape/Torch Coral)
Euphyllia (all species 
of a higher taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
Order Milleporina (Fire Corals)
Family Milleporidae
Milleporidae (all 
species of a higher 
taxon)
II Austria Aug.
1,
1985
Jan. 6, 1989
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Table-5 CITES Specific Reservations Summary
The information used to compile this table was obtained from “Annotated CITES 
Appendices and Reservations,” CITES Secretariat/UNEP World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre, (2001), the Annotated CITES Appendices and Reservations (2005) at 
http://www.cites.org/common/resources/Annot_app_2005.pdf, as well as the Species 
Database available on the CITES website at
http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/species.html._________________________________
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State Reservation/T erritorial Marine Species *Date/Source
Limitation
Australia Australia has a federal 
constitutional system in which 
legislative, executive and judicial 
powers are shared or distributed 
between its central, State and 
Territorial authorities. The 
implementation of the Convention 
throughout Australia will be 
effected by the Federal, State and 
Territorial Governments having 
regard to their respective 
constitutional powers and 
arrangements concerning their 
exercise.
**BGBL. 1994 
II p. 776
Denmark The Convention shall not apply to 
the Faroe Islands nor to Greenland, 
whose autonomous authorities are 
responsible for nature conservation 
matters in these regions.
Instrument of 
ratification dated 
5 August 1982 
BGBL. 1985 II, 
p .1156
Reservation concerning the 
(territorial limitation) of Faroe 
Islands revoked
Note verbale of 
31 May 1989 
BGBL. 1999 II, 
p. 381
Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix I 
and II in regard to Faroe Islands 
and Greenland
Balaenoptera 
physalus (Fin 
whale), 
Balaenoptera 
borealis (Sei 
whale), Physeter 
macrocephalus (syn 
Catodon) (Sperm 
whale)
Note verbale of 
Danish embassy 
to Federal 
Republic of 
Germany dated 
20 December 
2002
Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix II 
in regard to the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland
Balaenoptera 
bonaerensis 
(Antarctic Minke 
whale),
Balaenoptera edeni 
(Bryde’s whale), 
Capera marginata 
(Pygmy Right 
whale)
Note verbale of 
20 December 
2002
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State Reservation/T erritorial 
Limitation
Marine Species *Date/Source
France Reservation concerning Appendix 
I “interpretation” concerning the 
species
Chelonia mydas 
(Green turtle)
BGBL. 1994 II, 
p. 776-7 
French national 
reports to COPs 
5 and 6
New
Zealand
Accession shall not extend to 
Tokelau unless and until a 
Declaration to this effect is lodged 
by the Government of New 
Zealand with the Depositary
Instrument of 
Accession dated 
30 May 2000
Norway Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix II
Lagenorhynchus 
alhirostris (White 
Beaked dolphin), 
Lagenorhynchus 
acutus (Atlantic 
White-sided 
dolphin)
Jan. 12,1989
Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix II
Orcinus orca (Killer 
whale), Monodon 
monoceros 
(Narwhal)
Dec. 11, 1991
Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix II
Balaenoptera 
bonaerensis 
(Antarctic minke 
whale),
Balaenoptera edeni 
(Bryde’s whale), 
Carpera marginata 
(Pygmy Right 
whale),
Orcinas orca (Killer 
whale)
BGBL. 1999II, 
p. 381-2;
Letter of 
Norway’s 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
to Federal 
Republic of 
Germany of 20 
December 2002
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State Reservation/T erritorial 
Limitation
Marine Species *Date/Source
Reservation concerning the 
inclusion of species in Appendix I 
and II
Balaenoptera 
physalus (Fin 
whale), 
Balaenoptera 
borealis (Sei 
whale), 
Carcharodon 
carcharias (Great 
White shark), 
Physeter
macrocephalus (syn. 
Catodon) (Sperm 
whale),
Letter of 
Norway’s 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
to Federal 
Republic of 
Germany of 20 
December 2002
Portugal The Convention does not apply to 
Macau
(Note: Macau was returned to 
Chinese sovereignty on 20 
December 1999)
Note verbale of 
Portuguese 
embassy of 23 
April 1999
Table-6 CMS Specific Reservations Summary
The information for this summary was provided by the German Ministry for the 
Environment (Germany is the Depositary for the CMS treaty) and an unofficial list of 
specific reservations found on the CMS website at
http://www.cms.int/pdf/reservations_territories__rev.pdf (last visited May 22, 2006). 
Some statements by CMS parties concerning territorial application have been omitted.
*The published source is provided where available. The date the reservation appears in 
the published source may differ from the date the reservation was filed or became 
effective.
**BGBL. II is the Bundesgesetzblatt 77, the German Federal Law Gazette, Part II, which 
is issued by the German Federal Minister of Justice.
388
Table-7 CCAMLR Exclusion of Conservation Measures from Adjacent Waters of Certain Islands
Number 
and Year*
Conservation Measure (and category) Adjacent Waters of Islands 
Excluded
22-03
(1990)
Mesh size for Champsocephalus gunnari (general 
fishery matters/gear regulation)
Kerguelen, Crozet
10-01
(1998)
Marking of fishing vessels and fishing gear 
(compliance)
Kerguelen, Crozet
32-12
(1998)
Prohibition of directed fishing for Dissostichus 
eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 58.7 (fishery 
regulations/fishing seasons, closed areas and 
prohibition of fishing)
Prince Edward
23-04
(2000)
Monthly fine-scale catch and effort data reporting 
system for trawl, longline and pot fisheries 
(general fishery matters/data reporting)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
23-05
(2000)
Monthly fine-scale biological data reporting 
system for trawl, longline and pot fisheries 
(general fishery matters/data reporting)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
21-01
(2002)
Notification that Members are considering 
initiating a new fishery (general fishery 
matters/notifications)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
32-11
(2002)
Prohibition of directed fishing for Dissostichus 
eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 58.6 (fishery 
regulations/fishing seasons, closed areas and 
prohibition of fishing)
Crozet, Prince Edward
25-03
(2003)
Minimization of the incidental mortality of 
seabirds and marine mammals in the course of 
trawl fishing in the Convention Area (general 
fishery matters/minimization of incidental 
mortality)
Kerguelen, Crozet
10-02
(2004)
Licensing and inspection obligations of 
Contracting Parties with regard to their flag 
vessels operating in the Convention Area 
(compliance)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
10-03
(2005)
Port inspections of vessels carrying toothfish 
(compliance)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
21-02
(2005)
Exploratory fisheries (general fishery 
matters/notifications)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
24-01
(2005)
The application of conservation measures to 
scientific research (general fishery
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
* This summary includes only those measures in force at the end o f 2005.
f CCAMLR has changed its numbering system for conservation measures over the years. The number 
codes used here to identify conservation measures are those found in the CCAMLR Summary o f  
Conservation Measures and Resolutions in Force, at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05-06/02- 
summary.pdf (visited June 21, 2006). For explanatory notes on the codes and their meaning see Schedule of 
Conservation Measures in Force 2005/06 Season see Introduction, Table o f Contents, Map, Categories, 
Codes at http://www.ccamlr.Org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05-06/01-intro.pdf (visited June 21, 2006).
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Conservation Measure (and category) Adjacent Waters of Islands 
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matters/research and experiments)
25-02
(2005)
Minimization of the incidental mortality of 
seabirds in the course of longline fishing or 
longline fishing research in the Convention Area 
(general fishery matters/minimization of 
incidental mortality)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
32-09
(2005)
Prohibition of directed fishing for Dissostichus 
spp. except in accordance with specific 
conservation measures in the 2005/06 season 
(fishery regulations/fishing seasons, closed areas 
and prohibition of fishing)
Kerguelen
33-03
(2005)
Limitation of by-catch in new and exploratory 
fisheries in the 2005/06 season (fishery 
regulations/by-catch limits)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
41-01
(2005)
General measures for exploratory fisheries for 
Dissostichus spp. In the Convention Area in the 
2005/05 season (fishery regulations/toothfish)
Kerguelen, Crozet, Prince Edward
Table-7 CCAMLR Exclusion of Conservation Measures from Adjacent Waters of Certain Islands
The information used to compile this table was supplied by CCAMLR Summary of Conservation 
Measures and Resolutions in Force, available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/05-06/02- 
summary.pdf (last visited June 21, 2006)._________________________________________________
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